


OF
WISDOME
THREE BOOKES

WRITTEN IN FRENCH
by
PETER CHARRON
Doct: of Lawe in Paris.
Translated by Samson
Leonard

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To the Reader.

Entle Reader, when I first saw this Book in French di-
vided into three parts, and all three carrying the title of
Wisdome, and having read
the Preface, I conceived some excellency in
it beyond the reach of common endeavours;
The first part teaching us the knowledge of
our selves, and our humane condition, with
the inward and outward parts of man, his
thoughts, words, actions, and all his motions,
as a preparative unto Wisdome; The second
part instructing a civil life, and forming a
man for the world; shewing the privileges
and proper qualities of a wise man, and how
every man ought to live, and how to die; The
third part teaching the way how to attain to
wisdom, and instructing man universally in

A 2 all

To the Reader.

all things, and that by a discourse of the four moral virtues; & finding the matter penned with so great gravity and wisdom (as a great and learned Doctor said unto me, after I had shewed him some part thereof in English) that it was a work (as he thought) beyond the capacity of man; He gave me encouragement to go forward in the translation of it, both for the great worth thereof, & the general good; In which I must acknowledg, that not without advise I have partly omitted, and partly altered the discourse upon some points which I conceived not fit to pass the Press. For the main work I think it needless to say much in commendation of it, for it hath already sufficiently commended it self to the world by four former impressions; And for this sixth, though it be last, I hope this new labour will not make it lesse esteemed.

Sampson Lennard.

A Table of the Chaptets of these three Books of Wisdome.

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The first Book of knowledge of our selves and humane condition.
And exhortation to study and knowledge of our selves.

The Preface of the first Book.

The first consideration of man, which is naturall, by all the parts whereof he is composed.

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OF
WISDOME
three Books.

THE PREFACE.

Where the Name, Subject, Purpose, and Method of this Work is set down, with an Advertisement to the Reader.

WI is required at the first to entry into this Work, that we know what this wisdome is; and since it beareth that name and title, how we purpose to speak thereof. All men in general at the first view of the simple word it self, do easily conceive and imagine it to be some quality, sufficiency, or habits, not common or vulgar, but excellent, singular, and elevated above that which is common and ordinary, be it good or evil: For it is taken and used (though perhaps improperly) in both kinds: *Sapienes sunt ut facient mala: They are wise to do evil:* and signifieth not properly a good and laudable quality, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoever it be. And therefore we do as well say a wise Tyrant, Pirat, Theif, as a wise King, Pilot, Captain: that is to say, Sufficient, prudent, advised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently: For there is opposite unto Wisdome not only folly, which is an irregularity or looseness of life, and Wisdome a regularity or moderation, well measured and proportioned; but also common baseness and vulgar Simplicity: For Wisdome is high, strong, and excellent; yea, whe-

i.
Of the word
WVidome.

Hierom.
Arist. lib. 5.:
Metaphys.

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whether it be in good or evil, it containeth two things: Sufficiencie, that is, Provision or furniture for whatsoever is required and necessary; & that it be in some high degree of excellency. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdome to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word; whereby they conclude, that there are few wise men, that they are rare as every excellency is; and that to them by right it appertaineth to command and govern others; that they are as Oracles: from whence is that saying, *Believe others, and refer thy self to the wise.* But well to define this thing, and according to truth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one accord, nor is it easie, for otherwise do the common people, otherwise the Philosophers, otherwise the Divines speak thereof. These are the three floors and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by order, and rules, and preceps, the former very confusedly and imperfectly.

2.
The division of
VVisdome.
Now then we may say, That there are three sorts and de-

grees of Wisdome, Divine, Humane, Mundane, which cor-
respond unto God; Nature pure and entire; Nature vitia-
ted and corrupted. Of all these sorts and every of them
do all these three orders of the world, which before we
speak of, write and discourse, every one according to his
own manner and fashion: but properly and formerly the
common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wis-
dome, the Philosopher of humane, the Divine of divine
Wisdome.

3.
Worldly wi-
dome.
1 John 2. 16.
James 3. 15.
Worldly wis-
dome, and of the three the more base,
(which is divers according to the three great Captains and
Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulency, Pleasure, Glo-
ry, or rather Avarice, Luxury, Ambition: *Quicquid est in
mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia earnis, su-
perbia vite;* All that is in the world is the lust of the eyes,
the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life: For which
cause it is called by S. James, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica:*

Earth-

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Earthly, Sensual, Devilish,) is proved by Philosophy and Divinity, which pronounceth its folly before God; *Stultum fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi:* God hath made the ^{1 Cor. 1.20.} wisdome of this world foolishness. Of this wisdome therefore we speak not in this Book, except it be to dispraise and condemn it.

Divine Wisdome, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Divines¹, but somewhat diversly. As for the common or worldly Wisdome, I disdain it, and passe by whatsoever may be spoken thereof as prophane, and too unworthy in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculative, saying, That it is the knowledge of the principles, first causes, and highest power to judg of all things, even of the most Sovereign, which is God himself: and this Wisdome is Metaphysical, and resideth wholly in the understanding², as being the chief good and perfection ^{Thom. I. 1.} thereof: it is the first and highest of the five intellectual ^{quest. 57. 2.} virtues³ which may be without either honesty, action, or ^{2. p. 19.} other moral virtue. The Divines make it not altogether so speculative, but that it is likewise in some sort Practick, for they say, That it is the knowledg of divine things, from which there ariseth a judgment and rule of humane actions; and they make it two-fold, The one acquired by study, and comes near to that of the Philosophers; which I am to speak of: The other infused and given by God, *De sursum descendens, Coming from above.* This is the first of the seven gifts of the holy Ghost, *Spiritus Domini Spiritus sapientia, The spirit of God is the spirit of wisdome:* Which is not found but onely in those that are just and free from sin, *In malevolam animam non introibit sapientia: Wisdome cannot enter into a wicked heart.* Of this Divine ^{Sap. I.} wisdome likewise our purpose is not here to speak, it is, after some sort and measure handled in my first Verity, and in my Discourses of Divinity.

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5
Humane.

Wisdom according to the common sort.

According to
Philosophers
and Divines.

A comparison
betwixt Divinity
and Philosophy.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane Wisdome which in this book we are to deliver unto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place we must give some brief and general view, which may be as an Argument and Summary of this whole Work. The common descriptions are divers and insufficient; Some and the greatest part think that it is only a wisdome, discretion, and advised carriage in a mans affairs and conversation. This may well be called common, as respecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and considereth not at all any other thing then that which outward appeareth. It is altogether in the eyes and cares of men, without any respect or very little of the inward motions of the mind: so that according to their opinion wisdome may be without essential piety or probity, that is, a beautiful cunning, a sweet and modest subtily. Others think that it is a rude, unreasonable, rough singularity, a kind of sullen frowning and frampole austerity in opinions, manners, words, actions and fashion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humour, Philosophers, that is to say, in their counterfeit language, fantastical, divers, different and declining from the customes of other men.

Now this kind of wisdome according to the doctrine of our book, is rather a folly and extravagancy. You must therefore know, that this wisdome whereof we speak, is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Divines, whereof both have written in their Moral learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly, as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and formal subject they write of, because they apply themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Divinity mounteth much higher, and is occupied about virtues infused, Contemplative and Divine, that is to say, about Divine wisdome and Belief. So that Philosophers

The Preface.

phers are more stayed, dispersed more certain, and more common, ruling and instructing not onely the particular knowledge or actions of men, but the common and publicke, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weales, Empires. Divinity is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principally into the eternal good and salvation of every one. Again, the Philosopher handlith this subject more sweetly and pleasingly, the Divine more austere and drily. Again, Philosophy which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient than Grace, and the Natural than the Supernatural) seemeth to perswade gratioufly, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh:

Simil & jucunda & idonea dicere vita,

Lectorum delectando, pariterque mosendo:

Horac.

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inventions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apothegmes, sententious mothes, adorned with Eloquence and Art. Theologie, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command, and imperiously like a Master to enjoyn. And to conclude, the virtue and honesty of Divines is too anxious, scrupulous, deject, sad, fearful and vulgar. Philosophy, such as this Book teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton too ; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare, Doubtlesse the Philosophers have herein been excellent, not onely in writing and teaching, but in the rich and lively representation thereof in their honourable and heroical lives. I understand here by Philosophers and Wise men, not onely those that have carried the name of Wise men, such as *Thales*, *Solon*, and the rest of that rank, that lived in the time of *Cyrus*, *Cresus*, *Pisistratus*; nor those that came afterwards, and have publickly taught it, as *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Aristippus*, *Zenon*, *Antisthenes*, all chief Professours apart,
and

The Preface.

and many other their Disciples different and divided in
sects; but also all those great men who have made singular
and exemplary profession of virtue and wisdom, as
Phocion, Aristides, Pericles, Alexander, whom *Plutarch* cal-
led as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and di-
vers other Greeks: The *Fabricii, Fabii, Camilli, Catones,*
Torquati, Reguli, Lelii, Scipiones, Romans, who for the
most part have been Generals in Armies. And these are
the reasons why in this my Book I do more willingly and
ordinarily follow the advice and sayings of Philosophers,
not in the mean time omitting or rejecting those of the
Divines: For both in substance they do all agree, and are
very seldom different, and Divinity doth nothing disdain
to employ, and to make good use of these wise sayings of
Philosophy. If I had undertaken to instruct the cloister,
and the retired life, that is, that profession which attend-
eth the secrets Evangelical, I must necessarily have fol-
lowed *ad amissim* the advice of the Divines: but our Book
instructeth a civil life, formeth a man for the world, that
is to say, to humane wisdom, not divine.

6

A general de-
scription of
humane wi-
dome.

We say then naturally and generally both with the Phi-
losopher and the Divine, and this humane wisdom is a
kind of law or reason, a beautiful and noble composition
of the entire man, both in his inward part & his outward,
his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his motions.
It is the excellency and perfection of man as he is a man,
that is to say, according to that which the first fundamen-
tal and natural law doth require; as we say, That that
work is well wrought and excellent, that is compleat and
perfect in all the parts thereof, and wherein all the rules
of Art have been observed; that man is accounted a wise
man, that best knoweth after the best and most excellent
manner to play the man, that is to say, (to give a more
particular picture thereof) that knowing himself and the
condition of men, doth keep and preserve himself from all
vices,

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vices, errours, passions and defects as well inward and proper to himself, as outward and common to other men, maintaining his spirit pure, free, universal, considering and judging of all things without band or affection, alwayes ruling and directing himself in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and universal law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in us, unto which he doth apply and accommodate his own proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their laws, customes, and ceremonies of the countrey where he is, without the offence of any, carrying himself wisely and discreetly in all affaires, walking alwayes uprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himself, attending peaceably whatsoever may happen, and at the last, death it self. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facility may be drawn to four principal heads; Knowledge of our selves, Liberty of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise. He that hath an erronious knowledge of himself, that subjecteth his mind to any kind of servitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himself partial, and by enthralling himself to some particular opinion, is deprived of the liberty and jurisdiction of discerning, judging and examining all things. He that striveth against Nature, under what pretence soever it be, following rather opinion or passion, then reason; he that carrieth himself troubledly, disquietly male-content, fearing death, is not wise. Behold here in a few words the picture of humane Wisdome and folly, and the summe of that which I purpose to handle in this Work, especially in the Second Book, which exprefly containeth the rules, treatise, and offices

The Preface.

offices of Wisdome, which is more mine then the other two, and which I once thought to have published by it self. This verbal description of Wisdome is represented unto the eye even at the entrance, or threshold of this Book by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her self upon nothing, in her pure and simple nature, beholding her self in a glasse, her countenance cheerful, merry, and manly, upright, her feet close joyned, upon a square pillar, and embracing her self, having under her feet incchained four other women as slaves unto her, that is to say, *Passion*, with a changed and hideous countenance; *Opinion*, with wandring eyes, inconstant, giddy, born upon the heads of the people; *Superstition*, astonisched and in a trance, and her hands fastned the one to the other; *Virtue* or Honesty and Pedanticall Science with a sullen visage, her eye-lids elevated reading in a Book, where was written, *Yea*, *No*. All this needs no other application, then that which hereafter followeth: but hereof more at large in the second Book.

7

Two wayes to
attain this wis-
dome.

To attain unto this wisdome, there are two means: the first is in the original forming and first temper, that is to say, in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milk of the Nurse, and the first education; whereby a man is said to be either well born, or ill born, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed unto wisdome. A man would little think of what power and importance this beginning is; for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence used therein then there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so wretched a carelessness should be in us, of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selves; when in matters of lesse importance we take more care, use more diligence, more counsel then we should, never thinking of our greatest affairs and most honourable, but by hazard and peradventure. Who is he that taketh counsel with himself,

The Preface.

self, or endeavoureth to do that, which is required for the preservynge and preparing of himself as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthful of spirit, and apt for wisdome? For that which serveth for the one, serveth for the other, and Nature after one manner attendeth them all. This is that which men think of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustful pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Common-weal, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law, or rule, or publike advice. It is most certain, that if men did herein carry themselves as they ought, we should have other men, of more excellent spirit and condition, then we have amongst us. What is required herein, and to the first nourishment and education, is briefly set down in our Third Book, *Chap. I.4.*

The second means to attain wisdome is the study of Philosophy, I mean not of all the parts thereof, but Moral (yet not forgetting the Natural) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth and representeth unto us the law of Nature, instru~~c~~teth man universally in all things, both publick and private, alone and in company, in all domestical and civil conversation, taketh away all that savage nature that is in us, sweetmeth and tameth our natural rudeness, cruelty and wildenes, and worketh and fashioneth it to wisdome. To be brief, it is the true science of man; all the rest in respect of it, is but vanity, or at least wise not necessary, or little profitable: for it giveth instructions to live and die well, which is all in all, it teacheth us perfect wisdome, an apt, judicious, well-advised honesty. But this second mean is almost as little practised, and as ill employed as the first: for no man careth greatly for this wisdome, so much are all given to

B.

that

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that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principall means to attain to wisdome, the Naturall, and Acquired. He that hath been fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath been favourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet temperature, which bringeth forth a great goodnesse in Nature, and sweetnesse in manners, hath made a fair march without great pain to the second: But that man with whom it is otherwise, must, with great and painful study of the second, beautifie and supply that which is wanting; as *Socrates* one of the wisest said of himself, That by the study of Philosophy he had corrected and reformed his natural infirmities.

9

The less to wisdom, and
means to folly,
are two.

V

Natural.

There are contrariwise two formall lets or hinderances unto folly; Natural, and Acquired. The first, which is natural, proceedeth from the original temper and temperature, which maketh the brain either too soft, moist, and the parts thereof gross and materiall, whereby the spirits remain fottish, feeble, less capable, plain diminished, obscure, such as that is, for the most part, of the common sort of people; or too hot, ardent, and dry, which maketh the spirits foolish, audacious, vicious. These are the two extreams, *Follie* and *Folly*: Water and Fire, Lead and Mercury, altogether improper or unapt to wisdom, which requireth a spirit full of vigour and generous, and yet sweet, pliant, and modest: but the second is more easily amended by discipline then the former.

2

Acquired.

The second, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture or instruction; or from that which is evil, which amongst other things consisteth in an obstinate and sworn prejudicte prevention of opinions, wherewith the mind is made drunken, and taketh so strong a tincture, that it is made unapt and uncapable to see or to find better whereby to raite and enrich it self. It is said of these kind of men, That they are wounded and stricken, that they

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they have a hurt or blow in the head: unto which wound if likewise learning be joyned, because that puffeth up, it bringeth with it presumption and temerity, and sometimes arms to maintain and defend those anticipated opinions: it altogether perfecteth the form and frame of folly, and maketh it incurable. So that natural weaknesse, and acquired prevention, are two great hindrances; but science, if it do not wholly cure them, which seldom it doth, strengthened them and maketh them invincible, which turneth not any way to the dishonour of learning (as a man may well think) but to the greater honour thereof.

Science or Learning is a very good and profitable staff
or waſter, but which will not be handled with all hands; Of Learning.
and he that knows not well how to rule it, receiveth thereby more hurt then profit. It besoteth and maketh foolish (saith a great learned Writer) the weak and sick spirit; it polisheth and perfecteth the naturally strong and good. The feeble spirit knows not how to poffeffe science, how to handle it, and how to make use thereof as he should: but contrariwise is possessed and ruled by it, whereby he submits himself, and remains a slave to it, like a weak stomach overcharged with more victuals then it can digest. A weak arm wanting power and skill well to wield a waſter or staff that is somewhat too heavy for it, wearieth it ſelf and fainteth. A wise and couragious spirit overmastereth his wiſdom, enjoyeth it, uſeth it, and employeth it to his best advantage, enformeth his own judgement, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifieth his naturall light, and maketh himſelf more quick and active; whereas the other is made thereby more ſottish, more unapt, and therewithal more presumptuous; ſo that the fault or reproach is not in learning, no more then that Wine or other good drug is faulty which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his own needs: *Non eſt culpa vini, ſed culpa bibentis.* The fault is not in the Wine, but in the

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ii

*Of the word
Pedante, or
School-master.*

the infirmity of him that drinks it. Now then against such spirits, weak by nature, preoccupied, puffed up, and hindered by acquired wisdome, I make open warre in this Book, and that oftentimes under the word *Pedante*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authours is used in this sense. In its own Greek Original it was taken in the better sense, but in other later Languages, by reason of the abuse, and bad carriage of such men in the profession of ther learning, it is accounted base, vile, questuos, contentious, opinative, vain-glorious and presumptuous; by too many practised, and used but by way of injury and derision; and is in the number of those words that by continuance of time have changed ther signification; as *Tyrans*, *Sophister* and divers other. *Le seur de Bellay*, after the rehearfall of many notorious vices, concludeth as with the greatest, *But of all the rest, Knowledge pedanticall I detest.* And in another place,

*Said I thou didst live but to eat and drink,
Then poor were my revenge, thy faults scanty :
But that which most doth make thy name to stink,
Is, to be short, thou art a Pedanty.*

*An adverfio-
ment.*

It may be, some will take offence at this word, thinking it likewise toucheth them, and that I thereby have a will to tax or scoff the professors and Teachers of learning; but let them be pleased to content themselves with this free and open declaration which here I make; That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any gown-men or learned profession whatsoever: yea I am so far from it, that Philosophers are in so high esteem with me, that I should oppose my self against my self, because I account my self one of them, and profess the same learning: onely I touch a certain degree and quality of spirits, before deciphered, that is, such as have naturall capacity and sufficiency

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ciency after a common and indifferent manner, but afterwards not well filled, preoccupied, possessed with certain opinions: and these are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and go as well in short garments as in long gowns: *Vulnus tam eblavydatis, quam coronam voco: I reckon amongst the vulgar sort, as well Kings and Crowns, as Pedants and Clowns.* If any man can furnish me with any other word as significant as this to express these kind of spirits, I will willingly forgo this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himself aggrieved, shall but accuse and shew himself too scrupulous. It is true that a man may find other opposites to a wise man besides a *Pedant*, but it is in some particular sense, as the common, profane, vulgar sort of people; and oftentimes I use these opposites; but this is, as the low is opposite to the high, the weak to the strong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the servant to the master, the profane to the holy; as also a fool, which indeed according to the true sound of the word, is his truest opposite: but this is a moderate man to an immoderate, a glorious opinative man to a modest, the part to the whole, the prejudicate and tainted to the neat and tree, the sick to the sound: but this word *Pedant* in that sense we take it, comprehendeth all these and more too, for it noteth and signifieth him that is not onely unlike and contrary to a wise man, as those before mentioned, but such alone as arrogantly and insolently resisteth it to the face, and as being armed on all sides, raiseth himself against it, speaking out of resolution and authority. And forasmuch as after a sort he feareth it, by reason that he feeth himself discovered even from the top to the bottom, and his sport troubled by it, he prosecuteth it with a certain intestine hatred, he taketh upon him to censure it, to defame it, to condemn it, accounting and carrying himself as the truly wise, though he be a fool without peer and an ignorant self-conceited Gull.

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II

The method of come to the order and method thereof. There are three this Book.

Aster the purpose and argument of this Work, we Books: The first is wholly in the knowledge of our selves and humane condition, as a preparative unto wisdome, which is handled at large by five main and principal considerations, each one including in it divers others. The second Book containeth in it the treatises, offices, and general and principal rules of wisdome. The third, the particular rules and instructions of wisdome, and that by the order and discourse of four principal and moral virtues, *Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance;* under which four is comprised the whole instruction of the life of man, and all the parts of duty and honesty. Finally, I here handle this matter, not Scholarlike or Pedantically, not with enlarged discourse, and furniture of Eloquence or other Art; (For wisdome (*qua si oculis ipsiis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui,* If it could be seen with our cor-
parall eyes, would stir up in us an admirable desire thereof) needs no such helps to commend it self, being of it self so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingenuously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times dry and sower, like Aphorisms, overtures, and seeds of discourse.

Some think this Book too fool-hardy and free to contract and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in four or five words I thus answer: First, that wisdome which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this liberty and authority. *Fure suo singula-
ri,* to judge of all, (it is the priviledge of a wise and spiritual man, *spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & à nemine judicatur,* The spiritual man judgeth all, and is judged of none) and in judging to censure and condemn (as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she do? for the case standing thus, it cannot be, but she must incur the disgrace and envy of the world. In an-
other

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other place I complain of these kind of men, and reprove their popular weakness and feminine daintines, as unworthy, being over tender and delicate, to understand any thing of worth, and altogether uncapable of wisdom. The hardest and hardest propositions are best befitting an hardy and elevated spirit, and there can nothing seem strange unto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weaknesse to be astonished at any thing; we must rouz up our hearts, confirm and strengthen our minds, harden & inure our selves to hear, to know, to understand, to judge of all things, seem they never so strange. All things are agreeing and well-befitting the palate of the spirir, so a man be not wanting to himself, and neither do any thing, or yield his consent to whatsoever is not good and truly fair, no, though the whole world perswade him unto it. A wise man sheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weakness in them both.

Thirdly, in all that I shall propose, my meaning is not to bind any man unto it, I onely present things, and lay them out as it were upon a stall, I grow not into choler with many that gives me no credit, or dislikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedant*. *Passion* witnesseth that it is not reason so to do, and he that out of passion doth any thing, out of reason cannot do it. But why are they angry with me? Is it because I am not altogether of their opinion? Why, I am not angry with them because they are not of mine. Is it because I speak something which is not pleasing to their taste, or to the palate of the vulgar sort? Why therefore I speak it. I speak nothing without reason, if they knew how to understand it, how to relish it. If they can bring better reason to disprove mine, I will hearken unto it with delight and thanks to him that shall shew it me. But yet let them not think to beat me down with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other

The Preface.

men, for these have but small credit in my jurisdiction, save in matter of Religion, where onely authority prevails without reason: This is authorities true Empire, reason onely bearing sway in all other Arts without it, as *S. Augustine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an unjust tyranny and an intaged folly to subject and enthrall our spirits to believe and to follow whatsoever our Ancestours have said, and what the vulgar sort hold to be true, who know neither what they say, nor what they do. There are none but fools that suffer themselves to be thus led by the noses: and this Book is not for such, which if it should popularly be received and accepted of the common sort of people, it should fail much in its first purpose and designtient. We must hear, consider, make account of our ancient Writers, not captivate our selves unto them but with reason. And if a man wou'd follow them, what should he do? for they agree not among themselves. *Aristotle*, who would seem to be the most sufficient amongst them, and hath adventured to challenge and to censure all that went before him, hath uttered more grosse absurdities then them all, and is at no agreement with himself, neither doth he know many times where he is; witness his Treatises of the Soul of man, of the Eternity of the world, of the Generation of the winds and waters, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion; but it were rather strange and wonderful that all men were of one opinion: for there is nothing more besiting nature and the spirit of man then variety. That wise Divine Saint *Paul* giveth us this liberty, in that he willetteth every man to abound in his own understanding, not judging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or think otherwise. And he speaketh it in a matter of greater moment and more ticklish, not in that which consisteth in outward action and observation, wherein we say we are to conform our selves to the common

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mon sort; and so that which is prescribed and accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is, the religious observance of viands and dayes; whereas all that liberty and boldnesse of speech which I challenge to my self, is but in thoughts, judgements, opinions, in which no man is quarter-mister, but he that hath them, every man about himself.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seem too harsh and brief, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser have stomachs warm enough to concoct and digest all) I have for the love of them explicated, enlightened and sweetned in this third Edition, reviewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly advertise the Reader that shall undertake to judge of this Work, to take heed that he fall not into any of these seven over-sights, as some others have done; that is: To refer that unto law and duty, which is proper unto action; that unto action, which is onely to be censured; that to resolution and determination, which is onely proposed, consulted of, and problematically and Academically disputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliver from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward state, profession, and condition, which is proper to the spirit and inward sufficiency; that to Religion and Faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and supernatural inspiration, which is proper to natural and moral virtue and action. All passion and preoccupation being taken away, he shall find in these seven points well understood how to resolve himself in his doubts, how to answer all objections, made by himself or by others, and inform himself touching my intention in this Work. And if nevertheless after all this, he will neither rest satisfied and contented, nor approve what I have written, let him boldly and speedily disprove it (for onely to speak ill, to bite,

to

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to slander the name of another man, though it be easie enough, yet it is base and pedantical) and he shall spec-
dily receive either a free confession and assent (for this Book doth glory and feast it self in the truth and ingenui-
ty thereof) or an examination of the impertinences and
follyes thereof.

**The subject and order of
these three Books.**

THe first Book teacheth the knowledge of our selves and
our humane condition, which is the foundation of
Wisdom, by five great and principall considerations of
man, and containeth 62. Chapters.

The second containeth the principal rules of Wisdome, the
priviledges and proper qualities of a wise-man, and hath
12. Chapters.

The third, in a Discourse of the four moral virtues, Pru-
dence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, setteth down the
particular instructions of Wisdome, in 43. Chapters.

Charron his 3 Books of Wisdom.

POSITION OF MAMMALS



O F
W I S D O M E
The first Book.

Which is

*The knowledge of our selves, and our
humane condition.*

An exhortation to the study and knowledge
of our *S E L V E S*.

The Preface to the first Book.

TH E most excellent and divine counsel, the best and most profitable advertisement of all others, *The knowledge but least practised*, is to study and learn how to *the first thing* to know our selves : This is the foundation of Wisdom, and the high way to whatsoever is good ; and there is no folly comparable to this, To be painful and diligent, to know all things else whatsoever, rather then our selves : For the true science and study of man, is man himself.

G O D, Nature, the wife, the world, preach man, and exhort him both by word and deed to the study and knowledge of himself. G O D eternally and without intermission beholdeth, considereth, knoweth Himself. The World hath all the lights thereof

2

An exhortation to the Study

contracted and united within it self , and the eyes open to see and behold it self . It is as necessary for Man to learn how to know himself , as it is naturall unto him to think , or to be near unto himself : Nature hath enjoyned this worke unto all . To meditate and to entertain our thoughts therein , is a thing above all things easie , ordinary , naturall ; it is the food , sustentation , life of the spirit , *cuius vivere est cogitare : Whose life is cogitation.* Now where can a man begin or continue his meditation more truly , more naturally then with himself ? Is there any thing that toucheth him more nearly ? Doubtless , to study other learnings , and to forget our selves , is a thing both unnaturall and unjust . The true and principal vocation of every man , is to employ his thoughts upon himself , and to tie himself unto himself : for so doth every thing else , setting bounds and limits to their other busines and desires . And thou man , which wilt seem to contain the whole universe , to know all things , to controll , to judge , neither knowest nor endeavourest the knowledge of thy self ; and so going about to make thy self skilfull , and a Judge of Nature , thou provest the onely fool of the world ; thou art of all other the most beggerly , the most vain and miserable ; and yet most proud and arrogant . Look therefore into thy self , know thy self , hold thy self to thy self ; thy spir't and will which is elsewhere employed , reduce it unto thy self . Thou forgettest thy self and loosest thy self about outward things ; thou betrayest and dis-robest thy self ; thou lookest always before thee ; gather thy self to thy self , and shut up thy self within thy self : examine , search , know thy self .

Nosce te ipsum ; nec te quasiveris extra ;

Respic quod non es.

Tecum habita , & noris quam sit tibi curia spellex ,

Tu te consule ,

Te ipsum concute , nunquid vitiorum

Inseveris olim natura , aut etiam consuetudo mala .

Know well thy self , and seek to know no more ;

And what thou art not , shame the same therefore :

Look truly to thy self , then shalt thou see

How short abode thou hast , advised therefore be .

Examine still thy conscience , which doth witness bear ,

What vice or evil is (by nature) sowne there .

By the knowledg of himself man arriveth sooner and better to the knowledg of God , then by any other means , both because he findest

findeth in himself better helps , more marks and footsteps of the divine nature , then in whatsoever besides he can any way know , *The ladder to the knowledge of the divine nature.* and because he can better understand and know that which is in himself then in another thing . *Formasti me & posuisti super me manum tuam , ideo mirabilis facta est scientia tua , id est , tui ex me :* Psalm .
Thou hast formed me , and put thy hands upon me , therefore thy science is become marvellous in me , that is , scientia tui , ex me : the science of thee in me . And therefore there was engraven in letters of gold over the porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (according to the *Panisms*) of Knowledg and Light , this sentence , *K N O W T H Y S E L F E ,* as a salutation and advertisement of God unto all ; signifying unto them , that he that would have access unto that *Divinity ,* and entrance into that Temple , must first know himself , *Cantic ,* and could not otherwise be admitted . *Si te ignoras , o pulcherima , egredere , & abi post hædos tuos . If thou know not who thou art , O thou the fairest among women , get thee forth , and follow thy kids .*

To become truly wise , and to leade a life more regular and pleasant , there needs no other instruction but from our selves : and doubtles , if we were good Scholers , there are no books could better instruct us , then we teach our selves . He that shall call to minde , and consider the excess of his passed choler , even how far this fever and frensie hath carried him , shall better be perswaded of the foul deformity of this passion , then by all the reason that *Aristotle* or *Plato* can alledged against it : and so of all other passions and motions of the soul whatsoeuer . He that shall call to minde how often he hath miscarried in his judgment , and been deceived by his memory , shall learn thereby to trut it no more . He that shall note how often he hath held an opinion , and in such sort understood a thing even to the engaging of his own credit , and the satisfying of himself and any other therein , and that afterwards time hath made him see the truth , even the contrary to that he formerly held , may learn to distrust his own judgment , and to shake off that importunate arrogancy and querulous presumption ; a capitall enemy to discipline and truth . He that shall well note and consider all those evills that he hath run into , that have threatened him ; the light occasions that have altered his courses and turned him from one estate to another : how often repentances and mislikes have come into his head ; will prepare himself against future changes , learn to know his own condition ; will preserve his modesty .

modesty, contain himself within his own rank, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterprise any thing that may pass his own forces: And what were this, but to see justice and peace in every thing? To be brief, we have no clearer looking glass, no better book then our selves, if as we ought we do study our selves, alwayes keeping our eyes open over us, and prying more narrowly into our selves,

5.
*Against such
as mis-knew
themselves.*

But this is that which we think least of, *Nemo in se tentat deservere*: *No man endeavours to descend directly into himself*: whereby it commeth to pass that we fall many times to the ground, and tumble headlong into the same fault; neither perceiving it, nor knowing to what course to take us: we make our selves fools at our own charges. Difficulties in every thing are not discerned, but by those that know them: and some degree of understanding is necessary, even in the marking of our own ignorance. We must knock at the door to know whether the door be shur: for when men see themselves resolved and satisfied of a thing, and think they sufficiently understand it, it is a token they understand nothing at all: for if we knew our selves well, we would provide far better for our selves and our affaires; nay, we should be ashamed of our selves and our estate, and frame our selves to be others then we are. He that knows not his own infirmities, takes no care to amend them; he that is ignorant of his own wants, takes as little care to provide for them, he that feels not his own evills and miseries, adviseth not with himself of helps, nor seeks for remedy. *Deprehendas si oportet, priusquam emendes: sanitatis initiam, sentire sibi opus esse remedio.* Thou must of necessity know thy self, before thou amend thy self: it is the very first beginning of health, to acknowledg the sickness, and that thou hast need of remedy. And here behold our unhappiness: for we think all things goe well with us, and we are in safety, and we live in content with our selves, and so double our miseries. *Socrates* was accounted the wiest man of the world, not because his knowledg was more compleat, or his sufficiency greater then others, but because his knowledg of himself was better then others; in that he held himself within his own rank, and knew better how to play the man. He was the King of men, as it is said, that he that hath but one eye is a king in respect of him that hath never an eye, that is to say, doubly deprived of his sense: for they are by nature weak and miserable, and therewithall proud, and feel not their misery. *Socrates* was but purblind

and knowledge of our selues.

blind ; for being a man as others were , weak and miserable , he knew it , and ingenuously acknowledged his condition , and lived and governed himself according unto it . This is that which the Truth it self spake unto those which were full of presumption , and by way of mockery said unto him , Are we blind also ? If ye were blind , saith he , that is , if you thought your selves blind , you should see , but because ye think ye see ; therefore you are blinde ; therefore your sin remaineth . For they that in their own opinion John 9.
see much , are in truth stark blind ; and they that are blind in their own opinion , see best . It is a miserable thing in a man , to make himself a beast by forgetting himself to be a man . *Homo enim commis* , id fac semper intelligas : *Seeing thou art a man , see thou always remember it* . Many great personages , as a rule or bridle to themselves , have ordained that one or other should ever buzz into their ears that they were men . O what an excellent thing was this , if it entred as well into their hearts , as is sounded in their ears ? That Mot of the Athenians to Pompey the Great , Thou art so much a God , as thou acknowledgest they self to be a man , was no ill saying ; for at the least to be an excellent man , is to confess himself to be a man .

The knowledg of our selves (a thing as difficult and rare , as to misdeem and deceive our selves easie) is not obtained by any other , 6. False means to know our selves. that is to say , by the comparison , rule , or example of another .

*Plus alijs de se quam tu tibi credere noli : Do not believe other
more of thy self , than thou thy self knowest of thy self* . Much less also by our speech and judgment , which oftentimes commeth short to discern , and we diloyall and fearfull to speak : not by any singular act , which sometimes unawares hath escaped a man , tricked forward by some new , rare and accidentall occasion , and is rather a trick of *Forsun* , or an eruption of some extraordinary junacy , then any production of frut truely ours . A mans judgement not of the greatness or depth of a River , by that water which by reason of some sudden inundation of neighbour rivers overfloweth the banks . One valiant act makes not a valiant man ; nor one just , a just man . The circumstances and source of occasions doth import much and alter us , and oftentimes a man is provoked to do good by vice it self : So hard a thing is it , for man to know man . Nor likewise by all thosse outward things , that are outwardly adjacent unto us , as offices , dignities riches , nobility , grace , and applause of the greatest Peers and common people . Nor by the

An exhortation to the studie.

carriages of a man in publike places is a man knowne ; for as a king at Chesse , so he standeth upon his guard , he bridleth and contracteth himself ; fear , and shame , and ambition , and other passions , make him play that part that you see : But truly to know him , we must look into his inward part , his privy chamber , and there not how to day , but every day he carrieth himself . He is many times a different man in his houle , from that he is in the Country , in the Palace , in the Market place ; another man amongst his domesticall friends , from that he is amongst strangers : when he goeth forth of his houle into some publike place , he goeth to play a Comedy , and therefore stay not thou there , for it is not himself that playeth , but another man , and thou knowest him not .

7.
True means.

The knowledg of a mans self , is not acquired by all these four meane ; neither must we trust them , but by a true , long , and daily study of himself ; a serious and attentive examination , not onely of his words , and actions , but of his most secret thoughts (their birth , progresse , continuance , repetition) and whatsoever is in him , evn his nightly dreams prying narrowly into him , trying him often and at all houres , pressing and pinching him even to the quick . For there are many vices hid in us , and are not felt for want of force and means ; so that the venomous serpent that is benummed with cold , suffereth himself to be handled without danger : neither doth it suffice afterwards to acknowledge the fault by tale or peece-maile , and so think to mend it by marring it ; but he must in general re-acknowledg his weaknes , his misery , and come to an universall amendment and reformation .

8.
*The proposition
and division of
this Book.*

Now if we will know man , we must take more then ordinary pains in this first book , taking him in all senses , beholding him with all visages feeling his pulse , sounding him to the quick , entring into him with a candle and a snuffer , searching and creeping into every hole , corner , turning , closet , and secret place : and not without cause ; for this is the most subtile and hypocriticall covert and counterfeit of all the rest , and almoft not to be known . Let us then consider him after five manners set down in this table , which is the summe of the book :

There :

and knowledge of our felotes.

The first, Naturall, of all the parts whereof he is composed, and their apperances.

The second, Naturall and Morall, by comparison of man with beasts.

The third, of his life in declining state.

There are five considera-
tions of man & humane
condition:

The first, Naturall and Morall, of the differences that are between men in their condition: 1 Natures. 2 Spirits and sufficiencies. 3 Charges and degrees of superiority, inferiority. 4 Profession and conditions of life, advantages and disadvantages. 5 Naturall, Acquired, Casuall.

The fourth, Morall of his manners, humours, conditions, which are referred to five things: 1 Vanitie. 2 Weaknes. 3 Inconstancy. 4 Misery. 5 Presumption.

The first consideration of Man, which is naturall, by all the parts and members whereof he is composed.

CHAPTER. I.

Of the frame or formation of Man.

I

T is two fold, and to be considered after a two fold manner: the first and originally, once immediately by God in his supernaturall creation; the second and ordinary in his naturall generation. According to that discretion which Moses setteth down touching the workmanship and creation of the world (the boldest and richest piece of work, that ever man brought unto light: I mean the History of the nine first Chapters of *Genesis*, which is of the world newly born and reborn) man was made of *God*, not only after all creatures, as the most perfect, but the master and superintendent of all. *Ut primitus pisibus maris, volatilibus celi, bestijs*

I.
Man made by
Gen. i. 23, &c.

Of the framer or formers of Men.

sover. That he might rule over the fish of the sea the Powres of the aire, and the beasts of the earth. And in the self same day , where-in the fourfooted beastes of the earth that come nearest unto him were created (although those two that resemble him most are, for the inward parts the Swine , for the outward the Ape) but also after all was done and ended , as the closing up , seal , and sign of his works , he hath also there imprinted his armes , and his portrait , Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagin' persona . Signumque est super nos hunc vultus tuus . Every man is a short compendious image of God . The light of his countenance is sealed upon us , as a summary recapitulation of all things , and an epitome of the world , which is all in man , but gathered into a small volume , whereby he is called , The little world ; as the whole universe may be called , The great man : as the tie and ligament of Angels and beasts , things heavenly and earthly , spirituall and corporall ; and in one word , as the latt hand , the accomplishment , the perfection of the work , the honour and miracle of Nature . The reason is , because God having made man with deliberation , counsell , and preparation , & dist , Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram : and he said , Let us make man in our Image , according so our likenesse he rested . And this rest also was made for man . Sabbathum proper hominem , non contra . The Sabbath is for man , not man for it . And afterwards he had nothing to make new , but make himself man ; and that he did likewise for the love of man : Proper nos hominem & proper nostram salutem : For us men , and our salvation . Whereby we see , that in all things God hath aimed at man , finally in him , and by him , brevi man ; In a short summe , or summarilie , to accommodate all unto himself , the beginning and end of all .

2.
Naked.

3.
Upright.

Secondly , he was created all naked , because more beautifull then the rest , being pure , neat , and delicate , by reason of his chyn humours well rempered and seasoned .

Thirdly , upright , but little touching the earth , his head directly tending unto heaven , wheron he gazeth and sees and knoweth himself as in a glasse ; quite opposite unto the plant , which hath its head and root within the earth : so that man is a divine plant , that flourishest and grows up unto heaven : A beast as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant , goes as it were athwart , having his two extremes towards the bounds or extremities of the Horizon more or less . The cause of this uprightness in man , besides the will of his Master-workman , is not properly the reasonable soule , as we see in those

Of the frame or formation of Man.

those that are crook-backed, crumpshouldered, lame; nor in the straight line of the backbone, which is likewise in serpents, nor in the natural or viral heat, which is equalled, or rather greater in divers beast, although all these may (perhaps) serve to some purpose; but this upright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man, the holiest and divinest creature.

Sicut in his animal membrisque capaces alia:

*Apostrophe from these, in making man
He made a sacred (creatura, beatis profani,
Who (though they were not made enough to see't)
Was made the means, where they and God do meet.*

Dumbe work for man; but God made man we find

To contemn these works, and know his mind:

and as King in this low region. To small and particulat royalties, there belong certain marks of Majestie, as we see in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocodile, the Lion with his collar, the colour of his hair, and his eyes; in the Eagle; the King of the Bees: so man the univerſal King of these lower parts, walketh with an upright countenance, as a Master in his houſe ruling, and by love or force taunting every thing.

His body was first framed of virgin-earth, and red, from whence he took his proper name *Adam*, for the appellative was *Ish*: and *How framed*.
that being not yet moistened with rain, but with the water of the *Gendis*.
fountain.

*Mixtam fluvialibus undis
Fixis in effigiem*

*Of running water and of ferville earth
Did God build man, (the Poet knew not breath)
Grace ran away, or rather he from that,
Yet man stood still, or rather nature sat,
But not in Paradise; Globe of earth and seas,
Now only earth, past over Euphrates.*

By reaſon the body is the firſt-born, or elder then the ſoul, as the matter then the form; the house muſt be made and trimm'd before it be inhabited; the ſhop before the workman can uſe it. Afterwards the Soul was by diuine iſpiration iuſtified, and ſo the body by the ſoul made a living creature, *Inspiravit in factum ejus spiraculum uite, &c. He breathed in his face breath of life.*

*¶ A diuine ordinary and natural generation and for nation, which is made of the ſeed in the wombbe of the woman, the ſelf-same *He is made in the matrix.**

Of the frame or formation of Man

order is observed: The body is first formed as well by the elementary force of the *Energia*, and forming virtue which is in the seed; aiding in some sorte the heat of the matrix, as the celestiall, which is the influence and virtue of the Sun; *Sol & homo generant hominem*, *The Sun and Man do engender man*. In such order, that the

*conceived of
engendered seed.* even first dayes the seed of the father and mother do mingle, unite and curdle together like cream, and are made one body, which is the conception. *Nonne sicut lac mulisti me, & sicut caseum me coagulasti? Hast thou not milked me like milk, and hast thou not coagulated, and curdled me as cheese?* The next seven dayes this seed is concocted, thickned, and changed into a mass of flesh, and indigested for rulles bloud which is the proper matter of an humane bo-

*changed.
formed in
body.* die. The third seven dayes following, of this mass or lump is made and fashioned the body in gross; so that about the twentieth daye are brought forth the three noble and heroicall parts, the *Liver Heart, Brain*, distant an oval length, or, as the *Hebreus* say, holding themselves by thin *commissures* or joynnts, which afterwards fill themselves with flesh, after the fashion of an ant, where there are three grosser parts joyned by two thine. The fourth seven dayes which end near thirty, the whole body is ended, perfected, joyned, *furnished organized*; and so it begins to be more an *Embrion*, that is, unperfected in shape, but capable, as a matter prepared to its function, to receive

*joyned, ergo
nized.
furnished
organized;
ments for
sense, the soul;* which faileth not to insinuate and invest it self into the body, towards the seven and thirtieth or for ieth day after the fift weeks ended. Doubling this term, that is to say, at the third moneth this infant endowed with a soul, hath motion and sense, the hair and nayls begin to come. Tripling this term, which it at

*Indured with
soul-motion.
Brought forth.* the ninth moneth, he cometh forth, and is brought into the light. These terms or times are not so justly prefixed, but that they may either be hastened, or prolonged, according to the force or feebleness of the heat both of the seed and of the matrix: for being strong it hasteneth, being weak it sloweth; whereby that seed that hath less heat and more moisture, whereof women for the most part are conceived, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a soul, untill the fortieth day or after, and moveth not till the fourth moneth, which is near by a quarter more late then that of the male child.

The first and generall distinction of man.

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C H A P. II.

The first and generall distinction of Man.

MAN, as a prodigious creature, is made of parts quite contrarie, and enemies to themselves. The soul is a little God ^{1.} The division of the body as a beast, as a dunghill. Nevertheless, these two parts ^{man in two parts.} are in such sort coupled together, have such need the one of the other to perform their functions, *Alterius sic altera posse est,* & *conjurat amict:* So one thing doth ask the fellowship and help of another: and doth as it were friendly conjure it; and do so with all their complaints embrace each other, that they neither can continue together without warr, nor separate themselves without grief and torment; & as holding the Wolf by the ears, each may say to other, *I can neither live with thee nor without thee, Nec secum, nec sine te.*

But again, forasmuch as there are in this soul two parts very different, the high, pure, intellectuall, and divine, wherein the beast hath no part; and the base, sensitiv, and brutish, which hath body and matter, and is as an indifferent me in betwix the intellectuall part and body; a man may by a distinction more morall and politick, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit*, the *Soul*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit* and *Flesh*, hold the place of the two extremes, as heaven and earth; the *Soul* the middle region, where ^{2.} *In these parts.* are engendred the Meteors, tumult, and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heriocall part, a diminutive, a spark, an image, and dew of the Divinity, is in a man as a King in his Commonwealth, it breatheth nothing but good, and heaven to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* (contrary wife) as the dregs of a people besotted, and common sink of man, tendeth alwayes to the matter, and to the earth; the *Soul* in the middle, as the principall of the people, betwixt the best and the worst, good and evil is continually solicited by the *Spirit* and the *Flesh*, and according unto that part towards which it applyeth it self, it is either spirituall and good, or carnall and evil. Here are lodged all those naturall affections, which are neither virtuous nor vicious, as the love of our Parents and friends, fear of shame, compassion towards the afflicted, desire of good reputation.

This distinction will help much to the knowledge of man, and to discern his actions, that he mistake not himself, as it is the man ^{3.} *The willing* *to do, judging by the bark and outward appearance, thinking thereof.* that to be of the *Spirit* which is of the *Soul*, nay, of the *Flesh*;

Of the Body, and first of all the parts.

attributing unto virtue that which is due unto nature, nay unto vice, How many good and excellent actions have been produced by passion, or at least by a natural inclination, *Ut serviant genio & suo indulgenti animo? That they may serve their humours, and satisfy their pleasure?*

CHAP. III.

Of the Body, and first of all the parts thereof,
and their places.1.
The division of
the body.2.
Inward and
many.

THE Body of man consisteth of a number of parts, inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular, or coming near unto that figure.

The inward are of two sorts: The one in number and quantity spread through the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the basis and upholding pillars of the whole building, and within them (for their nourishment) the *marrow*, the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veins* issuing from the *liver*, as channels of the first and natural blood; the *arteries* coming from the *heart*, as conduits of the second blood, more subtle and vital. These two mounting higher than the *liver* and the *heart*, their original forces are more strain then those that go downwards; to the end they should help to mount the blood; for that narrowness more strait added, serves to raise the humours, the *senses* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body and conduits of the animal spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seven pairs which serve the *lenses* of the head, *Sight, Hearing, Taste, Speech*, the other are hard, whereof there are thirty couples proceeding from the rump of the back to the muscles; the *Tendons*, *Eisamenta*, *Grippers*; the fourth, *Humours, Blood, Choler*, which worketh, provoketh, penetrateth, hindereth obstructions, catteth forth the excrements, bringeth cheerfulness; *Melancholy*, which provoketh an appetite to every thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Phlegme*, which sweetmeth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats: The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the natural heat and radical humour, and they are in three degrees of excellency, the *Natural, Vital, Animal*; The *Fat*, which is the thickest and grossest part of blood.

Singular, four regions of the body. The other are singular (save the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certain place. Now there are four places

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Of the body, and parts of the body.

of regions, as degrees of the body, steps of names, where she exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lower is for generation, in which are the privy parts serving therunto. The second next unto that, in which are the intreals, viscera, that is to say the *Stomach*, yielding more to the left side, round, wherin in the bottome then at top, hiving two orifices or mouths, the one above to receive, the other beneath, which adwatereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it self. It scattereth, gathereth together, minglith, concocth the viciuals, and puttis them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kunde of white Sac, fit for the nourishment of the body, which is likewise wrought within the *Mesentaine* veins, by which it passeth unto the Liver. The *Liver* hot and moist, inclining toward the right side, the hot house of blod, the chief of fischer fountain of the veins, the seat of the natural nourishing faculty, or vegetative foul, made and engendered of the blood of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Mesentaine* veins, and receiveth into its lap by the *Vena portae*, which entreth into the concavities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thoroough the whole body by the help of the great *Vena cava*; which ariseth from the branch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the rivets of a fountain. The *Spleen* towards the left side, which receiveth the discharge and excrements of the Liver: The *Reins*, the *Entrails*, which though they are all in one, yet are distinguished by diversitie and names, equaling seventeen times the length of a man, as the length of a man is equalled by seven foot. In these two first parts or degrees, which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very differenter, the one generative for the continuance of the kinde, the other matriue for every particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscent soul.

The third degree compared to the *Aetherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midrife*, and from that above by the narrowness of the throat; in which is the irascible soul, and the pectoral parts *Precordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fist rib, having his point under the left pap of dug, the original fountain of *Aerries*, which are alwayes moved, and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which, as by channels, it sendeth and distributeth thoroough the whole body the vital blood which is hach concocted, and by it the spirit and virtue vital.

Th:

1.
2.

3.

The *Lungs*, of substance vary soft and spongeous, supple to draw to, and force forth, like a pair of bellows, instruments both of respiration whereby the heart is refreshed, drawing unto it the blood, the spirits, the air, and disburthening it self of those fumes and excrements which oppresse it, and of the voice by means of the rough *Aristie*.

The fourth and highest, which answereth to the celestial region, is the head, which containeth the *Brain*, cold and spongeous, wrapped within two skins, the one more hard and thick, which toucheth the brain-pan, *Dura mater*; the other more easie and thin, which includeth the *Brain*, *Pia mater*: from it do issue, and are derived, the *Sinews* and marrow that descendeth and falleth down into the reins of the back. This *Brain* is the seat of the reasonable soul, the source of sense and motion, and of the most noble animal spirits, composed of the vital, which being raised from the heart by the *Aristies* unto the brain, are concocted and re-cocted, elaborated and made subtle by the help of the multiplicity of small *Aristies*, as fillets diversly woven and enterlaced, by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double net, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vital spirit being retained and sojourning, oftentimes passing and repassing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, spiritual in an excellent degree.

*Outward parts
singular.*

The outward and visible parts, if they be single, are in the middle; as the *Nose*, which serveth for respiration, smell, and the comfort of the brain, and the disburthening thereof, in such sort, that by it the air entreth, and issueth both down into the lungs, and up into the brain. The *Mouth*, which serveth to eat and to speak, and therefore hath many parts serviceable therunto; without, the lips; within the tongue, soft and very subtle, which judgeth of flavours; the *Teeth*, which bruise and grind the victuals; the *Novel*, the two sinks or wayes to eale and disburden the body.

*Double and
equal.*

If they be double and alike, they are all collaterals and equal, as the two eyes, planted in the highest stage, as sentinels, composed of many and divers parts; three *humours*, seven *sinewes*, seven *muscles*, divers colours, of many fashions, and much art. These are the first, and most noble outward parts of the body in beauty, utility, mobility, activity, yea, in the action of love, *of id est amarum*, they are to the visage, that which the visage is to the body, they are the face of the face: and because they are tender, delicate, and gracious, they are fenced and rampained on all parts, with *skins*,

lids,

Of the singular properties of the body of man.

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Eyes, bruis, ears. The *eyes*, in the self same height that the *eyes* are, as the scours of the body, *Porters* of the spirit, *the Receivers*, and *Judges* of sounds which alwayes ascend; they have their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the aise and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might be hindred and judge the worse. The *arms* and *hands*, the work-masters of all things, and universal instruments. The *legs* and *feet*, the props and pillars of the whole building.

C H A P. IV.

Of the singular properties of the body of man.

THE body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiarities proper unto themselves, not common with other creatures. The first and principal are speech, upright stature, the form or feature, the port or carriage, whereof the wife, yea, the Stoicks themselves made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a fool in a humane shape, then wise in the form of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be termed a hand) His natural nakedness, laughter, crying. The Sense of tickling, hair on the lower lid of the eye, a vinble navel, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at Nose, a strange thing, considering that he carrieth his head upright, and a beat downwards: To blush for shame, wax pale for fear. To be amanibidexer, disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to move the ears, which berayeth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them known, by his blushing, paleness, motion of the eyes, and nose.

The other properties are likewise peculiar unto man, but not wholly, but by way of excellency; for they are also in beasts, but in a lesse degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and hair in the head. The pliant facility of the body, and the parts thereof to all motion and every sense. The elevation of the breasts. The great abundance of the brain. The greatness of the bladder. The form of the foot, long forward, short backward. The quantity and purity of the blood. The mobility and agility of the tongue. The multitude and variety of dreams, insomuch that he seemeth the onely dreamer, sneezing. And to be short, the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips,

Peculiar properties in the body of man.

Peculiar properties by way of excellency.

There

3. *Divers habits.* These are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificial and affected countenances; others are so proper and natural, that they that have them, neither feel them nor know them in themselves; as to go stooping: but all have that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, natural, and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hand before him when he falleth.

gratified custome set to aility, but by a pidi-

CHAP. V.

Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.

L. *The praise of beauty.* THE goods of the body are Health, Beauty, Chearfulness, Strength, Vigour, a prompt readiness and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautiful and rich present that Nature can bestow upon any, and above all other things to be preferred; nor onely Science, Nobility, Riches, but Wisdom it self, which the auctorit among the wisedom affirm. It is the only thing that deerveth our whole employment, yea, our life it self to attain unto it: for without it life is no life, but a death, virtue and wisdom grow weak and faint. What comfort can all the wisedome of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be thoroughly stricken with an *Aphexis*? Doubtless, there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health but *Honesty*, which is the health of the *Soul*. Now it is common unto us with beasts; yet, many times it is greater, and farre more excellent in them then in us: and notwithstanding it be a gift of nature, *Gaudemus bene nati*.

He that is gently born may well rejoyce,
To have by nature what he would by choice;
 given in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milk, Good government, which consisteth in soberie and moderate exercises, lighenes of heart, and a continual avoidance of all passions, do preserve it much. Grief and sickness are the contraries unto it; which are the greatest, if not the onely evils that follow man, whereof we shall speake hereafter. But in the preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature, which hath given them health, do far exceed them; they oftentimes forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearely for it.

2. *Beauty.* Next followeth *Beauty*, a good of great account in the society of men. It is the first means of reconciling or uniting ones to another,

ther, and it is very likely, that the first distinction that hath been of one man from another ; and the first consideration that giveth preheminence to one above another, hath been the advantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerful quality, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the society of men ; for there are none so barbarous, none so resolute, that hath not been beaten by it. It presenteth it self unto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the judgement, it makes deep impressions, and preserveth a man with great authority ; and therefore *Socrates* called it, *A short tyranny* ; and *Plato*, *The priviledge of Nature* : for it seemeth that he that carrieth in his countenance the favours of Nature, imprinted in a rare and excellent beauty, hath a kind of lawful power over us, and that we turning our eyes towards him, he likewise rutmeth our affections, and enchantereth them in despite of our selves. *Ariosto* saith, that it appertaineth to those that are beautiful, to command ; that they are venerable next to the Gods themselves ; but there are none, but such as are blind, but are touched with it. *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cesar*, these great Commanders, have made great use thereof in their greatest affairs ; yea, *Scipio*, the best of them all. *Fair* and *Good* are near neighbours, and are expressed by the self same words, both in *Greek*, and in the *Scriptures*. Many great Philosophers have attained to their wisdom, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable, and much required in beasts themselves.

There are in Beauty divers things to be considered : That of men is properly the form and feature of the body ; as for other *The distinction of Beauty*. beauties, they belong unto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one settled which moved not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion, and colour of the members, a body that is not swoln or puffed up, wherein the sinews and veins appear not from fat, nor the bones pressle nor the skin, but full of blood and spirit, and in good stafe, having the muscles elevated, the skin smooth, the colour *Vermillion* : The other moveable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding, or carriage of the motion of the members, and above all, the eyes. The former beauty of it self is as it were dead, this active and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sower ; others that are sweer, yea, though they be fading.

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. There is nothing more beautiful in man, then his soul ; and in the body of man *of the Visage*.
then

then his visage, which is as it were the soul abbreviated, that is, the pattern and image of the soul; that is, her Escutcheon, with many quarters, representing the collection of all her titles of honour, planted and placed in the gate and forefront, to the end that men may know, that here is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man; and therefore Art, which imitateth Nature, takes no care to represent the person of a man but onely to paint or carve the visage.

Seven singularities in the visage of man.

1. There are many special singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beasts, (for to say the truth, they have no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man: As the number and diversity of the parts and forms of them, in beasts there is neither chin, nor cheeks, nor forehead, much lesse any form or fashion of them. Variety of colours, as in the eye onely there is black, white, green, blue, red, chrystalline. Proportion, for the senses are there double, answering the one to the other, and in such a manner, that the greatness of the eye, is the greatness of the mouth, the largeness of the forehead, the length of the nose; the length of the nose, that of the chin and lips. An admirable diversity of countenances; and such, that there are hardly found two faces, in all respects, like one another: this is a chief point of workmanship, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable, yea necessary for humane society; first, to know one another: for infinite evils, yea, the dissipation of humane kind must needs follow, if a man should mistake himself by the semblance and similitude of divers visages; yea, it would be a confusion worse then that of *Babel*. A man would take his daughter for his sister, for a stranger his enemy for his friend. If our faces were alike, we should not discern a man from a beast; and if they were not all unlike one another, we could not know how to discern a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent art of Nature, to place in this part some secret that might give contentment to one another, through the whole world: for by reason of this variety of faces, there is not a person that in some part is not beautiful. The dignity and honour of it, round figure, form upright and elevated on high, naked and uncovered, without hair, feathers, scales, as in other creatures, looking up unto heaven. Grace, sweetnes, a pleasant and decent countenes, even to the giving up of a mans Soul, and the ravishing of his will, as hath been shewed before. To be brief, the visage is the throne of beauty and love; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and agreeable
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.

Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.

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agreeable unto man; he true and most significant symbols of amity and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations, to declare the inward motions and passions of the Soul, as Joy, Heaviness, Love, Hatred, Envy, Malice, Shame, Choler, Jealousie, and so forth. It is as the hand of a Dial which nogeth the hour, and moments of time, the wheels and motions themselves being hid within. And as the aire, which receiveth all the colours and changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & derigit, in facie legitur homo. The body covereth and discovereth the soul, and man is known even by his face.*

The beauty of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and clear front, eye-brows well ranged, thin and subtile; the eye well divided, chearful, sparkling; as for the colour, I leave ^{A description of the beauty of the face.} it doubtful: the nose lean, the mouth little, the lips coralline; the chin short and dimpled, the cheeks somewhat rising, and in the middle the pleasant *gelasin*, the eares round and well compact, the whole countenance with a lively tincture white and vermillion. Nevertheless, this description of Beauty is not generally received; the opinions of Beauty are different, according to the diversity of nations. With the Indians the greatest Beauty consisteth in that, which we accounte the greatest deformity, that is, in a tawny colour, thick and swollen lips, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with black or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendent, to the end, they may give their little ones suck over their shoulders: and to attain to this form of beauty, they use all-manner of Art. But not to wander so far, in Spain the chiefest beauty is lean and nearly compyt; in Italy fat, corpulent and solid: the soft, and delicate, and fluttering please the one; the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding the other.

The beauty of the Body, especially the vesture, should in all reason demonstrate and witnessse the beauty of the soul, (which is a ^{The beauty of the soul and body.} quality and rule of opinions and judgements, with a certain steadfastnesse and constancy) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, then the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit: and when this is not, we must needs think, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to pass, that we oftentimes see it: for the milk of the Nurse, the first institution, conversation, bring great alterations to the original nature of the soul, whether in good or evil. So-

crates 9

crass confessed that the deformity of his body, did justly accuse the natural deformity of his soul, but that by industry and instruction he had corrected that of the soul. This outward countenance is a weak and dangerous surety; but they that bely their own physiognomy, are rather to be punished then others, because they falsifie and betray that good promise that nature hath planted in their front, and deceive the world.

C H A P. VI. *Of the vestments of the body.*

*Nakedness is
natural.*

There is great likelihood, that the custome or fashion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the first and original amongst men, and that of covering and adorning the body with garments was artificial, and invented to help and enlarge Nature, as they which by artificial light go about to increase the light of the day: for Nature having sufficiently provided for all other creatures a covering, it is not to be believed, that she hath handled man worse then the rest, and left him only indigent, and in such a state, that he could not help himself without foreign succours, and therefore those reproaches that are made against Nature as a stepmother, are unjust. If men from the beginning had been cloathed, it is not unlikely that they would ever have disrobed themselves, and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and shame it self: and nevertheless, it is done and observed amongst many nations. Neither can it be alledged that we clothe our selves either to cover our nakedness or privy parts, or to defend us against cold (for these are the two reasons I intended; for against heat, there is no appearance of reason) because Nature hath not taught us, that there is any thing in our nakedness, that we should be ashamed of: it is we that by our own fault and fall, have told it our selves: *Quis indicavit tibi quod nudus es, nisi gaudet ligato quod praeceperam tibi ne consideres comedisti?* Who told thee that thou wast naked, unless thou hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? And Nature hath already sufficiently hid them, put them far from our eyes, and covered them. And therefore it is less needful to cover those parts only, as some do in those Countries where they go all naked, and ordinarily are not covered: for why should he that is the Lord of all other

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other creatures, nor daring to shew himself naked unto the world, hide himself under the spoils of another, nay adorn himself? As for cold, and other particular and local necessities, we know that under the self same air, the self same heaven, one goes naked, another appatelled; and we have all the most delicate past uncovered: and therefore a wandering person being asked, How he could go so naked in winter, answered that our faces are always naked, and he was all face: Yea many great personages have ever gone with their heads uncovered, *Aduinissa*, *Ceser*, *Hannibal*, *Severus*; and many nations there are, which go to the warres and fight all naked: and the counsel that *Plato* giveth for the continuance of health is, never to cover either head or face. And *Horre* saith, that when it was first ordained, that men should uncover their heads in the presence of the gods, and of the magistracie, that it was rather for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the injuries of the times, then for reverence. Lastly, the invention of covers and houses against the injuries of heaven, and men is more ancien, more natural, more universal, then of garments, and common with many creatures, but an industrious search for vident more natural then either. Of the use of garments, and aliments hereafter.

Lib. 3. c. 43.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Soul in general,

Behold here a matter of all others most difficult, handled and *The Preface* discoursed by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians*, *Greeks*, *Sabians*, and *Latins*: by our later Writers more shallowly as all other Philosophy, but with great diversity of opinions, according to the diversity of Nations, Religions, professions; without, my certain accord or resolution: the general knowledge and discourse thereof, may be reduced to these ten points: The definition, Essence of Nature, Faculties and Actions, Unity or Plurality, Source, Entrance into the body, Residence therein, Sear, Sufficiency to execute her functions, the End, and Separation from the body.

It is fitt very hard to define, or truly to say what the soul is, as generally all other forms, because they are things relative which subtlety not in themselves, but are parts of a whole, and this is the reason, why there is such and so great diversity of definitions of them, whereof there is not any received without contradiction. *Aristotle*

I.
*The definition
very difficult.*

D

Aristotle

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2.
Socrate hath confuted twelve that were before him, and could hardly make good his own.

2.
Easy to say what is it not.

It is easie to say what it is not : That it is not *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*; Nor the temperatur: of the four Elements, or qualities, or humours, which is alwayes changeable, without which a creature is and lives ; and besides that, this is an accident, the *Soul* a substance. Again, Metals and things inanimate, have likewise a temperature of the four Elements, and fift qualities. Neither is it blood, (for there are many things animate and living without blood, and many creatures die without the shedding of a drop of blood.) Nor the beginning and cause of motion (for divers things inanimate move, as the adamant moves the iron ; amber or jet, straw ; medicines and roots of trees being cut and dried, draw and move,) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Energie*, or perfection, for that word *Entelechia* is diversly taken and interpreted) of a living body : for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it self, as to live, to see, to understand is the action of the *Soul*. And it would likewise follow, that the *Soul* should be an accident, not a substance, and could not subsist without that body whereof it is the act and perfection, no more then the cover of an house may be without the house, and a relative without his correlative. To be brief, it is to say what the soul doth, and is to another, not what it is in it self.

3.
Hard to say what it is.

But to say what the *Soul* is, is very difficult, A man may simply say, That it is an essential quickning form, which giveth to the plant the vegetative or growing life ; to a beast, a sensible life, which comprehendeth the vegetative ; to a man, an intellectual life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in number the greater contains the lesse, and in figures the *Pentagon* contains the *Tetragone*, and this the *Trigone*, I call it the intellectual soul, rather then the reasonable, which is comprehended in the intellectual as the lesse in the great : for the reasonable in some sense and measure, according to the opinion of the greatest Philosophers and experience it self, is likewise in beasts, but not the intellectual, as being more high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus* : Like a horse and mule in whom there is no understanding. The *Soul* then is not the beginning or source, that word doth properly belong to the sovereign first author, but an inward cause of life, motion, sense, understanding. It moveth the body, and

and it self is not moved ; as contrarily, the body is moved, and moveth not at all : it moveth I say the body, and not it self, for nothing but God moveth it self ; and whatsoever moveth it self, is eternal Lord of it self : and that it moveth the body, it hath it not of it self, but from an higher cause.

Concerning the nature & essence of the *Soul*, I mean an humane *Soul* (for the *Soul* of a beast is without all doubt corporal, material, bred and born with the matter, and with it corruptible) ^{The nature and essence of the soul.}

there is a question of greater importance then it seemeth; for some affirm it to be corporal, some incorporal : and this is agreeable to reason, if a man be not opinative. That it is corporal, see what the grounds are ; *Spirits* and *Devils*, good and ill, which are wholly separated from all matter, are corporal, according to the opinion of all Philosophers, and our greatest Divines, *Tertullian*, In homil. de *Origen*, *S. Basil*, *Gregory*, *Augustine*, *Damascene*; how much spir. l. 2, de lib. more the *Soul* of man, which hath society, and is united to a matter. *Hom. de Epiph.* Their resolution is, that whatsoever is created, being compared unto God, is gross, corporal, material, and only God is incorporal ; that every spirit is a body, and hath a bodily nature. Next unto authority almost universal, the reason is irrefragable. whatsoever is included in this finite world, is finite, limited both in virtue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and natural conditions of a body : for there is nothing but a body which hath a superficial part, and is situated and fastened in a place. God only is wholly infinite, incorporal ; the ordinary distinctions, *circumscripitive*, *definitive*, *effective*, are but verbal, and in nothing either help or hurt the cause : for it alwayes stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the self same time that they are in a place, they cannot be elsewhere ; and they are not in a place either infinite, or very great, or very little, but equal to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it were not so, spirits could not change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they do : and so they should be immoveable, indivisible, indifferently in all. Now if they appear that they change their place, the change convicteth that they are moveable, divisible, subject unto time, and to the succession thereof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a body. But because many simple men under this word corporal, do imagine visible, palpable, and think not that the

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Pure air of fire without the flame or coal at bodies, how therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both Separated and human are not corporal, as in truth they are not in that sense: for they are of an invisible substance, whether airy, as the greatest part of Philosophers and Divines affirm; or celestial, as some *Hebreus* and *Aristoteles* teach calling by the self same name both the heaven & the spirit, an essence proper to immortality; or whether (if they will have it so) of a substance more subtle and delicate, yet they are alwayes corporal, since limited by place, moveable, subject to motion and to times. Finally, if they were not corporal, they should not be possible and capable of suffering as they are: the humane receiveth from his body pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turn; as the body from the spirit, and his passions, many good qualities, many bad virtues, vices, affections, which are all accidents: and all as well the spirits Separated and Devils as humane, are subject to punishment and torment. They are therefore corporal: for there is nothing passible, that is not corporal, and it is only proper unto bodies to be subject to accidents.

3. The faculties and actions of the soul.

Now the Soul hath a great number of virtues and faculties, as many almost as the body hath members: There are some in plants, more in beasts; most in man, to know, to live, to feel, to move, to desire, to affect, to assemble, to retain, to concord, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reject, to see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to speak, to breathe, to engender, to think, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, judge; all which are no parts of the Soul: for so it should be divisible, and should consist upon accidents, but they are her mental qualities. The actions come after and follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to the doctrine of great S. Dennis followed of all, that is, we must consider in spirituall creatures these things; *Essence*, *Faculties*, *Operation*: By the latter, which is the action, we know the faculty, and by it the essence. The actions may be hindered and wholly cease wi hout any prejudice at all unto the soul, and her faculties as the science and faculty of Painting remaineth entire in the Painter, although his hands be bound, and so be made unable to Paint: But if the faculties themselves perish, the Soul must needs be gone, no otherwise then fire is no longer fire having lost the faculty of warming.

4. The unity of the soul.

The essence and nature of the Soul being after a sort explicated; one of the busiest questions that belongeth unto the Soul offereth,

offereth it self to our consideration, that is, whether there be in a creature, especially in man, one soul or many? Touching which point, there are divers opinions, but may be reduced into thre. Some of the *Greeks*, and almost all the *Arabiques* imitating them, have thought (not onely in every particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortal *Soul*. The *Egyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrary, that there was a plurality of souls in every creature, all divers and distinct, two in every beast, and three in man; two mortal, the vegetative and sensible, and the third intellective, immortal. The third opinion, as the mehe betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all nations, is, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature, not more. In every of these opinions there is some difficulty. I leave the first, as being already sufficiently confuted and rejected. The plurality of souls in every creature & man, on the one side seemeth very strange and absurd in Philosophy, for that were to give many forms to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances & subjects in one, two beasts in one, three men in one, on the other side, it giveth credit and helpeth much our belief, touching the immortality of the intellectual *Soul*, for there being three souls, there can follow no inconvenience, that two of them should die, and the third continue immortal. The unity of the *Soul* seemeth to resist the immortality thereof; for how can one and the same indivisible, be in a mortal part and an immortal? as nevertheless *Aristotle* would have it. Doubtlesse it seemed that of necellity the *Soul* must be either altogether mortal, or altogether immortal, which are two very foul absurdities. The first abolisheth all religion and sound Philosophy: the second maketh beasts likewise immortal. Nevertheless it seems to be more true, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature, for the plurality and diversity of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplyeth in any thing this unity, no more then the diversity of rivers, the unity of one spring or fountain, nor the diversity of effects in the Sun, to heat, to enlighten, to melt, to dry, to whiten, to make black, to dissipate the unity and simplicity of the Sun; for should they, there should be a great number of souls in one man, and Suns in one world. Neither doth this essential unity of the *Soul* any thing hinder the immortality of the humane *Soul* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetative and sensitive faculties, which are but accidents;

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accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soul* not having a subject or instrument whereby to do it, but the third intellectual *Soul* is always well, because for it there is no need of the body, though whilet it is within it, it make use thereof to exercise it self; inasmuch that if it did return unto the body, it were onely again to exercise her vegetative and sensitive faculties, as we see in those that are raised unto life to live here below, not in those that are raised to live elsewhere, for such bodies need not to live by the exercise of such Faculties: Even as* there is no want nor decay in the Sun, but it continueth in it self wholly the same, though during a whole eclips it neither shine nor warm, nor perform his other effects in those places that are subject to it.

*The source of
the soul.*

Having shewed the unity of the soul in every subject, let us see from whence it cometh, and how it entreth into the body. The original beginning of souls is not held to be the same of all, I mean of humane souls; for the vegetative and sensitive, of plants and beasts, is by the opinion of all altogether material, and in the seed, for which cause it is likewise mortal. But concerning the *Soul* of man there are four celebrated opinions, According to the first, which is of the *Stoicks*, held by *Philo Indenus*, and afterward by the *Maniches*, *Priscilianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought forth as a part or parcel of the substance of God, who inspirereth it into the body, alledging to their best advantage the words of *Moses*, *Inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vita: He breathed in his face breath of life*. The second opinion, held by *Tertullian*, *Apollinaris*, the *Luciferians*, and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soul* proceedeth and is derived from the souls of our Parents with the seed, as the *Soul* of a beast. The third opinion, which is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, held by many *Rabbins* and Doctors of the Jews, and afterwards, by *Origen*, and other Doctors, teacheth, that the souls of men have been from the beginning, all created of God, made of nothing, and reserved in heaven, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receive them: and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the souls of men here below, were either well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sick, according to that life which they had lead above in heaven, before they were incorporate. And truly the master of Wisdome himself, sheweth, that the *Soul*, of the two, was the elder, and before the body, *Eram puer, bonam indolem sortitus,*

*fortius, imo bonus cum essem, corpus incontaminatum reperi. I was
a Boy, who by lot obtained a good disposition and nature, yea even be-
ing good, I obtained also an undefiled body.* The fourth opinion re-
ceived and held through all Christendome is, that they are all cre-
ated of God, and infused into bodies prepared, in such manner, that
the Creation and infusion is done at one & the same instant. These
four opinions are all affirmative, but there is a fist much retained,
which determineth nothing, and is content to say, that it is a secret
unknown unto men : of which opinion was Saint *Augustine, Gre-De orig. Epis.
gory* and others, who, nevertheless thought the two latter affirna-^{157.} *na-28.*

tive opinions more like to be true then the former.

Let us now see when and how the *Soul* entreth into the body, <sup>The entrance
of the soul into
the body.</sup> whether altogether at one instant, or successively ; I mean the hu-
mane *Soul* : for of that of a beast there is no doubt since it is na-
tural in the seed, according to *Aristotle* (whom most do follow) ^{7.}
that is, by succession of times, and by degrees, as an artificial form,
which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other; the head, af-
terwards the throat, the belly, the legs, insomuch that the vegeta-
tive and sensitive *Soul*, altogether material and corporeal, is in the
seed, and with the descent of the Parents, which fashioneth the
body in the matrix : and that done, the reasonable *Soul* arriveth
from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three souls,
neither together, nor successively, neither is the vegetative corrupted
by the arrival of the sensitive, nor the sensitive by the arrival of the
intellectual; but it is but one *Soul* which is made, finished, & perfect-
ed in that time which nature hath prescribed. Others are of opini-
on, that the soul entreth with all her faculties at one instant, that is
to say then, when all the body is furnished with Organs, formed, &
wholly finished, and that until then there was no *Soul*, but onely a
natural virtue and *Energy*, an essential form of the seed, which
working by the spirits which are in the said seed, with the heat of
the matrix and material blood, as with instruments, do form and
build up the body, prepare all the members, nourish, move and in-
crease them; which being done this *Energie* and seminal form van-
isheth and is quite lost, so that the seed ceaseth to be seed, losing its
form, by the arrival of another more noble, which is the humane
Soul, which causeth that which was seed, or an *Embryon*, that is a
substance without shape to be no longer seed, but a man.

The *Soul* being entred into the body, we are likewise to know <sup>The residence of
the soul in the
body.</sup> what kind of existence therein it hath, and how it is there resident.

Some

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Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, or how to joyn and unite the *Soul* with the body, make it to abide and reside therein as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his ship, a Coach-man in his Coach : but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soul* should not be the form nor inward and essential part of a creature, or of a man; it should have no need of the members of the body to abide there, nor any feeling at al of the contagion of that body, but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the body, of it self subsisting, which at its pleasure might come and go, and separate it self from the body, without the destruction and diminution of all the functions thereof, which are all absurdities. The *Soul* is in the body, as the form in the matter, extended and spread throughout the body, giving life, motion, sense, to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one intire subject, which is the creature, and there is no mean or middle that doth unite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the form there is no middle, according to all Philosophy. The *Soul* then is all, in all the body ; I add not(though it be commonly said) and all in every part of the body ; for that implieth a contradiction, and divideth the *Soul*.

8.
*The seats and
instruments
of the Soul.*

Now notwithstanding the *Soul*, as it is said, be diffused and spread through the whole body, yet nevertheless, to excite and exercise its faculties, it is more specially and expressly in some parts of the body, then in others ; in which it is said to have place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without *Souls*, without form. And as it hath four principles and chief faculties, so men give it four seats, that is, those four regions, which we have noted before in the composition of the body, the four first principal instruments of the Soul, the rest refer themselves unto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the engendring faculty to the engendring parts, the natural to the liver; the vital to the heart, the animal and intellectual to the brain.

9.
*The sufficiency
of the Soul for
the exercise of
her faculties.*

We are now to speak in general of the exercise of the faculties of the *Soul*, whereunto the soul of it self is wise and sufficient, inasmuch that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, and to exercise its functions as it ought, if it be not hindred, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, That nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistresse, which maketh a man apto all things : *In finis sum
nobis omnium artium ac virtutum scimus, magisterque ex occulto*

Dem

Dico prodiit ingenium. We have, as it were, sown in us the seed of all wits and virtues, and God, as a good Master, doth produce, extend, and teach our wit: which is early shewed by induction. The vegetative soul without instruction, formeth the body in the matrix with excellent Art, afterwards it flourishest it, and makes it grow, drawing the virtual unto it, retaining and concocting it, afterwards casting out the excrements, it engendreth and reformeth the parts that fail; these are things that are seen in plants, beasts, and men. The sensitive Soul of it self, without instruction, maketh both beasts and men to move their feet, their hands, and other members; to stretch, to rub, to shake, to move the lips, to preesse the dug, to cry, to laugh. The reasonable, of it self, not according to the opinion of *Plato*, by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body; nor according to *Aristotle*, by reception and acquisition, coming from without by the senses, being of it self, as a white paper, void of impression, although that serve to good purpose; but of it self without instruction, imagineth, understandeth, retaineth, reasoneth, discoufeth. But because this of the reasonable Soul, seemeth to be more difficult then the other, and woundeth in some sort Aristotle himself, it shall be handled again in his place, in the discourse of the intellectual Soul.

It remaineth that we speak of the last point, that is, of the separation of the Soul from the Body, which is after a divers sort and manner; the one and the ordinary is natural by death, and this is not the same in beasts and men: for by the death of beasts, the soul dieth, and is annihilated, according unto that rule, By the corruption of the subject, the form perisheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the Soul is separated from the body, but is not lost, but remaineth, insomuch as it is immortall.

10.
*The separation
of the body
two-fold.
Natural
and ordinary.*

The immortality of the Soul is a thing universallly, religiouly, &c: *The immortality of the Soul* (for it is the principal foundation of all religion) and peaceably received and concluded upon throughout the world, I mean by an outward and publick profession: seriously and inwardly, not so: witnessesse so many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers in the world: yea, the *Saduces*, the greatest Lords of the Jews, did not stick with open mouth to deny it; though a thing profitable to be believed, and in some sort proved by many natural and humane reasons, but properly and better established by the authority of Religion; then any other way. It seemeth that there is in a man a kind of inclination, and disposition of nature to believe it; for man desir-

rath naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea, furious care and love of our posterity and succession. Again, two things there are that give strength thereto, and make it more plausible; the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortality of our name, which how vain soever it be, carrieth a great credit in the world: the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane justice, remaining alwayes opposite to the Divine Justice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death: so that besides that, a man is altogether carried and disposed by nature to desire it, and consequently to believe it, the Justice of God doth conclude it.

3.
The Proofs.

From hence we are to learn, that there are three differences and degrees of *Souls*, an order required even to the perfection of the Universe. Two extremes, the one is that which being altogether material, is plunged, and overwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithal corruptible, which is the *Soul* of a beast, the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or society with the matter or body, as the soul of immortal Angels or Devils. In the middle, as the mean betwixt these two, is the humane soul, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is joyned with it, and may likewise subsist and live without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortality; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformity too absurd in nature, dishonourable to the Author, and a kind of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extremes, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle; that is partly the one and partly the other: there must needs be one that ties and joyns the two ends or extremes together, and that can be none but man. Below the lowest and wholly material, is that which hath no soul at all, as stones; above the highest and immortal, is the eternal only God.

4.
2. *Non natura
zrah.*

The other separation not natural nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impulsions, and at times, is very difficult to understand, and perplex. It is that which is done by ecclaties and ravishments, which is divers, and done by different means: for there is a separation that is Divine, such as the Scripture reporteth unto us, of *Daniel*, *Zachary*, *Esdras*, *Execliel*, *S. Paul*. There is another that is Demonaical, procured by devils, and good spirits and bad, as we read of many, as of *John D'ans*, called *Lescor*, who being

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in his ecstasie, a long time held for dead, was carried into the air and cast down upon the earth ; but so soon as he felt the blow that he received by the fall, he came to himself; but by reason of the great stoure of blood which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardan* telleth it of himself, and of his father, and it continueth authentickly verified in many and divers parts of the world of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weak and women possed, whose bodies remaine not onely without motion, and the beating of the heart and arteries ; but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blows, either with iron or fire, that could be given them, and afterwards (their souls being returned) they have felt great pain in their limbs, and recounted that which they have seen and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is an humaine separation, which proceedeth either from that maladie, which *Hippocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called, *The falling sickness*, *Morbus comitialis*, the signs whereof is a foaming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed ; but in stead thereof they have a stinking favour, or it is occasioned by stipticks, stupifying and benumming medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it self with too deep an attention about a thing, carrieth away the whole strength and power of the *Soul*. Now in these three kinds of ecstasies or ravishments, *Divine*, *Diabolical*, *Humane*, the question is, Whether the *Soul* be truly and really separated from the body ; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort employed and busied about some outward thing, which is forth of the body, that it forgetteth its own body, whereby followeth a kind of intermission and vacation of the actions, and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the Divine ecstasie, the Apostle speaking of himself, and his own act, dares not define any thing. *Si in corpore vel extra corpus nescio, Deus scit : Whether in the body, or without, I know not, God knoweth.* An instruction that may serve for all others, and for other separations of less quality. Touching the *Demoniacall* ecstasie, as not to feel a blow be it never so great, to report what hath been done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent conjectures of a true separation from the body, but not altogether necessary: for the devil can so alienate and occupy the foul within the body, that it shall not seem to have any action or commerce with the body for some certain time ; and in that time so besoteth the soul by presenting things unto the imagination, that have been done a far

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off, that a man may speak and discourse thereof: for to affirm that certainly the *Soul* doth wholly depart and abandon the body. Nature is too bold and fool-hardy: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginative or intellectual is carried out, and that the vegetative soul remaineth, were more to entangle ourselves; for the *Soul* in its essence should be divided, or the accident only should be carried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane ecstasie, doubtless there is no separation of the *Soul*, but only a suspension of the parent and outward actions thereof.

II.

The state of the soul after death.

What becomes of the *Soul*, and what the state thereof is, after the natural separation by death, divers men think diversly: and this point belongeth not to the subject of this book. The *Metempyschose* and transanination of *Pythagoras*, hath in some sort been embraced by the *Academicks, Stoicks, Egyptians*, and others; but yet not of all in the same sence: for some do admit it only for the punishment of the wicked, as we read of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the judgement of God. Others, and some great, have thought that good souls, being separated, become Angels; the wicked, Devils. It had been more pleasing to have said, Like unto them; *Non nesciunt, sed errant sicut Angeli. They marry not, but shall be as the Angels of God.* Some have affirmed, that the souls of the wicked, at the end of a certain time, were reduced to nothing. But, the truth of all this, we must learn from Religion, and Divines, who speak hereof more clearly.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Soul in particular; and first of the vegetative faculty.

I.
The faculties of the soul.

After this general description of the *Soul*, in these ten points we must speak thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties thereof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetative, Sensitive, Apprehensible or Imaginative, Appetible Intelle^tive, which is the sovereign *Soul* and truly humane. Under every one of these three are divers others which are subject unto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their rank.

2.
Of the vegetative and her subalterne.

Of the vegetable and basest *Soul*, which is even in plants, I will not speak much; it is the proper subject of Physicians of health and sickness. Let me onely say, that under this there are contained other three great faculties; which follow on the other: for the first

first serveth the second, and the second the third; but the third helpt of the former. The first then is the nourishing faculty, for the conservation of the substance of particular action, which divers others do serve as the ministers of the mortal, the Concoptive, the Digestive, separating the good and proper, from the naught and hurtful; the Respirator, and the Exhaler of impurities: The second, the increasing and growing faculty, for the perfection and due quantity of the *Individualum*: The third, is the Generative, for the conservation of the kind. Whereby we see, that the two first are for the *Individualum*, and work within in the body; the third is for the kind, and hath its effect and operation without in another body, and therefore is more worthy then the other, and cometh next to a faculty more high, which is the *Sensitive*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it self.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sensitive faculty.

IN the exercise of this faculty and function of the Senses there six things required to the exercise of this faculty.

1. things do concur, whereof four are within and two without.
2. That is to say, the *Soul*, as the first efficient cause. The faculty of *Sense* (which is a quality of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it self) that is, of perceiving and apprehending outward things; which is done after a five fold manner, which we call *The five senses* (of this number we shall speal hereafter) that is to say, *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Smelling*, *Tasting*, *Touching*. The corporal instrument of the *Sense*, whereof there are five, according to the number of the *Senses*; the Eye, the Ear, the high concavity of the Nose; (which is the entrance to the first ventricles of the brain) the Tongue, the whole Skin of the body. The *Spirit* which ariseth from the brain, the fountain of the sensitive *Soul*; by certain sinews in the said instruments, by which spirit and instrument the soul exerciseth her faculty. The sensible *Species* or object offered unto the instruments, which is different according to the diversity of the sense. The object of the eye sight, according to the common opinion, is colour, which is an inherent quality in bodies, whereof there are six simple, as White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Green, and Blue; some add a seventh, which is Black; but to say the truth, that is no colour, but a privation, being like unto darkness; is the other colours more or less unto the light. Of compound colours the number is infinite:

Of the Sensitive facultie.

infinite: but to speak more truly, the true object is light which is never without colour, and without which the colours are invisible. Now the light is a quality which cometh forth of a luminous body, which makes both it self visible and all things else; and if it be terminated and limited by some solid body, it reboundeth and redoubteth its beams: otherwise if it pass without any stop or termination, it cannot be seen except it be in the root of that light, or luminous body from whence it came, nor make any thing else to be seen. Of the Ear or Hearing, the object is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies, and it is divers: the pleasant and melodious sweeteneth and appeaseth the spirit, and for its sake the body too, and drives away maladies from them both: the sharp and penetrant doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of Tasting, the object is a favour or smack, whereof there are six divers simple kinds, *Sweet*, *Sour*, *Sharp*, *Tart*, *Salt*, *Bitter*; but there are many compounds. Of smell, the object is an odour or sent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous object ascending by the Nose to the first ventricles of the brain, the strong and violent hurteth the brain, as an ill sound the ear: the temperate and good doth contrariwise r^ejoyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching, the object is heat, cold, drouth, moiture either pleasant and polite, or sharp & smarting, motion, rest, tickling

6. The middle of space betwixt the object & the instrument, which is the Air neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be

2. So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth self by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and therein the spirit assisting, receiveth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion; and the senses are not purely passive: for notwithstanding they receive, and are stricken by the object, yet nevertheless in some sense and measure they do work or react in apprehending the species and image of the object proposed.

3. In former times and before Aristotle, they did make a difference betwixt the sense of Seeing, and the rest of the sensies, and they all held, that the light was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye the beams thereof unto the outward objects, and that the other sensies were passive, receiving the sensible object; but after Aristotle, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds & images of things and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered

The

There is more and more excellent matter to be delivered of the senses herafter by our world-worn John.

Now besides these five particular fentes which are without, there is within the common fense; where all the diversie objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other, which the particular fense could not do being every one attentive to his proper object, and nor able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

CHAP. X.

Of the *senses of Nature.*

ALL knowledge is begun in us by the fenses; so say our Schoolmen: but it is not altogether true, as we shall see hereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoil further back: every one of them is a Captain and Sovereign lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great; although the one have a far greater extent, and train, and affars then the other; as a little King is as well a Sovereign in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate.

It is an opinion amongst us, that there are but five fenses of nature, because we mark but five in us; but yet there may very well be more, and it is greatly to be doubted that there are but five, because it is impossible for us to know them, to affirm them, or to deny them, because a man shall never know the want of that fense which he hath never had. There are many beasts which live a full and perfect life, which want some one of our five fenses; and a creature may live without the five fenses, save the sense of *Feeling*, which is onely necessary unto life. We live very commodiously with five, and yet (perhaps) we do want one, or two, or three, and yet it cannot be known. One fense cannot discover another: and if a man want one by nature, yet he knows not which way to affirm it. A man born blind can never conceive that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight: it may be he will say, that he would see, but that is because he hath heard say, and learned of others, that it is to be desired: the reason is, because the fenses are the first gates, & entrances

*The importance
of the natural
fenses.*

2.
The number.

to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more than five that he hath, he cannot know how to judge whether there be more in Nature; yet he may have sense. What disowreth whether the difficulties that we find in many of the works of Nature, and the effects of creatures, which we cannot understand, do proceed from the want of some sense, which we have not? Of the hidden properties which we see in many things, a man may say that there are sensible faculties in Natur; proper to judge and apprehend them; but yet he must confess that we have them not; and that the ignorance of such things proceedeth from our own fault. Who knoweth whether it be some particular sense, that discovereth in the Cock the hour of mid-night and morning, and that moves him to crow? Who taught some beasts to choose certain herbs for their cure, and many such like wonders as these are? Nor man can affirm or deny, lay this if it is, or that it is.

3.
Their sufficienc
e.

Some have alayed to give a reason of this number of the five senses, and to prove the sufficiency of them, by distinguishing and diversly comparing their outward objects; which are, either all near the body, or distant from it; if near, but yet remaining without, it is the sense of Touching; if they exceed not a fathom, it shall be more distant and present by right line; it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflexion, it is the Hearing. A man might better have said thus, That the five senses being appointed for the service of an entire man, some are entirely for the body, that is to say, *Taste* and *Touching*; that, in that it entargeth this, is that it reuineth without. Others first and principal for the soul, as *Sight* and *Hearing*; the *sight* for invention, the *hearing* for acquisition and communication; and one in the middle, for the middle spirits, and ties of the soul and body, which is the *Smell*. Again, they answere to the four Elements, and their qualities: The sense of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the air; of *Taste*, to the water and moisture; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and puttaketh both of water and fire, by reason of the bright splendour of the eye. Again, they say that there are so many, sensies, as there are kinds of sensible things; which are colour, sound, odour, taste or favour, and the fifth, which hath no proper name, the object of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plain, and so forth. But men deceiveth themselves, for the number of the sensies is not to be judged by the number of sensible things, which are no cause that there are so many. By this reason there should be many more, and one, and the same

sense should receive many divers heads of objects, and one and the same object be apprehended by divers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus*, are distinguished from the five Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attain to the knowledge of things, but by the five Senses, and that Nature hath given it to many, because it was necessary for its end and benefit.

Their comparisons are divers in dignity and nobility. The Sense of *Seeing* excelleth all the rest in five things: It apprehendeth farther off, and extendeth it self even to the fixed stars. It hath more variety of objects: for to all things, and generally in all, there is light and colour, the objects of the eye. It is more exquisite, exact, and particular, even in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending even in a moment, and without motion, even the heavens themselves: in the other senses there is a morion that requireth time. It is more divine, and the marks of Divinity are many. Liberty incomparable above others, whereby the eye feeth, or feeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoil it self, and not to suffer it self to be seen: Activity and ability to please or displease, to signifie and ministrate our thoughts, wills, and affections: for the eye speaketh and striketh, it serveth for a tongue and a hand; the other senses are purely passive. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the privation of the object thereof, which is darkness, brings fear, and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himself robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of company. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spiritual, and the iurisdictio thereof more inward. But the particular comparison of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, & of Speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the Sense of Feeling receiveth greater grief, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily, the Taste great delight, & almost no grief. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is universal, spread through the whole body, to the end the body should feel heat and cold: The organs of the rest are assigned to a certain place and member. *The weakness*

4. *Comparison.*

From the weakness and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error, and mistakings: for sithence that by their means and mix-

Of the senses of Nature.

mixture we attain to all knowledge, if they deceive us in their report, we have no other help to stick unto. But who can say, or accuse them, that they do deceive us, considering that by them we begin to learn and to know? Some have affirmed that they do never deceive us; and when they seem to do it, the fault proceedeth from something else; and that we must rather attribute it to any other thing, then to the senses. Others have said clean contrary, that they are all false, and can teach us nothing that is certain. But the middle opinion is the more true.

6.
*The mutual
deceit of the
spirit & senses*

Now whether the Senses be false or not, at the least it is certain that they deceive, yea, ordinarily enforce the discourse, the reason, & in exchange are again mocked by it. Do then but consider what kind of knowledge and certainty a man may have, when that within, and that without is ful of deceit and weakness, and that the principal parts thereof, the essential instruments of science, do deceive one another. That the Senses do deceive and enforce the understanding, it is plain in those senses whereof some do kindle with fury, others delight and sweeten, others tickle the *Soul*. And why do they that cause themselves to be let blood, launced cauterized, and burnt, turn away their eyes; but that they do well know that great authority that the Senses have over their reason? The sight of so ne bottoneis depth or precipitate downfall, astonisheth even him that is settled in a firm and sure place: and to conclude, doth not the Sense vanquish, and quite overcome all the beautiful resolutions of virtue and patience? So on the other side, the senses are likewise deceived by the understanding; which appeareth by this, that the *Soul* being stirred with Choler, Love, Hatred, or any other pallion, our senses do see and hear every thing otherwise then they are; yea, sometimes our senses are altogether dulled by the passions of the *Soul*, and it seemeth that the *Soul* retireth and shutteth up the operation of the Senses, and that the spirit being otherwise employed, the eye discerneth not that which is before it, and which it feeth, yea, the sight and the reason judge diversly of the greatness of the Sun, the Stars, nay of the figure of a staff any thing distant.

7.
*The senses
common to
man and beasts,*

In the Senses of Nature, the beasts have as well part as we, and sometimes excel us: for some have their hearing more quick then man, some their sight, others their smel, others their taste: and it is held, that in the sense of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smell, the Dog; of Taste, the Ape; of Feeling,

the Tortuis : nevertheless, the preheminence of that sense of Touch is given unto man, which of all the rest is the most brutish. Now if the Senses are the means to attain unto knowledge, and that beasts haue a part therein, yea sometimes the better part; why should not they haue knowledge ?

But the Senses are not the onely instruments of knowledge, neither are our Senses alone to be consulted or believed: for if beasts by their Senses judge otherwise of things then we by ours, as doubtless they do; who must be believed? Our spittle cleaneth and drieth our wounds, it killeth the serpent; What then is the true quality of our spittle? To drie and to cleanse, or to kill? To judge well of the operation of the senses, we must be at some agreement with the beasts, nay, with our selves: for the eye pressed down & shut, seeth otherwise then in its ordinary state; the ear stopt, receiveth the objects otherwise then when it is open: an infant sees, hears, tasteth, otherwise then a man; a man, then an old man; a sound then a sick; wise then a fool. In this great diversity and contrariety, what shall we hold for certain? Seeing that one sense believeth another, a picture seems to be held up to the view, and the hands are folded together,

8.
*The judgement
of the senses
hard and dan-
gerous.*

C H A P. XI.

Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.

THese are the three most rich and excellent jewels of all those that are in this muster, and of whose preheminency it is disputed. Touching their Organs, that of the Sight in its composition and form is admirable, and of a lively and shining beauty, by reason of the great variety and subtillty of so many small parts or pieces; and therefore it is said, That the eye is one of those parts of the body, which do first begin to be formed, and the last that is finished: and for this very cause it is so delicate; and said to be subject to sixscore maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the sense of Hearing to many great advantages. For the service of the body the Sight is most necessary, and therefore doth more import a beast, then Hearing. But for the spirit, the Hearing challengeth the upper place, The sight serveth well for the invention of things, which by it have almost all been discovered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Again, the Sight is not capable but of corporal things and particular, and that onely of their crut or superficial part; it is the instrument of ignorant men and unlearned,

A comparison
of the three.

Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.

*qui moventur ad id quod adest, quodque praesens est: Who are moved
with the present object.*

2.
*The preemi-
nency of hear-
ing.*

The Ear, is a spiritual Sense, it is the interceder and Agent of the understanding, the instrument of wise and spiritual men, capable not onely of the secrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriveth not; but also of the general kinds, and all spiritual things and divine, in which the sight serveth rather to disturb then to help; and therefore we see not onely many blind, great and wise, but some also that are deprived of their sight, to become great Philosophers; but of such as are deaf, we never heard of any. This is the way by which a man entreth the fortresse, and makes himself master of the place, and employeth his spirit in good or ill; witness the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her duty of chastity by the sound of a Harp: and *David* by the self-same means chased away the evil spirit from *Saul* and restored him to health: and that skilful player of the Flute, that sweetned the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brief, Science, Truth, and Virtue, have no other entrance into the Soul, but by the Eare. Christianity it self teacheth, that faith and salvation cometh by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, then help thereunto: that faith is the belief of those things that are not seen, which belief is acquired by hearing; and it calleth such as are apprentices or novices therein, Auditours; *xarxubus, charcibis*. Let me add this one word, that the Hearing giveth succour and comfort in darkness, & to such as are asleep, that by the sound they may be awaked, and so provide for their preservation. For all these reasons have the wisest so much recommended Hearing, the pure and virgin-guardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man; as for the safety of a city, the gates and walls are guarded that the enemy enter not.

3.
*The force and
authority of
speech.*

Speech is peculiarly given unto man, an excellent present and very necessary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth: it is the interpreter and image of the Soul, *animi index & speculum*, the messenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within issueth forth, and committeth it self to the view, all things come forth of darkness and secret corners into the light, and the spirit it self makes it self visible: and therefore an ancient Philosopher said once to a child; *Speak, that I may see thee*, that is to say, the inside of thee. As vessels are known whether they be broken or whole, full or empty by the sound, and metals by the touch; so man by

Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.

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his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is nearest the heart, is the tongue, by the root thereof; so that which comes nearest unto our thought, is our speech: for from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. In regard of him which receiveth it, it is a powerful master, an impious commander, which entereth the fortress, possesseth it self of the possessor, stirreth him up, animitereth, exasperateth, appeaseth him, maketh him sad, merry, imprinteth in him whatsoeuer passion it handleth, and feedeth the Soul of the heart, and makes it pliable to every sense: it makes him blush, wax pale, laugh, cry, tremble for fear, mad with choler, to leap for joy, and pierceth him through with passion. In regard of all, Speech is the hand of the spirit, wherewith, as the body by his, it taketh and giveth, it asketh counsel and succour and giveth it. It is the great Intermediary and Huckster: by it we traffick. *Mors à Mercurio;* peace is handled, affairs are managed, Sciences and the good of the spirit are distributed, it is the band and cement of humane society (so that it be understood: For, saith one, A man were better to be in the company of a dog than he knoweth, than in the company of a man whose language he knoweth not, *Ut extorris alieno, non sibi homini's vice,*) As a stranger unto a stranger, and not in place of a man. To be brief, it is the instrument of whosoever is good or ill, *Vita & mors in manus lingue: life and death is in the power of the tongue:* There is nothing better, nothing worse than the tongue. Of the good The tongue of a wise man is the door of a royal Cabinet, which is no sooner opened, but incontinently a thousand diversities present themselves to the eye, every one more beautiful than other, come from the Indies, Pern, Arabia; So a wise man produceth and rangeth them in good order, sentences, and Aphorisms of Philosophy, similitudes, examples, histories, wise sayings, drawn from all the mines, and treasures old and new, *Qui profert de thesauro suo nova & vetera;* Who brings forth of his treasury old and new things, which serve for a rule of good manners, of policy, and all the parts both of life and of death, which being applied in their times and to good purpose, bring with it great delight, great beauty and utility, *Malum aurum in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore suo.* Like golden apples in beds of silver, so were words spoken in due season. The mouth of a wicked man is a flinking & contagious pit, a flanderous tongue murdererth the honour of another, it is a sea and university of evils, worse then feters, fire, poyon, death, hell, *Universitas iniquitatis, malorum*

Of the other facultis, Imaginative, Memorative, &c.

malum inquietum, venenum mortiferum, ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, mitis potius infernus quam illa. The generality of iniquity, an unquiet evil, a deadly poison, a fire consuming all, whose death is most wicked, and more unprofitable then hell it self.

4.
The correspondence of Hearing & Speech. Now these two, Hearing and Speech, answer, and are accommodated the one to the other; there is great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by nature in one and the same subject, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soul doth traffick, and hath her intelligence. By these two, the souls are poured the one into the other, as vessels when the mouth of one is applyed to the entry of the other; So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deaf and dumb, the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable: Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiveth all things from without, and conceiveth as the female: Speech is the gate to go forth, by it the spirit ageth & bringeth forth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints, or irons together, there comes forth the sacred fire of truth: for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, purifie and cleanse themselves, and all manner of knowledge comes to perfection. But Hearing is the first, for there can nothing come forth of the soul, but that which first entreth: and therefore he that by nature is altogether deaf, is likewise dumb. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moveables, and utensils, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distribute them; so that the good and ill of the tongue, and almost of the whole man, dependeth upon the eare. He that hears well, speaks well; and he that hears ill, speaks ill. Of the use and government of the tongue, hereafter, *Lib. 3. Chap. 43.*

CHAP. XII.

Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitive.

THe phantaſtick or imaginative faculty, having recollected, and with-drawn the kinds and images apprehended by the ſenses, retaineth and reserveth them: in ſuch ſort that the objects being absent and far diſtant, yea, a man ſleeping, and his ſenses being bound and shut up, it preſenteth them to the ſpirit and thought; *Phantasma idola, seu imagines diuinari;* *The Phan-*

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Of the intellective facultie and truly humane.

Phantasmas are called idols, images, and representations of things, and do almost work that within in the understanding, which the object doth without in the sense.

The Memorative faculty is the Guardian and Register of all the species or kinds and images, apprehended by the sense, retired, and sealed up by the imagination.

The Appetitive faculty seeketh and pursueth those things, which seem good and convenient.

2.

3.

C H A P . X I I I .

Of the intellective facultie and truly humane.

Two things are to be known, before we enter into this discourse, the seat or instrument of this intellective faculty, and ^{the seat and instrument of} the action. The seat of the reasonable soul, *ubi sedet pro tribunali, where he sitteth as in his throne or tribunall seat,* is the brain, and not the heart, as, before *Plato* and *Hippocrates*, it was commonly thought: for the heart having feeling and motion, is not capable of wisdom.

5.

Now the brain which is far greater in man, than in all other creatures, if it be well and in such manner made and disposed, that the reasonable soul may work and exercise its powers, it must come near unto the form of a ship, and must not be round nor too great, nor too little, although the greater be lesse vicious. It must be composed of a substance and parts subtile, delicate, and delicious, well joyned and united without separation, having four little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals between and behind them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and coniunction or the vitall spirits, afterwards to be made animal, and carried to the three ventricles before, wherein the reasonable soul doth exercise its faculties, which are three, *Understanding, Memory, Imagination,* which do not exercise their powers apart and distinctly, each one in each ventricle, as some have commonly thought; but in common all three together in all three, and in every of them, according to the manner of the outward senses, which are double, and have two ventricles, in each of which the senses do wholly work, whereby it comes to passe, that he that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the

Of the intellective faculty, and truly humane.

patic) ceaseth nor nevertheless to exercise all the three; though more weakly, which he could not do, if every faculty had his chamber or ventricle apart.

2.
*The reasonable
Soul is Orga-
nical.*

Some have thought that the reasonable Soul was not organical, that is, had no need of any corporal instrument to exercise its functions, thinking thereby the better to prove the immortality of the Soul. But not to enter into a labyrinth of discource, ocular and ordinary experience disproveth this opinion, and convinceth the contrary: For it is well known that all men understand not, nor reason not alike and after one manner, but with great diversity; yea, one and the same man may be so changed, that at one time he may reason better then at another; in one age, one estate and disposition, better then in another; such an one better in health then in sickness; and another better in sickness then in health; one the same man, at one and the same time, may be strong in judgement, and weak in imagination. From whence can these diversities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence cometh it, that drunkenness, the bite of a mad dog, a burning feaver, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomack, and other accidentes, pervert and turn topsy-turvy the judgement, intellectual spirit and all the wisdom of Greece; yes, constrain the Soul to dislodge from the body? These accidentes being purely corporal, cannot reach nor arrive to this high intellectual faculty of the reasonable soul, but only to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the Soul cannot well and regularly act and exercise his functions, and being violently inforsed, is constrained either to absent it self, or depart from the body. Again, that the reasonable Soul should have need of the service of the instruments, death no way prejudice the immortality thereof: for God maketh use thereof, and accommodateth his actions; and as according to the diversity of the air, region, and climate, God brings forth men very divers in spirit and natural sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italie* men more ingenious, then in *Algeria* and *Turarie*: So the spirit according to the diversity of the organical dispositions, and corporall instruments discoureth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable Soul, is the Brain, and the temperature thereof, whereof we are to speak.

3. Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the four first qua-

qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fist besides, which is the harmony of these four. Now from the Temperature of the brain, proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable brain, and the Soul, but that which is the cause of great misery unto man, is, that faculties there be three faculties of the reasonable Soul. Understanding, Memory, Imagination, do require and exercise themselves by contrary Temperatures. The temperature which serveth, and is proper to the understanding is dry, whereby it comes to pass that they that are striken in years, do excel those in their understanding that are young, because in the brain as years increase, so moisture decreaseth. So likewise melancholick men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heaviness and filling are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor faciem, animus sapientissimus, exercitio das intellectum;* Head, dries and refines the wit, affliction gives understanding. And beasts that are of a dry temperature, as *Ants, Bees, Elephants,* are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moist temperature are stupid and without spirit, as swine: And the Southern people of the world are dry, and moderate in the inward heat of the brain, by reason of their violent outward heat.

The temperature of the memory is moist, whereof it is that infants have better memory than old men, and the morning after *The memory* that humidity that is gotten by sleep in the night, is more apt for *moist.* Infancy. *I Septentrionalis.* hear understand a moisture that is not waterish or distilling, wherein no impression may be made, but are, viscous, fat, and oily, which easily receiveth, and strongly retaineth, as it is seen in pictures wrought in oil.

The temperature of the imagination is hot, from whence it commeth that frantick men, and such as are sick of burning maladies, *The imagination* are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry, Divisiones,* and that it hath greatest force in young men, and of middle *Tumb.* years (Poets and Prophets have flourished in this age) and in the *The middle* middle parts betwixt North and South. *region.*

By this diversity of temperatures it commeth to pass, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weak in of the temperatures. *A comparison* the rest: that the temperatures of the memory and understanding are very different and contrary, it is clear, as dry and moist; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drought and moisture:

Of the intellective faculty and truly humane.

moysture : and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sick in understanding and memory, and held for fools and mad men ; but the reason thereof is, because the great heat that serveth the imagination, consumeth both the moysture which serveth the memory, and the subtily of the spirits and figures which should be in that drinessse, which serveth the understanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two.

5.
*Three only
temperatures.*

By that which hath been spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principal temperatures, which serve and cause the reasonable Soul to work, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Drinessse, Moisture : Cold, is not active, nor serveth to any purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions of the Soul ; and when we finde in some authours, that Cold serveth the understanding, and that they that have cold brains, as Melancholick men and the Southern, are wise and ingenious ; there Cold is taken, not simply, but for a great moderation of heat : for there is nothing more contrary to the understandinge, and to wisdome, then great heat, which contrariwise serveth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soul ; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receive divers degrees, subdivisions, and distinctions.

6.
*Subdivision of
the faculties.*

There are three principall offices and differences of understanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase : these Sciences which appertain to the understanding, are School Divinity, the Theorick of Physick, Logick, Philosophy naturall and moral. There are three kinds of differences of memory ; easily to receive and lose the figures ; easily to receive, and hardly to lose ; hardly to receive, and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammer, the Theorick of the Law, Positive Divinity, Cosmography, Arithmetick. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a far greater number then either of the memory or understanding : to it do properly appertain, Inventions, Merry-conceits, and Jets, Tricks of subtily, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatnesse, Elegancy, Gentility : because to it appertain, Poetry, Eloquence, Mulick, and generally whatsoever consisteth in Figure, Correspondency, Harmony, and Proportion.

7.
*The propriety
of the faculties
and their order.*

Henceby it appeareth that the vivacity, subtily, promptitude, and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination ; solidity, maturity, varity, to a drie understanding. The imagina-

tion is active and stirring, it is it that undertaketh all, and sets all the rest a work : the understanding is dull and cloudy : the memory is purely passive, and see how ; The imagination first gathereth the kinds and figures of things both present, by the service of the five senses, and ablenet by the benefit of the common sense : afterwards presenteth them if it will, to the understanding, which considerereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and judgeth ; afterwards it putteth them to the safe custody of the memory, as a Scrivener to his book, to the end he may again, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscencia*, Remembrance) or else, if it will, it commits them to the memory before it presents them to the understanding ; for to recollect, represent to the understanding, commit unto memory, and to draw them forth again, are all works of the imagination ; so that to it are referred the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would have it, to the end they may make more then three faculties of the reasonable Soul.

The common sort of people, who never judge aright, do more esteem of memory, and delight more in it, then in the other two, because they have much use of counting, and it makes greater shew and stir in the world, and they think, that to have a good memory is to be wise ; esteeming more of Science, then of Wildome ; but yet of the three it is the least, being such as may be even in fools themselves : for very seldom is an excellent memory, joyned with understanding and wiidome, because their temperatures are contrary. From this error of the common people, comes that ill course, which every where we see, in the instruction of our youth, who are alwayes taught to learn by heart, (so they term it) that which they read in their books, to the end they may afterw:ards be able to repeat it ; and so they fill and charge the memory with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the understanding, and to form the judgement, whereby he may be made able to make use of his own proper good, and his naturall faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things : so that we see that the greatest scholars that have all Aristotle and Cicero in their heads, are the veriest fots, and most unskilful in publick affairs, and the world is governed by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the understanding is the first, the most excellent and principall peece of harnesse : If that speed well, all goes well,

8.
Their compari-
son in dignit.

See of this lib.
3. cap. 13.

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well, and a man is wise; and contrarwaise, if that miscarry, all goes a crosse. In the second place is the imagination: the memory is the last.

9.
*An Image of
the three facul-
ties of the soul.*

All these differences, it may be, will be better understood by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable soul. In every Court of justice, there are three orders or degrees; the highest are the Judges, with whom there is little stir, but great action. for without the moving or stirring of themselues, they judge, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of judgement, the highest part of the soul. The second are the advocates and Proctors, in whom there is great stir and much adoe, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, onely they hatch and prepare the busynesse: this is the picture of the imagination, an undertaking unquiet faculty, which never resteth, no not in the profoundest sleep; and it makes a noise in the brain, like a pot that feetheth, but never setteth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stir nor action, but pure passion, as the Guardian or Custos of all things, and this representeth the memory.

10.
*The action of
the reasonable
soul.*

The action of the reasonable Soul, is the knowledge and understanding of all things: The spirit of man is capable of understanding all things, viisble, invisible, universal, particular, sensible, insensible, *Intellexus est omnia: Understanding is all:* but it self either understandeth it not at all, as some are of opinion (witnessesse so great and almost infinite opinions thereof, as we have seen before by those doubts and objections that have always crossed it) or very darkly, imperfectly, and indirectly, by reflection of the knowledg of things upon themselves, by which it perceiveth and knoweth that it understandeth, and hath power and faculty to understand: this is the manner whereby the spirit knows it self. The first sovereign Spirit, God, doth first know himself, and afterwards in himself all things; the latter spirit, Man, quite contrary, all other things rather then himself, and is in them as the eye in a glass: how then should it act or work in it self without means, and by a straight line?

11.
*The mean
whereby it
worketh.*

But the question is concerning the means whereby it knoweth and understandeth things. The common received opinion that came from Aristotle himself is, that the *Spirit* knoweth and understandeth by the help and service of the Senses, that it is of it self as a white empty paper, that nothing commeth to the understanding,

ding, which doth not first pass the senses? *Nil est in intellectu quod non faciat prius in sensu.* There is nothing in the understanding, which is not first in the sense. But this opinion is false: first because (as all the wisest have affirmed, and hath been before touched) the seeds of all sciences, and virtues are naturally dispersed and distributed into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their own; and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then they sufficiently abound. Besides, it is injurious both to God and nature: for this were to make the state of the reasonable Soul worse than that of other things, then that of the vegetative and sensitive, which of themselves are wise enough to exercise their functions, as hath been said; for beasts without the discipline of the senses know many things, the universals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know all men; and are taught to avoid the danger of things hurtful, and to seek and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shameful and absurd, that this so high and so divine a faculty should begg its good of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which do apprehend only the simple accidents; and not the forms, natures, essence of things; much less things univerial, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Again, if the Soul were made wise by the aid of the senses, it wold follow, that they that have their senses most perfect and quick, should be most witty, most wise; whereas many times we see the clean contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more unapt, and that many have of purpose deprived themselves of the use of some of them, to the end the soul might better, and more freely execute its own affaires. And if any man shall object that the soul being wise by nature, and without the help of the senses, all men must necessarily be wise, and always understand and reason alike: which being so, how commeth it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that understand, execute the functions more weakly at one time then at another, the vegetative soul far more strongly in youth, the reasonable soul more weakly then in old age, and in a certain state of health or sicknesse, then at another time? I may answer, that the argument is not good: for touching the first, that is, That all men must be wise: I say, that the faculty and virtue of understanding is not given alike unto all, but with great inequality, & therefore it is a saying as ancient as honourable, even of the wisest, that the acting understanding was given but to few;

and

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities.

and this inequality prooveth that Science comes not of sense : for as it hath been said, they that excel others in their senses, come short of others in their understanding and Science. Touching the second; The reasoun why a man doth not exercise his functions alwayes after one manner, is because the instruments whereby the Soul must necessarily work, cannot alwayes be disposed as they should ; and if they be for some speciall kind of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the brain, by which the Soul worketh, is divers and changeable ; being hot and moist, in youth, it is good for the vegetative, naught for the reasonable ; and contrariwise, being cold and dry, in old age, it is good for the reasonable, ill for the vegetatiye. The brain by a hot burning malady being heated and purified, is more fit for invention and divination, unfit for maturity and soundnes of judgement and wisdome. By that which hath been spoken let no man think, that I affirm that the spirit hath no service from the senses, which I confess to be great, especially in the begining, in the discovery, and invention of things : but I say in the defence of the honour of the spirit, that it is false that it dependeth upon the senses, and that we cannot know any thing, understand, reason, discourse, without the sense : for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can do nothing without it.

12.

The spirit in this understanding faculty procedereth diversly, and by order : It understandeth at the first instant, simply and directly a Lion to be a Lion, afterwards by consequents that he is strong : for seeing the effects of his strength, it concludeth that he is strong. By division or negative, it understandeth a Hare to be fearful ; for seeing it flie and hide it self, it concludeth that a Hare is not strong, because fearful. It knoweth some by similitude, others by a collection of many things together.

C H A P. X I V.

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reasons, invention, verity thereof.

THIS humane Spirit, and *Oeconomy* of this great and high intellectual part of the soul is a depth of obscurity, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and involved labyrinth, and bottomless pit, consisting of many parts, faculties, actions, divers motions, having many names, doubts and difficulties.

The first office thereof is simply to receive and apprehend the images

images and kinds of things, which is a kind of passion and impression of the Soul, occasioned by the objects & the presence of them ; this is imagination and apprehension.

The force and power thereof, to seed, to handle, to stirre, to concoct, to digest, the things received by the imagination : this is reason, *λόγος*.

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conjoyn, separate, divide the things received, and to add likewise others : this is discourse, reasoning, *λόγιον, διάλογος, γνωστική διατύπωσις*.

The subtile facility, and chearful readines to do all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium* ; and therefore to be ingenious, sharp, subtile, piercing, is all one.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and rewarding of it, to frame a resolution more solid : this is judgement.

The effect in the end of the understanding : this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it self, to put forward, and to advance the thing known : this is will. *Intellectus extensus & promotus*.

Wherefore all these things, *Understanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Judgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same essence, but all divers in force, virtue, and action : for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weak in another : and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtlety, may be weak in judgement and solidity.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatness of the spirit of man, the capacity, vivacity, quickness thereof : let i be called the image of the living God, a taste of the immortal substance, a stream of the Divinity, a celestial ray, whereunto God hath given reason, as an animated stern to move it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmony ; that by it there is a kind of kindred betwixt God and man : and that he might often remember him, he hath turned the root towards the heavens, to the end he should alwayes look towards the place of his nativity : to be brief, that there is nothing great upon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit ; if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth above the heavens, These are all pleasing and plausible words, whereof the Schools do sing.

2.
*The general
description and
commendation
of the Spirit.*

But

Of the humane Spirit, she parts, functions, qualities.

But I desire, that after all this we come to sound and to study how to know this spirit : for we shall find after all this, that it is both to it self and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feit, a tedious and importunate parasite, and which, as a juggler and player at fast and loose, under the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inventeth, and causeth all the mischiefs in the world; and the truth is, without it there are none.

4. There is far greater diversity of spirits then of bodies, so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more *Diversities of distinctions of the spirit.*
See hereof more chap. 39. forms or fashions to be spoken of : we may make three classes or forms, whereof each one hath many degrees : The first, which is the lowest, are those weak, base, and almost brutish spirites, near neighbours to beasts themselves, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the seed and temperature of the brain, either too cold, or too moist, as amongst other creatures, fishes are the lowest; or by reason that they have not been in some sort removed, and reviewed, but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these we make no great account, as being unfit to be ordered and settled into any certain and comitant society, because both for their own particular they cannot possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should alwayes be under the tuition of another, this is the common and base people, *qui vigilans sterit ; mortua cui vita est ; prope jam vivo ariue videni ;* who waking snorteth, whose life is dead, or rather almost alive, and seeing, which understandeth not, judgeth not it self. The second which is the highest, are those great and high spirites, rather devils then ordinary men, spirites well born, strong and vigorous. Of these kind of people, there was never age yet could tell how to build a common weal. The third which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees, of these almost is the whole world composed. Of this distinction and others, hereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be known, as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwayes in motion.

The particular description of the spirit. First therefore it is a perpetual agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather then it will, it forgeth false and phantastical subjects, in earnest deceiving it self, even to its own discredit. As idle and unmanured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thousand kinds of wild and unprofitable herbs, un-

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reason, invention, verity thereof.

until they be sown with other seeds, and women alone without the company of men, bring forth sometimes great abundance of unformed, indigested lumps of flesh : so the *Spirit*, if it be not busied about some certain object, it runs riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not, and if it have not a settled limit, it wandereth and loseth it self. For, to be every where, is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*; but yet it must proceed from elsewhere, then from it self. If it be solitary, and wanteth a subject to work on, it creepeth along, and languisheth; but yet it must not be enforced. For too great a contention, and intention of the *Spirit* over-bent, and strained, deceiveth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

It is likewise universal, it meddleth and minglēth it self withal, it hath no limited subject or jurisdiction. There is not any thing ^{universal} wherewith it playeth not his part, as well to vain subjects and of no account, as high and weighty ; as well to those we can understand, as those we understand not. For to know that we cannot understand or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must stick in the bone & bark thereof, is an excellent sign of judgment ; for science, yea truth it self, may lodge near us without judgment, and judgement without them, yea, to know our own ignorance, is a fair testimony of judgement,

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy, running in a moment from the one end of the world to the other, without stay or rest stirring it self, and penetrating through every thing ; *Nobilis & inquietus sudden.* *mentis homini data est, nunquam se tenet ; spiritus vagus, quietis impatiens, novitate rerum latissima. Non mirum ex illo caelesti spiritu descendit, caelestium autem natura semper in motu est : A noble and unquiet mind is given unto man, who never withholdeth her motion, inconstant, every where dispersed, impatient of rest, delighted most with novelties : No marvel if she descend of celestiall spirit ; for that the nature of celestiall things, is to be in perpetuall motion. This great speed & quicknes, this agility, this twinkling of the eye, as it is admirable, and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propensity unto folly and madnesse, as perh aply you still hear.*

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetual agent without repose, universal, prompt, and sudden, it hath been accounted immortal, and to have in it self some mark and sparkle of Divinity.

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities.

The action of the spirit is alwayes to search, ferret, contrive, without intermission, like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seek, and therefore Homer calls men *diagnes*. There is no end of our inquisitions : the pursuits of the spirit man are without limits, without form : the food thereof is double ambiguity, it is a perpetuall motion without rest, without bound. The world is a school of inquisition ; agitation and hunting is its proper dish : to take, or to fail of the prey, is another thing.

But it worketh and purfュeth its enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order, and without measure : it is a wandring instrument, moveable, diversly turning ; it is an instrument of lead and of wax, it boweth and straiteneth, applieth it self to all more supple and facile then the water, the aire, *Flexibilis, omni humore obsequensior* : *& ut spiritus, qui omni materia facilior & tenuior* : It is flexible, and more yielding to every humour, and as the spirit, which is more facil and easie to every matter or substance. It is the shoe of Theramenes, fit for all.

The cunning is to find where it is ; for it goes alwayes athwart, and crosse, as well with a lie, as with truth : it sporteth it self and findeth a seeming reason for every thing ; for it maketh that which is impious, unjust, abominable in one place ; piety, justice, and honour in another : neither can we name any law, or custome, or condition, that is, either generally received of all, or rejected ; the marriage of those that are neir of bloud, the murder of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, lawful in another. *Plato* refused an embroydered and perfumed robe offered him by *Dionysius*, saying, That he was a man, and therefore would not adorn himself like a woman. *Aristippus* accepted of that robe, saying, The outward acoutrement cannot corrupt a chaste mind. *Diogenes* washing his coleworts, and seeing *Aristippus* passe by, answered him, If thou knewest how to live with coleworts, thou wouldest never follow the court of a Tyrant. *Aristippus* answered him, if thou knewest how to live with Kings, thou wouldest never wash coleworts. One persuaded *Solon* to cease from the bewailing the death of his sons, because his tears did neither profit nor help them. Yea, therefore (saith he) are my tears lust, and I have reason to weep. The wife of *Socrates* redoubled her grief, because the Judges put her husband to death unjustly : What, saith he, wouldest thou rather I were justly condemned ? There is no good, saith a wifeman, but that to the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared, *In equo enim est dolor & miseria*.

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reason, invention, verity thereof.

misse rei, & timor amittenda : A like troublesome is the grief of a thing already lost, and the fear lest it should be lost. Quite contrary, saith another, we embrace and lock up that good a great deal the more carefully, which we see less sure, and alwayes fear will be taken from us. A Cynick Philosopher demanded of *Antigonus* the King, a dram of silver ; That, saith he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then give me a Talent, saith the Philosopher. And that, saith the King is no gift for a Cynick. One said of a King of *Sparta* that was gentle and debonair, He is a good man even to the wicked. How shoulde he be good unto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked ? So that we see, that the reason of man hath many visages : it is a two-edged sword, a staff with two pikes. *Ognime daglia ha il suo riverso*: there is no reason but hath a contrary reason, saith the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this voluntarie & flexibility proceedeth from many causes ; from the perpetual alteration and motion of the body, which is never twice in a mans life in one & the same estate ; from the objects which are infinite, the air it self, and the serenity of the heaven,

11.

Tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse

Jupiter autiferas Istravit lampade terras :

Mens minds on earth, the self-same conse do run,

Being fair or foul as is th' Olympick Sun.

and all outward things : inwardly from those shakings and tremblings which the Soul gives unto it self by the agitation, and stirreth up by the passions thereof : insomuch that it beholdeth things with divers countenances ; for whatsoever is in the world hath divers lustres, divers considerations. *Epictetus* said, it was a pot with two hands. He might better have said with many.

The reason hereof is, because it entangleth it self in its own work, like the Silk-worm ; for as it thinketh to note from far, ^{12.} *I* ^{The reason of} know not what appearance of light, and imaginary truth, and flies ^{this entangle-} unto it ; there are many difficulties that crosse the way, new sent ^{ment.} that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

The end at which it aimeth is two-fold, the one more common and natural, which is Truth, which it searcheth and pursueth ; for ^{12.} *The end is ve-* there is no desire more natural then to know the truth : we assay all *rity, which it* the means we can to attain unto it, but in the end all our endeavours come short ; for truth is not an ordinary booty, or thing *can neither at-* that will suffer it self to be gotten and handled, much lesse to be *tain nor find.*

Of the humaine Spirit, the parts, functions & qualities,
 possessed by any humaine Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosome of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, understandeth not any thing aright, in purity and in truth as he ought : appearances do alwayse compels him on every side, which are as well in those things that are false, as true. We are born to search the truth, but to possesse it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himselfe into it, but his that runs the fairest course towards the mark. When it falleth out that he hits upon a truth, it is by chance and hazard ; he knows not how to hold it, to possesse it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errors are received into our soul, by the self-same way and conduit that the truth is : the spirit hath no means either to distinguish or to choose ; and as well may he play the soothsayer that tells a truth, as a lie. The means that is wert, for the discovery of truth, are reason and experience, both of them very weak, uncertain, divers, wavering. The greatest argument of truth, is the general consent of the world. Now the number of Fools doth far exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how shalld that general consent be agreed upon, but by corruption, and an applause given without judgement and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began the dance.

14.
The second end of invention. The other end, less natural, but more ambitious, is Invention, unto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honour, to the end it may raise it self, and prevail the more : this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an Image of the Divinity. From the sufficiency of this invention, have proceeded all thole works, which have ravished the whole world with admiration ; which if they be such as are for the publick benefit, they have deified their Authours. Those works that shew rather finenesse of wit, than bring profit with them, are painting, carving, architecture, the art perspective ; as the Vine of *Zenous*, the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the Image of *Memnon*, the Horse of *Airain*, the wooden Pigeon of *Architas*, the Crow of *Myron*, the Elie and Eagle of *Monroyall*, the Sphear of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimedes*, with his other engins. Now Art and Invention seem not onely to imitate Nature, but to excel it, and that not onely in the *Individuum* or particular (for there is not any body either of man or beast so univerally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature, I mean besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diets, & proper sub-

subject of art, those distillations of waters and oyls, made of simples, which Nature framed not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we think ; and to speak properly and truly, there is no invention but that which God revealeth : for such as we account and call so, are but observations of natural things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the Art Optick from shadows, Sun-dials from the shadows of trees, the graving of Seals from precious stones.

By all this that hath before been spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quick and *The Spirit vs
of dangerouſe* vigorous : for being so industrious, so free and universal, making its motions so irregularly, using its liberty so boldly in all things, not tying it self to any thing ; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an unjust tyranny : it will undertake to examine all things, to judge the greatest part of things plausibly received into the world, to be ridiculous and absurd, and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it self against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way, and loseth it self ; and we cannot but see, that they that have any extraordinary vivacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest roof of that middle *classis* before spoken of) are, for the most part, lawlesse both in opinions and manners. There are very few of whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the liberty of whose judgements a man may wade without temerity, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to find a great and lively spirit, well ruled and governed: it is a dangerous sword which a man knows not well how to guide ; for from whence come all those disorders, revolts, heresies and troubles in the world, but from this ? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingenii: nihil sapientiae odiosus acumine nimio. Great errors proceed not but from great wits: nothing is more prejudicial to wisdom, than too much sharpnesse of wit.* Doubtless that man lives a better time, and a longer life, is more happy and far more fit for the government of a Common-wealthe, saith Thucidides, that hath an indifferent spirit, or somewhat beneath a mediocrity, then he that hath a spirit so elevated and transcendent, that it serveth not for any thing but the torment of himself and others. From the firmest friendships do spring the greatest ennemities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies : and even so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our souls the most desperate resolutions

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities.

and disorderly Frenesies. Wisdome and folly are near neighbours, there is but a half turn betwixt the one and the other ; which we may easily see in the actions of mad men. Philosophy teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest folly, but of the finest wit. And therefore, saith Aristotle, there is no great spirit without some mixture of folly. And Plato telleth us, that in vain a temperate and sound spirit knocked at the door of Poetry. And in this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets do love sometimes to play the fool, and to leap out of the hinges. *Insanire jucundum est, dulce despere in loco : non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.* It is a delightful thing sometimes to be mad, a sweet matter in some cases to be foolish : The mind unlesse it be altogether employed, can do no great matter, or attempt any thing of moment as long as it is wholly collected within it self.

16.
It must be bridled and why.

Seneca

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keep it within narrow bounds, to bridle and bind it with Religions, Laws, Customs, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Promises, mortal and immortal, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawless kind of liberty it freeth it self, and escapeth all these, so unruly is it by nature, so fierce, so opinative: and therefore it is to be led by Art, since by force it cannot. *Natura contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium argue arduum nitens, sequiturque facilius quam ducitur, ut generosi & nobiles equi melius facili frano reguntur.* The mind of man is naturally stubborn, always inclining to difficult and contrary things, and doth easier follow them is lead by force, like unto generous horses, that are better governed with an easie bridle, then a cutting bit. It is a surer way gently to tutour it, and to lay it asleep, then to suffer it to wander at its own pleasure: for if it be not well and orderly governed, (as they of the highest classis which before we spake of) or weak, and soft and plain (as those of the lower rank) it will lose it self in the liberty of its own judgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by some means or other held back, as having more need of lead then wings, of a bridle then a spur, which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing that people of an indifferent spirit, lived in more quiet and content, then the over-quick and ingenious. There have been more troubles and seditions in ten years in the only city of Florence, then in five hundred years in the countries of the Helvicians and the Retians. And to say the truth, men of a common sufficiency

ficiency are most honest, better citizens, more pliant and willing to submit themselves to the yoke of the laws, their superiors, reason it self, then those quick & clear-sighted men, that cannot keep themselves within their own skins. The finest wits are not the wisest men

The Spirit hath its maladies, defects, tares or refuse, as well as the body and much more, more dangerous, and more incurable : but *The defect of the spirit.* that we may the better know them, we must distinguish them : some are accidental, and which come from else-where, and those *Accidental proceeding from three causes.* arise from three causes : the disposition of the body: for it is manifest, that the bodily malady which after the temperature thereof, doth likewise alter the spirit & judgement ; or from the ill composition of the substance of the brain, and organs of the reasonable Soul, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that have their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the *universal contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the world.* wherewith the Spirit being preoccupied, tainted, and overcome, or which is worse, made drunken, and manacled with certain phantastical opinions, it ever afterwards followeth and judgeth according to them, without regard either of further enquiry, or recoilings back: from which dangerous deluge all spirits have not force and strength to defend themselves.

The third much more near, is the malady and corruption of the *will, and the force of the passion.* this is a world turned topsy-turvy : the will is made to follow the understanding as a guide and lamp unto it ; but being corrupted and seized on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of our first father *Adam*) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the understanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous judgements : Envy, Malice, Hatred, Love, Fear, make us to respect, to judge, to take things otherwise then they are, and quite otherwise then we ought, from whence cometh that common cry, Judge without passion. From hence it is that the beautiful and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base mis-constructions, that vain & wicked caufes and occasions are feigned. This is a great vice and a proof of a malignant nature and sick judgement, in which there is neither great subtlety nor sufficiency, but malice enough: This proceedeth either from the envy they bear to the glory of another man, or because they judge of others according to themselves, or because they have their taste altered, and their sight so troubled, that they cannot discern

of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions qualities,

discern the clear splendour of virtue in its native purity ; From this self-same cause and source it cometh, that we make the virtues and vices of another man to prevail so much, and extend them further then we ought, that from particularities we draw consequents and general conclusions : if he be a friend, all sits well about him, his vices shall be virtues ; if he be an enemy, or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him : insomuch that we shame our own judgement, to smooth up our own passions. But this rests not here, but goeth yet further ; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errors in our faith and religion, if we look well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt wills, from a violent and voluptuous passion, which afterwards draweth unto it the understanding it self, *Sedit populus manducare & bibere, &c. quod vult non quod est, credit, qui cupis errare* : *The people sitth down to eat and drink, &c. He that hath a meaning to go astray believes every thing as he would have it, not as it is indeed.* In such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath been afterwards held and maintained for a verity, and revelation from heaven : that which was only in the sensuality, hath taken place in the highest part of the understanding : that which was nothing else but a passion and a pleasure, hath been made a religious matter and an article of faith : so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soul amongst themselves. These are the three outward causes of the faults and miscarriages of the Spirit, judgement, and understanding of man ; The body, especially the head, sick, or wounded, or ill fashioned ; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof ; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soul, which are all inferiour unto it. The first are pitiful, and some of them to be cured, some not : the second are excusable and pardonable : the third are accusable and punishable, for suffering such a disorder so near them as this is ; those that should obey the Law, to take upon them to give the Law.

18.
Naturell.

There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more natural unto it, and in it. The greatest and the root of all the rest is pride and presumption (the first and original fault of all the world, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all evils) by which a man is onely content with himself, will not give place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposeth himself in his own opinions, takes upon him to judge and condemn others, yea even that which he understands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God ever made

made, is of judgement, because every man is content with his own, and thinks he hath enough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selves. We never understand sufficiently and truly the weakness of our spirit : but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writing of others but of it self, for which cause this first book hath been written.

C H A P. X V.

Of Memory.

Memory is many times taken (by the vulgar sort) for the sense and understanding, but not so truly and properly : for both by reason (as hath been said) and by experience, the excellency of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weakness of the other; and to say the truth, it is a faculty very profitable for the world, but it comes far short of the understanding, and of all the parts of the *Soul*, is the more delicate, and most frail. The excellency thereof is not very requisite, but to three sorts of people; Merchants or men of Trade, great talkers, (for the store-house of the memory is more full and furnished, than that of invention ; for he that wants it, comes short, and must be fain to frame his speech out of the forge of his own invention.) and liars, *mendacem oportet esse memorem*: *it behoveth a liar to have a good memory*. From the want of memory proceed these commodities: to lie seldome, to talk little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory sufficeth for all.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the Imagination and Opinion.

THe Imagination is a thing very strong and powerful, it is it that makes all the stir, all the clatter ; yea the perturbation of the world proceeds from it (as we have said before, it is either the only, or at least the most active and stirring faculty of the Soul.) The effects thereof are marvellous and strange: it worketh not *The effects of* only in its own proper body and Soul, but in that of another man, *the Imagination* yea it produceth contrary effects: it makes a man blush, wax *on marvellous*, pale, tremble, dote, to waver; these are the least and the best: it takes away the power and use of the engendring parts, yea, when there is most need of them, & is the cause why men are more sharp

Of the Imagination and Opinion.

sharp and austere, not onely towards themselves, but others, witness those ties and bands, whereof the world is full, which are for the most part impressions of the apprehension, and of fear. And contrariwise, without endeavour, without object, and even in sleep it satisfieth the amorous desires, yea changeth the sex, witness *Lucius Cossitus*, whom *Pliny* affirmeth to have seem to be changed from a woman to a man, at the day of his marriage ; and divers the like. it marketh sometimes ignorinously, yea it killeth, and makes abortive the fruit within the womb ; it taketh away a mans speech, and gives it to him that never had it, as to the son of *Cræsus* : it taketh away motion, sense, respiration. Thus we see how it worketh in the body. Touching the Soul, it makes a man to lose his understanding, his knowledge, judgement; it turns him fool and mad-man, witness *Gallus Vibius*, who having over-bent his spirits in comprehending the essence & motions of folly; so dislodged and dis-joyned his own judgement, that he could never settle it again : it inspireth a man with the fore-knowledg of things secret, and to come, and causeth those inspirations, predictions, and marvellous inventions, yea it ravisheth with extasies : it killeth not seemingly, but in good earnest, witness that man, whose eyes being covered to receive his death, and uncovered again, to the end he might read his pardon, was found stark dead upon the scaffold. To be brief, from hence spring the greatest part of those things, which the common sort of people call miracles, visions, enchantments. It is not always the Devil, or a familiar spirit, as now adayes the ignorant people think, when they cannot finde the reason of that they see: nor alwayes the spirit of God(for those supernatural motions we speak not of here) but for the most part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent, who faith and doth such things ; or of the patient and spectator, who thinks he feeth that he feeth not. It is an excellent thing, and necessitati in such a case, to know wisely how to discern the reason thereof, whether it be natural, or supernatural, false or true, *Discretio spirituum, A discerning of spirits.* And not to precipitate our judgments, as the most part of the common people do by the want thereof. In this part and faculty of the soul doth opinion lodg, which is a vain, light, crude, and imperfect judgment of things, drawn from the outward senses, and common report, settling and holding it self, to be good in the imagination, and never arriving to the understanding, there to be examined, sifted, and laboured ; and to be made

made reason, which is a true, perfect, and solid judgment of things : and therefore it is uncertain, inconstant, fleeting, deceitful, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vain and untrue. It is the mother of all mischiefs, confusions, disorders : from it springs all passion all troubles. It is the guide of fools, sots, the vulgar sort ; as reason of the wife and dexterous.

It is not the truth and nature of things, which doth thus stir and molest our souls, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying ; Men are tormented by the opinions that they have of things, not by the things themselves. *Opinione sapius quam re laboramus ; plura sunt qua nos tenent, quam qua premunt. We are more troubled with the opinion of things, than with the things themselves ; there are more things that hold us, than which press or urge us.* The verity and *Essence* of things entreth not into us, nor lodgeth near us of it self, by its own proper strength and authority : for were it so, all things should be received of all, all alike and after the same fashion ; all should be of like credit, and true it self, which is never but one and uniform, should be embraced thorowout the whole world. Now for as much as there is so great a variety, yea contrariety of opinions in the world, and there is not any thing concerning which all do generally accord, no not the wilest and best born and bred ; it giveth us to understand, that things enter into us by composition, yielding themselves to our mercy and devotion, lodging themselves near unto us, according to our pleasure, and humour, and temper of our souls. That which I believe, I cannot make my companion believe ; but, which is more, what do I firmly believe to day, I cannot assure my self that I shall b. lieve to morrow : yea it is certain, that at another time I shall judg quite otherwise. Doubtless every thing taketh in us such place, such a taste, such a colour, as we think best to give unto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soul is, *Omnia munda mundis ; immunda, immundis : All things are clean to the pure and clean ; as also unclean, to the impure and unclean.* As our apparel and accoutrments do as well warm us, not by reason of their heat, but our own, which they preserve, as likewise nourish from the coldnes of the ice and snow ; we do first warm them with our heat , and they in recompence thereof preserve our heat.

Almost all the opinions that we have, we have not but from authority : we believe, we judge, we work, we live, we die, and all upon

3. upon credit, even as the publike use and custome teacheth us ; and we do well therein : for we are too weak to judge and chuse of our
Lib. 1. cap. 1. selves ; no the wise do it not, as shall be spoken.
¶ 2.

C H A P. XVII.

Of the Will.

*The prehemi-
nence and im-
portance of the
will.*

THe will is a great part of the reasonable soul , of very great importance, and it standeth us upon, above all things, to study how to rule it, because upon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

*The comparison
thereof with
the understand-
ing.* It only is truly ours, and in our power ; all the rest understanding, memory, imagination may be taken from us, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents : not the will.

*Doubtful, if
not erroneous.* Secondly, This is that, that keepeth a man entire, and importeth him much : for he that hath given his will, is no more his own man, neither hath he any thing of his own.

Thirdly, This it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giveth us the temper and the tincture.

As of all the goods that are in man, virtue or honesty is the first and principal, and which doth far excell knowledg, dexterity ; so we cannot but confess, that the will, where virtue and goodness lodgeth, is of all others the most excellent : and to say the truth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dis-honest, because he understandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and fair, and honest, or wicked, and dishonest ; but because he loveth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The understanding hath other preheminences : for it is unto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light unto the traveller, but in this it giveth place unto the will.

The true difference betwixt these faculties, is in that by the understanding things enter into the Soul, and it receiveth them (as those words, to apprehend, conceive, comprehend, the true offices thereof do import) but they enter not entire, and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacity of the understanding : whereby the greatest and the highest do recoil and divide themselves after a sort, by this entrance ; as the Ocean entreth not altogether into the *Mediterrane Sea*, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibraltar*. By the will, on the other side, the soul goeth forth of it, and lodgeth and liveth elsewhere

where in the thing beloved, into which it transformeth it self; and therefore beareth the name, the title, the livery, being called virtuous, vicious, spiritual, carnal: whereby it followeth, that the will is enabled by loving those things that are high, and worthy of love; is vilified, by giving it self to those things that are base and unworthy; as a wife honoureth or dishonoureth her, by that husband that she hath taken.

Experience teacheth us, that three things do sharpen our will, Difficulty, Rarity, and Absence, or fear to lose the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facility, Abundance, or Satiety, and daily presence or assured fruition. The three former give price and credit to things, the three latter engender contempt. Our will is sharpened by opposition, it opposeth it self against denial. On the other side, our appetite contemneth and letteth pass that which it hath in possession, and runs after that which it hath not, *Permissum sit vilenus; quod licet, ingratuum est, quod non licet, acrius urit*: Things permitted we despise, and that which is lawful we loath, but violently pursue those things that are prohibited. Yea it is seen in all sorts of pleasures. *Omnium rerum voluptas ipso quod debet fugari pericula crescit: All pleasures are increased, even with the danger wherewith they ought to be despised.* In as much that the two extremes, the defect and the abundance, the desire and the fruition, do put us to like pain. And this is the cause why things are not truly esteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his own Country.

How we are to direct and rule our wills, shall be said hereafter.

PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

An Advertisement.

The matter of the passions of the mind is very great and plentiful, and takes up a great room in this doctrine of wisedome. Lib. 2. cap. 6. &c. 7. lib. 3. in the virtues of fortitude and temperance. To learn how to know them, and to distinguish them, is the subject of this book. The general remedies to bridle, rule, and govern them, the subject of the second book. The particular remedies of every one of them, of the third book, following the method of this book, set down in the Preface. Now that in this first book we may attain the knowledg of them, we will first speak of them in general in this first Chapter, afterwards in the Chapters

Of the Passions in general.

ters following, particularly of every one of them. I have not seen any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, than *Le Sieur de Vair*, in his little morall books, whereof I have made good use in this passionate subject.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Passions in general.

¶ 1. *The description of Passions.* **P**assion is a violent motion of the *Soul* in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the *Soul* thinketh to be good for it, or to fly that which it takes to be evil.

2. *Their agitation.* But it is necessary that we know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselves in us; which a man may represent by divers means and comparisons: first in regard of their agitation and violence. The soul which is but one in the body, hath many and divers powers, according to the divers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh use, and the objects which are presented unto it. Now when the parts wherein it is inclosed, do not retain and occupy it, but according to the proportion of their capacity, and as far forth as it is necessary for their true use; the effects thereof are sweet, benign, and well governed: but when contrariwise the parts thereof have more motion and heat then is needful for them, they change and become hurtful; no otherwise then the beams of the Sun, which wandring according to their natural liberty, do sweetly and pleasantly warm; if they be collected and gathered into the concavities of a burning-glaſs, they burn and consume that they were wont to nourish and quicken. Again, they have divers degrees in the force of agitation; and as they have more or lesse, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselves to be ralld and digested, expressing themselves by words and tears, the greater and more violent astonish the soul, oppresse it, and hinder the liberty of its actions. *Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Light cares move the tongue, but great cause astonishmen and silence.*

2. *Of their vice and irregularities.* Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and justice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a *Commonweale*, and the state of the soul to a *state-royal*, wherein the Sovereign for the government of so many people hath under-magistrates, unto whom for the exercise of their charges, he gives laws and ordinances, res-

serving unto himself the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Upon this order dependeth the peace and prosperity of the state : and contrariwise, if the Magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Prince and the people shall suffer themselves either to be deceived by facility, or corrupted by favour; and without respect either of their Sovereign, or the Laws of him established, shall use their own authority in the execution of their affairs, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Even so in man, the understanding is the Sovereign, which hath under it a power estimative, and imaginative, as a Magistrate, both to take knowledge, and to judge by the report of the senses of all things that shall be presented, and to move our affections for the better execution of the judgements thereof : for the conduct and direction whereof in the exercise of its charge, the law and light of Nature was given unto it : and moreover, as a help in all doubts, it may have recourse unto the counsel of the Superior, and Sovereign, the understanding. And thus you see the order of the happy state thereof : but the unhappy is, when this power which is under the understanding, and above the senses, whereunto the first judgment of things appertaineth, suffereth it self for the most part to be corrupted and deceived, whereby it judgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and moveth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth us with much trouble and unquietnesse. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, ate first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but onely the face and outward form, carrying unto the image of things, with some favourable commendation, and as it were a fore judgement and prejudicte opinion of their qualities, according as they finde them pleasing, and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessary for the universal good of man : and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent judgement of the vulgar sort. From these two false advisements and reports of the Sentes, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soul and inconsiderate opinion which we conceive of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtful to be followed oneschewed ; which doubtless is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistress : for it is no sooner conceived, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and understanding, it possesseth it self of our imagination, and as within Citadel, holdeth the Fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and removeth our affections, with violent

Opinion.

Of the Passions in general.

lent motives of hope, fear, heaviness, pleasure. To be brief, it makes all the Fools, and the seditions of the soul, which are the passions, to arise.

I will likewise declare the same thing, by another similitude of military policy. The *Senses* are the *Sentinels of the soul*, watching for the preservation thereof, and messengers, or scouts to serve as *Ministers*, and *Instruments* to the understanding, the sovereign part of the *soul*. And for the better performance hereof, they have received power to apprehend the things, to draw the forces, and to embrace and reject them, according as they shall seem agreeable, or odious unto their nature. Now in exercising their charge, they must be content to know, and to give knowledge to others of what doth pass, not enterprising to remove greater forces, let by that means they put all into an *alarm* and confusion. As in an Army, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watch-word, and knowledge of the design, and purpose of the Captain that commandeth, may be deceived, and take for their succour, their enemies disguised which come unto them; or for enemies, those that come to succour: So the *Senses*, by not apprehending whatsoever is reason, are many times deceived by an appearance, and take that for a friend, which is our enemy. And when upon this thought and resolution, not attending the commandment of reason, they go about to remove the power concupiscent and irascible, they raise a sedition and tumult in our souls, during which time, reason is not heard, nor the understanding obeyed.

*The distinction
of the Passions
according to
their obj. &
and subject.
Of the concur-
piscible fix.*

4. By this time we see their regiments, their ranks, their generall kinds and special. Every passion is moved by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the soul doth simply so consider of it, this motion is called love: if it be present & such whereof the *soul* in it self taketh comfort, it is called pleasure and joy: if it be to come, it is called desire: If by that which is evil, it is hate: if present in our selves, it is sorrow and grief: it in another, it is pity: if it be to come, it is fear. And these which arise in us by the object of an apparent evil, which we abhor and fly from, descend more deeply into our hearts & arise with greater difficulty. And this is the first bond of that seditious rout, which trouble the rest and quiet of our souls, that is, in the concupiscent part, the effects whereof: notwithstanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not so violent as those that follow them: for these first motions formed in this part, by the object which presenteth

Of the Passions in Particular.

reth it self, do pass incontinently into the irascible parts, that is to say, into that compass where the soul seeketh the means to attain, or avoid that which seemeth unto it either good or ill. And then even as a wheel that is already in motion, receiving another motion by a new force, turns with far greater speed; so the *Soul* being already moved by the first apprehension, joyning a second endeavour to the first, carrieth it self with far more violence then before, and is stirred up by passions, more puissant and difficult to be tamed, insomuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, uniting themselves, & hacking the one the other by a mutual consent: for the first passions, which are formed upon an object of an appearing good, entring into consideration of means whereby to obtain it, stir up in us either hope or despair. They that are formed upon an object of an evil to come, stir up in us either fear, or the contrary which is audacity; of a present evil, choler and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly pervert the reason which they finde already shaken. Thus you see the principall winds from whence arise the tempests of our *Soul*, and the pit whereout they rise, is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandering, uncertain, contrary to nature, verity, reason, certainty) that a man hath, that the things that present themselves unto us, are either good or ill: for having conceived them to be such, we either follow them, or with violence fly from them. And these are our passions.

OF PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR.

An Advertissement.

WE will intreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanity, misery, injustice, and that foulnesse that is in them, to the end we may know and learn how justly to hate them. The counsel that is given for the avoidance of them, is in the books following. These are the two parts of physick, to shew the malady, and to give the remedy. It remaineth therefore, that here we first speak of all those that respect the appearing good, which are love and the kinds thereof, desire, hope, despair, joy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge, cruelty, fear, sadness, compassion.

In the Irascible part.

Lib. 3. is the virtue of Fortitude and Temperance.

C H A P. XIX.

Of Love in generall.

*The distinction
of love and
comparison.*

Llib. 3.

THe first and chief mistresse of all the passions is Love, which consisteth of divers subjectes, and wherof there are divers sorts and degrees. There are three principal kinds unto which all the rest are referred (we speak of the vicious and passionate love, for of the virtues, which is Amity, Charity, Dilection, we will speak in the virtue of justice) that is to say, Ambition or pride, which is the love of greatness and honour; Covetousness, the love of riches; and Voluptuous or carnal love. Behold here the three gulfs, and precipitate steps, from which, few there are that can defend themselves: the three plagues and infections of all that we have in hand, the minde, body and goods: the armories of those three captain enemies of the health and quiet of mankind, the Devil, the flesh, the world. These are in truth three powers, the most common and universal passions: and therefore the Apostle hath divided into these three whatsoever is in the world; *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum, aut carnis, aut superbia vite: All that is in the world, is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life.* Ambition, as more spiritual; so it is most high and noble then the others. Voluptuous love, as more natural and universal (for it is even in beasts themselves, where the rest are not) so it is more violent, and lesse vicious: I say simply violent, for sometimes ambition excels it: but this is some particular malady. Coyetousnesse of all the rest is the sickest and most lottish.

C H A P. XX.

Of Ambition.

*I.
The description.* **A**mbition (which is a thirst after honour and glory, a gluttonous and excessive desire of greatness) is a sweet and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous spirits, but is not without paine got forth again. We think it is our dutys to embrase whit is good, and amongst those good things, we account of honour more then them all. See here the reason why with all our strength we run unto it. An ambitious man will

Of Ambition.

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will always be the first, he never looks backward, but still forward to those that are before him: and it is a greater grief unto him to suffer one to go beyond him, then it is pleasure unto him, to leave a thousand behind him. *Haber hoc vitium omnis ambitio,* Seneca.
non respuit: All ambition hath this vice, not to look back. It is two-fold: the one of glory and honour, the other of greatnesse and command: that is profitable to the world, and in some sence permitted, as shall be proved; this pernicious.

The seed and root of ambition is natural in us. There is a proverb that saith, That nature is content with a little: and another quite contrary; That nature is never satisfied, never content; but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and to enrich it self, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with a loose bridle, it runneth headlong to greatnesse and glory. *Natura nostra imperii est avida, & ad implendum cupiditatem praecepis: We are naturally greedy of authority and empire, and run headlong to the satisfying of our desires.* And with such force and violence do some men run, that they break their own necks, as many great men have done, even at the dawning as it were, and upon the point of entrance and full fruition of that greatnesse which hath cost them so dear. It is a natural and very powerful passion, and in the end it is the last that leaveth us: and therefore one calleth it, The shirt of the soul: because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiam sapientibus* Tacitus.
cupido gloria novissima exsultur. The last vice which even the wise abandon is desire of glory.

Ambition, as it is the strongest and most powerful passion that is, so it is the most noble and haughty, the force & puissance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmounted all other things: even the strongest of the world, yea all other passions and affections, even love it self, which seemereth nevertheless to contend with it for the Primacy: As we may see in all the great men of the world, *Alexander, Scipio, Pompey*, and many other, who have courageously refused to touch the most beautiful Damosels, that were in their power, burning nevertheless with ambition, yea that victory they had over love, served their ambition, especially in *Cesar*; For never was there a man more given to amorous delights, even of all sexes, and all sorts of people, witnessesse so many exploits, both in *Rome* and in strange Countries; nor more careful and curious in adorning his person: yet ambition did always so carry him, that for his amorous

3.
*The force and
Primary
shores.*

Of Ambition.

pleasures he never lost an hour of time, which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatness, for ambition had the sovereign place in him, and did fully possess him. We see on the other side, that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of love hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affairs. But yet both of them being weighed in equall balance, ambition carrieth away the prize. They that hold that love is the stronger, say that both the soul and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it self dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spirituall: And in as much as love posseseth the body, it is therefore the more weak, because it is subject to satiety, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporal, naturall, and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by divers means have allayed, yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of satiety, yea is sharpened by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soul it self and in the reason.

^{4.}
The care of life

It doth likewise vanquish love and robbeth it, not onely of its health and tranquillity (for glory and tranquillity are things that cannot lodge together) but also of its own proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly prove, who desiring and consulting with others to make her Son Emperour, and understanding that it could not be done, but with the losse of her own life, she answereth, as if ambition it self hath spoken it, *Oculis modo imparet: Let me be slain, so he may reign.*

^{5.}
The laws.

Thirdly, ambition enforceth all the Laws, and conscience it self; the Learned have said of ambition, that it is the part of every honest man alwayes to obey the Laws, except it be in a case of sovereignty for a Kingdome, which onely deserveth a dispensation, being to dainty a morsel, that it cannot but break a mans fast; *Si violendum est ius, regnandi causa violandum est, in careris pietatem colas.* If man may at any time violate justice, it must be to gain a Kingdome; in the rest observe Justice and Piety.

^{6.}
Religion.

It likewise trampleth under foot, and contemneth the reverence and respect of Religion, witnesseth *Jeroboam*, *Mahomet*, who never took thought for Religion; but tolerated all religions, so he might reign: and all those arch-hereticks who have liked better to be chief leaders in errors and lies with a thousand disorders, than to be disciples of the truth there-

Therefore saith the Apostle, That they suffer themselves to be puffed up with this passion and affection, make shipwrack, and wander from the faith, piercing themselves thorow with many sorrows.

To be short, it offereth violence even to the laws of Nature it self. This hath been the cause of so many murders of Parents, infants, brothers; witness: *Absalon, Abimelech, Athalia, Romulus, Sei* King of the *Persians*, who killed both his father and brother, *Soliman* the great Turk, his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it bears all to the ground, so high and haughty is it. It lodgeth only in great minds, even in the Angels themselves.

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and daily enterprizes: Renown and glory doth not prostitute it self to so base a prize; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange, and unusual. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts down a man, and makes him a begger, and to duck and stoop to all sorts of people, and by all means, yea the most abject, at what base price soever, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedy of greater glory then he is capable of; and to swell and to be puffed up for every good and profitable action, is to shew his tail while he lifts up his head.

Ambition hath many and divers wayes, and practised by divers means: there is one way straight and open, such as *Alexander, Caesar, Themistocles*, took; there is another oblique and hidden, which many Philosophers and professours of piety have taken, who go forwards by going backwards, go before others by going behind them, not unlike to wier-drawers, who draw and go backward; they would fain be glorious by contemning glory. And to say the truth, there is a greater glory in refusing and trampling glory underfoot, therin the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is never better carried, better guided, then by wandring, and unusual wayes.

Ambition is a folly and a vanity, for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the smoke, in stead of the light, the shadow in stead of the body, to fasten the contentment of his mind upon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his own liber-

*Is enforceit.
Nature.*

8.

9.

10.

of Ambition.

ty, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himself, to displease himself; for the pleasure of the beholders, to let his own affections depend upon the eyes of another; so far forth to love virtue as may be to the liking of the common sort; to do good, not for the love of good, but reputation. This is to be like unto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before he give them a vent.

11.
It is insatiable. Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulf that hath neither brink nor bottom; it is that vacuity which the Philosophers could never finde in Nature; a fire which increaseth by that nourishment that is given unto it. Wherein it truly payeth his master: for ambition is onely jett in this, that it sufficeth for his own punishment, and is executioner to it self. The wheel of *Ixion* is the motion of his desires, which turn and return up and down, never giving rest unto his mind.

12.
The excuses of ambition vain. They that will flatter ambition, say it is a servant or help unto virtue, and a spur to beautiful actions; for it quitteth a man of all other vices, and in the end, of himself too; and all for virtue: but it is so far from this, that it hideth sometimes our vices; yet it takes them not away, but it covereth or rather hatcheth them for a time under the deceitful cinders of a malicious hypocrisy, with hope to set them on fire altogether, when they have gotten authority sufficient to reign publikely and with impiety. Serpents loose not their venome, though they be frozen with cold, nor an ambitious man his vices, though with a cold dissimulation he cover them: for when he is arrived to that pitch of height that he desired, he then makes them feel what he is. And though ambition quit a man of all other vices, yet it never taketh away it self, An ambitious man putteth himself forth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publick good, but yet he is never the better man that performs them, because they are not the actions of virtue, but of passion; no, though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not born for our selves, but for the weale publick. The means men use to mount themselves to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arrived thereunto, do sufficiently shew what men they are, and their own consciences tell the most that follow that dance, that however the publick good be their outward colour, yet their own particular is that they intend.

Particular aduisements and remedies against this evil you shall finde Lib. 3. Cap. 42.

C H A P.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Covetousnesse and her counter-passion.

TO love and affect riches is covetousness; not only the love and affection, but also every over-curious care and industry about riches, yea their dispensions themselves and liberty, with Art and too much attention procured, have a sent of covetousness: for they are not worthy an earnest care and attention.

The desire of goods, and the pleasure we take in possessing of them is grounded onely upon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soul, which with a venomous heat consumeth our natural affections, to the end it might fill us with virulent humours. So soon as it is lodged in our hearts, all honest and natural affection which we owe either to our parents or friends, or our selves, vanisheth away. All the rest, in respect of our profit seemeth nothing, yea we forget in the end, and contemn our selves, our bodies, our minds, for this transitory trash, and as our Proverb is, We sell our horse to get us hay.

Covetousnesse is the vile and base passion of vulgar fools, who account riches the principal good of a man, and fear poverty as the greatest evil; and not contenting themselves with necessary misery of means, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Gold-covetousnesse in smiths ballance, when Nature hath taught us to measure it by the five points. ill of necessity. For what greater folly can there be then to adore that which nature it self hath put under our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth, as unworthy to be seen, yea rather to be contemned, and trampled under foot? This is that that the onely sin of man hath torn out of the intrails of the earth, and brought unto light, to kill himself. *In lucem properi qua pugnaremus excutimus: non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, qua fuerum ima terrarum.* We dig out the bowel of the earth, and bring to light those things for which we would fight; we are not ashamed to esteem those things most highly, which are in the lowest and nethermost parts of the earth. Nature seemeth, even in the first birth of gold, and womb from whence it proceedeth, after a sort to have prelaged the misery of those that are in love with it: for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those Countries where it groweth, there grows with it neither grass, nor plant, nor other thing that is worth any thing, as giving us to understand thereby, that in those minds where the desire of this Metall groweth, there cannot remain so much as a

Of Covetousness and her counter-passion.

spark of true honour and virtue. for what thing can be more base, then for a man to degrade, and to make himself a servant, and a slave to that, which should be subject unto him? *Apud sapientes divitiae sunt in servitute, apud stultum in imperio: Riches serves wise men, but commands a fool.* For a covetous man serves his riches, not they him; and he is said to have goods as he hath a fever, which holdeth and tyrannizeth over a man, not he over it. What thing more vile then to love that which is not good? neither can make a good man; yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times pervert good manners, but never amend them? Without which so many wise men have made themselves happy, and by which many wicked men have come to a wicked end. To be brief, what thing more miserable then to bind the living unto the dead, as *Mezenius* did, to the end their death might be languishing and the more cruell; to tie the spirit to the excrement and scum of the earth; to pierce thorow his own soul with a thousand torments, which this amorous passion of riches brings with it; and to intangle himself with the ties and cords of this malignant thing, as the Scripture calleth them, which doth likewise term them thorns, and theevies which steal away the heart of man, snares of the Devil, idolatry, and the root of all evil. And truly he that shall see the Catalogue of those envies and molestations which riches engender within the heart of man, as their proper thunder-bolt and lightning, they would be more hated then they are now loved. *Desunt inopia multa, avaritia omnia: in nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus.* Poverty wanteth many things, but covetousness all; a covetous man is good to none, and worst of all to himself.

4.
The counter-passion to covetousness.

There is another contrary passion to this, and vicious, To hate riches, and to spend them prodigiously; this is to refuse the means to do well, to put in practise many virtues, and to flee that labour which is far greater in the true command and use of riches, then in not having them at all; to govern himself better in abundance then in poverty. In this there is but one kind of virtue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firm and constant. In abundance there are many, Temperance, Moderation, Liberality, Diligeunce, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not expressed, but that he look to himself: here, that he attend first himself, and then the good of others. He that is spoiled of his goods hath the more liberty to attend the more weighty affairs of the spirit: and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians, out of the greatnessse.

wesse of their courage, have put it in practise. He doth likewise discharge himself of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest government of our riches in their acquisition, conseruation, distribution, use and imployment : but he that quitteth himself, of his riches, for this reason, flyeth the labour and busines that belongs unto them ; and quite contrary, doth it not out of courage, but cowardize : and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but because he knoweth not how to make use of them, how to use them. And not to be able to endure riches, is rather weakness of mind, then wisedome, saith *Seneca*.

C H A P. XXII.

Of carnall Love.

Carnal love is a Fever and furious passion, and very dangerous unto him that suffereth himself to be carried by it : For what becomes of him? He is no more himself; his body endureth a thousand labours in the search of his pleasure; his mind a thousand hells to satisfie his desires; and desire it self increasing, grows into fury. As it is natural, so it is violent and common to all, and therefore in the action thereof it equalleth and coupleth fools and wisemen, men and beaults together. It maketh all the wisdome, resolution, contemplation, and operation of the soul beastly and brutish. Hereby, as likewise by sleep, *Alexander* knew himself to be a mortall man, because both these supprese the faculties of the soul.

I.
It is strong, na-
tural and com-
mon.

Philosophy speakeith freely of all things, that it may the better find out their causes, govern and judge of them ; so doth Divinity, *Why ignomi-*
which is yet more chaste and more strait. And why not, since that *nisi*.
all things belong unto the jurisdiction and knowledge thereof? The Sunne shines on the dunghil, and is neither infected, nor annoyed therewith. To be offended with words is a token either of great weakness; or some touch or guilt of the same malady. Thus much be spoken for that which followeth, or the like if it shall happen. Nature on the one side with violence thrutteh us forward unto this action ; all the motion of the world resolveth and yieldeth to this copulation of the male and female : on the other side it causeth us to accuse, to hide our selves, to blush for shame, as if it were a thing ignominious and dishonest. We call it a shamefull

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full act, and the parts that serve thereunto our shameful parts. But why shameful, since natural, (and keeping it self within its own bounds) just, lawful, and necessary? Yea, why are beasts exempted from this shame? It is because the countenance seems foul and deformed? Why foul, since natural? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted; Is it to the end it may serve as a bridle and a stay to such a kind of violence? Why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serveth as a spur, and as sulphur; or that the instruments thereof move without our consent, yea against our wills? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashful, and many other things move of themselves in us, without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shameful: not onely inward and hidden as the pulse and motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serve the appetite of eating, drinking, discharging the brain, the belly, and their shuttings and openings, are besides, nay, many times against our wills: witness those sneesings, yawnings, tears, hoquets, and fluxions, that are not in our own power, and this of the body: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, believeth, misbelieveth, and the will it self, (which many times willeth that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparent: the visage blushesth, waxeth pale, wan, the body groweth fat, lean, the hair turneth gray, black, white, grows, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that hereby the poverty and weaknesse of man may be the more truly shewed? that is as well seen in our eating and drinking, our griefs, weariness, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoever the reason be, the action in it self, and by nature is no way shameful, it is truly natural; so is not shame: witness the beasts. Why say I beasts? The nature of man, saith Divinity, maintaining it self in its first original state, had never known what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence cometh shame, but from weakness, and weaknesse but from sin, there being nothing in Nature of it self shameful? The cause then of this shame not being in Nature, we must seek it elsewhere. It is therefore artificial. It is an invention forged in the closet of *Venus*, to give the greater prite to the busyness, and to enkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burn the clear, as Smiths use to do, to enflame the desire to see what it is, that is hidden; to hear and know what it is that is muttered and whispered. For to handle things

things darkly as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giveth taste and estimation unto them. Contrariwise, a boore, free, and open permission and commodity, derogateth from the worth, and taketh away the true relish and delight thereof.

This action then it self, and simply taken, is neither shameful nor vicious, since it is natural and corporal, no more then other the *In what sense* like actions are : yea, if it be well ordered it is just, profitable, necessary at the least, as it is to eat and drink. But that which doth so much discredit it, is, that moderation is seldom kept therein, and that to attain thereunto, we make great stirres, and many times use bad means, whereby it draweth after it, if it go not before, many evils, all worse then the action it self. The charge riseth above the principal, and this is to fish (as it is said) with thredds of gold and purple. And all this is purely humane. Beasts that follow simply nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the art of man on the one side sets a strait guard about it, planteth at the gate shame to give it a relish : on the other side (O the cousenage of men !) it inflameth and sharpeneth the desire, it devisheth, removeth, troubleth, turneth all topie-turvie to attain unto it, (witness Poetry, which sporteth not it self in any thing, so much as in this subiect) and findeth every entrance unto it to be better, then by the gate, and the lawful way, and followeth every wandering way, rather then the common way of marriage.

C H A P. XXIII.

Desires, Concupiscence.

There arise not so many billows and waves in the Sea, as desires
in the heart of man : it is a bottomless depth, it is infinite, ^{I.} *The bottomless*
divers, instant, confused, and irresolute ; yea, many times hor-*depth of desire.*
rible and detestable, but ordinarily vain, and ridiculous in its own
desires.

But first it shall not be amisse to distinguish them. Some are
natural, and they are just and lawful : they are likewise in beasts, ^{2.} *Their distin-*
they have their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them ; *inan.* *Natural* ne-
and living according to those, there is no man a begger. Of these *cessary, lib. 2.*
shall be spoken hereafter more at large : for (to say the truth) *cap. 6.* these are not passions. Others are besides nature, proceeding from *Not natural.*
our opinions and phantasie, artificial, superfluous, which we may,
for distinction sake, call concupiscences or lusts. These are purely
hu-

Seneca.

humane ; beasts know not what they are ; onely man is immoderate in his appetites : these are without limits, without end, and age nought else but confusion. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascuntur, ubi desinant non habent.* Nullus enim terminus falso est : via cuncti aliquid extrellum est, error immensus est. Naturall desires have their bounds, but those which grow of a false opinion are without end : For in that which is false, there is no limit : he that travelleth in his right way, comes to an end of his journey ; but he that is out of his way, knows not whither he wanders. And therefore living according to these ; there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that we have spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions : It is for these that a man sweats, and travells, *ad supervacua sudatur*, that a man journeyeth by sea and by land, goeth to war, kills himself, drowns, betrays, loseth himself : and therefore it was well said, That concupisence is the root of all evil. Now it falleth out many times (a just punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfie his desires, and to glut himself with the goods and pleasures of Fortune, he loseth and is deprived of those of Nature : and therefore *Diogenes* having refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to give him that he had taken from him, to go out of the Sun.

C H A P. XXIV.

Hope, Despair.

Our desires and concupisences gather heat, and redouble their force, by hope, which inflameth with the soft and gentle air thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our minds a fire, from whence ariseth a thick smoak, which blindeth our understanding, carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes us dream waking. So long as our hopes endure, our desires endure with them. It is a play-game, wherewith Nature busieth our minds. Contrariwise, when despair is once lodged near us, it tormenteth our souls in such a sort, with an opinion of never obtaining that we desire ; that all busynesse besides must yield unto it. And for the love of that which we think never to obtain, we loose even the rest of whatsoever we possesse. This passion is like unto little children, who to be revenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry

gry with himself, and requireth of it self the punishment of its own folly and infelicity. After those passions that respect the apparent good, come we to those that respect the evil.

C H A P. XXV.

Of Choler.

CHoler is a foolish passion, which putteth us wholly out of our selves, and with seeking the means to withstand and beat back the evil which it threatneth us, or hath already procured us, maketh the blood to boyl in our hearts, and stirreth up furious vapours in our spirits, which blind us and cast us headlong to whatsoever may satisfie the desire which we have of revenge: It is a shott fury, a way to madness; by the prompt and ready impetuosity and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentim & vis universa ejus est: Sudden and violent is the force thereof.*

*The descripti-
on.*

The causes that dispose and move unto choler, are first, Weakness of spirit, as we see by experience in women, old men, infants, sick men, who are commonly more choleric than others. *Invali-
dum omne natura queritur est: All weak things are full of com-
plaint.* A man deceiveth himself, to think that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions are like the enkleavours of children and old men, who run when they think to go: for there is nothing more weak then an immoderate motion, and a great imbecillity is it in a man to be choleric. Secondly, the malady of the mind, whereby it is made over-rendet to bear blows, as the ulcerate parts of the body, where the sound being intercised therin, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nisi quam sine
querela agra tanguntur: Sore things are never touched without complaint.* The losse of a penny, or the omission of gain puts into choler a covetous man; a laughter or glance of his wife, stirs this passion in a jealous man. Thirdly, lust, vain niceesse, self-love, which makes a man anxious and angry, puts him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nulla res magis iracundiam alit quam luxuria: Nothing doth more warish anger than luxury.* This love of trifles, of a glasse, a dog, a bird, is a kind of folly that troubleth us much, and stirrs up this choleric passion in us. Fourthly, too much curiosity; *qui nimis inquirit, seipsum inquietat; he that searcheth too much disquiet-
eth himself.* This is to seek occasions, and out of the lightness of

the

the heart to cast a man into choler, not attending any cause thereof, *Sepe ad nos ira venit, sapimus nos ad illam: anger often cometh unto us, we often to it.* Fifthly, lightness in believing what comes first to the ear. But the principal and former cause is, an opinion of contemps and mis-usage, either by word, deed, countenance. These are the reasons whereby we pretend to justify our choler.

5.
6.

3.
The signs.

The signes and symptomes are very manifest, and more then of any other passion; and so strange that they alter and change the whole estate of man, they transform and disfigure him. *Ut sit difficile utrum magis detestabile visum, aut deformis: So that it is difficult to know, whether it be a more detestable or deformed vice.* Some of them are outward, the face red and deformed, the eyes fiery, he looks furious, the ear deaf, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulse beating, the vains swollen, the tongue stammering, the teeth gnashing, the voice loud and hoarse, the speech imperfect, and to be brief, it puts the whole body into a fire and a fever. Some have broken their veins, suppress their urine, whereby present death hath ensued. What then can the estate of the spirit be within, when it causeth so great a disorder without? Choler at the first blow driveth away and banisheth reason and judgement, to the end it may wholly possess the place; afterwards it tis all with fire, and smoak, and darknesse, and noise; like unto him that puts the Master out of the house, and then sets fire and burns himself alive within; or like unto a ship, that hath neither stern nor Pilot, nor sails nor oars, which commits its fortune to the mercy of the waves, winds, and tempests, in the midst of a furious sea.

4.
The effects.

The effects thereof are great, many times miserable and lamentable. *Choler first enforceth us to injustice, for it is kindled and sharpened by a just opposition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reason he hath to be angry.* He that is moved to anger, upon a false occasion, if a man yield him any good reason why he should not be angry, he is presently more incensed, even against the truth and innocence it self: *Pertinaciores nos facit iniqitas ira; quasi argumentum sit juste irascendi, graviter irasci.* The iniquity of anger doth make us more stubborn; as if it were an argument and proof of just anger, to be grievously angry. The example of *Piso* is very notable, and proves this true, who excelling otherwife in virtue (the history is very well known) being moved to choler, did unjustly put three to death, and by a subtile occasion caused them to be found guilty, onely because they acquitted one

as unguilty, whom he by his former sentence had condemned. It is likewise sharpened by silence and cold replies, as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his choler ; which is proper unto women, who many times are angry, to the end they may stir up that passion in another, and increase their choler even to fury, when they see that a man vouchsafeth not to nourish that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* sheweth it self to be more savage then a beast, since neither by defence or excuse, nor by silence and patience without defence, it will not be wonne or pacified. The injustice thereof is likewise in this, that it will be both a judge and a party, that it will that all take part with it, and grows to defiance with as many as will seem to contradict it. Secondly, for as much as it is inconsiderate and heady, it casteth us headlong into great mischiefs, and sometimes even into those which we most fie, and do wish and would willingly procure another man. *Dat pænas dum exigit, It is punished while it punishmenteth*, or far worse. The passion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burst themselves in pieces upon that which they fall, it pursueth with such violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the avoiding of its own, It intrappeth and intangleth us, makes us to speak and to do things shameful, uncomely, unworthy our selves. Lastly, it carrieth us so beyond our selves, that it makes us to do things scandalous, dangerous, and irrevocable, murders, poisonings, treasons, whereby follow great and too late repentances ; witness *Alexander* the Great after he had slain *Clytus* : and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to say, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

This passion feeds upon it self, flattereth and tickleth it self, with a perswasion that it hath reason, that it is just, excusing it self upon the malice and indiscretion of another ; but the injustice of another cannot make that just, nor the loss that we receive by another make that profitable unto us : it is too rash and inconsiderate to do any thing that is good, it would cure an evil with an evil ; for to yield the correction of an offence to *Choler*, is to correct a vice by it self. Reason which should have the command over us, needs no such officers as of their own heads execute laws, not attending her ordinance ; she would have all things done according to nature by measure, and therefore violence doth no way befit it. But what, shall virtue fee the insolency of vice and not be angry with it ? shall the liberty thereof be to bridled as not to dare to be

Hatred.

be moved against the wicked? virtue desires no indecent liberty, it needs not turn its own strength against it self, nor that the wickednesse of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well bear the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperity without envy. He must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the self same patience that Physicians do the injuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdome, nor more profitable in the world, then to endure the folly of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, we make it our own. That which hath heretofore been spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, envy, revenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil are *Lib. 3. cap. 31.*

C H A P. XXVI.

Hatred.

HAtred is a stranger, which strangely and without reason troubleth us: and to say the truth, what is there in the world that tormenteth us more? By this passion we put our selves into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex us; the sight of him moveth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea, we never present him to our memories, but with despight and gnashing of teeth, which puts us besides our selves, and tears our own hearts; whereby we suffer in our selves, the punishment of that evil we wish unto another. He which hateth, is the patient; he that is hated, the agent: conter ry to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what do we hate? Men, or their matters and affaers? Doubtlesse we hate nothing that we should: for if there be any thing to be hated in this world, it is hate it self, and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in us.

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 32.*

C H A P. XXVII.

Envie.

ENvie is a couzen-germane to Hatred; a miserable passion, and our ragious beaft, which in torment excelleth hell it self. It is a desire of that good that another possessteth, which gnaweth our heart,

Jealousie.

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heart, and turneth the good of another man to our own hurt. But how should it torment us, since it is as well against that which is ill, as that which is good? Whilest an envious man looketh obliquely upon the goods of another man he loseth what is good in himself, or at leastwise takes no delight in it.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3.*

Cap. 33.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Jealousie.

Jealousie is a passion like almost both in nature and effect unto Envy, but that it seemeth that Envy considereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the possession of another man, and that we desire it for our selves; and Jealousie concerneth our own proper good, whereof we fear another doth partake.

Jealousie is a weak maladie of the soul, absurd, vain, terrible, and tyranical, it insinuateth it self under the title of amity, but after it hath gotten possession, upon the self-same foundation of love and good will, it buildeth an everlasting hate. Virtue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries of this rage, or rather the fuell unto this fury.

It is likewise the Gall that corrupteth all the Honey of our life: it is commonly mingled with the sweetest and pleasantest actions, *The venome* which it maketh so sharp and fower, as nothing more: it changeth *thereof*, love into hate, respect into disdain, assurance into diffidence: it engendreth a pernicious curiosity and desire in a man to clear himself of that evil, which being past remedy, by too much stirring flinkerh the more: For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring into the light, sound with a trumpet his own shaine and misery, and the dishonour of his own children?

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are *Lib.*

3. cap. 35.

CHAP. XXIX.

Revenge.

THe deere of revenge is first a cowardly and effeminate passion proceeding from a base, weak, and abject mind, which *A Cowardly* experience telleth us to be true; for we commonly see the weakest *Mens* minds

Revenge.

minds the most malitious and revengeful, as women and children. The valiant and generous mind doth little feel this passion, but contemneth and disdainteth it, either because the injury toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injury toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injury is not worthy his revenge, as not daigning so far to debase himself: *Indignus Cesaris ira, Unworthy the anger of Caesar.* The hil, thunder, and tempests, and those fearful motions that are in the air, do neither trouble nor touch the superior celestial bodies, but onely the weak and inferiour: and even so the indiscretions and childish brawls of fools wound not great and high minds. All the great men of the world, *Alexander, Caesar, Epaminondas, Scipio*; have been so far from revenge, that quite contrary they have done good unto their enemies.

2.
Biting.

Secondly, it is a boylng and biting passion, and like a worm it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with it, it molesteth them by day, and by night keeps them awaken.

3.
Veuyf.

It is likewise full of injustice, for it tormenteth the innocent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, to feel that evil and punishment, which the desire of revenge giveth to a mans heart; and the party offended goes to lay on the burthen, as if he had not already hurt enough by the injury received, in such sort, that many times and ordinarily, whilst he tormenteth himself to seek means of revenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes himself merry with it. But it is also far more unjust in the means of the execution, which many times is wrought by treasons and villainous practices.

4.
Dangcrouse.

Lastly, the execution is not onely painful, but dangerous too; for experience telleth us, that he that seeks to be revenged doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not, comes to passe, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his own. The fear of justice tormenteth him, and the care to hide those that love him.

5.
*To Kill, is not
to revenge.*

Again, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not revenge, but meer cruelty, which proceedeth from cowardlinesse and fear. To be revenged, is to bear his enemy, to make him stoop, not to kill him; for by killing he feels not the power of his wrath, which is the end of revenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be revenged upon a dogge or a beast, because he can no way taste or conceit his revenge. In true revenge there must be a kind

kind of pleasure and delight in the revenger : and he upon whom he is revenged, must feel the weight of his displeasure, suffer pain, and repent him of the cause, which being kild he cannot do ; yea, he is rather freed thereby from all misery ; and contrariwise, he that is the revenger, endureth many times that torment and fear which he wifheth to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardlinesse and fear, lest his enemy feeling the force of his revenge, should live to requite him with the like ; which though it make an end of the quarrel, yet it woundeth his reputation ; it is a trick of precaution, and not of courage : and is the way to proceed safely, but not honourably. *Qui occidit longe, non ulciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur : He that killeth afar off, doth neither revenge, nor obtain renown.*

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil are

Lib. 3. Cap. 34.

C H A P. XXX.

Cruelty.

Crueuty is a villainous and detestable vice, and against nature, and therefore it is likewise called inhumanity. It proceedeth from weakness ; *Omnis ex infirmitate ferit as est : All cruelty proceedeth of infirmity.* And it is the daughter of cowardlinesse : for a valorous man, doth alwayes exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercy, but he is satisfied, *Romana virtus, parcere subiectis, debellare superbos : The Roman virtue, was to spare the humble and subdue the proud.* Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weakness cannot be of this rank, to the end it may yet get the name of Valour, it makes bloud and massacres the proof thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloody, because they fear, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them ; and therefore they exercise their cruelty against all, even wo men too, because they fear all ; *Cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet : He strikes all because he fears all.* Cowardly dogs bite and tear with their teeth, within the house, the skins of thofe wild beasts, which in the open field they durst not look upon. What make civil wars so cruel, but that tie wherewith the common people are led and linked, who like dogs that are backt by their master, back one another ? The Emperour

Sadnesse, or heaviness of heart.

Mauritius being told that one Phocas a souldier should kill him, enquired what he was, and of what nature and condition; being told by his sonne in law Philip, that he was a base coward: Why then, saith he, no marvel if he be a murdefer and cruel. It proceedeth likewise from the inward malignity of the soul, which feedeth and delighteth it self with the hurt of another. Monstres like Caligula.

C H A P. XXXI.

Sadnesse, or heaviness of heart.

1.
The description **S**Adnesse, is a languishing feblenesse of the spirit, and a kind of discouragement engendred by the opinion that we have of the greatness of those evils that afflict us. It is a dangerous enemy to our rest, which presently weakeneth and quelleth our souls, if we take not good heed, and taketh from us the use of reason and discourse, and the means whereby to provide for our affairs, and with time it rusteth and fenoweth the soul, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his virtues asleep, even then when he hath most need to keep them awaked, to withstand that evil which oppresseth them: but we must discover the foulness and folly, the pernicious effects, yea, the injustice that is in this cowardly, base, and feeble passion, to the end we may learn with all our might to flie and avoid it, as most unworthy the wisest men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks; which is not so easie to be done because it excuseth and covereth it self with many beautiful colours of Nature, Piety, Goodnes, yea, the greatest part of the world it draws to honour and favourit, making it an ornament to wildome, virtue, conscience.

2.
Not natural.
Publike mournings. First then, it is so far from being naturall (as it would make men believe) that it is formall, and an enemy to nature, as may easily be proved. Touching ceremonious sorrows, and publick mournings, so much affected and practised in former times, and likewise at this present (my meaning is not to touch the honesty and moderation of obsequies and funerals, nor that sorrow that belongs to piety and religion) what greater impolture or deceitful coulengage can there be in any things besides? How many fained and artificial counterfeit coulengages are there, with no small cost and charges, both in those whom it concerneth, the authours of the sport, and those whose offices they make use of in that busyness? For to give the better

better credit to their juggling tricks, they hire people to lament and to send up their shrekkings, cries, and lamentations, which all men know to be fained and extorted for money, tears that are not shed but to be seen, and so soon as they are out of sight, are dried up : where is it that Nature hath taught us this ? Nay, what is there that Nature doth more abhor and condemn ? It is a tyrannical, false and vulgar opinion (the worst, as hath been said, almost of all the passions) that teacheth us to weep, and lament in such a case. And if a man cannot finde occasion of tears and an heavy countenance in himself, he must buy it at a dear p̄ice in another, in such sorte that to satisfie this opinion, he must enter into a great charge, whereof nature if we would credit it, would willingly discharge us. Is not this willingly and publikely to betray reason, to enforce and to corrupt nature, to prostitute his own manhood, to mock both the world and himself, to satisfie the vulgar sort, which produce nothing but errour , and account of nothing that is not counterfeit and disguised ? Neither are those more particular sorrows natural, as it seems to many; for if they did proceed from nature, they would be common to all men, and almost touch all men alike. Now we see that the self-same things that are causes of sorrow to some, give occasion of joy unto others, that one Province, one person laugheth, at that whereat another weepeth ; that they that are converiant with those that lament, exhort them to resolution, and to quit themselves of their tears. Yea the greatest part of those that thus torment themselves, when you have talked with them, or that themselves have had the leisure but to discourse upon their own passions, they confess that it is but a folly thus to afflict themselves, and praise those who in the like adversities, have made head against Fortune, and with a manly and generous courage have withstood their afflictions. And it is certain, that wen do not accommodate their mountings to their cause of sorrow, but the opinion of those with whom they live. And if a man mark them well, he shall finde that it is opinion, which the more to annoy us preseruenth the things unto us, which torment us either more then they should, or by anticipation, fear and prevention of that which is to come, sooner then they should.

But it is against nature, in as much as it polluteth and defaceth whatsoever nature hath made beautiful and amiable in us, which is drowned by the force of this passion, as the beauty of a pearl is dissolved in vinegar. We make our selves hereby spectacles of pity, we 3. *Against na-*

Sadnesse, or heaviness of heart.

we go with our heads hanging, our eyes fastened on the earth, our mouths tongueles, our members immoveable, our eyes serve for no other use then to weep, that you may say we are nothing but sweating statues, turned (as the Poets feign) like *Njobe* into a stome by the power of this passion.

4. Injurious and impious.

Now it is not only contrary and an enemy unto nature, but God himself : for what other thing is it, but a rash and outragious complaint against the Lord and common law of the whole world, which hath made all things under the Moon changeable and corruptible ? If we know this law, why do we torment our selves ? If we know it not, wherefore do we complain, but of our own ignorance, and that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world ? We are here not to give a law, but to receive it, and to follow that which we find established : for to torment our selves by contradicting, doth but double our pain.

5. Pernicious.

Besides all this, it is pernicious and hurtful unto man, and by so much the more dangerous, because it killeth when we think it comforts, hurteth under the colour of doing good, under a false pretence of plucking the iron out of the wound, it drives it to the heart; and the blows thereof are so much the more hardly avoided; & the enterprises broken because it is a domestical enemy brought up with us, which we have engendred for our own punishment.

6. Outwardly.

Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited ; it dishonoureth and defameth man. Do but consider when it entreth into us, it filleth us with shame, in such sort, that we dare not shew our selves in publick place, no not privately to our dearest friends : and after we are once possessed of this passion, we do nothing but seek corners to hide our selves from the sight of men. What is this to say, but that it condemneth it self, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is ? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantonness to hide her self, and to fear to be known. Again do but consider the veltments and habits of sorrow, how strange and effeminate they are ; which sheweth, that it taketh away whatsoever is manly and generous in us, and puts upon us the countenances and infirmities of women : and therefore the *Thracians* adorned those men that mourned, like women. And some say, that sorrow makes men eunuchs. The first and more manly and generous laws of the *Romans* forbade these effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men should so degenerate

Sadnesse, or heavinessse of hearts.

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degenerate from their own natures, & do things contrary to man-hood; allowing onely of those first tears which proceed from the first encounter of a fresh and new grief, which may fall even from the eyes of Philosophers themselves, who keep with their humanity their dignity: and may fall from the eyes, virtue no: falling from the heart.

Now it doth not onely alter the visage, change and dishonestly disguise a man outwardly, but piercing even to the marrow of the bone, *Tristitia exsiccat ossa: Heaviness dries the bones.* It weakneth likewise the soul, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man unapt to good and honourable enterprises, taking away the taste, the desire, and the disposition to do any thing that is profitable either to himself or to another, and not onely to do good, but to receive it. For even those good fortunes that light upon him displease him: every thing is tart unto his soul, as victuals to a corrupted stomack: and lastly, it maketh bitter our whole life, & poysoneth all our actions.

Inwardly.

It is two-fold, great and extream, or at leastwise, though not great in it self, yet great when by reason of a sudden surprize and furious unexpected alarum it seacheth upon the heart of man, pierceth it through, depriveth him of motion and sense, like a stone, and not unlike that miserable mother *Niobe*.

The distinction
8.

*Dirigit visus in medio, calor ossa reliquit,
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatigatur.
She swounded at the half, all being too much,
To see at once and live; her grief was such:
She falls, she fluctuates, she resounds and breaks,
And scarce at length, with much ado she speaks.*

And therefore the Painter diversly and by degrees presenting unto us the sorrow and miserable estate of the parents and friends of *Iphigenia* when she was sacrificed; when he came to her father, he painted him with his face covered, as confessing his Art not sufficient to express in the visage a grief of that degree. Yea, sometimes a sorrow may be such, that it killeth out-right. The second degree is the indifferent sorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater then the former, yet in time it is lessened and eased, and is expressed by tears, sobs, sighs and lamentations: *Cura loves loquuntur, ingentes stupent, Light cares do speak, great confound.*

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are Lib. 3.

Cap. 29.

H. 4

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Compassion.

VVE sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pity their miseries, either because by a secret consent we participate on the others evils, or because we fear that in our selves, which hath happened to others. But this is done two wayes, whereby there is likewise a twofold compassion; The one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himself, not effeminating his own nature, and without impeachment of equity or honour, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted: this is that virtue so much commended in Religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: The other is a passion of a feeble mind, a scottish and feminine partie, which proceedeth from a delicate tendernesse, a troubled spirit, proper to women, infants, and to cruel and malicious minds (which are consequently base and cowardly), as hath been proved in the Chapter of *Cruelty* who pity the punishment of offenders, which produceth unjust effects, not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state, and condition.

Advisements and remedies against this evil, you shall find,
Lib. 3. Cap. 30.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Fear.

1. *The disposition* **F**EAR is the apprehension of an evil to come, which holdeth us in a continual care, and runneth before those evils which fortune threatneth us.

We speak not here of that fear of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that fear which proceedeth from love, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloved, commendable in subjects and all inferiors towards their superiors; but of that vicious fear that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sin, the twin of shame, both of one wombe, sprung from that close and cursed marriage of the spirit of man with a diabolical persuasione. *Tremo eo quod nudus essem, & abscondi me: I fear, because I was naked, and therefore I hid my self.*

2. *The malice thereof* It is a deceitful and malicious passion, and hath no other power than to over us, but to mock and seduce us: it serveth its turn with that which

which is to come, where though we seem to foresee much, we see nothing at all, and in that doubtful darknesse it holdeth us, as in a dark place, as thieves do by night, to the end they may rob a man, and nor be known, and give a great and sudden affright with a small number. And therefore it tormenteth us with masks and shewes of evils, as men fear children with bug-bears; evils that have nothing but a timple appearance, and have nought in themselves whereby to hurt us; yea, are not evils, but that we think them so. It is the onely apprehension which we have, which makes that evil to us, which is not so, and draweth evil even from our own good to afflict us withall. How many do we see every day, that with fear to become miserable, become that they fear, and turn their vain fear into certain miseries? How many have lost their friends, by distrusting their friends; have got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in such sort conceived an opinion, that his wife hath played false play with him, that for grief he languisheth; another hath in such sort apprehended such a conceit of poverty, that he falleth sick: and to be brief some have died for fear to die. And even so may a man say almost of whatsoever we fear; for fear seemeth not to other end, then to make ys find that which we flee from. Doubtless, fear is of all other evils the greatest and most tedious; for other evils are no longer evils then they continue, and the pain endureth no longer then the cause; but fear is of that which is, and that which is not, and that (perhaps) which never shall be, yea somerimes of that which cannot possible be. Behold then a passion truly malicious and tyrannical, which draweth from an imaginary evil, true and bitter torrois, & is over-greedy by thought and opinion, to overtake, nay, out-run them.

Fear doth not onely fill us with evils, and many times by false appearances, but it likewise spoyleth all the good that we have, and all the pleasure of our life; as an enemy to our rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good which he feareth to loose, life it self cannot be pleasant, if a man fear to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient Writer) can bring pleasure with it, but that against the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared.

It is also a strange passion, indiscreet, and inconsiderate, and proceeds as often from the want of judgement, as of heart: It ariseth from dangers, and many times casteth us into dangers; for it engendreth in us such an inconsiderate desire to get out, that it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindreth us from taking that order that is fit to get

Fear.

get out. It bringeth a violent kind of trouble, whereby the soul being affrighted, withdraweth it self into it self, and debateth with it self how to avoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on us with such an astonishment, that we lose our judgement, and there is no longer reason or discourse in us, it maketh us to flie when no man pursueth, yea, many times our own friends and succourers : *A deo pavor eriam auxilia formidas ; Insomuch that fear dreadeth his own helps.* Many have run mad herewith, yea the senses themselves have hereby lost their use : we have our eyes open, and see not ; one speaks to us, and we hearken not unto him; we would flie, and we cannot go.

An indifferent fear puts wings to our heels ; a great nayl fastens our feet and entangles them. Fear perverteth and corrupteth the entire man : both the spirit, *Pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat ; Fear deprives my mind of all wisdom and understanding.* And the body,

Obstupni, steteruntque coma, vox fauibus hasti.

Cold sudden fear supplants his nature's heat,

And layes him speechles, till his blond retreat.

Sometimes it makes desperate, and therefore resolute, like that *Romane Legion under the conduct of the Consul Sempronius against Hannibal, Audacem fecerat ipse rumor ; Fear made him bold.* There are fears and affrightments without any apparent cause, and as it were by some celestial impulsion, which they call Panick terrors. *Terrores de celo, arsemibus hominibus pre timore ; Terrors from heaven, men consuming away with fear :* such as once happened in the city of *Carthage*, and wherewith whole people and armies have been confounded.

Luke 31.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil are
Lib. 3. Cap. 28.

The

The second Consideration of MAN,

*By comparing him with all other
creatures.*

CHAP. XXXIV.

We have considered man wholly and simply in himself:

Now let us consider him, by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent means to know him. This comparison hath a large extent, and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, wherein man is and very profitable, if it be well done. But who shall do it ?

Shall man ? He is a party, and to be suspected ; and to say the truth, deals partially therein : which may be easily proved, because he keeps neither measure nor mediocrity. Sometimes he placeth himself far above all ; he terms himself a master, and disdaineth the rest ; divides unto them their morsels, distributeth such a portion of faculties and powers unto them as shall seem good unto him. Sometimes, as it were in despight, he debaseth himself beneath all ; he murmureth, complaineth, wrongeth Nature as a cruel step-mother, makes himself the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extremes are equally against reason, verity, modestie. But how would you have him to walk uprightly and evenly with all other creatures, when he doth it not with man ; his companion, nor with God himself, as shall be shewed ? This comparison is also difficult to do : for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moveth within them ? But yet let us do our endeavour to do it without passion.

First, the policy of the world is not so unequal, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion between the parts thereof, but that they are near neighbours, and touch one another, have a resemblance, some more, some less. So is there a great vicinity and kindred betwixt man and other creatures : they have many things alike and common to each other, and they have differences likewise, but not so far distant and unlike, but that they may hold together. Man is neither altogether above, nor beneath the rest. *All that is under heaven, saith the Wisdom of God, yuns Ecclesiast. the same fortune.*

Let us first speak of those things that are common to all, and almost

*A profitable
and difficult
comparison,
wherein man is
suspected.*

*In the Chapter
of presumption.*

The second Consideration of Man.

3.
Things com-
mon.
Eccles. 4.

1. Nakednes,
cap. 5.

2. Swadling
clothes.

3. Crying.

4. Arms.

5. Eating.

6. Speech.

almost alike; which are to engender, nourish, to do, move, live, die ; *Idem interius hominis & jumentorum, & aqua utrinque conditio : As the death of men so of beasts, and condition of them both is alike.* And this is against those that find themselves aggrieved, saying, That man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked upon the naked earth, without covert, without armour, bound, swaddled, without instruction of what is fit for him : whereas all other creatures are clothed and covered with shels, husks, hair, wool, feathers, scales ; armed with teeth, horns, talons, both to assault and to defend : taught to swim, to run, to fly, to sing, to seek their relief, and man knows neither how to go, nor to speak, nor to eat, nor any thing but cry, without an apprenticeship and much labour. All these complaints to him that considereth the first composition and natural condition, are unjust and false ; Our skin is as sufficiently proved against the injuries of times and seasons as theirs ; witness many Nations(as hath been said) that never knew what garments meant : yea, those parts that we think good, we keep uncovered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands, the stomach, and the delicate damsels their breasts. Bands and swaddling clothes are not necessary; witness the *Lacedemonians*, and in these dayes the *Switzers*, *Almains*, which dwel in cold countreys; the *Bisques* and vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common unto beasts, all creatures almost complain and groan for a time, after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is natural, and have more motion of our members, use their service more naturally and without instruction. If some beasts excel us in this, we in the same excel divers others. The use of eating is both in them and in us natural, and without instruction. Who doubteth that an infant, being once able to feed himself, knows how to seek his sustenance ! And the earth likewise bringeth forth and offereth enough unto him for his necessity, without other culture or art ; witness so many Nations, which without labour, industry and care, live plentifully. As for speech, a man may well say, that if it be not natural, it is not necessary: but it is common to man with other creatures: What else but speech is that faculty we see in them, of complaining, rejoicing, of calling others to their succour, of making love ? And as we speak by gestures and motion of the eyes, the head, the shoulders the hands(herein deaf men are very cunning) so beasts as we see in those that have no voice, who nevertheless do enter-
- change

change their mutual offices, and as in some kinde of measure beasts understand us, so we them. They flatter us, threaten us, intreat us, and we them; we speak to them, and they to us, and if we perfectly understand not one another, where is the fault? In us or in them? That is not to be determined. They may as well account us beasts by that reason, as we them, yet they reproach us for that we our selves understand not one another. We understand not the *Bisques*, the *Britans*, and they all understand the one the other, not onely of the same, but (which is more) of a divers kind. By a certain barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

Again, they have their intelligence with us. In the warrs in the middest of the fight, Elephants, Doggs, Horses, understand with us, they frame their motions according to the occasion they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they have their pay, and divide the booty with us, as it hath been practised in the new conquest of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

Let us now come to those differences and advantages that the one hath over the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things above other creatures, and in others, beasts have the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby be knit and inchain'd together, in this general policy of the world and natur'e. The certain advantages or excellencies of man, are those great faculties of the soul; the subtilty, vivacity, and sufficiency of the spirit to invent, to judge, to chuse, speech to demand, and to offer, and to succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath invented either of it self, or learned from another. The form also of the body, the great diversity of the motion of the members, whereby his body doth him better service.

The certain advantages that beasts have over men, and such as are past all doubt, are either general or particular. The general of beasts ^{5.} _{general.} are health, and strength of body far more perfect, constant, and strong in them, among whom there are no blind, deaf, lame, mire, diseased, defective and ill born, as amongst men. The *Sereno* hurts them not, they are not subject to rheumes from whence proceed almost all other diseases; from which man though he cover his head with a hat and a houle too, can hardly defend himself. Moderation in diet and others actions, innocency, safety, peace, and tranquility of life, a plain and iure liberty without shame, fear,

fear, or ceremony, in things natural and lawful, (for it is onely man that hath cause to hide himself in these actions, and whose faults and imperfections offend others.) Exemption from so many vices and disorders, superstition, ambition, avarice, envy, yea mighty dreams trouble not them as they do men: not so many thoughts and phantasies. The particular advantages are the pure, high healthful, pleasant ambition, and abode of birds in the air. Their sufficiency in so ne Arts, as the Swallow and other birds in Building; the Spider in spinning and weaving; divers beasts in Physick; and the Nighting le in Musick. Marvellous effects and properties, not to be imitated, no not imagined, as the property of the fish *Remora*, to stay the greatest vessels of the Sea ; as we read of the chief galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the self-same of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedes* or Cramp fish, to benum and dead the members of another, though not far distant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foresee the winds ; of the Chameleon, to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their passages from country to country, according to the diversity of the reasons ; of all beasts that are danis, in knowing which of their young is the best ; for some hap falling out, of defending them from danger, or conveying them to their nests, they alwayes begin with that they know and foresee to be the best. In all these things man is far their inferiour, and in so ne of them he hath no skill at all. A man may add unto this, if he will, the length of our lives, which in so ne beasts doth seven or eight times exceed the longest term of the life of man.

6. Those advantages that men pretend to have above beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many : First the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, judgment, prudence. There are here two things to be spoken, the one of the verity of the thing it self. It is a great question, whether beasts be deprived of all these spiritual faculties. The opinion that they are not deprived, but have them, is the more true and the more authentick. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagorus*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphyry*, *Plutarch*, and maintained by this reason. The composition of the brain, which is that part which the Soul makes use of, and whereby it reasoneth, is all alike, as the same in beasts and men, confirming by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals ; by the light of one onely man, they know all men; they know how

Disputable ad-

vantages.

1.

Reason.

how to joyn, and divide, & distinguish, the good from the ill, for the safegard of their lives, liberty, and little ones. Yea, we read and see, if we would but mark and consider it, many things done by beasts, that do far excel the sufficiency, subtily, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men; some of those that are best worth the noting, I will note unto you. The Fox being to passe over a river that is frozen with ice, applieth his ear unto the ice to finde whether he can hear any noise, and that the water doth run under it, that thereby he may resolve either to go forwrd, or to retire back; of whom the *Thracians* have learned the same cunning, being to passe their frozen rivers. A Dog, to the end he may know which way of three, either his master, or that beast he hunteth is gone, having assured himself by senting them, that he hath not passed by two of them, because he finds not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground, or farther traversing, he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a river with a sack of salt on his back, and being plunged into the deep with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter; which the Mule (falling into the deep by chance) having found, being afterwards loaden with wool, used the same remedy, and sunk the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a ship, casting stones into a pipe of oil, to make the oil to mount, that he might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crows of *Barbarie*, who by that means raise the water when it is too low, that they may drink. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch, whereto their companion is fallen, to help him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Susa*, being taught to go in a wheel a just hundred turns, to draw water to water the gardens, they would never exceed that just number, and were never deceived in their account. All these things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and division? To say they know not this, were to deny that we see they do. What should we think of that dexterity that is in the Elephant, in plucking those darts and javelings forth of his body, with little or no pain at all? of the Dog that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publike play upon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiff, and suffering himself to be carried forth by little & little coming to himself, & lifting up his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and strange

The second consideration of Man.

strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Jugglers dō? of the policies and inventions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults we make upon them? of the husbandry and great providence of the Ant, in laying abroad his grain to dry, lest it take moisture and so corrupt, in nipping the ends thereof that it grow not? of the policy of the Bee, where there is such diversity of offices and charges so firmly established.

7.
*An opposition
of the natural
instinct.*

To beat down all this, some dō maliciously attribute these things to a natural, servile and forced inclination; as if beasts did perform their actions by a natural necessity, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downward, the fire mounteth upward. But besides that, that cannot be, nor enter into our imagination; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and division, and consequents; they likewise know not what this natural inclination and instinct is; they be wots which they abude to small purpose, that they might not be deaf and mute altogether. Again, this saying is retorted against them: for it is beyond all comparison more noble, honourable, and resembleth more the Divinity to work by nature their by Art and apprenticeship: to be led and directed by the hand of God, then by our own; regularly to act by a natural and inevitable condition, then regularly by a rash and casual liberty.

By this objection of the natural instinct, they would likewise deprive them of instruction and discipline both active and passive, but experience gives them the lie; for they dō both receive it: witness the Pie, the Parrot, the Black-bird, the Dogge, the Horse, as hath been said; and they give it, witness the Nightingale, and above all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beasts in dulciry, and all kind of discipline and sufficiency.

8.
As for this faculty of the spirit whereof man doth so much glory, which is to spiritualize things corporal and absent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceiveth them after its own manner, *Nam intellectum est intelligentia ad modum intelligentis;* For that which is understood, is in him that understandeth, after the manner of the understander, beasts themselves do the like. The Horse accuttoned to the wars, sleeping in his stable, trembleth and groaneth as if he were in the midlit of the fight, conceiveth the sound of the drumme, the trumpet, yea an army it self. The Hare in sleep, panting, lifteth up her scur, shaking her legs, conceiveth a spiritual Hare. Dogs that are kept for guard, in their sleep do snarl, and

and sometimes break out-right, imagining a stranger to become. To conclude this first point, we must confess that beasts do reason, have the use of discourse and judgment, but more weakly and imperfectly then man; they are inferiour unto men in this, not because they have no part therein at all; they are inferiour unto men, as amongst men some are inferiour unto others; and even so amongst beasts there is such a difference: but yet there is a greater difference between men; for (as shall be said hereafter) there is a greater distance between a man and a man, then a man and a beast. But for all this, we must not hereby infer a kind of equality or parity betwixt a beast and a man (though, as Aristotle saith, there are some men so weak and blockish, that they differ from a beast only in figure) and that the soul of a beast is immortal, as that of a man; or the soul of a man mortal, as that of a beast: for these are but malicious illations. For, besides that in this reasoning faculty, a man hath a very great advantage above beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spiritual, whereby he is said to be like unto God himself, and is capable of immortality, wherein beasts have no part, and are signified by that understanding, which is more then a simple discourse, *Nglite fieri sicut equus & mulsus, in quibus non est intellectus: Be not like horse and mule, in whom there is no understanding.*

The other point which we are to speak of in this matter is, that this preheminence and advantage of understanding, and other spiritual faculties that man pretendeth, is sold him at a dear rate, and brings with it more hurt then good: for it is the principal source of all those evils that oppresse him; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolutions, trouble, despair, which beasts want, by the want of this great advantage: witness the Hog of Pyrrho, which did eat his meat peaceably in the ship, in the mid-left of a great tempest, when all the men were almost dead for fear. It seemeth that these great parts of the soul, have been denied unto beasts; or at least-wile lessened, and given them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed upon man for his torment: for it is long of them that he toileth and travelleth, tormenteth himself with what is past, and that which is to come; yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those evils that are not, nor ever shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill, until they feel it; and being escaped, they are presently in security and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable even in that wherein he thought

The second consideration of Man.

thought himself most happy : whereby it seemeth that it had been better for man, not to have been indued and adorned with all those beautiful and celestial arns, since he turneth them against himself, even to his own destruction. And to say the truth, we see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, live at best content, and feel not their evil accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spiritual.

10.
2. Signiorie and command.

Gen. 1.

Another advantage that man pretendeth above beasts, is a signiorie and power of commanding, which he thinketh he hath over beasts : but besides, that is an advantage that men themselves have, and exercise the one over the other, this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beast ? It is a monstur that was never seen, yea men do more fear beasts, then beasts them. It is true, that man hath a great preheminence over beasts ; *Ut praeficit piscibus maris, volatilibus caeli, bestiis terra: Thaz be mighte rule over the fish of the sea, the fowls of the aire, and the beasts of the earth.* And this by reason of his beautiful and upright form, of his wisdome, and the prerogative of his spirit : but not that he should either command, or they obey.

11.
3. Liberty.

There is likewise another advantage, near neighbour to this pretended by man, which is a plain liberty, reproaching beasts with their servitude, captivity, subjection : but this is to small purpose. There is far greater reason why man should reproach man ; witness those slaves, not onely made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntary, who either sell for money their liberty, or give it out of the lightness of their hearts, or for some commodity, as the ancient Fencers sold our-right women to their mistresses, souldiers to their captains. Now, there is none of all this in beasts, they never serve one another, nor yield themselves to any servitude either active or passive, either to serve, or to be served, and are in every thing more free then men. And as man goeth to the chace, taketh, killeth, eareth the beast ; so is he taken killed, eaten by them in his turn, and honourably too, by main strength, not by wit and art, as man doth : and not onely by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonourable. Beasts assemble not themselves in troupes to go to kill, to destroy, to ransack, to intchal another troupe of their kind, as men do.

12.
4 Virtue.

The fourth and greatest advantage pretended by man, is in virtue, but of mortal it is disputable (I mean moral materially by the out-

outward action :) for formally the mortality, good or evil, virtue and vice, cannot be in a beast. Kind acknowledgement, officious amity, fidelity, magnanimity, and many other virtues, which consist in society and conversation, are more lively, more express and constant, then can be in the common sort of people. *Hircanus* the dog of *Lysimachus* continued upon the bed of his dead master, refuting all kinde of sustenance, and afterwards cast himself into that fire wherein his master was burnt, and there died with him. The self-same did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dog of wise *Hesiodus* discovered the murder of his master. Another in like sort in the presence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole army. Another which never ceased, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from city to city, until that sacrilegious robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to judgment. That history is famous, of the Lion that was host and nurse to *Andromeda* the slave, and his Physitium, which would not touch him being cast out unto him : which *Appion* affirmeth to have seen at *Rome*. An Elephant having in choler killed his governour, repenting himself of it, refused any longer to eat, drink, or live. Contrariwise, there is not a creature in the world, more unjust, unthankful, traitorous, perfidious, lying, and deceitful, then man. Again, forasmuch as virtue consisteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleasures, beasts are much more moderate therein then we, and do better contain themselves within the limits of nature. For they are not onely not touched with unnatural, superfluous and artificial passions and desires, which are all vicious and infinite, as men, who for the most part are plunged in them, but also in the natural, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the female, they are far more moderate and stayed. But that we may see which is the more virtuous or vicious, a man or a beast, and in good earnest to shame a man more then a beast, let us take the virtue most proper and agreeable unto man, that is, as the word it self importeth, humanity: as the most strange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now herein beasts have advantage enough, even to make men blush for shame. They never assail, and seldom offend those of their kind, *Major serpensum ferarumque concordia quam hominum*; Greater is the concord and agreement amongst serpents and wilde beasts, then amongst men. They never fight but for great and just causes, as the defence and preservation of their lives, liberty, and their little ones: and that

Humanity.
Cruelty.

The second Consideration of Man,

they do with their natural and open arms, by their onely force and valour, and that one to one, as in single combats, and not in troupes, nor by designment. Their combats are short and soon ended, until one of them be either wounded, or yieldeth; and the combat ended, the quarrel, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrel but against man, for not onely light, vain and frivolous causes, but many times unjust, with artificial and traiterous arms, by deceits and wicked means, in-troupe and assembly gathered by assencion; and lastly, his wars are long, and never ended but with death; and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

12.
*The conclusion
of the second
consideration.*

The conclusion of this comparison is, that untruly and vainly doth man glorifie himself above beasts. For if man have in him something more then they, as especially the vivacity of the spirit and understanding, and those great faculties of the soul; so likewise in exchange is he subject to a thousand evils from which the beasts are freed; inconstancy, irresolution, superstition, a painful care of things to come, ambition, avarice, envy, curiosity, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations. This spirit wherewith man maketh himself so merry, brings him a thousand inconveniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not onely hurt the body, trouble, break and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it self. What casteth man into folly and madness, but the sharpness, agility, and proper force of the spirit? The most subtil follies and excellent lunacies proceed from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirir, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities, and from soundest healths mortal maladies: Melancholy men, saith *Plato*, as they are more capable of knowledg and wisdome, so likewise of folly. And he that well marketh it, shall find, that in those elevations and sales of a free soul, there is some mixture of folly; for to say the truth, these things are near neighbours.

13.
*An exhorta-
tion.*

Touching a simple life, and such as is according to nature, beasts do far exceed men; they live more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth hereof, and benefiteth himself by making them an instruction unto himself, which doing, he frameth himself to innocency, simplicity, liberty, and that natural sweetnesse which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupted in us by our artificial inventions

tions, and unbridled licentiousness, abusing that wherein we say we excell them, which is the spirit, and judgement. And therefore God doth many times send us to school to birds, beasts themselves, to the Kite, the Grasshopper, the Swallow, the Turtle, the Ant, the Ox, the Ass, and diverse others. Lastly, we must remember that there is a kind of commerce betwixt beasts and us, a certain relation and mutuall obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one and the same master, and are of the same family that we are. It is an unworthy thing to tyrannize over them, we owe justice unto men, and pity and gentleness to such other creatures as are capable thereof.

The third Consideration of Man, which is by his life.

C H A P. XXXV.

*The estimation, brevity, description of the life of man,
and the parts thereof.*

IT is a great and principall point of wisdom, truly to know how to esteem of life, to hold and preserve it, to lose or to take of the estimation and worth of life. it away, to keep and direct it, as much as after such a manner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindred. The vulgar unlearned sort account it a sovereign good, and preferreth it above all things; yea, he will not flick to redeem and prolong it by all the delays that may be, upon what conditions soever, thinking it can never be bought too dear: for it is all in all with him, his motto is, *Vita nihil carius: Nothing is dearer than life.* He esteemeth and loveth his life for the love of it self: he lives not but to live. It is no marvell if he fail in all the rest, if he be wholly compounded of errors, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamentall point he mistakes himself so grossly. It may be likewise with some lesse esteemed and more basely accounted of then it should, either by reason of some insufficiency in judgement, or a proud misknowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselves and others, and I cannot be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to be

at all: and that the best is the shortest life: *Optimum non usci, aut quam citissime abolescit.* The best thing is, not to be born, or presently to dye. And it is neither well nor wisely said, What hurt or what malice had it been, if I never had been? A man may answer him with the like question: Where had that good been which is come, and being not come, had it not been evill not to have been? It is a kinde of evill that wanteth good, whatsoever it be, yea though not necessary: These extremitie are too extream and vicious, though not equally: but that seemes true that a wise man spake, That is such a good as a man would not take, if he knew, well what it were before he took; *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus;* No man would accept of life, if he knew what it were. It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hud-winkt into it. Now when they are within, some do cocker and flatter themselves therein, that upon what condition soever, they will not go forth again; others do nothing but murmur and vex themselves: but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves, (for a man neither lives nor dies when and how he will), and that though the way be rough and hard, yet nevertheless it is not alwayes so, without winssing, or striving and troubling any thing, they accommodate themselves unto it as they may, and so pass their life in quietnes, making of necessity a virtue; which is a token of wisdom and industry: and so doing, they live as long as they should, and not, like fools, as long as they can. For, there is a time to live, and a time to dye: and a good death is far better then an ill life, A wise man lives no longer, then that his life may be worth more then his death: for the longest life is not alwayes the better.

2.
Of the length
and brevity of
life.

All men do much complain of the brevity of the life of man: not onely the simple vulgar sort, who wish it should never have end; but also (which is most strange) the greatest and wisest make it the principall ground of their complaints. To lay the truth, the greatest part thereof being diverted and otherwise employed, there remains little or nothing for it self: for the time of our infancy, old age, sleep, maladies of minde and body, and many other times, both unprofitable and unfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth, is little or nothing at all. Nevertheless, without opposing the contrary opinion to them that hold a short life, to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaint seemeth to have little equity and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For,

to

to what end serveth a long life? Simply to live, to breath, to eat, to drink, to see this world: for all this what needs so long time? We have seen, known, tasted, all in a short space; and, knowing it, to desire so long a time to practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to do always one and the same thing? If it be not tedious and irkome, at the least it is superfluous: it is a turning wheel where the same things come and go: it is always to begin where we end, and to re-spin the same web. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life, to learn and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowldg and virtue. Alas! good souls that we are, what should we know, or who should teach us? We employ but badly that little which is given us, not only in vanities, and those things that yield us no profit, but in malice and sin; and then we cry out and complain, that we have not enough given unto us. And to say the truth, to what end serves so great store of knowldg and experience, since in the end we must leave it and dislodg it; and having dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise? But you will say, that there are beasts that do triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are told thereof; be it so: but yet there are a number that live not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that live out their time. By what right, or reason, or priviledg, can man challenge a longer life then other creatures? Is it because he doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthy life? By this reason, he should live less time then all other creatures; for there is none comparable to man, in the ill employments of his life, in wickednes, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodefty in manners, as hath been shewed before, in the comparison of man with beast: so that as I asked even now, to what end a long life served; now I ask what evils there would be in the world, if the life of man were long? What would he not enterprise, since the shortnes of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast; and the uncertainty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, cannot stay him, living as if he should live ever? On the one side he feareth, perceiving himself to be mortall, but notwithstanding that, he cannot bridle himself from not coveting, hoping, enterprizing, as if he were immortall. *Tanquam semper vitiis vivisis, Seneca.*
nunquam vobis fragilias vestra succurris: omnis tanquam mor-

of the life of Man, and the parts thereof.

tales immetis, tanquam immortales concupiscentis. To live as though ye were always to live; your frailty never comes into your minde: ye fear all things as mortall, but ye desire all things as immortall. And to say the truth, what need hath Nature of all these great and goodly enterprises and imployments, whereby man challengeth a longer life then other creatures? Man therefore had no subject whereof to complain, but to be angry with himself. We have life enough, but we are not good husbands, we manage it not well; life is not short, but we make it so; we are not in want, but prodigall, non inopes vita, sed prodigo: we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought-worth, as if we had more then enough: we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vain. *Magna vita pars elabatur male agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus:* A great part of life is lost to those that do ill, a greater to those that do nothing, and all to those that do that they shoulde not do. A man studieth not to live, but rather busieth himself in any other thing; he shall never know how to do a thing well, by acquitting himself of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserve their lives untill they can live no longer, then take comfort in life, when there is nothing left but the lees and dregs thereof. Oh what folly, what misery is this! Yea there are some that have sooner ended, then begun to live, and life is past before they thought of it. *Quidam vivere incipiunt, cum definendum, quidam ante defierunt, quam inceperint. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia, semper incipit vivere.* Some begin to live, when they shoulde dye; some ended, before they begin; amngt other evils, folly hath this, that it alwayes begins to live.

3.
A description
of the life of
man.

Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedy, a perpetuall issue of errors, a web of unhappy adventures, a pursuit of diverse miseries inchain'd together on all sides; there is nothing but evill that it distillett, that it prepareth; one evill drives forward another evill, as one wave another; torment is ever present, and the shadow of what is good deceiveth us; blindnes and want of sense possessesthe the beginning of our life, the middle is ever in pain and travell, the end in sorrow; and beginning,middle, and end in errour.

The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries common, ordinary and perpetuall; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diversity of the parts, ages and seasons; infancy,

infancy, youth, virility, old age; every one have their proper and particular discommodities.

The greatest part of the world speak more honourably and favourably of old age, as the more wise, ripe moderate accusing and *A comparison betwixt youth and old age.* shamming youth of a vicious, foolish, licentious life, but very unjustly: for in truth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome then those of youth, it fills the minde more with wrinckles, then the visage; and there is not a soul growing old, grows not sowre and rotten. With the body the spirit is used, and the worse for the use, and at last returns to infancy again, *Bis pueri scnes: Old men twice children.* Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth us insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to terme wisdom a difficulty of humours, an anxiety and distaste of things present, an impotency to do as in former times: Wisdom is too noble to be served with such officers. To wax old is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices, but to change them into worse. Old age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it cannot taste or relish it aright, like *Aesop's dog*, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it cannot joy in it: for old age leaveth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdaineth old age; for it is alwayes wanton and sporting; and it is no reason that impotency should corrupt judgment, which should in youth know vice in pleasure; and, in old age, pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temerity, indiscreet forwardness, and unbridled liberty, and over-greedy desire of pleasure, which are naturall things proceeding from the heat of the bloud and naturall vigour, and therefore the most excusable; but the vices of old age are far otherwise. The lighter are a vain and frail prouterie, an envious partling, unsociable humours, superstition, care to get riches, even then when the use of them is lost, a sottish avarice, and fear of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because old men are long acquainted, and as it were cockered in this world, whereby their affections are knit unto it, which is not in young men: but besides these they are envious, forward, unjust: but that which is most sottish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not only be reverenced, but feared, and therefore they put upon them an austre look and disdainfull, thinking thereby to extort fear and obedience: but they are therein much deceived, for this stately and furious gesture is received of youth with mockery and laughter, being practised onely to blinde their eyes, and

and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in old age so many faults on the one side , and so many impotencies on the other , and therefore so fit for contempt , that the best way to compass their desires , is love and affection ; for command and fear are no longer fit armes for them . It ill besits them to make themselves to be feared : and though they could do it , yet love and honour is a fairer purchase .

The fourth Consideration of Man, *morall, by his manners, humours, conditions, very lively and notable.*

THE PREFACE.

ALL the descriptions, the wise and such as have taken greatest pains in the study of humane knowledg , have given unto men , seem all to note in man four things : *Vanity, weakness, Inconstancy, Misery*; calling him the spoil of times , the play-game of Fortune , the image of inconstancy , the example and spectacle of infirmity , the ballance of envy and misery , a dream , a fantasie , ashes , a vapour , a morning dew , a flower that presently fadeth and withereth , a winde , grals , a bladder , or bubble , a shadow , leaves of trees carried with the wind , unclean seed in his beginning , a sponge of ordures , a lack of miseries in his middle age , a stench , and meat for worms in his end ; and to conclude , the most miserable and wretched thing in the world . *Job* , one of the most sufficient in this matter , as well in the practice and contemplation thereof , hath well and at large described him , and after him , *Solomon* , in their books . To be short , *Pliny* seemeth very properly to have deciphered him , in calling him the most miserable , and yet the most arrogant creature of the world . *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec miserius quicquam homine aut superbius:* That it is only certain , that there is nothing certain , neither any thing more proud , and miserable then man . By the first word (miserable) he comprehendeth all those former descriptions , and as much as all the rest have said ; but by the other (the most proud) he toucheth another chief point very importent : and he seemeth in these two words to have uttered whatsoever can be said . These are those

two things, that seem to hurt and hinder one the other, Misery and Pride, Vanity and Presumption. See then how strange and monstrous a patch-coat man is.

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diverse parts, the soul and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe him entire, in his perfection and declining state. Some refer unto the body whatsoever ill can be spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and, in regard of his spirit, extoll him above all other creatures; but, one the other side, whatsoever is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forged and proceedeth from the spirit of man, and in it there is far more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, than in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproach in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plinius* proveth it in a book written of that subject. Now let us consider man more according to the life, then heretofore we have done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these five heads, vanity, weakness, inconstancy, misery, and presumption, which are his more natural and universall qualities, but the two latter touch him more neerly. Again, there are some things common to many of these five, which a man knoweth not to which to attribute it, and especially imbecillity and misery.

C H A P. XXVI.

1. *Vanity.*

Vanity is the most essentiaſ and proper quality of humane nature. There is nothing ſo much in man, be it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is alwayes abundance) as base feebleneſ, ſotilneſ, and ridiculous vanity: and therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kinde of disdain of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, then *Heraclitus*, that wept and tormented himſelf, whereby he gave ſome teſtimony, that he made ſome account thereof; and *Diogenes* who ſcorned it, then *Timon* that hater and fier of the company of men. *Pindarus* bath expreſſed it more to the life then any other, by the two vainest things in the world, calling it the dream of a ſhadow, *οὐδὲς ὅρας ἀργεῖται*.

This is that, that hath wrought in the wiſeſt ſo great a contempt of man, that bearing of ſome great diſignment and honourable enterprise,

enterprise, and judging it such, were wont nevertheless to say, that the world was not worthy a mans labour and pains, (so answered *Statilius to Brntus*, talking with him about the conspiracy against *Cesar*) and that a wise man should do nothing but for himself, for it is not reason that wise men, and wisdom should put themselves in danger for fooles.

2.
Thoughts.

This vanity is shewed and expressed many wayes, and after a diverse manner; first in our thoughts and private imaginations, which are many times more then vain, frivolous, and ridiculous wherein nevertheless we spend much time, and yet perceive it not. We enter into them, we dwell in them, and we come forth again insensibly, which is a double vanity, and great forgetfulness of our selves. One walking in a hall, considereth how he may frame his paces after a certain fashion upon the boords of the floore: another discourses in his minde, with much time and great attention, how he should carry himself if he were a King, a Pope, or some other thing, that he is assured can never come to pass; and so he feedeth himself with wind, yea less then wind, that, neither is, nor ever shall be. An other dreameth how he shall compose his body, his countenances, his gestures, his speech after an affected fashion, and pleaseth himself therein, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that every man should take delight in. But what a vanity and foolish weakness in our desires is this, that brings forth beliefs and hopes far more vain? And all this falleth out, not only when we have nothing to do, when we are swallowed up with idleness, but many times in the midst of our most necessary affaires: so naturall and powerfull is vanity, that it robbeth and plucketh out of our hand, the truth, solidity, and substance of things, and fills us with wind, yea with nothing.

3.
Care for time
to come.

Another more foolish vanity, is a troublesome care of what shall here fall out when we are dead. We extend our desires and affections beyond our selves, and our being; we would provide that something should be done unto us, when we know not what is done unto us; we desire to be praised after our death: what greater vanity? It is not ambition, as it seemeth, and a man may think it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honour: if this praise of our selves when we are gone, might any way profit either our children, our parents, or our friends that survive us, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selves; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch us, nor benefit

nefit others, is a meer vanity, like that of those who fear their wives will marry after their departure ; and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue unmarried, and bind them by their wills so to do, leaving unto them a great part of their goods upon that condition. This is a vanity, and many times injustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past, which, dying, exhorted their wives to marry speedily for the better encrease of the Common-wealthe. Others ordain, that for the love of them, and for their sakes, a friend keep such and such a thing, or that he do this or that unto their dead bodies, which rather sheweth their vanity, then doth any good to soul or body.

See here another vanity, we live not but by relation unto another ; we take not so much care what we are in our selves in effect and truth, as what we are in the publike knowledge of men ; in such sort, that we do many times deceive and deprive our selves, of our own goods and commodities, and torment our selves, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not onely in outward things and such as belong to the body, and the expence and charge of our means, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seem unto us to be without fruit, if others enjoy them not, and they be not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

4.

5.

Our vanity is not onely in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh and tormenteth both soul and body. Many times men trouble and torment themselves, more for light occasions and matters of no moment, then for the greatest and most important affairs that are. Our soul is many times troubled with small phantasies, dreams, shadows, fooleries, without body, without subject, it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorrow, joy, building castles in Spain. The remembrance of a farewell of some particular grace or action, afflicteth us more then a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certain words pronounced with a pittiful full voice, yea with sighs and exclamations, pierceth even to the quick, as Oratours and Players, and others that sell wind and smoak, do well know and practice. And this wind catcheth and carrieth away many times men that are most constant and settled, if they stand not upon their guard : so puissant is vanity over men. And not onely light and little things do shake and trouble

*Agitations of
the spirit.*

trouble us, but also lies and impostures, even those we know to be such (a stringe thing) in such sort, that we take pleasure to deceive our selves in good earnest, to feed our phantasies with tales, with nothing. *Ad fallendum nosmetipos ingeniosissimi sumus:* We are wise to deceive our selves; witnessse they that weep and afflict themselves hearing a relation, or seeing a tragedy, which they know to be an invention made for delight, even of those things that never were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that he died for one whom he knew to be foul old, deformed, not because he loved her, but because she was well painted, and plistered or coloured with other impostures, though he always knew them to be such.

6.
*Visitations and
offices of cour-
tesies.*

Let us come from the particular vanity of every particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanity is tied to the nature of man, not only as a private and personal vice. What vanity and los of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congijs, and mutual entertainments, those offices of courtesie, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises? How many hyperbolical speeches, hypocrities and impostures are there in the sight and knowledge of all, both of those that give them, that receive them, that hear of them! insomuch that it seemeth to be a match and marker made together, to mock, lye, and deceive one another. And that which is worth all the rest, he that knows that a man doth impudently lye unto him, must yet give him thanks; and he that knows that when he lies he is not believed, sets a bold face upon the matter, attending and observing one the other, who shall first begin and end; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What inconveniences doth man endure? He faigneth, countereifeth, disquieteth himself; he endureth heat, cold, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaveth his weighty affaires for the wind. We are vain at the charge of our own ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample under foot the substance, and the winde carrieth the body, so much is man a slave to vanity: and he that will do otherwise, shall be held for a fool; and a man that understands not the world. It is dexterity well to play this Comedy, and folly, not to be vain. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vain and unprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and pernicious, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vain boastings! Man desireth and delighteth

delighteth to speak of himself and that which is his, and if he think he have either done, or said, or possesse any thing that is worthy estimation, he is not at ease until he hath uttered it, and made it known unto others : when a commodity first commeth, he enreth into an account thereof, he valuereth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will not seem to attend his commodity, though he seek it with industry ; and then to hear what the speech of the people is abroad, he thrusts himself into company, and it tickleth him at the heart to hear his happy successe spoken of, and that men esteen of him the more, and of what he etteems.

But better to make known what credit and command this vanity hath over the nature of man, let us call to mind that the greatest alterations of the world, the most general and fearful agitations of States and Empires, armes, battels, murthers have risen from light, ridiculous and vain causes, witness the warts of *Troy* and *Greece*, of *Silla* and *Marius*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Augustus* and *Antony*. The Poets signifie as much, when they set all *Greece* and *Asia* on fire for an Apple. The first occasions and motives arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase : a testimony of the vanity and folly of man. Many times the accident doth more then the principal, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quick then the greatest, nay the causes and subjects themselves. The robe of *Cesar* troubled *Rome* more then his death did, or those two and twenty stabs with a poignard that were given him.

Lastly, the crown and perfection of the vanity of man is shewed, in that which he most affecteth and seeks after ; he pleaseth himself and placeth his whole felicity in those vain and frivolous goods, without which he may well and commodiously live, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essential : his chance is winde, his whole good nothing but opinion and dreams, wherein he is matchlesse, *God* hath all good things in essence, all evil in understanding ; man quite contrary possessth his good things by phantasie, his evil in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and phantasies, but with that which is present, palpable, and in verity. Vanity hath been given unto man as his proper part and condition ; he returns, he stirrs, he hunts up and down, he catcheth a shadow, he adoreth the winde, he flies, he dies, and a moat at the last is the hire of his dayes work ; *Vanitas creatura subiecta est etiam molens, universa vanitas omnis homo.*

7.
Publike and
universall agi-
tations.

8.

*Felicity and
contentment.*

Debility or Infirmity.

bono vivens: Every creature is subject to vanity, even against his will, and all men living are but vanity.

C H A P. XXXVII.

Debility or Infirmity.

1. **B**ehold here the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledge: for how should vanity be other then frail and feeble? This weaknesse is confessed, and proved by all that account many things easie to be understood of all, but is not taken to be such in thos: things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth to be most strong, and least weak; in desiring, possessing and using those things that he hath and holdeth, and in every good and evil; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excel others, and to be something. These are the true testimonies of his weaknesse: but we shall see this better apart.

2.
*In desiring
and chusing.*

First, touching desire, a man cannot settle his contentment in any thing, no nor his own desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse what we should; and whatsoever we have desired or obtained, it satisfies us not: but we go blenting after things unknown and to come, because things present content us not, and we more esteem of things absent. If one should put a man to his own choice, make him his own carver, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he repent not his choice, or which he will not add unto, or take from, or alter some way or other; for he desires that which he knows not how to exprefle: and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angry and falleth out with himself.

3.
*In passing and
using.*

The weaknesse of man doth more appear, and is greater in the possession and use of things, and that divers wayes: first, in that he cannot make use of any thing in its own purity and simple nature; but he must disguise, alter and corrupt them, before he can accommodate them to his use: the elements, metals, and all things else in their own nature are not fit for use. Good things, delights and pleasures cannot be enjoyed without some mixture of evil and discomodity; *Medio de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus argat: Even from amidst the fountains of delights do arise alwayes some bitterness, which even in the height of pleasure do annoy.* The highest pleasure that is, hath a sigh and a complaint to accompany it; and being come to perfection is but debility, a dejection

dejection of the minde , languishment. And extreme and full contentment hath more moderate severity , then wanton delight ; *Ipsa felicitas , so nisi temperat , premis : Felicity it self , unless it temper is self , vexeth.* And therefore it was well said of him , that God sells unto us whatsoever good thing he sends us : that is to say , That he giveth nothing unto us purely good , but that we buy it at the scales with an addition of some evill to make up weight , So likewise sorrow is never pure , without the alliance of some pleasure ; *Labor voluptasque dissimillima natura , societate quadam naturali inter se sunt juncta ; est quaedamflare voluptas : Labour and pleasure , though in nature most unlike , yet by a certain naturall society , they are linked together , so that even to weep is a certain delights.* So all things in this world are mingled and compounded with their contraries : those motions and wrinkles in the visage that serve to laugh , serve to weep , as Painters teach us : and we see that the extremity of laughter is mingled with tears . There is no good thing in us , that hath not some vicious tincture with it : *Omnis justitia nostra sunt ranquam pannus infirmitatis : All our righteousness is as a monstrous cloth , as anon shall be shewed in his due place; nor no evill without some good: Nullum sine anachoramento malum est : There is no sin without punishment.* Misery it self alwayes serves to some end : for there is no evill without good , no good in man without evill : all is mingled , and there is nothing pure in our hands . Secondly , whatsoever happeneth unto us , we take and enjoy with an ill hand ; our taste is unresolved and uncertain , it knows not how to hold and possesse any thing after a good manner : and from thence sprang that undetermined question of the sovereign good . The better things many times in our hands , by our infirmities , vice , insufficiency , are made worse , are corrupted , become nothing , are unprofitable unto us , yea sometimes hurtful & contrary .

But humane imbecillity is more richly displayed in good and evil , in virtue and vice : hence it is , that man cannot be , when it is good and seems good unto himself , either wholly good , or wholly wicked , *evil.* but he hath his weakness , his impotencies in them both . Touching virtue , three points are to be consider'd : the first is , that it is not in the power of man to do all good , to put in practise all virtue ; insomuch that many virtues are incompatible , and cannot be altogether , at least in one and the same subject as filiall or maidenny contynency and viduall , which are wholly different ; the married and unmarried estate ; the two second of widow hood & marriage .

Ter. ul.

being more painfull and busie , and having more difficulty and vice then the two first , of virginity and the unmarried estate , which have more purity , grace and ease : *Virgo felicior , vidua laboriosior :* *in illa gratia , in ista virtus coronatur :* The virgin is the happier , the widow the more painfull , in the former grace , in the latter virtue is crowned . That constancy which is in poverty , want , adverfity , and that which is in abundance and prosperity : patience in beggery and liberality . And this is more true in vices , which are opposite one against the other .

5. The second point is , That many times a man cannot perform that , which belongs to one virtue , without the scandal and offence either of another virtue , or of it self , insomuch that they hinder one the other : whereby it comes to pass , that a man cannot satisfie the one , but at the charge of the other ; which we must not attribute unto virtue , or think that the virtues cross and contrary one another ; for they agree well enough ; but unto the weakness of our humane condition , all the sufficiency and industry thereof being so short and so feeble , that it cannot finde any certain univerfall and constant rule , whereby to make an honest man : and such order can not be taken , but that the meane to do well , do many times hinder one the other . Let us take for example , Charity and Justice : If I encounter my father or my friend in the warres , on the enemies part , in justice I ought to kill him , but in charity I should spare and save him . If a man be wounded to the death and past all remedy , and that there remained nothing but a grievous languishing , it were a deed of charity to make an end of him , as he did that killed *Saul* at his earnest intreayt ; but this charity is punished by justice , as he was by *David* , and that justly , *David* being the minister of publick justice , not private charity : yea to be found neer unto a man in such a case , in a suspiciois place , and where there is doubt of the murderer , although he be there to perform some office of humanity , is very dangerous ; and the best thing that can happen unto him , is to be called into question , and put to answer to that accident , whereof he is innocent . So that we see that justice doth not only offend charity , but it hampereth and hindereth it self : and therefore it was very well laid , and truly , *Summum jus , summa iniuria :* *Extreme right , extreme wrong .*

6. The third point and the most notable is , that a man is constrained many times to use bad means , for the better avoidance of some great evill , or the execution of what is good , in such sort that he must sometimes

Sometimes approve as lawfull, not onely those things that are not good, but that are starke naught; as if to be good, it were necessary to be somewhat wicked. And this is seen in every thing, in *Policie, Infinit, Verity, Religion.*

In *Policie*, how many evils are there permitted, and publickly acted, not onely by connivence or permission, but also by the approbation of the laws themselves? as shall hereafter be said in his due place; *Ex Senatusconsulis & plebisctis sceleris exercitacne: Crimis are committed by the decrees of the Senate, and approbations of the people.* To disburden a State or Common wealth, either of too great a number of people, or of such as are inflamed with a desire of wars, which the state, like a body replete with bad or abundant humours, cannot bear, it is the manner to send them elsewhere, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the French, Lombards, Goths, Vandals, Saracens, Turk: have been accustomed to do. To avoid a civill war, it is the manner to entertain a strange war. To instruct others in the virtue of Temperance, Lycurgus caused the *Hotes* their servants to be made drunk, that by the ugly deformity of their sober ffaous inundation, others might grow into an horror and detestation of that sin. The Romans, to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordained of purpose those furious spectacles of the Fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders; afterwards for slaves or servants, but innocents; and lastly for free-men that gave themselves therunto. Brothell houses in great Cities, *njuries*, divorces, under the law of *Moses*, and in diverse other nations, and religions, have been permitted for the better avoiding of great mischieves, *Ad durissim cordis rorsum: For the hardness of mens hearts.*

In *Justice*, which cannot subsist, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely justice commutative, for that is not strange; it is after a sort necessary, and men could not live and traffick together, without mutuall damage without offence, and the lawes allow of the losse which is under the moyety of the just price. But also justice distributive as it self confesseth; *Summum jus, summa injuria, & omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos utilitatem publicam rependitur: Extreme right is extreme wrong, and all great examples have some injustice which for the common good is practised against all: Plato alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of favour and pardon, to draw the offender to confess his fault. This is by injustice, deceit*

Debility or Infirmit.

and impudency to do justice. And what should we say of the invention of tortures, which is rather a proof of patience, than verity? For, both he that can suffer them and cannot, will conceal the truth. For, why should grief cause a man rather to speak that which is, than that which is not? If a man think that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being a means to save his life? *Illa tormenta a gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cuiusque sum animi, sum corporis regit quasitor, fletit libido, corruptit spes, infirmas meens, us in tis verum angustia nil veritatis loci relinquatur: Grief governeth those torments; nature doth moderate, the searer both of the body and minde doth rule, lust boweth, hope corrupteth, fear weakeneth, so that in so many extremities, there is no place for truth.* In defence hereof it is said, that tortures do astonish and quell the guilty, and extort from him a truth; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent: but we do so often see the contrary, that this may be doubted; and to say the truth, it is a poor means full of uncertainty, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not do, to avoid such torment? *Etenim innocentes mentiri cogit dolor: For grief enforceth innocents to lie;* in such sort that it falleth out that the Judge which giveth the torture to the end an innocent should not die, causeth him to die an innocent, and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand have falsely accused their own heads, either to shorten their torments, or their lives. But in the foot of this account, is it not a great injustice and cruelty to torment and to rack a man in pieces, for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end, they may not kill a man without just cause, they do worse then kill him: if he be innocent and bear the punishment, what amends is made him for his unjust torture? He shall be quit; a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thank you. But it is the less evill that the weakness of man could invent.

9.
Verity.

If a man be weak in virtue, much more is he in verity, whether it be eternall and divine, or temporall and humane. That astonisheth him with the lightning, and beats him down with the thunder thereof, as the bright beams of the Sun, the weak eyes of the Owle: if he presume to behold it, being oppressed, he presently fainteth; *Qui scruta- sor est maiestatis, opprimeatur à gloria: The curious searcher of Gods majesty shall be oppressed by his glory,* in such sort, that to give himself some breath, some taste, he must disguise, temper, and cover it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane verity, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speaks it, is many times hol-

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holden for an enemy : *Veritas odium parit, Truth breedeth hatred.* It is a strange thing , man desireth naturally to know the truth and to attain thereunto , he removeth all lets whatsoever , and yet he cannot attain it : if it be present : he cannot apprehend it , if he apprehend it , he is offended with it . The fault is not in the truth , for that is alwayes amiable , beautifull , worthy the knowldg ; but it is humane imbecillity that cannot endure the splendour thereof . Man is strong enough to desire , but too weak to receive and hold what he desireth . The two principall means , which he useth to attain to the knowldg of truth , are reason and experience . Now both of them are so feeble and uncertain (though experience the more weak) that nothing certain can be drawn from them . Reason hath so many formes , is so pliable , so wavering , as hath been said , and experience much more , the occurrents are alwayes unlike ; there is nothing so universall in nature , as diversity , nothing so rare and difficult , and almost impossible , as the likeness and similitude of things : and if a man cannot note this dissimilitude , it is ignorance and weakness ; I mean this perfect , pure , and entire similitude and dissimilitude : for to say the truth , they are both whole and entire , there is no one thing that is wholly like or dislike to another . This is an ingenious and marvellous mixture of nature .

But after all this , what doth better discover this humane imbecillity then Religion ? yea , the very intention thereof , is to make *Religion.*
man feel his own evill , his infirmity , his nothing and to make him to receive from God his good , his strenght , his all things . First , it preacheth it unto him , it beats it into our memory , it reproacheth man , calling him dust , ashes , earth , flesh , bloud , grafs . Afterwards it insinuateth it into Him , and makes him feel it after an excellent and goodly fashion , bringing in God himself , humbled , weakened , debased for the love of him , speaking promising , swearing , chiding , threatening : and to be brief , conversing and working with man after a base , feeble , humane manner , like a father that counterfeits his speech , and plays the child with his children . The weakness of man being such , so great , so invincible that to give it some access and commerce with the Divinity , and to unite it unto God , it was necessary that God should debase himself to the basest : *Dens quia in altitudine sua à nobis parvulus apprehendi non poterat , ideo se stravis hominibus :* God because in his height he could not be apprehended by us little ones , did humble himself to men . Again , it makes him see his own weakness by ordinary effects ; for all the prin-

Debility or Infirmitas.

cipal and holiest exercises, the most solemn actions of religion, are they not the true syntomes and arguments of humane imbecillity and fickness? Those sacrifices that in former times have been used thorowout the world, and yet in some countries continue, not onely of beasts, but also of living men, yea of innocents, were they not shamefull marks of humane infirmity and misery? First, because they were signes and symbols of his condemnation and malediction (for they were as publike protestations, that he had deserved death, and to be sacrificed as those beasts were) without which there had never been any bloudy offerings, propitiatory and expiatory sacrifices. Secondly, because of the baseness of the purpose and intent, which was to think to appease, flatter, and gratifie God by the massacre and blood of beasts, and of men; *Sanguine non colendus Dens: que enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est?* God is not worshipped with bloud: for what can there be in shedding innocent bloud? It is true, that God in those first ages, yet the feeble infancy of the world and nature remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands of religious men, even for their devotion, or rather Christ his sake: *Respectis Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera ejus:* God had respect to Abel, and to his gifts, taking in good part that which was done. with an intent to honour and serve him; and also afterwards, the world being as yet in its apprenticeship, *sub pedagoga,* was wholly seasoned in this opinion so universall, that it was almost thought natural. I touch not here that particular mystery of the religion of the Jewes, who used them for figure (that it a point that belongs to religion) and with whom it was common to convert that which was humane, or naturall and corporall, to a holy and sacred use, and to gather from thence a spirituall fruit. But this was not because God took pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it self good: witness the Prophets, and the clearest sighted amongst them, who have always frell said; *Si volueris sacrificium dedidisti, unique holocaustis non delectaberis; sacrificium & oblationem nolueris, holocaustum pro peccato non posulasti, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c.* If thou wouldest have sacrifice, I had given it thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offerings, neither wile thou have any sacrifices or oblation, nor requirest any burns offering for sin, I will not receive the calves from thy house, &c. And have called back and invited the world to another sacrifice more high, spirituall, and worthy the Divinity; *Sacrificium Deo spiritu:* unres unrem per-

forabis mihi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in meo cordis mei: Immola Deo sacrificium laudis: Misericordiam vole, non sacrificium: The spirit is a sacrifice to God, thou hast boared mine ears, to the end I might do thy will, and keep thy law in the middest of my heart: Offer unto God the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, I will have mercy and not sacrifices. At the last, the Son of God, the Doctor of Truth, being come to secure and free-denize the world, did abolish them wholly: which he had not done, if it had been a thing in it self and essentially good, and that it had pleased his father: for contrarily *Pater non tales querit, sed tales qui adorant in spiritu & veritate: My Father doth me seek such, but those that worship him in spirit and truth.* And to say the truth, it is one of the godliest effects and fruits of Christianity after the abolition of idols, And therefore *Indian* the Emperour, his capitall enemy, as in despight of him, offered more sacrifices then ever any other did in the world, attempting to set them up again with idolatry. Wherefore let us here leave them, and let us see those other principall parts of Religion.

The Sacraments in a matter base and common bread and wine, *Sacraments,* and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our poverty and basenes? Repentance, the universall remedy of our maladies, is a thing in it self shamefull, feeble, yea evill: for to re-pente, to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is evill, though by consequent it be good. An oath, what is it, but a symptome and shamefull *An oath,* mark of distrust, infidelity, ignorance, humane infirmity, both in him that requires it, that gives it, that ordaines it? *Quod amplius est à malo est: That which is more is from the devill.* See then how Religion healeth our evils by meanes not onely small and feeble; our weaknes so requiring: *Sculta & infirma mundi elegit Dens:* God hath chosen the foolish and simple of the world; but such as by no meanes are of any value, nor are good in themselves, but good in that they serve and are employed against evill, as medicines are: they sprang from an ill cause, yet they drive away ill: they are good, as gibbets and wheeles are in a Common-wealth, as vomits and other discharges proceed from ill causes, are to the body: to be brief, they are such good things, as that it had been far better we had never had them; and never had we had them, if man had been wise, and preserved himself in that estate wherein God hath placed him; neither shall he have them any more, so soon as he is delivered from this captivity, and arrived to his perfection.

Debility or Infirmitie.

All this sheweth how great this humane weakness is to any thing that is good, in Policie, Justice, Verity, Religion toward God, but that which is more strange is, that this weakness is as great in what is evill: for man, though he be willing to be wicked, yet he cannot be wholly such, b^tt when he hath done his wort^t, there will be more to do. There is alwayes some remorse and fearfull consideration, that mollifieth the will, and maketh it relent, and still reserveth something to be done; which have been the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a project for their saftey. This is imbecillity and fottishment, and from hence did arise that Proverb at their cost; That a man must not play the fool by halves. A speech uttered with judgment; but that may have both a good and ill sense. To say that a man when he is once in, must still proceed to worse, and worse, without any reservation or respect, it is a very pernicious doctrine, and the Proverb saith well against it; The shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certain cases, the middle way is very dangerous; as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a Wolf by the eares, he must either win him altogether by courtesie, or utterly undo him and extinguish him; which was alwayes the practice of the *Romanes*, and that very wisely: amongst others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*, at the exhortation of *Camilus*; *Pacem in perpetuum petre, vel serviendo, vel signo: To get perpetuall peace, either serving, or in pardoning;* For in such a case to do things by halves, is to lose all, as the *Sannites* did, who for want of putting in practice that counsell given them by an old weather-beaten fouldier, concerning the *Romanes*, whom they had then inclosed and shut up, paid dearly for it; *Aur conciliandus, ans tollendus hostis: An enemy is either to be reconciled, or made out of the way.* The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable and rather to be chosen; and we ought not to come to the second but in extremeties, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath been said, is shewed the extream imbecillity of man, in good an evill, and that good or evill which he either doth, or flieth, is not purely and entirely good or evill: so that it is not in his power to be wholly deprived of all good, not altogether wicked.

Let us likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weakness. It is imbecillity and pusillanimity not to dare, or not to be able to apprehend another, or to be reprehended: he

that is feeble or courageous in the one, is so in the other. Now it is a strange kinde of delicateness, to deprive either himself, or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verbal a wound, that doth onely touch and pierce the eare. Near neighbour unto this it is, not to be able to give a deniall with reason, nor to receive and suffer a repulse with patience.

In false accusations and wicked suspicions, which are done in place of justice and judgment, there is double imbecillity; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that in justifying and excusing themselves too carefully, and, as it were, ambitiously.

Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem? Whom doth an infamous lie fear but a liar? This is to betray their own innocency, to put their conscience and their right to compromise and arbitrement; for by such plea *Perspicuitas argumentatione elevatur: Perspicuity by argument is made more apparent.* Socrates in judgment it self would not do it, neither by himself, nor by another, refusing to use the learned plea of great *Lysias*, and chose rather to die; the other is in a contrary case, that is, when the accused is so courageous, that he takes no care to excuse or justifie himself, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as unworthy his answer and justification, and he will not do himself that wrong to enter the lists: this course hath been practised by generous men; by *Scipio* above all others, many times out of the marvellous constancy of his minde. Now others are offended herewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that he hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yield himself: or impuring this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law and inability to justifie himself. O feeble humanity! the accused or suspected, whether he defend or defend not himself, it is imbecillity and cowardliness. We wish a man courage to defend himself, and when he hath done it, we shew our own weakness by being offended with it.

Another argument of imbecillity is, when a man shall subject and additt himself to a certain particular form of life; this is a base kinde of tenderness, and effeminate delicacie, unworthy an honest man, and makes us unprofitable, different in conversation, and may be hurtfull too, in a case where change of manners and carriage is necessary. It is likewise a shame, either not to dare, or not to be able to do that which he seeth every man do besides himself. It were fittest that such people should live, and hide themselves in the

12.
False suspi:
ons and accus:
ations.

14.
Tenderness
and delicacie.

Debility or Infirmity.

the Chimney corner in their private houses. The fairest form of living is to be pliable to all, even to excess it self if need be; to be able, to dare, to know how to do all things, and yet to do nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to use all.

15.
Search of
books.

It is likewise imbecility, and a great and vulgar foolishness, to run after strange and scholastical examples, after allegations, never to settle an opinion without testimonies in print, nor to believe men but such as are in books, nor truth it self, but such as is ancient. By this reason, fooleries and toyes, if they once pass the Preses, they have credit and dignity enough. Now there are every day many things done before our eyes, which if we had but the spirit and sufficiency well to collect, to search with dexterity, to judg of, and to apply to their time, which should frame and finde miracles and marvellous examples, which yield not in any thing to those of times past, which we so much admire, and therefore we admire because they are ancient and in Print.

16.

Again, another testimony of weakness is, that man is not capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extremities; for if they be small and in outward shew base, he contemneth and disdaineth them as unworthy, and it is offensive unto him to consider of them: if they be very great and over splendent, he fears them, he admires them, and is offended with them. The first doth principally concern great and high minds; the second is common with those that are weak.

17.
Sudden occur-
rents.

This weakness doth likewise appear in our hearing, sight, and in the sudden stroke of a new unexpected occurrent, which surpriseth and seizeth upon us unawares. For they do in such sort affright us, that they take from us, both our sense and speech.

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur:
Stiffe in our sight he grew, heat left his bones,
He fals, and scarce at length breathes out these mones.*

Yea, sometimes life it self: whether they be good; witness that Romane Dame, who died for joy, seeing her son return safe from the warrs; *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the tyrant: or whether they be evill; witness *Diodorus*, who died in the field for shame, because he was not able to resolve a doubt, nor answer an argument.

18.
Braveries and
submissions

Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is twofold, and after two contrary manners; Some yield and are overcome by the tears and

and humble supplication of another , and their courage and gallantry is wounded with their words : others quite contrary are not moved by all the submissions and complaints that may be, but are rather more oburate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weakness , and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar mindes : but the second is not without difficulty , and is found in all sorts of people. It shold seem that to yield unto virtue , and to manly and generous strength and vigour , is the part of a valorous and generous minde. It is true , if it be done in a reverent esteem of virtue , as *Scanderbeg* did , receiving into grace a souldier whom he had seen to carry himself valorously in fight even against himself ; or as *Pompey* did , pardoning the City of the *Mamerians* , for the virtue of *Zenon* a citizen thereof ; or as the Emperour *Conradus* did , forgiving the Duke of *Baviers* , and others besieged with him , for the magnanimity of their women , who privily conveyed them away , and took the danger upon their own heads. But if it be done with a kiade of astonishment and affright of the power of virtue , as the people of *Thebes* , who lost their hearts hearing *Epinomidas* then accused , recount unto them his honorable acts , and severely reproaching them with their ingratitude , it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander* , containing the brave resolusion of *Bella* taken with the city of *Gaza* where he commanded , was neither weakness nor courage , but choler , which in him had neither bridle , nor moderation .

C H A P. XXXVIII.

3. Inconstancy.

MAN is a subject wonderfully divers , and wavering ; upon whom it is very difficult to settle an assured judgment , I say a judgment universall and entire , by reason of the great contrariety and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions , are nothing else but eruptions and impulsions enforced by occasions , and that have reference to others. Irresolution on the one part , and afterwards inconstancy and instability , are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtless our actions do many times so contradict one the other , in so strange a manner , that it seems impossible they should all come forth of one and the same shop ; we alter and we feel it not , we escape

3. Inconstancy.

escape as it were from our selves and we rob our selves; *Ipsi nobis furio subducitur*: Being stolen as it were from our selves. We go after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the winde of occasions carrieth us, not according to reason; *At nil potest esse aquabile, quod non à certa ratione proficitur*: Nothing can be just which proceedeth not from reason. Our spirits also and our humours are changed with the change of time: Life is an unequall motion, irregular, of many fashions. In the end we stirr and trouble our selves, by the instability of our behaviour. *Nemo non quotidie consilium mutat, & votum*: modo uxorem vult, modo amicam; modo regnare vult, modo non est eo officio hor servus; nunc pecuniam spargit, nunc rapit, modo frugi videtur & gravis, modo prodigus & vanus; mutamus subinde personam. No man there is, who daily changeth not his minde, purpose, and desires; sometimes he will have his wife, sometimes a concubine; sometimes he will domineer, again, no servant more humble and officious than he; Now he prodigally spends his own, at another time he violently rakes after other mens goods; sometimes he would seem grave and thrifey, another time a spend thrift and vain; so every moment we are changed.

Quod petiit, spernit repetet quod nuper amisit,

Estuar, & vita disconvenit ordine toto.

Scornes what he honor'd, seeks what he lost, to finde,

Swels and abates, inconstant as the winde.

Man is a creature of all those the most hard to be founded and known, for he is the most double and artificiall covert, and counterfeit, and there are in him so many cabinets and blind corners, from whence he comes forth sometimes a man, sometimes a Satyre; so many breathing holes, from whence he breathes sometimes heat, sometimes cold, and from whence comes forth so much smoak: all his carriage and motion is a perpetuall race of errores; in the morning to be born, in the evening to die; sometimes in the rack, sometimes at liberty; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie, he laughs and weeps for one and the same thing; he is content, and discontent; he will, and he will not, and in the end he knows not what he will: now he is filled with joy and gladness, that he cannot stay within his own skin, and presently he falleth out with himself, nay dares not trust himself; *Modo amore nostri, modo odio laboramus*; sometimes we love, sometimes we loath our selves.

C H A P. XXXIX.

4. Misery.

Behold here the main and principall line and lineament of the picture of a man, he is (as hath been said) vain , feeble , frail , *Misery proper* inconstant in good , in felicity , in pleasure , but strong , constant , ^{unstable man.} and hardened in misery : he is misery it self quick and incarnate , and this is in a word to exprefis humanity , for a man is all misery , and without him there is not any in the world . It is the property of a man to be miserable , oonly man and all man is alwayes miserable . *Homo natus de muliere brevis vivens tempore , repletus multis miserijs : Man born of a woman hath but a short time to live , and is full of miseries.* He that will take upon him to represent unto us all the parts of humane misery , had need to discover his whole life , his substance , his entrance , his continuance , his end , I do not therefore undertake this busyness , it were a work without end , and besides , it is a common subject handled by all : but I will here only quote certain points which are not common , nor taken for miseries , either because they are not felt , or sufficieatly confidered of , although they be such as prell man most , if he know how to judg of them .

The first point and proof of the misery of man , is his birth ; his entrance into the world is shamefull , vile , base , contemptible ; his ^{In his begin-} departure , his death , raine , glorious and honourable : whereby it ^{ning and his} seemeth that he is a monster , and against nature , since there is ^{end.} shame in making him , honour in destroying him : *Nostri nosmiser penites & pudic : We are ashamed and repent our selves of our selves :* Hereof a word or two . The action of planting and making man is shamefull , and all the parts thereof ; the congregidents , the preparations , the instruments , and whatsoever serves thereunto is called and accounted shamefull , and there is nothing more uncleane , in the whole nature of man . The action of destroying and killing him honourable , and that which serves thereunto glorious : we gild it , we enrich it , we adorn our selves with it , we carry it by our sides , in our hands , upon our shoulders . We disdain to go to the birth of man ; every man runs to see him die , whether it be in his bed , or in some publick place , or in the field . When we go about to make a man , we hide our selves , we put out the candle , we do it by stealth . It is a glory and pomp to unmake a man ,

4.
5.
Tertul. de
Spectac.
Seneca.

to kill himself ; we light the candles to see him die , we execute him at high noon , we sound a trumpet , we enter the combat , and we slay him when the sun is at highest . There is but one way to beget , to make a man ; a thousand and a thousand meanes , inventions are to destroy him . There is no reward , honour or recompence assign'd , to those that know how to encrease , to preserve humane nature ; all honour , greatness , riches , dignities , empire , triumphs , trophies are appointed for those that know how to afflict , trouble , destroy it . The two principall men of the world , Alexander , and Cesar , have unmade , have slain , each of them (as Pliny reporteth) more then a million of men , but they made none , left none behinde them . And in ancient times , for pleasure onely and pastime , to delight the eyes of the people , there was publick slayings , and massacres of men made . *Homo sacra res per jocum est Insim occiditur : satis spectaculi in homine mors est : innocentes in ludum venient , ut publica voluptatis hostiae fiant :* Man , though a sacred thing , is slain even for sport and delight ; death in man is spectacle enough : Innocents come to the game , that they may be made the sacrifices of the publick pleasure . There are some nations that curse their birth , bles their death . How monstrous a creature is this , that is made a horror unto himself ? None of all this in any other creature , no not in the whole world besides .

The second point and testimony of the misery of man , is , the diminishing of his pleasure , even those small and slight ones that appertain unto him , (for of such as are great and found he is not capable , as hath been shewed in his weakness) and the impairing of the number and sweetnes of them . If it be so , that he do it not for Gods cause , what a monster is this ? that is an enemy unto himself , robbes and betrays himself , to whom his pleasures are a burthen and a cross . There be some that flee from health , joy , comfort , as from an evill thing .

*O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent !
O wretched man , whose very goods are naught ,
And whose indifferences worse , whose joys have faults ,*

We are not ingenious but to our own hurt , it is the true diet of the force of the spirit .

But there is yet that which is worse , the spirit of man is not onely a diminisher of his joy , a trouble feast , and enemy to his small , naturall and just pleasures , as I mean to prove ; but also a forger of those that are evill : it faineth , feareth , flieith , abhorreth

4.
Forging of
evill.

as great mischiefs, things that are not any way evill in themselves, and in troth, which beasts themselves fear not, but that by his own proper discourse and imagination they are fained to be such, as not to be advanced in honour, greatness, riches, as cuckoldship, sterilitie, death: for to say the truth, there is nothing but griefe it self that is evill, and which is felt. And though some wise men seem to see these things, yet it is not for their own sakes, but because of that griefe which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards: for many times it is a forerunner of death, and sometimes followeth the loss of goods, of credite, of honour. But take from these things griefe, the rest is nothing but fantasie, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits it self of other busyness to be miserable, and imagineth within its own bounds false evils besides the true, employing and extending his misery instead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feel not these evils, but are exempted from them, because Nature judgeth them not to be such.

As for sorrow, which is the only true evill, man is wholly born thereunto, and it is his naturall property. The *Mexicanes* thus ^{He is born to} ^{sorrow.} salute their infants coming forth of the womb of their mother: *Infans, thou art come into the world to suffer: endure, suffer, and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is naturall unto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasongs. All the parts of man are capable of sorrow, very few of delight. The parts capable of pleasure, cannot receive more then one or two sorts, but all can receive the greatest number of griefs, all different, heat, cold, pricking, rubbing, trampling, fleasing, beating, boyling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which have no proper name, (to omit those of the soul) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, then to express them. Man bath no long continuance in pleasure; for that of the body is like a fire of straw; and if it could continue, it would bring with it much envy and displeasure: but sorrows are more permanent, and have not their certain seasons as pleasures have. Again, the empire and command of sorrow is far more great, more universall, more powerfull, more durable, and (in a word) more naturall, then that of pleasure.

To these three a man may add other three: Sorrow and grief is more frequent, and falleth often; pleasure is rare. Evill comes easily of it self, without seeking; Pleasure never comes willingly, it must

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4. Misery.

must be sought after ; and many times we pay more for it then it is worth. Pleasure is never pure , but alwayes distempered , and mingled with some bitterness , and there is alwayes something wanting ; but sorrow and grief is many times entire and pure. After all this , the worst of our market , and that which doth evidently shew the misery of our condition , is , that the greatest pleasures touch us not so neer , as the lightest griefes. *Segnius homines bona , quam mala sentiunt : men more slowly feel that which is good , than that which is evill.* We feel not so much our soundest health , as the least malady that is : *Pungit in cruce vix summa viola in plaga corpus , quando valere nil quenquam moves.*

6.

By memory and anticipation.

It is enough that man be indeed and by nature miserable , and besides , true and substantiall evils he fain and forge , false and fantasticall , as hath been said ; but he must likewise extend and lengthen them , and cause both the true and false to endure , and live longer then they can , so avarous is he of misery ; which he doth divers wayes. First , by the remembrance of what is past , and the anticipation of what is to come , so that we cannot fail to be miserable , since that those things which are principally good in us , and whereof we glory most , are instruments of misery. *Futuro torquemur & praezirito , multa bona nostra nobis nocent , timoris tormentum memoria reducit , providentia anticipat , nemo praesentibus sanctum miser est : We are tormented with that which is past , and with that which is to come , even our own goods do harm us , memory reduceth the torment of fear , providence anticipateth , no man is miserable only by things present.* It is not enough to be miserable , but we must increase it by a continuall expectation before it come , nay leek it , and provoke it to come , like those that kill themselves with the fear of death ; that is to say , either by curiosity or imbecillity , and vain apprehension , to preoccupate evils and inconveniences , and to at end them with so much pain and ado , even those which peradventure will never come neer us. These kinde of people will be miserable before their time , and doubly miserable , both by a reall sense or feeling of their misery , and by a long premeditation thereof , which many times is a hundred times worse then the evils themselves. *Micis afficit sensus fatigatio , quam cogitatio : The concit of affliction , doth hurt more then affliction it self.* The essence or being of misery endureth not long , but the minde of man must lengthen and extend it , and entertain it before hand. *Plus dolent quam necesse est , qui ante dolet quam necesse est. Quodam magis quedam,*

quādam antequām debant; quādam cū omnino non debant; nos
torquent. Aut augēmus dolorem; aut frigimus; aut præcipimus:
He sorrowish more then he needs, that lamenteth before he hath need:
some things afflict us more then they shoulde, some before they shoulde,
some when they shoulde not at all; either we increase our grief, or we
fie it, or we command it. Beasts do well defend themselves from
this folly and misery, and are much bound to thank Nature that
they want that spirit, that memory, that providence that man
hath. Cesar said well, that the best death was that which was
least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before
death, hath been to many a greater torment, then the execution it
self. My meaning is not here to speak of that virtuous and phi-
losophicall premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the soul
is made invincible, and is fortified to the proof against all assaults
and accidents, whereof we shall speak hereafter: but of that
fearfull and sometimes false and vain apprehension of evils that
may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke,
all the beauty and serenity of the soul, troubleth all the rest and
joy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it self to be
wholly surprised. It is more easie and more naturall not to think
thereof at all. But let us leave this anticipatōn of evill, for simply
every care and painfull thought, bleating after things to come by
hope, desire, fear, is a very great misery. For, besides that we have
not any power over that which is to come, much less over that
which is past; (and so it is vanity, as it hath been said) there doth
still remain unto us that evill and damage, *Calamitosus est ani-
mūs, futuri anxius; That minde is in a lamentable case, which is
troubled for future things:* which robbeth our understanding, and
taketh from us the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will
not suffer us to settle and content our selves therein.

Lib. 1. cap. 7.

But this is not yet enough. For, to the end man may never
want matter of misery, yea that he may alwayes have his full, he
never ceaseth searching and seeking with great study, the causes
and aliments of misery. He thrusseth himself into busines even
with joy of heart, even such as when they are offered unto him,
he should turn his back towards them, and either out of a misera-
ble disquiet of minde, or to the end he may shew himself to be in-
dustrious, a man of employmēnt and understanding, that is a fool
and miserable too, he enterpriseth, moveth and removeth new busi-
ness, or else he putteth himself into that of other mens. To be short,

4. *Misery.*

he is so strongly and unceasantly molested with care , and thoughts not onely unprofitable and superfluous , but painfull and hurtfull , tormented with what is present , annoyed with what is past , vexed with that which is to come , that he seemeth to fear nothing more , then that he shall not be sufficiently miserable . So that a man may justly cry out , O poor and wretched creatures that you are , how many evils do you willingly endure , besides those necessary evils that nature hath bestowed upon you ! But what ? Man contenteth himself in misery , he is obstinate to ruminate and continually to recall to minde his passed evils . Complaints are common with him , and his own evils and sorrowes seem many times dear unto him , yea it is a happy thing for small and light occasions , to be termed the most miserable of all others : *Eft quedam dolendi voluptas: There is a certain delight in grief.* Now this is a far greater misery to be ambitiously miserable , then not to know it , not to feel it at all . *Homo animal querulum , cupide suis incumbens miseria: Man is a complaining creature , willingly yielding to his own miseries.*

8. By incompatibility. We will not account it a humane misery , since it is an evill common to all men , and not to beasts ; that men cannot accommodate themselves and make profit of one another , without the los & hurt , the sicknes , folly , sin , death of one another . We hinder , wound , oppress one the other in such manner , that the better sort even without thought or will thereunto , out of an insensible desire , and innocently thirst after the death , the evill , the pain , and punishment of another .

9. In the remedies of remedy. So that we see man miserable , both natnally and voluntarily , in truth and by imagination , by obligation and willingness of heart . He is too miserable , & yet he fears he is not miserable enough & laboureth to make himself more miserable : let us now see how . When he feels any evill , and is annoyed with some certain misery (for he is never without many miseries that he feels not) he endeavoureth to quit himself thereof ; but what are his remedies ? Truly such as importune him more then the evill it self , which he would cure ; in such sort , that being willing to get forth of one misery , he doth but change it into another , and perhaps into a worse . But what of that ? the change it self , perhaps delighteth him , or at least yields him some solace : he thinketh to heal one evill with another , which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth : that is , That there is nothing profitable , if it be not painfull : That is worth naught that costs nothing ,

thing, yea ease it self is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing but true, and which convicted man to be miserable. That no evil can be taken away, but by another evill, whether it be in body or in soul. Spirituall maladies and corporall, are not cured and chased away, but by torment, sorrow, pain. The spirituall by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonments, which are truly afflictions, and such as ^{*It was erroneous, but corrected.*} gaule us too, notwithstanding the resolution and devotion willingly to endure them: for if we use them either for pleasure or profit, they can work no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of covetousness, of household government, then of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporall in like sort be medicines, incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feel that are bound to medicinall rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoies them. So likewise other evils, as ignorance is cured by great, long, and painfull study: *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem: He that increaseth knowldg, increaseth labour.* Want and poverty, by great care, watchings, travell, sweatings: *In sudore vultus tui: In the sweat of thy browes:* So that both for the soul and for the body, labour and travell is as proper unto man, as it is for a bird to flie.

All these miseries above mentioned are corporall, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher then the ^{*spirituall miseries.*} imagination and phantasie. Let us consider of the more subtle and spirituall, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more active and more our own, but less felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because he only feeleth those evils, that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speak of them, so much is he confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries. We must therefore by the way as it were, and gently, say something, at least with the finger point a far off, to give him occasion to consider and think thereof, since of himself he hides it not. First, in regard of the understanding, is it not a strange and a lamentable misery of humane nature, that it should wholly be composed of error and blindness? The greatest part of common and vulgar opinions, yet the more plausible, and such as are received with reverence, are false and erroneous, and which is worse, the greater part unprofitable for humane society. And although some of the wiest, which are but few in number,

ber understand better then the common sort, and judg of these opinions as they shoule, nevertheless sometimes they suffer themselves to be carried, if not in all and always, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firm and constant, that he suffer not himself to be carried with the stream, yes sound and prepared to keep himself cleer from so universall a contagion. The generall opinions received with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift river which carrieth all with it : *Prob superi, quantum mortalia pictora caca noctis habent ! O miseras, hominum menses & pectora caca, qualibus in tenebris vita, quantisque prictis degitur hic avi quodcunque est ! O God, how much foolish bloudness rests in the breasts of men ! O the sinfull and miserable basenesse of mens, mindes ; in what darkness is our life, and how many dangers doth this age whatsoever it is, pass through !* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing, to run over all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken : yet let us take a view of some few of them, which in their due place shall be handled more at large.

see lib.3. cap.1. 1. To judge of advice and counsell by the events, which are no way in our own hands, and which depends upon the heavens.

Lib.2. cap.8. 2. To condemn and reject all things, manners, opinions, laws, customes, observations, as barbarous and evill, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconvenience in them ; but onely because they are universall, and different from such as are ordinary and common.

Lib.2. cap.3. 3. To esteem and commend things, because of their novelty, or rarity, or strangeness, or difficulty, four messengers which have great credit in vulgar spirits : and many times such things are vain, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodness and commodity. And therefore that Prince did justly contemn him that glorified himself, because he could from far cast a grain of millet, thorow the eye of a needle.

4. Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weak minds are infected.

5. To esteem of men for their riches, dignities, honours, and to contemp those that want them, as if a man shoule judge of a horse by his saddle and bridle.

6. To account of things not according to their true, naturall, and essentiaill worth, which is many times inward and bidden, but

but according to the outward shew, or common report,
 7. To think to be revenged of an enemy, by killing him; for
 that is to put him in safery, and to quit him from all ill, and to
 bring a vengeance upon himself: it is to take from his enemy all
 sense of revenge, which is the principall effect thereof. This doth
 likewise belong unto weakness.

8. To account it a great injury, or to think a man miserable,
 because he is a cuckold: for what greater folly in judgment can
 there be, then to esteem of a man the less for the vice of another,
 which he never allowed? As much may be said of a bastard.

9. To account less of things present; and that are our own,
 and which we peaceably enjoy; and to esteem of them most, when
 a man hath them not, or because they are another mans: as if the
 presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want
 of them increase it:

Virtutem incolunem odimus,
Sublatam ex oculis querimus invidi:
Absence endearcs, we weigh not what we have,
And yet in others, would envie and crave.

And this is the cause, why a Prophet is not esteemed in his own
 country. So likewise, mastership and authority, ingendreth con-
 tempt of those that are subject to that authority; husbands have
 a careless respect of their wives, and many fathers of their chil-
 dren. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) love her no more? then
 marry her. We esteem more the horse, the house, the servant of
 another, because he is another's and not ours. It is a thing very
 strange to account more of things in imagination, then in sub-
 stance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whe-
 ther it be before he have them, or after he hath had them. The cause
 hereof in both cases may be, because, before a man possesseth them,
 he esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according
 to that which he imagineth them to be, or they have by another
 been reported to be; and possessing them, he esteemeth them accord-
 ing to that good and benefit he getteth by them; & after they are
 taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly, in their
 perfection and declination, whereas before he enjoyed them and
 used them, but by piecemeal successively: for a man thinketh he shal
 always have time enough to enjoy them, & by that means they are
 gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the reason,
 why the grief is greater in having them not, then the pleasure in

possessing them. But herein there is as much imbecillity as misery. We have not the sufficiency to enjoy, but only to desire. There is another vice clean contrary to this, and that is, when a man setteth himself in himself, and in such sort conceits himself and whatsoever he hath, that he preserrs it before all, and thinks nothing comparable to his own. Though these kinde of people be no wiser then the other, yet they are at least more happy.

10. To be over-zealous in every question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himself importunate and opinative in every thing, so he may have some fair pretext of justice, religion, the weale-publick, the love of the people,

see cap. 17.

11. To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weep for the death, or unhappy accident of another, to think that not to be moved at all, or very little, is for want of love and affection. There is also vanity in this.

Lib. 1. cap. 10.

12. To esteem, to make account of actions that are done with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemn those that are done otherwise, and to think that they that proceed after so sweet and calme a manner, do nothing, are as in a dream, without action; and to be brief, to esteem Art more then Nature. That which is puffed up, swollen and elevated by study, fame, report, and striketh the sense, (that is to say artificiall) is more regarded and esteemed, then that which is sweet, simple, plain, ordinary, that is to say, Naturall, that awaketh, this brings us asleep.

13. To give an ill and wrong interpretation of the honourable actions of another man, and to attribute them to base and vain, or vicious causes or occasions; as they that attributed the death of young *Cato*, to the fear he had of *Cesar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seemes to be offended; and others more foolishly, to ambition: This is a great malady of the judgment, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and manners, or envie against those that are more worthy then themselves, or from that vice of bringing their own credit to their own door, and measuring another by their own foot, or rather then all this, from imbecillity and weakness, as not having their sight so strong and so certain, to conceive the brightness of virtue, in its own native purity. There are some that think they shew great wit and subtily, in depraving and obscuring the glory of beautifull and honourable actions, wherein they shew much more malice then sufficiency. It is a shing easie enough to do, but base and villanous,

14. To

14. To defame and to chaffise over-rigorously, and shamefully, certain vices, as crimes in the highest degree, villainous, and contagious; which are nevertheless but indifferent, and have their root and excuse in nature: and not so much to detest, and to chaffise with so greedy adoe those vices that are truly great, and against nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15. Behold also after all this, a true testimony of spirituall misery, but which is wily and subtile, and that is, that the spirit of man in its best temper, and peaceable, settled, and soundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, naturall, and indifferent things. To be capable of divine and supernaturall, as of divination, prophesie, revelation, invention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the gods, he must be sick, displaced from his naturall seat, and as it were corrupted, *corruptionis*, either by extravagancie, extasie, inspiration, or by dreaming; insomuch that the two naturall wayes to attain thereunto, are either fury, or dead sleep: So that the spirit is never so wise, as when it is a fool, nor more awaked, then when it sleepeth; it never meeteth better, then when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it never mounteth or flies so high, as when it is most dejected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be as it were lost, and without it self. This toucheth not in any sort the Divine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reveal himself; man in the meane time continuing settled in his sense and understanding, as the Scripture makes mention of *Moses* and divers others.

16. To conclude, can there be a greater fault in judgement, then not to esteem of judgment, not to exercise it, and to prefer the memory, and imagination, or phantasie before it? We see those great goodly, and learned orations, discourses, lectures, sermon-books, which are so much esteemed and admitted, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heap and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a work of memory and reading, and a thing very easie, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and hereof are so many books composed) with some few points handled, with a good instruction or two (a work of imagination) and here is all. This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any spark of judgment, or excellent virtue: so likewise the authors themselves,

4. *Misery.*

are many times weak and common in judgment, and in will corrupted: how much better is it, to hear a country swane, or a merchant talking in his counting-house, discoursing of many goodly proportions and verities, plainly and truly without art or form, and giving good and wholesome counsell, out of a sound, strong, and solid judgment?

11.
Of the Will.

In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable; they are without number, among which these following are some few of them.

1. To be willing rather to seem an honest man, then to be, and rather to be such to another, then to himself.

2. To be far more ready and willing to revenge an offence, then to acknowledg a good turn, in such sort, that it is a corrosive to his heart to acknowledg, pleasure and gain to revenge, a proof of a malignant nature, *gratia oneri est, ultio in quaestu habetur.*

3. To be more apt to hate, then to love; to slander, then to commend; to feed more willingly and with greater pleasure upon the evill, then the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse and the exercise of his style: witness Lawyers, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man, are idle; eloquent, in evill. The words, invention, figures, to speak ill, to scoffe, are far otherwise, more rich, more emphaticall and significant, then to praise, or speak well.

4. To flie from evill, to do what is good, not properly for the good effect by naturall reason, and for the love of virtue; but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base and idle, of gain and profit, vain-glory, hope, fear, of custome, company; and to be brief, not simply for himself and his duty, but for some other outward occasion, and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such, unequally, diversly; not perpetually, constantly, uniformly.

5. To love him the less whom we have offended, and that because we have offended him, a strange thing; and which proceedeth not always from fear that he will take occasion to be revenged, for it may be he wilbeth us never the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse us, and bringe to memory our fault and indiscretion: And if the offender love not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will; for commonly he that hath a will to offend, loves him the less whom he hath offended; *Chi offende, mai non pardona:* He that offends, never forgives.

6. As

6. As much as may be laid of him to whom we are much bound for courtesies received , his presence is a burden unto us, he putteth us in minde of our band and duty , he reproacheth unto us our ingratitude and insabilities . and we wish he were not so , we were discharged of that duty . Villaines by nature : *Quidam quo plus debent , magis oderrunt : leve as alienum debitorem facit , grave ini- mitum :* *Soror , the more they ought to love , the more they hate : a little debt alienateth a little , a great maketh him an enemy .*

7. To take pleasure in the evill , burt , and danger of another , to grieve and repine at his good advancement , prosperity , (I mean when it is without cause of hatred , or private quarell , for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill deserfe of man .) I speak here of that common and naturall condition , whereby , without any particular malice , men of indifferent honesty , take pleasure to see others adventure their fortunes at sea , and are vexed to see them thrive better then themselves , or that fortune should smile more upon others , then them , and make themselves merry with the sorrow of another : this is a token of a malicious seed in us .

To conclude , that I may yet shew you how great our misery is , let me tell you that the world is replenished with three sorts of people , who take up much room therein , and carry a great sway both in number and reputation : the *Superstitions* , *Formalists* , *Pendants* , who notwithstanding they are in divers subjects , jurisdictions , and theatres , (the three principall , religion , life or conversation , and doctrine) yet they are all of one stampe , weak spirits , ill born , or very ill instructed , a very dangerous kinde of people in judgment , and touched with a disease incurable . It is lost labour to speak to these kinde of people , or to perswade them to change their minds , for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world , opinative obstinacy is there in his proper seat ; he that is once striken and touched to the quick with any of these evills , there is little hope of his recovery : who is there more softish , and withall more brain-sick and heady then these kinde of people ? Two things there are that do much hinder them , (as hath been spoken) naturall imbecillity , and incapacity , and afterwards an anticipated opinion to do as well and better then others . I do here but name them , and point at them with the finger , for afterwards in their places here quoted , their faults shall be shewed at large .

The superstitions , injurious to God , and enemies to true religion , cover

4. *Misery.*

cover themselves with the cloake of piety , zeal and love towards God , even to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more then is needfull , thinking thereby to merit much , and that God is not onely pleased therewith , but indebted unto them for the rest . What would you do to these kinde of people ? If you tell them that they do more then they need , and that they receive things with the left hand , in not understanding them aright , they will not believe you , but tell you , that their intent is good (whereby they think to save themselves) and that they do it for devotion . Howsoever , they wil not quit themselves of their gain , nor the satisfaction which they receive , which is to binde God unto them .

2.
Formalists.

The *Formalists* do wholly tye themselves to an outward form and fashion of life , thinking to be quit of blame , in the pursuit of their passions and desires , so they do nothing against the tenor of the Lawes , and omit none of their formalities . See here a miserable churle , which hath overthrown and brought to a desperate state many poor families ; but this hath fallen out , by demanding that which he thought to be his own , and that by way of justice . Who then can affirm that he hath done ill ? O how many good works have been omitted , how many evills committed , under this cloak of formes , which a man sees not ! And therefore it is very truly said , That the extremity of law , is the extremity of wrong : and as well said , God shield us from *Formalists* .

3.
Pedants. lib. 3. cap. 13.

The *Pedantie* or houshold school master , having with great study and paines filched from other mens writings their learning , they set it out to the view and to sale , and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it , and let it flie with the wind . Are there any people in the world so softish in their affaires , more unapt to every thing , and yet more presumptuous and obstinate ? in every tongue and nation , *Pedant* , *Clerke* , *Master* , are words of reproach . To do any thing softishly , is to do it like a *Clerke* . These are a kinde of people , that have their memories stuffed with the wisdom of other men , and have none of their own : their judgments , wils , consciences are never the better , they are unapt , simple , unwise , in such sort , that it seems that learning serves them for no other use , then to make them more fooles , yea more arrogant prattlers : they diminish , or rather swallow up their own spirits ; and bastardize their understanding , but puffe up their memory . Here is that misery seated which we now come to speak of , and is the last of those of the understanding .

CHAP.

C H A P. XL.

5. Presumption.

Behold here the last and leudest line or lineament of this picture ; it is the other part of that description given by *Pliny* ; the plague of man , and the nurse of false and erroneous opinions, both publick and particular , and yet a vice both naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must be considered diversly, and in all senses , high , low , collateral , inward and outward ; in respect of God, things high and celestiall, in regard of things base, at of beasts, man his companion, of himself , & all may be reduced to these two ; To esteem too much of himself , and not to esteem sufficiently of another : *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios : Luc. 18.*
Trusted in themselves, and despised others. A word or two of either.

First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in Religion , or faise service of God , proceedeth from this ; That we esteem not enough of God , we understand him not, ^{in regard of} _{God.} and our opinions , conceits , and belieses of the Divinity , are not high and pure enough. I mean not by this enough proportion answerable to the greatness of God , which being infinite ; receiveth not any proportion ; for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or believe enough : but I mean enough , in respect of what we can and ought to do. We soare not high enough , we do not elevate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit , when we enter into an imagination of the Divinity ; we over-basely conceit him, our services are unworthy his majesty , we deal with him after a baser manner then with other creatures , we speak not only of his works , but of his majesty , will , judgments , with more confidence and boldnes then we dare to do of an earthly Prince or man of honour. Many men there are , that woulde scorn such kinde of service and acknowledgement , and would hold themselves to be abused , and their honours in some sort violated , if a man should speak of them , or abuse their names in so base and abject a manner. We enterprise to leade God , to flatter him , to bend him , to compound or condition with him ; that I may not say , to brave , threaten , despise , murmure against him. *Cesar* willed his Pilot not to fear to hoise up sales , and commit himself to the fury of the seas , even against destiny and the will of the heavens , with this only

5. Presumption.

see lib. 1. cap.
10.

only confidence , That it was Cesar whom he carried. *Angustus* having been beaten with a tempest at sea, defied god *Neptune*, and in the chiefest pompe of the *Circean* sports , caused his image to be taken down , from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods , to be revenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundreth and lightenereth , shoot against heaven , to bring God himself into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea , and wrote a bill of defiance against the hill *Atbos*. And one telleth of a Christian King neer neighbour of ours , who having received a blow from God , swore he would be revenged , and gave commandement that for ten years no man should pray unto him , or speak of him.

see lib. 2. cap.
18.
See lib. 3. cap. I.

Audax Iapeti genus,
Nil mortalibus arduum est;
Calum ipsum petimus fultitiā , neque
Per nostrum pacimur scelus
Iracunda lovem ponere fulmina:
Audacious Christians, Iaphes backward seed,
Goe the contrary way (to heaven) with speed;
Whose sins incessant, minute, hour, and day,
Provoke Gods rod to walk, his flaffe to stay.

But , to leave these strange extravagancies , all the common sort of people , do they not plainly verifie that saying of *Pliny* , That there is nothing more miserable , and therewithall more glorious then man ? For on the one side he faineth losy and rich opinions of the love , care , and affection of God towards him , as his minion and onely beloved; and in the mean time , he returneth him no duty or service worthy so great and loving a God. How can a life so miserable , and a service so negligent on the one side , agree with an opinion and belief so glorious and so haughty on the other ? This is at one and the same time , to be an angell and a swine : and this is that wherewith a great Philosopher reproached the Christians , that there were no people more fierce and glorious in their speech , and in effect more dissolute , effeminate , and villainous. It was an enemy that spake it , perhaps to wrong and abuse us , but yet he spake but that which doth justly touch all hypocrites.

In respect of
Nature.

It likewise seemeth unto us , that we burthen and importune God , the world , and nature , that they labour and travell in our affaires , they watch not but for us , and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen unto us , and especially

cially at our death. Few there are that resolve and believe , that it is their last hour , and almost all do even then suffer themselves to be mocked with vain hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of our selves , and we think that the whole world bath great interest in our death , that things fail us according to that measure that we fail them ; or that they fail themselves, according to that measure that they fail us ; that they go the self-same dance with us , not unlike those that row upon the water, think the heavens , the earth , yea Cities themselves to move, when they move ; we think to draw all with us , and there is no man amongst us that sufficiently thinks he is but one.

Belides all this , man believeth that the heaven, the stars, all this great celesticall motion of the world , is only made for him. *Tot Of beauen. circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos : And that all the Gods are in convention for him alone.* And the poor miserable wretch is in the mean time ridiculous : he is here beneath , lodged in the last and worst stage of the world , most distant from the celesticall vault, in the sink of the world , amongst the filth and lees thereof, with creatures of baser condition , made to receive all these excrements and ordure , which rain down and fall from above upon his head ; nay he lives not but by them , and to endure all those accidents that on all sides happen unto him ; and yet he makes himself believe, that he is the master and commander of all , that all creatures , yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies , whereof he knows not the least virtue , and which he is constrained with astonishment to admire , move not but for him , and to do him service. And because he beggetteth (wretch that he is) his living , his maintenance, his commodities from the beams , light and heat of the Sun , from the rain and other distillations of heaven , and the air , he sticks not to say , that he enjoyeth the heavens and the elements , as if all had been made , and still move only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much , and perhaps more justly and peremptorily. For man, who many times receiveth many discommodities from above, and of all that he receiveth hath nothing in his own power or understanding , nor can divine of them , is in continuall doubt and fear , least those superiour bodies should not move stright , and to that end and purpose which he hath proposed , and that they procure unto him sterility , sickness , and whatsoever is contrary to his designtment, and so he trembleth under his burthen ; whereas beasts receive whatsoever cometh from above , without stir or apprehension

5. Presumption.

bension of what shall happen unto them , and without complaint , of that which is hapned , which man cannot do . *Non nos causa mundo sumus hyemem astatemque referendis suis ista leges habent , quibus divina exercentur : minns nos suspicimus , si digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur : non tanta celo nobiscum societas est , ut nostro fato sit ille quoque siderum fulgor . We are not the cause why the world hath course and recourse of winter and summer , these things have their rules and lawes , by which the will of God is executed : we honour our selves the less , if we think our selves worthy ; that for our sakes so many things should be moved : we have not that society with the heavens , that the stars should only shine for us .*

4.
Of creatures.

In respect of things base and earthly , that is to say , all other creatures , he disdaineth and contemoeth them , as if they did not appertain to the same master-workman , and came not of the same mother , did not belong to the same family with him , as if they did not any way concern him , or had any part or relation unto him . And from hence proceedeth that common abuse and cruelty that is practised against them , a thing that reboundeth against that common and universall master which hath made them , which hath care of them , and hath ordained laws for their good and preservation , hath given them preheminence in certain things , and sent man unto them as to a school . But this belongs to the subject of the Chapter following .

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine , that the world is made for man , and man for God : for besides the instruction that man draweth in generall , from every high and low thing , whereby to know God , himself , his duty , he also draweth in particulars from every thing , either profit , pleasure , or service . That which is above him , which he hath least in understanding , and nothing at all in his power , the azured heaven so richly decked and counterpointed with stars , and rowling torches never ceasing over our heads , he only enjoyeth by contemplation , he mounteth and is carried with admiration , fear , reverence of the author and soveraign Lord of all ; and therefore in this sense it was truly said by *Anaxagoras* , That man was created to contemplate the heaven and the Sun , and as truly by other Philosophers was he called *εραπορχοτον* from base and inferiour things , he draweth help , service , commodity ; but for a man to persuade himself that in the framing of all these things , no other thing was thought upon but man , and that he is the only end and But of all these

these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great folly and an over-bold presumption.

Finally, but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himself, that is to say, in regard of himself, and of man his companion, but within, in the progresse of his judgment and opinion; and without in his communication and conversation with another. Concerning which, we are to consider three things, as ^{Three degrees of humaine presumption.} three heads which follow on the other, where humanity bewrayeth in a softish imbecillity the foolish presumption thereof. The first in believing or misbelieving (here is no question of Religion, nor of faith and belief Theologicall, and therefore we must still call to minde the advertisement given in the Preface) where we are to note two contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; the one and the other more ordinary, is a kinde of lightness, *qui cito credit, levius est corde; he that lightly believeth, is light in heart:* and too great a facility to believe and to entertain whosoever is proposed, with any kinde of appearance of truth or authority. This belongeth to the folly, simplicity, tenderness and imbecillity of the weaker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, sick, superstitious, astonished, indiscreetly zealous, who like wax do easily receive all impressions, suffer themselves to be taken and led by the eares. And this is rather an error and weakness, then malice, and doth willingly lodg in minds gentle and debonaire. *Credulitas error est magis quam culpa, & quidem in opimi cuiusque mentem facile irrepit: Credulity is rather an error, than a fault which easily creepeth into the best mans heart.* We see almost the whole world led and carried with opinions and beliefs, not out of choice and judgment, yea many times before they have either years, or discretion to judg, but out of the custome of the country, or instruction in youth received, or by some sudden encounter as with a tempest, whereby they are in such sort fastened, subjected, and enthralled, that it is a matter of great difficulty, ever to unlearn them again. *Veluti tempestate delati at quacunque disciplinam tanquam ad saxum adhaescunt: They cleave to any discipline as to a stone, being carried thither w^t a tempest.* Thus is the world led, we trust our selves too much, and then persuade others to believe us. *Unusquisque manuit credere quam judicare; versat nos & precipitat traditio per manus error, ipsa confusando assentiendi periculosa & Lubrica: Every one had rather believe then judg; error comming by tradition, doth precipitate and tosse us, the very custome of assenting*

¹ To believe,
misbelieve.

5. Presumption.

is dangerous and slippery. Now this popular facility, though it be in truth weakness and imbecillity, yet is not without presumption. For, so lightly to believe and hold for truth and certainty, that which we know not, or to enquire of the causes, reasons, consequents, and not of the truth it self, is to enterprise, to presume too much. For from what other cause proceeds this? If you shall answer from a supposition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man handleth and stirreth the foundations and effects of a thousand things which never were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are false. How many fables, false and supposed miracles, visions, revelations, are there received in the world, that never were? And why should a man believe a miracle, a thing neither humane nor naturall, when he is able by nature and humane means to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying have like visages, like carriage, relish gate, and we behold them with one and the same eye. *Ita sunt finitima falsa veris, ut in precipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere: Falshood is so near unto truth, that a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be unadvisedly carried away.* A man ought not to believe that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernaturall and superhumane approbation, which is onely God, who is onely to be believed in that he saith, only because he saith it.

7. The other contrary vice, is an audacious temerity, to condemn and reject as false all things that are not easily understood, and that please not the palate. It is the property of those that have a good opinion of themselves, which play the parts of men of dexterity and understanding, especiall Hereticks, *Sopbists*, *Pedanties*, for they finding in themselves some speciall point of the spirit, and that they see a little more clearly then the common sort, they assume unto themselves law and authority, to decide and determine all things. This vice is far greater, and more base then the former: for it is an enraged folly, to think to know as much as possibly is to be known, the jurisdiction and limits of nature, the capacity of the power and will of God to frame unto himself and his sufficiency the truth and falsehood of things, which must needs be in so certain and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinary language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there, which at one time we have rejected with laughter as impossible, which we have been constrained afterwards to confess and approve, yea and others too, more strange then they?

And

And on the other side , how many things have we received as articles of our faith, that have afterwards proved vanities and lies ?

The second degree of presumption , which followeth and com-^{2. To affirme}
monly proceedeth from the former , is certainly and obstinately *and cedemus.*
to affirm or disprove , that which he hath lightly believed , or mis-
believed ; So that it addeth unto the first , obstinacy in opinion ,
and so the presumption increaseth . This facility to believe , with
time is confirmed , and degenerateth into an obstinacy , invincible ,
and uncapable of amendment ; yea , a man proceeds so far in this
obstinacy , that he defends those things that he knows and under-
stands least , *Majorem fidem homines adhuc sis qua non intelli-
gunt ; cupiditate humanis ingenii lubet iuu obscura creduntur :* Men
easily believe those things they understand not ; by a naturall desire
of humane wit , obscure things are easily believed . He speaks of all
things with resolution . Now affirmation and opinative obstinacy ,
are signes of negligence and ignorance accompanied with folly and
arrogancy .

The third degree , which followeth these two , and which is the
height of presumption , is to perswade others to receive as canon-^{3. To perswade,}
call whatsoever he believeth , yea imperiously to impose a belief as
it were by obligation , and inhibition to doubt . What tyranny is
this ? Whosoever believeth a thing , thinks it a work of charity
to perswade another to believe the same ; and that he may the bet-
ter do it , he feareth not to add of his own invention , so much as he
feeth necessary for his purpose to supply that want and willingness ,
which he thinks to be in the conceit of another of that he tel-
l. There is nothing unto which men are commonly more prone , then
to give way to their own opinions . *Nemo sibi tantum errat , sed
aliis erroris causa & author est : No man erres only to himself , but
is the author and cause of error to others .* Where the ordinary
mean wanteth , there a man addeth commandement , force , fire ,
sword . This vice is proper unto dogmatists , and such as will govern ,
and give laws unto the world . Now to attain to the end hereof
and to captivate the beliefs of men unto themselves , they use two
means : First , they bring in certain generall and fundamentall pro-
positions , which they call principles and presuppositiones , whereof
they say we must neither doubt nor dispute ; upon which they after-
wards build whatsoever they please , and leade the world at their
pleasure : which is a mockery , whereby the world is replenished
with errors and lies . And to say the truth , if a man should examine

these principles, he should finde as great, or greater untruths and weaknesses in them, then in all that which they would have to depend upon them, and as great an appearance of truth in propositions quite contrary. There have been some in our time, that have changed and quite altered the principles and rules, of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomy, Physick, Geometrie*, in nature, and the motion of the windes. Every humane proposition hath as much authority as another, if reason make not the difference. Truth dependeth not upon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Divinity have not revealed them; all the rest is but a dream and smoke. Now these great masters will, that whatsoever they say, should be believed and received, and that every man should trust them, without judging or examining what they teach, which is a tyrannicall injustice. God onely(as hath been said) is to be believed in all that he saith, because that he saith it: *Qui a semetipso loquitur mendax est: He that speaketh of himself is a liar.*

The other mean is a supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestiall revelation and apparition, which hath been cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or private Captains. The persuasion taken from the subject it self, possesseth the simpler sort; but at the first it is so tender and frail, that the least offence, mistaking or imprudence that shall happen, undoeth all: for it is a great marvell, how from so vain beginnings and frivolous causes, there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth wonderfully grow and increase, in such sort, that it fasteneth even upon the most expert and skilfull, by reason of the multitude of believers, witnesses, years, wherewith a man suffereth himself to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurn against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to believe it. The greatest and most powerfull means to persuade, and the best touch-stone of truth, is multitude of years and believers: now fools do win the game, *saniatis patrocinium est insanientium turba: The mad multitude is a patronage for sobriety.* It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolve and settle his judgment against the common opinion. All this may easily appear, by those many impostures & fooleries which we have seen to go for miracles, and ravish the whole world with admiration, but instantly extinguished by some accident, or by the exact inquiry.

3. Presumption.

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inquiry of such as are quick sighted , who have cleared and discovered the couzenage ; which if they had but time to ripen , and to have fortified in nature , they had continued for ever , been generally received and adored . And even such as are divers others, which by the favour of fortune , have passed for currant , and gained publick belief , whereunto men afterwards accommodate themselves , without any farther desire , to know the thing in its first form and originall , *Nusquam ad liquidum fama perdicitur : Report is never brought to full triall.* And this is the reason , why there are so many kindes of religion in the world , so many superstitious customes of the Pagans , which are yet remaining even in Christendom , and concerning which we cannot wholly assure the people . By this whole discourse we see what we are , and to what we tend , since we are led by such guides .

The fifth and last Consideration of Man , by *those varieties and great differences that are in him , and their comparisons.*

C H A P. X L I.

Of the difference and inequality of men in generall.

There is nothing in this lower world , wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men , and where the differences are so distant and divers in one and the same subject , and kinde . If a man should believe *Pliny , Herodotus , Plutarch* , there are shaps of men in some countries , that haue very little resemblance with ours , and some that are of a mixt and doubtfull kinde , betwixt men and beasts . There are some countries where men are without heads , carrying their eyes and mouths in their breasts ; where they are *Hermaprodites* ; where they go with four feet ; where they have one eye in the forehead , and a head more like to a dogs head then a mans ; where they are as fish from the navell downwards , and live in the water ; where their women bear children at five years of age , and live but eight ; where they have their heads and foreheads so hard , that iron cannot pierce them ; where they do naturally change into wolves and other beasts , and afterwards into men again ; where they are without a mouth , nourishing themselves with the smell of certain odors ; where they yield a

Of the differences and inequality of men in general.

seed that is black , where they are very little and dwarfs , where they are very great and giants , where they go alwayes naked , where they are all hairy , where they speak not , but live in woods like beasts , hidden in caves and hollow trees . And in our times we have discovered , seen with the eye , and touched with our fingers , where the men are without beards , without use of fire , corn , wine , where that is held to be the greatest beauty , which we account the greatest deformity , as hath been said before . Touching the diversity of manners , we shall speak elsewhere . And to omit many of these strange wonderments , we know that as touching the visage , it is impossible to finde two in all things alike ; it may fall out that we may mistake , and take the one for the other , because of the great resemblance that may be between two : but this must be in the absence of the one : for in the presence of them both , it is easie to note a difference , though a man know not how to express it . In the souls of men there is a far greater difference , for it is not onely greater without comparison , betwixt a man and a man , then betwixt a beast and a beast : but there is a greater difference betwixt a man and a man , then a man and a beast ; for an excellent beast comes nearer to a man of the basest sort and degree , than that man to another great and excellent personage . This great difference of men , proceedeth from the inward qualities , and from the spirit , where there are so many parts , so many jurisdictions , so many degrees beyond number , that it is an infinite thing to consider . We must now at the last learn to know man by those distinctions , and differences that are in him , which are divers , according to the many parts in man , many reasons , and means to compare and consider of him . We will here set down five principall , unto which the rest may be referred , and in generall all that is in man , *Spirit , body , naturall , acquired , publike , private , apparent , secret :* and so this fiftieth and last consideration of man , shall have five parts , which are five great and capitall distinctions of men , that is to say :

The first naturall , essentiall , and universall of all men , soul and body .

The second naturall and essentiall , principally , and in some sort acquired , of the force and sufficiency of the spirit .

The third accidentall of the estate , condition and duty of man , drawn from superiority and inferiority .

The fourth accidentall of the condition and profession of life .

The

The fifth and last of the favours and disfavours of Nature, and of Fortune.

C H A P. XLII.

*The first distinction and difference of men, naturall and essential,
drawn from the divers situation of the world.*

THE first more notable, and universall distinction of men, which concerneth the soul and body, and whole essence of man, is ^{1.} *The diversity taken and drawn from the divers site of the world, according to of men pro-*
which the aspect and influence of heaven, and the sun, the air,
the climate, the countrey, are divers. So likewise not onely the colour,
the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners,
are divers; but also the faculties of the soul: plaga cœli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animorum facit. Athenis tenui cœlum,
ex quo etiam scutiores Attice; crassum Thebis, ideo pingues Thebanis & valentes. The temperature of the celestiall Climat, is of great operation, both for the strenght of the body, and the vigour of the minde: The Athenian air is delicate, and therefore they of a more sharp and ready wit; The Theban gross, and they fat and strong. And therefore Plaso thanked God that he was an Athenian, and not a Theban. As fruits and beasts are divers, according to the divers countries wherein they are: so men are born more and less warlike, just, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ingenious, good, obedient, beautifull, sound, strong. And this is the reason why Cyrus would not agree to the Persians, to abandon their sharp and hilly countrey, to go to another more plain and pleasant, saying, That fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

Following this foundation, we may in grosse, divide the world into three parts, and all men into three kinds of nature: we will make three generall situations of the world, which are, the two extremities, South, and North, and the middle betwixt them both; every part and situation shall have sixty degrees. The Southern parts which is under the Equator, hath thirty degrees on this side the line, thirty on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two Tropicks, or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southern countries, Africk, and Ethiopia in the middle betwixt the East and the West; Arabia, Calient, the Moluques, Javes, Taprobana towards the Orient; Peru and the great Seas towards

^{2.} *The division
of the world
into three
parts.*

The other middle part, hath thirty degrees beyond the Tropicks; both on this side the line, and on that towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all Europe with the Mediterrene Sea in the middle, betwixt the East and West; all Asia both the less and the greater, which is towards the East, with China, Japan, and America, towards the West. The third, which is the thirty degrees, which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and icie countries, the Septentrionall people, Tertiary, Muscovy, Estorian, Magelan, which is not yet through y discovered.

6. Following this general partition of the world, the natures of Their natures. men, are likewise different in every thing, body, soul, religion, manners, as we may see in this title Table: For the

	Northern people are	Middle are	Southern are
1 In their bodies.	{ High and great, phlegmaticke, saanguine, white, and yellow, sociable the voice strong, the skin soft and hairy, great eaters and drinkers, puissant,	{ Indifferent and temperate in all those things, as neuters or partakers a little	{ Little, melancholik, cold, and drie, blacke, Solitary, the voice shrill, the skin hard, wch little hair, and curled, abstinent, feeble.
2 Spirit.	{ Heavy, obtuse, stupid Scotish, facill, light, inconstant.	{ of those two extremis, s, and participating most of that regi- on to which	{ Ingenuous, wise, subtile, Lepinative.
3 Religion.	{ Little religious and devout.	{ of that regi- on to which	{ Superstitions, contem- plative.
4 Manners.	{ Warriors valiant, painfull, chaste, free from jealousy, cruell and inhumane.	{ they are nee- rest neigh- borous.	{ No Warriors; idli- chaste jealous, cruell, and inhumane.

4. All these differences are easily proved. As for those of the body, they are known by the eye, and if there be any exceptions, they are rare, and proceed from the mixture of the people, or from the windes, the water, and particular situation of the place, whereby a mountain is a notable difference, in the self-same degree, yea the self-same countrey and city. They of the higher part of the city of Athens, were of a quite contrary humour, as Plutarch affmeth, to those that dwelt about the gate of Pyrens: and they that

that dwelt on the North side of a mountain, differ as much from those that dwel on the South side, as they do both differ from those in the valley.

As for the differences of the spirit, we know that mechanicall
and manuall Arts belong to the North, where men as made for ^{The spirit,} labour; Speculative sciences came from the South. *Cesar* and other ancients of those times, called the *Egyptians* ingenios, and subtile: *Moses* is said to be instructed in their wisdom; and Philosophy came from thence into *Greece*, Greatnes began rather with them, because of their spirit and subtily. The guards of Princes (yea in the Southern parts) are Northern men, as having more strength, and les subtilty and malice. So likewise the Southern people are indued with great virtues, and subject to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northern have goodness and simplicity. The lesser and middle sciences, as policies, laws, and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and policies have flourished.

As touching the third pointe, religions may come from the South, *Egypt*, *Arabia*, *Chaldea*; more superstition in *Africk*, ^{3.} Religion. then the whole world besides, witness their vowes so frequent, their temples so magnificent. The Northern people, saith *Cesar*, having little care of religion, being wholly given to the wars and to hunting.

As for manners, and first touching warrs, it is certain that the greatest armies, Arts, military instruments and inventions have ^{4.} Manners. come from the North. The *Scythians*, *Gothes*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Tartarians*, *Turkes*, *Germanes*, have beaten and conquered all other nations, and ransacked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, That all evill comes from the North. Single combates came from them. The Northern people adored a sword fastened in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are invincible, yea to the *Romanes*, who having conquered the rest of the world, were utterly destroyed by them. They grow weak and languish with the Southern windes, and going towards the South; as the Southern men coming into the North, redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fiercenes, they will not endure to be commanded by authority, they love their liberty, at leastwise elective commanders. Touching chastyty and jealousy in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to a man: yea one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cesar*. There is no jealousy, saith

The first distinction and difference

faith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselves together with strangers. In the South *Polygamy* is altogether received. All *Africk* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*: The Southerns die with jealousy, and therefore they keep *Eunuchs*, as gardians to their wives, which their great Lords have in great number, as they have stables of horses. Touching cruelty, the two extremes are alike cruell, but the causes are divers, as we shall see anon, when we come to speak of the causes. Those tortures of the wheel, and staking of men alive, came from the North: The inhumanities of the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, are too well known. The *Almanes*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offendours by law, but cruelly murder them as enemies. The Southerns flea their offendours alive, and their desire of revenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not glutted therewith. In the middle regions they are mercifull and humane: The *Romanes* punished their greatest offendours with banishment. The *Greeks* used to put their offendours to death, with a sweet drugg, made of a kinde of *Hemlock* which they gave them to drink. And *Cicero* saith, that humanity and courtesie were the conditions of *Aria minor*, and from thence derived to the rest of the world.

5.
The cause of
the aforesaid
differences.

The cause of all these corporall and spirituall differences, is the inequality and difference of the inward natural heat, which is in those countries and peoples, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Notherns, by reason of the great outward cold, which incloseth and drieth the heat into the inward parts, as caves and deep places are hot in Winter, so mens stomacks, *Ventres hycme calidiores*. Our stomacks are hot in winter. Weak and feeble in the Southers, the inward heat being dispersed and drawn into the outward parts, by the vehemency of the outward heat, as in Summer vaults, and places under the earth are cold. Mean and temperate in the middle regions. From this diversity, I say, and inequality of natural heat, proceed these differences not onely corporal, which are easie to note, but also spiritual; for the Southerns by reason of their cold temperature, are melancholike, and therefore staid, constant, contemplative, ingenious, religious, wise; for wisdom is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholick, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold blood. From this melancholy temperature it likewise commeth, that the Southerns are unchaste, by reason of their frothy, fretting tickling melan-

melancholy, as we commonly see in Hares; and cruell, because this fretting sharp melancholy, doth violently press the passions and revenge. The Northernns are of a phlegmatick and sanguine temperature, quite contrary to the Southern, and therefore have contrary qualities, save that they agree in this one, that they are likewise croell and inhumane, but by another reason, that is, for want of judgement, whereby like beasts, they know not how to contain and govern themselves. They of the middle regions are sanguine and cholericke, tempered with a sweet, pleasant, kindly disposed humour; they are active. We could likewise more exquisitely represent, the divers natures of these three sorts of people, by the application and comparison of all things, as you may see in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

<i>Northern.</i>	<i>Midlers.</i>	<i>Southern.</i>	<i>Qualities of the soule.</i>
<i>The common sense,</i>	<i>discourse and reasoning,</i>	<i>Understanding,</i>	
<i>Force, as of Beares and others beastes.</i>	<i>Reason and justice of men.</i>	<i>Subtilty of force, and religion of divines.</i>	
<i>Mars { Warre, The moon { Hunting.</i>	<i>Mercury { Emperors, Jupiter. { Oratours,</i>	<i>Saturn { contemplation, Planets. Venus { love.</i>	
<i>Arts and handi- crafts.</i>	<i>Prudence, knowledg of good and evill.</i>	<i>Knowledge of truth and Actions and falshood.</i>	<i>parts of the</i>
<i>Labourers, Artis- ters, Soldiery, to execute and obey.</i>	<i>Magistrates, provident, to judge, command.</i>	<i>Prelates, Philosophers, to contemplate.</i>	<i>Common-weal,</i>
<i>Young men, unapt.</i>	<i>Perfect men, managers of affaires.</i>	<i>Grave old men, wise, pensive.</i>	

The other distinction more particular, may be referred to this generall of North, and South: for we may refer to the conditions of the Northern, those of the West, and that live in mountaines, warriours, fierce people, desirous of liberty, by reason of the cold which is in mountaines. So likewise, they that are farr distant from the Sea, are more simple and innocent. And contrarily, to the conditions of the Southernns, we may refer the Easterlings, such as live in valleys, effeminate and delicate persons, by reason of the fertility of the place, which naturally yieldeth pleasure. So likewise

The second distinction and more subtile

wise they that live upon the Sea coasts are subtile, deceivers by reason of their commerce and traffick with divers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may say, & see that generally those of the North do excel in body, have strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and have for their part subtlety; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. So likewise we may see that their manners, to say the truth, are neither vices nor virtues, but works of Nature, which to amend or renounce a together is more then difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremity, to a mediocrity, it is a work of virtue.

C H A P. XLIII.

*The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the spirits
and sufficiencies of men*

1.
*Three sorts
and degrees of
people in the
world.*

1.
3.

This second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiency, is not so plain, and perceptible as the other, and comes as well from nature as atchievement; according unto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the first and the lowest are the weak and plain spirits, of base and slender capacity, born to obey, serve, and to be led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent judgment, make profession of sufficiency, knowledg, dexterity, but do not sufficiently understand and judg themselves, resting themselves upon that which is commonly held, and given them at the first hand, without further enquiry of the truþ and scource of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawful; and never looking farther then where they be, but thinking that it is every where so; or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceived, yea they are barbarous. They subject themselves to opinions, and the municipall lawes of the place where they live, even from the time they were first hatched, not onely by observance and custome, which all ought to do, but even from the very heart and soul, with a perswasion that that which is believed in their village is the true touchstone of truth, (here is nothing spoken of divine revealed truth, or religion) the onely, or at least the best rule to live well. These sorts of people are of the school and jurisdiction of Aristotle, affirmers, positive men, dogmatists, who respect more utility then verity, according to the use and

Of the spirits and sufficiencies of men.

and custome of the world , then that which is good and true in it self. Of this condition there are a very great number , and divers degrees ; the principal and most active amongst them govern the world , and have the command in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quick and clear spirit, a strong, firm, and solid judgment , who are not content with a bare affirmation , nor settle themselves in common received openions , nor suffer themselves to be wonne and preoccupied by a publick and common belief , whereof they wonder not at all , knowldg that there are many cosenages , deceits and impostures received in the world with approbation and applause , yea publick adoration and reverence : but they examine all things that are propoſed , ſound maturely , and ſeek without paſſion the cauſes , motives , and jurisdictions even to the root , loving better to doubt , and to hold in ſuſpence their belief , then by a loose and idle facile or lightneſſe , or precipitation of judgment to feed themſelves with lies , and afſirm or ſecure themſelves of that thing whereof they can have no certain reaſon. These are but few in number , of the Schoole of *Socrates* and *Plato* , modeſt, sober, stayed, conſidering more the ve‐rity and realty of things then the utility ; who if they be well born , having with that above mentioned probitie and government in manners , they are truly wiſe , and ſuch as here we ſeek after. But because they agree not with the common ſort , as touching o‐pinions , ſee more clearly , pierce more deeply , are not ſo facile and eaſie drawn to believe , they are ſuſpected and little eſteemed of others , who are far more in number , and held for phantaſticks and Philosophers ; a word which they uſe in a wrong ſenſe , to wrong others. In the firſt of theſe three degrees or orders there is a far greater number then in the ſecond , and in the ſecond then in the third. They of the firſt and laſt , the loweft and highest , trouble not the world , make no fir , the one for inſufficiency and weak‐neſſe , the other by reaſon of two great ſuſticiency , ſtabilitie , and wiſeſdom. They of the middle make all the fir , the diſputati‐ons that are in the world , a preuumptuous kinde of people , alwayes ſtirred , and alwayes stirring. They of the lower rank , as the bot‐tom, the lees, the ſink, reſemble the earth , which doth nothing but receive and ſuffer that which comes from above. They of the middle reſemble the region of the air , wherein are formed all the meteors , thundrings , and alterations are made , which afterwards fall upon the earth. They of the higher ſtage reſemble the firma‐ment

ment it self , or at least the highest region next unto heaven , pure, clear , neat and peaceable . This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the brain , which is different , moist, hot, dry, and that in many degrees , whereby the spirits and judgments are either very solid, courageous , or feeble , fearful , plain : and partly from instruction and discipline ; as also from the experience and practice of the world , which serveth to put off simplicity , and to become more advised . Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found under every robe , form and condition both of good and evil men , but diversly .

2.
*Another di-
stinction.*

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies , for some there are that make way themselves , and are their own guides and governors . These are happy , of the higher sort , and very rare ; others have need of help , and these are of two sorts : For some need only a little light , it is enough if they have a guide and a torch to go before them , they will willingly and easily follow . Others there are that must be drawn , they need a spurr , and must be led by the hand . I speak not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot , as they are of the lower range , or the malignity of their nature will not , as they of the middle , who are neither good to follow , nor will suffer themselves to be drawn and directed , for these are a people past all hope .

C H A P . X L I V .

*The third distinction and difference of men accidental,
of their degrees , estates and charges .*

THIS ACCIDENTALL distinction , which respecteth the estates and charges is grounded upon two principles and foundations of humane society , which are to command and obey , power and subjection , superiority and inferiority . *Imperio & obsequio omnia constant : All things do consist of command and subjection .* This distinction we better see , first in grosse in this Table .

	Families and house- hold go- vernment;	Marriage , of the husband and the wife. This is the source of all division. humane society.	
		Paternal of parents over their children. This is truly na- tural.	
Private which is either in	Herile , which is twofold , of	Lords , over their slaves. Masters , over their servants.	
	Patronall , of Patrons over their pupils : the use whereof is less frequent.		
All pow- er and subjection is either	Corporations and Colleges , Civil commu- nities over the particular members of that community.		
Publike which is either	Sovereign , which is three- fold , and they are three sorts of estates , cunctas nationes & urbes , po- pulus aut primores aut , singuli regunt , i.	Monarchy , of one. Aristocracy , of a few. Democracy , of all.	
	Subaltern , which is in those who are su- periors and inferiors , for divers reasons , places , persons , as	Particular Lords , in many degrees. Officers of the so- vereignty , where- of there are di- vers sorts.	

This publike power , whether it be sovereign , or subaltern , hath ^{The subdivisi-} other subdivisions , necessary to be known . The sovereign , which (as one of the fore-
had been said) is threefold , in regard of the manner of govern-
ment , is likewise threefold ; that is to say , every one of these three
is governed after a threefold manner , and is therefore called Roy-
al , or Signorial , or Tyrannical . Royal , wherein the sovereign (be
it one , or many , or all) obeying the lawes of Nature , preserveth
the

the naturall liberty and propriety of the goods of his subjects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, et singulas proprietas: omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio.* All power belongeth to Kings, to every particular man the propriety, the King possesseth all by command, private men by possession. Seignioriall or lordly, where the sovereign is Lord both of men and goods, by the right of armes, governing his subjects as slaves. Tyrannicall, where the sovereign contemning all laws of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subjects, differing from a Lord, as a thief from an enemy in war. Of the three sovereign states, the Monarchie, and of the three governments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable, and majesticall; as in former times, *Affyria, Persia, Egypt, and now Ethiopia* the most ancient, that, is *Muscovie, Tartary, Turkie, Peru.* But the better and more naturall state and government, is the Monarchy Royall. The most famous Aristocracies, hath sometimes been that of the *Lacerdemians*, and now the *Venitians*. The Democracies, *Rome, Athens, Carthage*, Royall in their goverment.

3. Of particullar Lords.

The publike subalterne power, which is in particular Lords, is of many kindes and degrees, principally five, that is to say, Lords Tributaries. who pay onely tribute.

Federaries, simple Vassals, who owe faith and homage for the tenure of their land. These three may be sovereigns.

Vassals bound to do service, who besides faith and homage, owe likewise personall service, whereby they cannot truly be sovereigns.

Naturall subjects, whether they be Vassals or Censors, or otherwise, who owe subjection and obedience, and cannot be exempted from the power of their sovereign, and these are Lords.

4. Of officers.

The publick subalterne power, which is in the officers of the sovereignty, is of divers kindes, and both in regard of the honour, and the power may be reduced to five degrees.

1. The first and basest, are those ignominious persons, which should remain without the city, the last executioners of justice.

2. The second, they that have neither honour nor infamie, Sergeants, Trumpeters.

3. The third, such as have honour without knowledg and power, Notaries, Receivers, Secretaries.

4. The fourth, they that have with honour, power, and knowledg; but without jurisdiction, the Kings servants.

The

The fifth, they that have with the rest jurisdiction; and these are properly called Magistrates: of whom there are many distinctions, and especially these five, which are all double:

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|---------------|
| 1 | 5 Majors, Senatours, | 2 | 5 Politicks. |
| 1 | 5 Minors, Judges. | 2 | 5 Militaries. |
| 2 | 5 Civil. } 4 Titularies in offices of form, who have it by
2 } Criminal. } Commissaries. (inheritance. | | |
| 3 | 5 Perpetuall, as the lesser both in number and otherwise should
3 } be. | | |
| 2 | 2 Temporall and moveable, as the greater should be. | | |

Of the estates and degrees of Men, in particular following this precedent Table.

An Advertisement.

Here we are to speak in particular of the parts of this table, and the distinctions of powers and subjections, (beginning with the private and domesticall) that is to say, of every estate and profession of men, to the end we may know them; and therefore this may be called, The Book of the knowledge of man, for the duties of every one shall be set down in the third Book, in the virtue of justice; where in like manner and order all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before we beginne, it shall be necessary summarily to speak of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principall causes of these diversities of estates and charges.

C H A P. XLV. *Of commanding and obeying.*

These, as hath been said, are the two foundations of all humane society, and the diversity of estates and professions: They are Relatives, they do mutually respect, ingender, and serve one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subject to a naturall kind of envy, and an everlasting contestation, complaint and obreception. The popular estate make the Sovereign of worse condition then a Carter. The Monarchy placeth him above God himself. In commanding

ding is the honour , the difficulty (these two commonly go together) the goodness , the sufficiency , all qualities of greatness ; Command , that is to say , sufficiency , courage , authority , is from heaven and of God , *Imperium non nisi divino fato datur : omnis potestas a Deo est : Empire and dominion is not given but by divine destiny : all power is from God above.* And therefore Plato was wont to say , That God did not appoint and establish men , that is to say , men of a common sort and sufficiency , and purely humane to rule others , but such as by some divine touch , singular virtue , and gift of heaven , do excell others : and therefore they are called *Heroes* . In obeying is utility , proclivity , necessity , in such sort , that for the preservation of the weale publick , it is more necessary then well to command ; and the denall obedience , or not to obey as men should , is far more dangerous , then for a Prince not to command as he should . Even as in marriage , though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loyalty , and fidelity , and have both bound themselves by promise in the same words , the same ceremonies and solemnities ; yet notwithstanding the inconveniences are incomparably far greater , in the fact of adultery , to the wife then the husband : even so , though command and obedience are equally required in every state and company , yet the inconveniences of disobedience in subjects , are far more dangerous then of ill government in a Commander . Many States have a long time continued and prospered too , under the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates , the subjects obeying , and accommodating themselves to their government : and therefore a wise man being once asked , why the Common-wealth of *Sparta* was so flourishing , and whether it were , because their Kings command well ? Nay rather , saith he , because the Citizens obey well . For if the subjects once refuse to obey , and shake off their yoke , that state must necessarily fall to the ground .

C H A P . X L V I .

Of Marriage.

N OTwithstanding the state of marriage be the first , more ancient and most important , and as it were the foundation and fountain of humane society , whence arise families , and from them common-weales , *Prima societas in conjugio est , quod principium urbis , seminaria Reipublice ; the firſt ſociety is in wedlock , which was*

was the beginning of cities, and the seminary of the common wealth: Yet it hath been contemned and defamed by many great Personages, who have judged it unworthy men of heart and spirit, and have framed many objections against it.

First, they account the band and obligation thereof unjust, a hard and oversight captivity, insomuch that by marriage, a man is bound and enthralled to the cares and humours of another. And ^{Objections at} if it fall out, that he hath mistaken in his chiose, and have met ^{2.} ^{with a hard bargain,} more bone then flesh, his life his ever afterwards most miserable. What iniquity and injustice can there be greater, then for one hours folly, a fault committed without malice, and by meer over-sight, yea many times to obey the advice of another, a man should be bound to an everlasting torment? It were better for him to put the halter about his neck, and to cast himself into the sea his head downward, to end his miserable life, then to live always in the pains of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of jealousie, of malice, of rage, of madnes, of brutish obstinacy, and other miserable conditions: and therefore one sticks not to say, That he that invented this knot and tie of marriage, had found a goodly and beautifull means to be revenged of man; a trap or gin to intangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another faith, That to marry a wise man to a fool, or a fool to a wise man, is to bind the living to the dead, which was the cruellest death invented by tyrants, to make the living to languish and die by the company of the dead. Secondly, they say, that marriage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits, insomuch that the flatteries and smooth speeches of the party beloved, the affection towards children, the care of houſhold affaires, and advancement of their families, do lessen, dissolve, and mollifie the vigour and strength of the most lively and generous spirit that is, witness *Sampson, Solomon, Marc. Antony.* And therefore howsoever the matter go, we had not need to marry. But thoſe that have more flesh then spirit, strong in body, and weak in minde, tie them to the flesh and give them the charge of ſmall and base matters, ſuch as they are capable of. But ſuch as are weak of body, have their spirits great, ſtrong, and puissant, is it not then a pity to binde them to the flesh, and to marriage, as men do beasts in the ſtable? We ſee that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for ſervice, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept aſunder from

the company and acquaintance of the other sex ; and it is the manner to put beasts of least esteem at random together. So likewise, such men and women as are ordained to the most venerable and holiest vocation , and which ought to be as the cream , and marrow of Christianity , Church men and religious , are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from marriage. And the reason is, because marriage hindereth and averteth those beautifull and great elevations of the soul , the contemplation of things high , celestiall and divine , which is incompatible with the troubles and molestations of domesticall affaires : for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitary continent life before marriage. Vertility may well hold with marriage , but honesty is on the other side.

Again; it troubleth beautifull and holy enterprises : as Saint Austin reporteth , that having determined with some other his friends , amongst whom there was some married , to retire themselves from the city , and the company of men, the better to attend to the study of wisdom and virtue , their purpose was quickly broken and altered , by the wives of those that were married. And another wise man did not doubt to say , that if men could live without women , they should be visited and accompanied by Angels: Moreover marriage is an hinderance to such as delight in travell, and to see strange countries , whether to learn to make themselves wise , or to teach others to be wise , and to publish that to others which they know. To conclude , marriage doth not onely corrupt and deject good and great spirits , but it robbeth the weale-publick of many beautifull and great things , which cannot manifest themselves , remaining in the bosom and lap of a woman , or being spent upon young children. But it is not a goodly sight , nay a great loss , that he that is able for his wisdom and policy , to govern the whole world , should spend his time in the government of a woman and a few children ? And therefore it was well answered by a great personage being sollicited to marry , That he was born to command men , not a woman ; to counsell Kings and Princes , not little children.

To all this a man may answer , that the nature of man is not capable of perfection , or of any thing against which nothing may be objected , as hath elsewhere been spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath , are in some degree or other but sickly , mingled with discommodities : They are all but necessary evils

3.
The answer to
the aforesaid
objections , etc .
4.

evils. And this is the best that man could devise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtilly have invented means to have avoided these thorny inconveniences; but besides that they built castles in the air, that could not long continue in use, their inventions likewise if they could have been put in practise, would not have been without many discommodities and difficulties. Man hath been the cause of them, and hath himself brought them forth by his vice, intemperancy, and contrary passion; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knows not well how to use any thing. Moreover a man may say, that by reason of these thornes and difficulties, it is a school of virtue, an apprenticeship, and a familiar and dometical exercise: and *Socrates*, a Doctor of wisdom, did once say, to such as hit him in the teeth with his wives pettish frowardnes, *That he did thereby learn even within his own dores, to be constant and patient every where else, and to think the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant unto him.* It is not to be denied, but that he that can live unmarried doth best: but yet for the honour of marriage, a man may say, that it was first instituted by God himself in *Paradise*, before any other thing, and that in the state of innocence and perfection. See here four commendations of marriage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without reply. Afterwards the Son of God approved it, and honoured it with his presence at the first miracle that he wrought, and that miracle done in the favour of that state of marriage, and married men; yea he hath honoured it with this priviledge, that it serveth for a figure of that great union of his with the Church, and for that caule it is called a mystery, and great.

Without all doubt, marriage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great evil; a great content, or a great trouble; a paradise, or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good; or a rough and dangerous match, and a gauling burthen some tye, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini Deus, aut lupus; A man is so man either a God or a Wolf*.

*Wholly good, or
wholly ill.*

Marriage is a work that consisteth of many parts; there must be a meeting of many qualities, many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoever a man say, he marrieth not only for himself; his posterity, family, alliance, and other means, are of great importance, and a grievous burthen. See here the cause why so few,

*A good mar-
riage a rare
good.*

good are found; and because there are so few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof; it is the condition of all great charges: Royalty is full of difficulty, and few there are that exercise it well and happily. And whereas we see many times that it falleth not out so luckily, the reason thereof is the licentious liberty & unbridled desire of the persons themselves, and not in the state and institution of marriage: and therefore it is commonly more commendable, and better fitted in good, simple, and vulgar spirits, where delicacy, curiosity, & idleness are less troublesome: unbridled humours and turbulent wavering minde are not fit for this state or degree.

6.
A simple description and summary of marriage.

Marriage is a step to wisdom, a holy and inviolable band, an honourable match. If the chiose be good and well ordered, there is nothing in the world more beautifull: It is a sweet society of life, full of constancy, trust, and an infinite number of profitable offices, and mutable obligations: It is a fellowship not of love, but amity. For love and amity are as different, as the burning sick heat of a feaver, from the naturall heat of a sound body. Marriage hath in it self amity, utility, justice, honour, constancy, a plain pleasure, but sound, firm, and more universall. Love is grounded upon pleasure onely, and it is more quick, piercing, ardent. Few marriages succeed well, that have their beginnings and progresse from beauty and amorous desires. Marriage hath need of foundations, more solid and constant, and we must walk more warily; this boylng affection is worth nothing, yea marriage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

7.
A description more exact.

Thus much is said summarily and simply; but more exactly to describe it, we know that in marriage there are two things, essentiall unto it, and seem contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to say, an equality sociable, and such as is between Peeres: and an inequality, that is to say, superiority and inferiority. The equality consisteth in an entire and perfect communication and community of all things, souls, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamentall law of marriage, which in some places is extended even to life and death, in such sort, that the husband being dead, the wife must incontinently follow. This is practised in some places by the Publike laws of the countries, and many times with so ardent affection, that many wives belonging to one husband, they contend, and Publikely plead for the honoor to go first to sleep with their Spouse (that is their word) alleging for themselves, the better to obtain their suit and preferment herein, their good service, that they were best.

beloved, had the last kisse of their deceased husband, and have had children by him.

*Et ceteramen habent lethi, qua viva sequatur
Conjugiam; pudor est non licuisse mori.*

*Ardens uictrices, & flamme pectora prabent,
Impunis que suis ora pernita viris.*

*Strive (and give reasons) each one earnestly
To have the honour, with their husband die;
To live in shame and losse, who doth obtain,
Imputes to pleasure, that which we count pain,
And is so ardent hot in her desire,
Fearing reversed judgment, more then fire,
That she makes haste, &c.*

In other places it was observed, not by Publike laws, but private compacts and agreements of marriage, as bewixt *Marc. Antony*, and *Cleopatra*. This equality doth likewise consist in that power which they have in commune over their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of her husband, the mistress of the house and family, as the husband, the master and Lord: and their joyn't authority over their family, is compared to an *Aristocracie*.

The distinction of superiority and inferiority consisteth in this, that the husband hath power over the wife, and the wife is sub. 8. *Inequality*. ject to the husband. This agreeth with all laws and policies; but yet more or less, according to the diversity of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is sub-ject to the husband. This superiority and inferiority is naturall, founded upon the strength and sufficiency of the one, the weakness and insufficiency of the other. The Divines ground it upon other reasons drawn from the Bible: Man was first made by God alone and immediately, expreſſly for God, his head, and according to his Image, and perfect; for nature doth always begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the ſecond place, after man, of the ſubſtance of man by occaſion and for another thing, *mulier est vir cecationatus*, A woman is a man occasionate, a mans occaſion, and the occaſion of a man, to ſerve as an aid, and as a ſecond to man, who is her head, & therefore imperfect. And this is the diſference by order of generation. That of corruption and ſin prooveth the fame, for the woman was the firſt in prevarication, and by her own weakneſs and will did ſin, man the ſecond, and by occaſion of the woman; the woman then the laſt in good and in generation, & by occaſion, the firſt

in evill and the occasion thereof, is justly subject unto man, the first in good, and last in evill.

9. *The power of the husband.*
Dion Halicar.
l. 2.
Lib. 2.
Lib. 6. bel. Gal. *the Greeks,* as *Polibius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband, bath been in some places such as that of the father, over life and death, as with the *Romans*, by the law of *Romulus*: and the husband had power to kill his wife in four cases, *Adultery, Suborning of children, counterfeiting of false keys, and drinking of wine.* So likewise with *the Greeks*, as *Polibius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband, was over the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated; but almost in all places the power of the husband and the subjection of the wife, doth infer thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vowes of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks; (as for blows, they are unworthy a woman of honour and honesty, saith the Law) and the wife is bound to hold the condition, follow the quality, countrey, family, habitation and ranke of her husband; she must accompany and follow him in all things, in his journeyes if need be, his banishment, his imprisonment, yea a wandring person a vagabond, a fugative. The examples hereof are many and excellent: of *Sulpitia*, who followed her husband *Lentulus*, being banished into *Cicily*; *Eriphrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mithridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandred thorow the world. Some add unto this, That wives are to follow their husbands even in the warrs, and into those Provinces, whether the husband is sent with publick charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiffe or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Judge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into judgment, without the permission of the Magistrate.

Corn. Tacit.

10. *The divers rules of marriage.*

Marriages is not carried after one and the same fashion, neither hath it in every place the same lawes, and rules, but according to the diversity of religons and countries, it hath rules either more easie, or more freight: according to the rules of Christianity, of all other the freightest, marriage is more subject, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free; the continuance is by constraint, depending of something else then our own wills. Other nations and religions, to make marriage more easie, free and fertile, have received and practised *Polygamy* and repudiation, liberty to take and leave wives: they accuse Christianity for taking away these

these two , by which means amity and multiplication , the principal ends of marriage , are much prejudiced , inasmuch as amity is an enemy to all constraint , and they do better maintain themselves in an honest liberty; & multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make known unto us in wolves , of whom the race is so fertile in the production of their young , even to the number of twelve or thirteen , that they far excell all other profitable creatures : of these there are great numbers killed every day , by which means there are but few ; and they , though of all others the most fertile , yet by accident the most barren : the reason is , because of so great a number as they bring , there is one onely female , which for the most part beareth not , by reason of the multitude of males that concur in the generation , of which the greatest part die without fruit , by the want of females . So likewise we may see how much Polygamy helpeth to multiplication , in those nations that receive it ; *Jews* , *Turks* , and other *Barbarians* who are able to raise forces , of three or four thousand fighting men fit for warrs . Contrariwise , in Christendom there are many linked together in matrimony , the one of which , if not both , are barren , which being placed with others , both the one and the other may happily leave great posterity behinde them . But to speak more truly , all his fertility consisteth in the fertility of one onely woman . Finally they object . That this Christianlike restraint , is the cause of many lascivious pranks , and adulteries . To all which we may answer , That Christianity considereth not of marriage by reasons purely humane , naturall , temporall ; but it beholds it with another visage , and weigheth it with reasons more high and noble , as hath been said . Add unto this , That experience sheweth in the greatest part of marriages , that constraint increaseth amity , especially in simple and debonair minds , who do easily accommodate themselves , where they finde themselves in such fort linked . And as for lascivious and wicked persons , it is the immodesty of their manners that makes them such , which no liberty can amend . And to say the truth , Adulteries are as common , where Polygamy and repudiation are in force ; witness the *Jews* , and *David* , who for all the wives that he had , could not defend himself from it : and contrariwise , they have been a long time unknown in policies well governed , where there was neither Polygamy , nor repudiation ; witness *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation . And therefore it is absurd to attribute it unto religion , which teacheth nothing but purity and continency .

Polygamy divers.

The liberty of Polygamy, which seemeth in some sort natural, is carried diversly according to the diversity of nations and policies. In some, all the wives that belong to one husband live in common, and are equall in degree, and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principall, and as the mistris, whose children inherit the goods, honours, and titles of the husband: the rest of the wives are kept a part, and carry in some places the titles of lawfull wives, in others of concubines, and their children are onely pensioners.

12.
Reputation divers.

The use of repudiation in like sort is different: for with some, as the *Hebreus*, *Greeks*, *Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not expressed, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawfull to marry another. But by the law of *Mahomet*, the separation is made by the Judge, with knowldg taken of the cause (except it be by mutuall content) which must be adultery, sterility, incompatibility of humours, an enterprise on his, or her part, against the life of each other, things directly and especially contrary to the state and institution of marriage: and it is lawfull to retake one another, as often as they shall think good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and over-sharpe and bitter husbands: The second, which is to express the cause, dishonoureth the parties, and discovereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficiently verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murthers doth commonly ensue, many times unknown unto men: as it was discovered at *Rome* before the use of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others, and they others too, to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath been, that the adulterer escapeth almost every where without punishment of death, and all that is laid upon him is divorce, & seperation of company, brought in by *Justinian*, a man wholly possessed by his wife, who caused whatsoever laws to pass, that might make for the advantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetuall adultery, desire of the death of the one party, the offender is not punished, the innocent injured remaineth without amends.

The duty of married folke, See Lib.3. Chap 12,

C H A P. XLVII.

Of Parents and Children.

THERE are many sorts and degrees of authority and humane power, Publick and Private, but there is none more naturall, Fatherly power. nor greater then that of the Father over his children, (I say Father, because the mother who is subject unto her husband cannot properly have her children in her power and subjection) but it hath not been awayes and in all places alike. In former times almost every where it was absolute and universall, over the life and death, the liberty, the goods, the honour, the actions and carriages of their children, as to plead, to marry, to get goods; as namely with the *Romanes* by the expresse Law of *Romulus*; *Parenatum in liberos omne ius esto, relegandi, vendendi, occidendi*: Let the Parents have full liberty to dispose of their children; yea, of banishing selling or killing them. Except onely children under the age of three years, who as yet could not offend either in word or deed: which Law was afterwards renued by the Law of the twelve Tables, by which the father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians*, according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* and *Prosper* affirm; with the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, who might sell their children in the fourth time. And it shoulde seem from the fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his son, that this power was likewise under the Law of Nature: for if it had been against his duty, and without the power of the Father, he had never consented thereto, neither had he ever thought that it was God that commanded him to do it, if it had been against nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocency, knowing that it was in the power of his Father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatness of the faieh of *Abraham*, because he would not sacrifice his son by virtue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but onely to obey the commandment of God. So likewise it was in force by the Law of *Moses*, Duet. 21 though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath been in ancient times, in the greatest part of the world, and which endured unto the time of the Romane Emperours. With the Greeks it was not so great and absolute, nor with the Egyptians: Nevertheless, if it fell out that the father had killed his sons wrongfully, and without cause, he had no other punishment, but to be

that

Dion Halic.
lib. 2. antiq.
Rom. l. in suis
ff. delib. &
post. Aul.
Gal. lib. 20.
Lib. 8. Eth.
cap. 20.
Lib. 6. Bel.
Gal.
Prosper.
Aquitain. in
Epist. Sig.

2.

The reasons
and fruits
thereof.

shut up three dayes together with the dead body:

Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of Fathers over their children, necessary for the culture of good manners, the chasing away of vice, and the Publick good, were first to hold the children in awe and duty: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape unpunished, to the great prejudice of the weal publick, if the knowledg and punishment of them, were but in the hand of publick authority; whether it be because they are domesticall and secret, or because there is no man that will prosecute against them: for the parents who know them, and are interested in them, will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolences, that are never punished by justice. Add hereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt Parents and Children, brothers and sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authority. And the Law did alwayes suppose, that the father would never abuse this authority, because of that great love which he naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with cruelty: which is the cause that instead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the Law: and there can be no greater torment to them, then to see their children in pain. And it falleth out very seldom or never, that this power is put in practice without very great occasion; so that it was rather a scar-crow to children, and very profitable, then a rigour in good earnest.

3.

The declinati-
on.

Lib. 1. de
Clem.
Salust. in bel.
Catil.
Valer. Maxi.

Now this fatherly power (as over-sharpe and dangerous) is almost of it self lost and abolished, (for it hath rather hapened by a kinde of d'scontinuance, then any exp're law) and it began to decline, at the coming of the Romane Emperours: for, from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, said, That he had seen more parricides punished in five years past, then had been in seven hundred years before; that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times, if it fell out that the father killed his childeen, he was not punished, as we may see by the examples of *Fulvius* the Senatour, who killed his son, because he was a partner in the conspiracy of *Cataline*: and of divers other Senators, who have made criminall processe, against their children in their own houses, and have condemned

denmed them to death, as *Cassius Tarrinus*; or to perpetuall exile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his Son *Sillanus*. There were afterwards laws ordained, that injoyned the father to present unto the Judge his children offending, that they might be punished, and that the Judge should pronounce such a sentence as the father thought fit, which is still a kind of foot-step of antiquity: and going about to take away the power of the father, they durst not do it but by halfe, and not altogether, and openly. These latter laws, come somewhat neer the law of *Moses*, which would, That at the onely complaint of the father made before the Judge, without any other knowldg taken of the cause, the rebellious and contumacious child should be stoned to death; requiring the presence of the Judge, to the end the punishment shoud not be done, in secret or in choler, but exemplarily. So that according to *Moses*, this fatherly power was more free and greater, then it hath been after the time of the Emperours; but afterwards under *Constantine* the Great, and *Theodosius*, and finally under *Justinian*, it was almost altogether extinct. From whence it is, that children have learned to deny their obedience to their parents, their goods, their aid, yea to wage law against them; a shamefull thing to see our Courts full of these cases. Yea they have been dispenced herewith, under pretext of devotion and offerings, as with the Jews before Christ, wherewith he reproacheth them; and afterwards in Christianity, according to the opinion of some: yea it hath been lawfull to kill them, either in their own defence, or if they were enemies to the Common-weale: although to say the truth, there should never be cause just enough, for a son to kill his father. *Nullum tantum scelus admissi potest a patre, quod sit parricidio vindicandum. & nullum scelus rationem habet.* A father cannot commit such a crime, as may be revenged with parricide, and no wickedness hath any reason.

Mat. 15.

Now we feel not what mischief and prejudice hath hapened to the world, by the abolishing and extinction of this fatherly power. The Common-weals wherein it hath been in force, have alwayes flourished. If there were any danger or evill in it, it might in some sort be ruled and moderated; but utterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honest nor expedient, but hurtfull and inconvenient, as hath been said.

Of the reciprocall duty of Parents and Children, See Lib. 3:
Chap. 14.

C H A P. XLVIII.

Lords and slaves, Masters and servants.

1.
The use of
slaves univer-
sal and against
nature.

The use of slaves, and the full and absolute power of Lords, and Masters over them, although it be a thing common throughout the world, and at all times (except within these four hundred years, in which time it hath somewhat decayed, though of late it revive again) yet it is a thing both monstrous and ignominious in the nature of man, and such as is not found in beasts themselves, who consent not to the captivity of their like, neither actively nor passively. The law of Moses hath permitted this as other things, *ad durissim cordis eorum*, for their hardness of hearts, but not such as hath been else-where : for it was neither so great, nor so absolute, nor perpetuall, but moderated within the compass of seven years at the most. Christianity hath left it, finding it universall in all places, as likewise to obey idolatrous Princes and Masters, and such like matters as could not at the first attempt and altogether be extinguished, they have abolished.

2.
Distinctions.

Tacit. de mor
German.

There are four sorts, Naturall, that is, slaves born ; Enforced, and made by right of warr ; Iust, termed slaves by punishment, by reason of some offence, or debt, whereby they are slaves to their Creditors, at the most for seven years, according to the law of the Jews, but alwayes untill payment and restitucion be made, in other places ; Voluntaries, whereof their are many sorts, as they that cast the dice for it, or sell their liberty for mony, as long sithence it was the custome in *Almaigne*, and now likewise in some parts of Christendom, where they do give and vow themselves to another for ever, as the Jews were wont to practise, who at the gate, bored a hole in their eare, in token of perpetuall servitude. And this kinde of voluntary captivity, is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

3.
The cause of
slaves.

It is covetousnes that is the cause of slaves enforced, and lewdnes the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and masters, have hoped for more gain and profit by keeping, they by killing them : and indeed, the fairest possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaves. By this means *Craffus* became the richest among the *Romanes*, who had besides those that served him five hundred slaves, who every day brought gain and commodity, by their gainfull Arts and mysteries, and afterwards when

te

he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

It is a strange thing to read of those cruelties practised by Lords upon their slaves, even by the approbation and permission of the Laws themselves: They have made them to till the earth being ^{The cruelties of Lords against their slaves.} chained together, as the manner is in *Barbary* at this day, they lodge them in holes and ditches: and being old, or impotent, and so unprofitable, they sell them, or drown them, and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withal: They kill them not only for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a glasse, but for the least suspicion, yea for their own pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time. And to give delight unto the people, they were constrained in their Publike Theaters to kill one another. If a Master hapned to be killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaves were all put to death, insomuch, that *Pedonius the Romane* being slain, although the murderer were known, yet by the order of the Senate, four hundred of his slaves were put to death.

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to hear of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaves against their Lords, when they have been able to work their revenge, not only in particular ^{The cruelties of slaves against their Lords.} by surprise and treason, as it fell out one night in the City of *Tyre*, but in set battel both by sea and land: from whence the proverb is,

So many slaves, so many enemies.

Now as Christian Religion, and afterwards *Mahumetisme* did increase, the number of slaves did increase, and servitude did cease, ^{Diminution of slaves.} insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the *Turks*, like apes imitating them, gave freedom and liberty to all those that were of their Religion; in such sort, that about the twelve hundred year, there were almost no slaves in the world, but where these two religions had no authority.

But as the number of slaves diminished, the number of beggars and vagabonds increased: for so many slaves being set at liberty, ^{The increase of poor people and vagabonds.} come from the houses and subje^ction of their Lords, not having wherewithal to live, and perhaps having children too, filled the world with poor People.

This poverty made them return to servitude, and to become voluntary slaves, paying, changing, selling their liberty, to the end ^{Return to servitude.} they may have their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause, and this voluntary servitude,

Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.

servitude, the world is returned to the use of slaves, because the Christians and Turks alwayes maintaining warres one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both oriental and occidental, although by the example of the Jews they have no slaves of their own nation, yet they have of others, whom, though they turn to their religion, they hold slaves by force.

The power and authority of masters over their servants, is not very great, nor imperious, and in no sort can be prejudical to the liberty of servants; onely they may chaitise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much lesse over those that are mercenary, over whom they have neither power nor correction.

The duty of Masters and Servants, see lib. 3. chap 15.

C H A P. XLIX.

Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.

1.
The description and necessity of the state.

HAving spoken of private power, we come to the Publike, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certain order in commanding and obeying, is the prop, the cement, and the soul of humane things: It is the bond of society, which cannot otherwise subsist; It is the vital spirit, whereby so many millions of men do breath, and the whole nature of things.

2.
The nature of the State.
Tacit.

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure; very difficult, subject to changes, *Arduum & subiectum fortuna cuncta regendi onus: The burthen of government is a hard master, and subject to fortune:* which decletheth, and sometimes falleth by hidden and unknown causes, and that altoe her at an instant, from the highest step to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it useth to be long a rising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subject to ambuscments, underminings, and dagers, wh^c h hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the Sovereigns, and the nature of the Sovereignty, which we are about to describe.

3.
The description of Sovereignty.

Sovereignty is a perpetual and absolute power, without constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a power to give laws to all in general, and to every one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another sith (to derogate from the common law) Sovereignty is so called; and

and absolute , because it is not subject to any humane laws , no not his own. For it is against nature to give laws unto all , and to command himself in a thing that dependeth upon his Will. *Nulla obligatio consistere posset , qua à voluntate promittentis statum capit :* No obligation can stand good , which hath his strength from the will of the promiser : nor of another , whether living ; or of his predecessors , or the countrey. Sovereign power is compared to fire , to the Sea , to a wild beast ; it is a hard matter to tame it , to handle it , it will not be crost , nor offended , but being , is very dangerous. *Potestas res est qua moveri , docerique non vult , & castigationem ageret :* Power is a thing which will neither be admonished nor taught , and with great difficulty , suffereth any correction.

The marks and properties thereof , are , to judge the last appeals ,
to ordain laws in time of peace and war , to create and appoint magistrates and officers , to give graces and dispensations against the Law , to impose Tributes , to appoist money , to receive homages , ambassages , oathes . But all this is comprehended under the absolute power , to give and make Laws according to their pleasure . Other marks there are of less weight , as the Law of the Sea and shipwrack , confiscation for Treason , power to change the Tongue , title of Majesty .

Greatnesse and Sovereignty is so much desired of all , because all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly , and all the ill is altogether inward : As also because to command others , is a thing as beautiful and divine , as great and difficult : and for this cause they are esteemed and reverenced for more then men . Which belief in the people , and credit of theirs , is very necessary and commodious to extort from the people due respect & obedience , the nurse of peace and quietnes . But in the end they prove to be men cast in the same mould that other men are , and many times worse born , & worse qualified in nature then many of the common sort of people . It seemeth that their actions , because they are weighty and important , do proceed from weighty and important causes : but they are nothing , and of the same condition that other mens are . The same occasion that breeds a brawl betwixt us and our neighbour , is ground enough of a war betwixt Princes : and that offence for which a Lackey deserves a whipping , lighting upon a King , is the ruine of a whole Province . They will as lightly as we , and we as they , but they can do more then we : the self-same appetites move a flye and an elephant . Finally , besides these passions , defects , and natural conditions ,

4.

The properties.

5.

Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.

which they have common with the meanest of those which do adore them, they have likewise vices and discommodities which their greatness and sovereignty bears them out in, peculiar unto themselves.

6. The ordinary manners of great Personages are, untamed pride,
The manners of Sovereigns. *Durus est veri insolens, ad recta scelbi regns non vult tamor: He that is insolent, is uncapable of the truth, kingly pride will not yield to those that are true, Violence too licentious. Id esse regni maximum pignus putant, si quicquid alii non licet, soli licet: quod non potest, vult posse, qui nimis potest: They think, it the greatest testimony of their royalty, that that which is not permitted others, is not lawful for them, he that hath power to do too much, will have power to do what he cannot: Their Motto that best pleaseth them is, *Quod liber licet; What they list is lawfull;* Suspicion, jealousie, *Shape natura potentia anxiæ,* They are naturally careful of their power, yea even of their own infants; Suspectus semper, invidiusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur, adeo ut dispiacent etiam civilia filiorum ingenia: The next whosoever destinat to succeed them, is always mistrusted and envied, insomuch that the civil demeanour of their own children doth also displease them. Whereby it falleth out, that they are many times in alarum and fear, *Ingenia regum prona ad fornidinam, Kings are naturally apt to fear.**

7. The advantages of Kings and Sovereign Princes above their people, which seem so great and glittering, are indeed but light, and almost imaginary; but they are repayed with great, true, and solid advantages and inconveniences. The name and title of a Sovereign, the shew and outside is beautiful, pleasant, and ambitious; but the burthen and the inside is hard, difficult, and irksome; There is honour enough, but little rest and joy, or rather none at all; it is a Publike and honourable servitude, a noble misery, a rich captivity, *Aurea & fulgida compedes, clara miseria;* witness that which *Augustus, Marcus, Anrelius, Persinax, Dioclesian,* have said and done, and the end that almost all the first twelve *Cesa's* made, and many others after them. But because few there are that believe this, but suffer themselves to be deceived by the beautiful shew, I will more particularly quote the inconveniences and miseries that accompany great Princes.

8. First, the great difficulty to play their part, and to quit themselves of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to govern so many people, since in the ruling of himself there are so many difficulties?

1. In their charge.

difficulties? It is an easier matter, and more pleasant to follow, than to guide; to travel in a way that is already traced, than to find the way; to obey, than to command; to answer for himself only, than for others too: *ne scimus multo jam se parere quicunq[ue], quam regere imperio res ualeat: it is far better to procure peace & quiet, than to govern a kingdom.* Addie hereunto, that it is required that he that commandeth, must be a better man than he that is commanded: so said *Cyrus* a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucity of those that are such as they ought to be. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the only Prince that in goodness excelled his predecessors: another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be graven in a ring.

Secondly, in their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they have a greater part then other men. But they are doubtless of 2. *In the pleasures and afflictions of life.* a worse condition then the pleasures of private men: for besides that the lustre of their greatness makes them unfit to take joy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too clear and apparent, and made as a butt and subject to censure, they are likewise crost and pored into, even to their very thoughts, which men take upon them to divine and judge of. Again, the great ease and facility that they have to do what please them, because all men apply themselves unto them, takes away the taste, and swareth that sweet which should be in their pleasures, which delight to man, but those that taste them, with some scarcity and difficulty. He that gives no time to be thirsty, knows not what a pleasure it is to have drink: Society is noysome, and goes against the stomach.

Pinguis amor ni visumque potens in radda nobis

Veriusam: & stomacho dulcis ut esca noet.

Extremity of Pleasure turns to pain.

So Venus fasciates, and honey's bane.

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome then abundance, ye they are deprived of all true and lively action, which cannot be 3. *In these without some difficulty and resistance.* It is not going, living, acting in them, but sleeping, and an insensible sliding away.

The third inconvenience that followeth Princes, is in their marriages. The marriages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntary; made with more affection, liberty, and contentement. One reason hereof may be that the common sort of men find more of their degree to choose, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, have no plentiful choice. But the other rea-

Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereignes.

son is better, which is, that the common sort in their marriages look but into their own affairs, and how they may accommodate it best unto themselves; but the marriages of Princes are many times enforced for Publick necessity: they are great parts of the State, and instruments serving for the generall good and quiet of the world. Great Personages and Sovereignes marry not for themselves but for the good of the State, whereof they must be more amorous and jealous; then of their wives and children: for which cause they many times hearken unto marriages where there is neither love nor delight; and matches are made between persons, who never knew nor have seen one another, much less affect: yea such a great man takes such a great Lady, whom if he were not so great, he would not take: but this is to serve the Weal-publick, to assure the States, and to settle peace amongst their people.

11. The fourth is, That they have no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour, in the exercises of the mind and of the body, which is one of the most delightful things in the commerce and conversation of men. The reason hereof is, because all the world gives place unto them, all men spare them and love rather to hide their own valour, to betray their own glory, then to hurt or hinder that of their Sovereign, especially where they know he affects the victory. This, to say the truth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully, and injuriously; and therefore one said, That the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, and to manage a horse, because in all other exercises every one bows unto them, & gives them the prize: but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great personages have refus'd the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteem of them, and rejoice in them, if they came from free-men, that durst say the contrary, and tax men if there were cause.

12.
5. Liberty of
travell.

The fifth is, That they are deprived of the liberty to travell in the world, being as it were imprisoned within their own Countreys, yea, within their own Palaces, being always inclosed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that wheresoever they be, and in all actions whatsoever, prying even thorough the holes of the chair: whereupon Alfonus the King said, That in this respect the estate of an ass was better then the condition of a King.

The

The sixth misery, That they are deprived of all amity and mutual society, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equals, or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparity puts them without the commerce and society of men; all humble services, and base offices, are done unto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from love, but from subjection, or to encrease their own greatness, or of custome and countenance; which is plain, because wicked Kings are as well served and reverenced as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloved; their is no difference, the self-same apparell, the self-same ceremony. Wherupon Julian the Emperour answere his Courtiers, that commended him for his Justice; *Perhaps I should be pround of these prayses, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserve it.*

13.

6. *Mutuall and
hearty amity.*

The seventh misery, worse perhaps then all the rest, and more dangerous to the Weal-publick, is, That they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affaires, and consequently not to call and employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessary. They are shut up, and beset with a certain kind of people, that are either of their own blood, or by the greatness of their Houses and Offices, or by prescription, are so far in authority, power, and managing of affairs before others, that it is not lawful, without putting all to hazard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kind of people that cover, and hold, as it were, hidden the Prince, do provide that all the truth of things shall not appear unto him; and that better men, and more profitable to the State come not near him, lest they be known what they are. It is a pityfull thing not to see but by the eyes, not to understand but by the ears of another, as Princes do. And that which perfecteth in all points this misery, is, that commonly and as it were, by destiny, Princes and great Personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humanne kind, Flatterers, Inventers of imposts or Tributes, Informers, who under a fair and false pretext of zeal and amity towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyalty and reformation, as the latter, spoil and ruinate both Prince and State.

14.

7. *Ignorance of
things.*

The eight misery is, that they are lesse free, and masters of their own wills then all other, for they are inforsed in their proceedings,

15.

8. *Not Masters
of their wills.*

Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.

by a thousand considerations & respects, whereby many times they must captivate their designments, desires, and wills: *In maxima fortuna, minima libertate.* In the greatest honour, the least liberty. And in the mean time in stead of being plaintiffs they are more rudely handled and judged then any other: For men will not stick to divine of their designes, penetrate into their hearts and inventions, which they cannot do: *Abdito Principis finibus, & quid oc-
culatus pars exquirere; illatum ancepit nec ideo affectare:* To prize in't the hidden secret of the Prince, and to search if they can find anything more secret; neither will they herein forbear although they know it unsiting; and looking into things with another visage, where they understand not sufficiently the affairs of the state, they require of their Princes what they think should be done, blame their actions, and refusing to submit themselves to what is necessary, they commonly proceed in their businesse rudely enough.

16.

A miserable end, not lonely tyrants and usurpers, for it belongs to them, but such as have a true title to their Crown; witness to many Romane Emperours after Pompey the Great, and Cesar, and in our time Mary Queen of Scotland, who lost her life by the hand of an executioner, and Henry the third, wilfully murdered in the middle of fourty thousand armed men; by a little Monk; and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempest oppose themselves against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that envy and emulate greatness below upon earth.

*Vixne adeo res humanas vis adhuc quidam
Obseruit & pulchros fasces, sub asque securis.
Proculeare, ac Indubio fibi habere videtur.
So far some hidden Highness seems to frown.
On hunting pride in Daedale or Crown,
As his both laughs at it, and bears it down.*

17.
*The conclusion
of their mijo-
ries.*

To conclude, the condition of Sovereigns is hard & dangerous: Their life if it be innocent, is infinitely painfull; if it be wicked, it is subject to the hate and slander of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers; for the greater a Prince is, the less may he trust others, and the more must he trust himself. So that we see, that it is a thing, as it were, annexed to Sovereignty, to be betrayed.

Of their duty, See the third Book, Chap. 16.

CHAP.

C H A P. L.

Magistrates.

Here are divers degrees of Magistrates as well in honour as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which have nothing common the one with the other, and many times they that are more honourable have less power, as Counsellors of the Privy Councell, the Secretary of the State. Some have but one of the two; others have both, and that of divers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that have both.

The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Sovereign and the particulars, in the presence of their Sovereigns have no power to command. As rivers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the Sea, & the starres their light in the presence of the Sun; so all power of Magistrates is but upon sufferance in the presence of their Sovereign: as also the power of inferiours and subalterne Magistrates in the presence of their superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superiority, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and prevention.

All Magistrates judge, condemn, and command either according to the law, and then their sentence is but the execution of the law; or according to equity, and such judgement is called the office, or duty of the Magistrate.

Magistrates cannot change nor correct their judgements, except the Sovereign permit it, under pain of injustice: they may revoke their commands or make stay of them, but not that which they have judged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause.

Of the duties of Magistrates, See Lib. 3.

C H A P. LI.

Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers.

It is one of the vanities and follies of man, to prescribe laws and rules that exceed the use and capacity of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors have done. They propose strange and elevated forms or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practise of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea, the attempt

attempt is dangerous to many. These are Castles in the air, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*, and *More*, the Oratour of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautifull and excellent imaginations; but he was never yet found that put them in use. The sovereign and perfect Law-giver and Doctor took heed of this, who both in himself, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extravagancies and forms divided from the common capacity of men; and therefore, he calleth his yoke easy, and his burthen light: *Jugum meum suave, & onus meum leve; My yoke sweet, and my burthen light;* And they that have instituted and ordered their company under his name, have very wisely considered of the matter that though they make speciall profession of virtue, devotion, and to serve the weal-publick above all others, nevertheless they differ very little from the common and civill life. Wherein there is first great justice: for there must always be kept a proportion betwixt the commandment, and the obedience, the duty and the power, the rule and the workmaster: and these bind themselves and others to be necessarily in want, cutting out more work then they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers, are the first Law-breakers: for they do nothing; and many times do quite contrary to that they enjoyn others, like the Pharisies, *Imponunt onera gravia, & non lunt ea digito movere: They impose great burdens, but will not themselves touch them with a finger.* So do some Physicians and Divines: so lives the World, rules and precepts are enjoyed, and men not onely by an irregularity of life and manners, but also by contrary opinion and judgement follow others.

There is likewise another fault full of injustice, they are far more scrupulous, exact and rigorous in things free and accidentall then in necessary and substantiall, in positive and humane, then in naturall and divine; like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts; and all like the Pharisies, as the great and heavenly Doctor telleth them to their reproach. All this is but hypocrisie and deceit.

C H A P. LII.

THe people (we understand here the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kind of people under what covert soever, of base, servile, and mechanical condition) are a strange beast with many heads; and

and which in few words cannot be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waves of the sea; they are moved and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant: there is nothing more easie them to drive them into what passion he will; they love not warres for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietnesse, but for varieties sake, and the change that there is from the one to the other: confusion makes them desire order, and when they have it, they like it not: they run alwayes one contrary to another, and there is no time pleaseth, but what is to come: *Hi vulgi mores, odisse praesentia, ventura cupere, praterita celebrare: It is the custome of the vulgar sort, to despise the present, desire the future, praise & extoll that which is past.*

They are light to believe, to gather together news, especially such as are most hurtfull; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonet of news, a man may assemble them together like Bees at the sound of the bason.

Without judgement, reason, discretion. Their judgement and wisdom is but by chance, like a cast at dice unadvised and headlong of all things; and alwayes ruled by opinion or custome, or the greater numbe, going al in a line, like sheep that run after those that go before them, and not by reason and truth. *Plebi non judicium, Tacit. non veritas: ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat. The common people have no judgement, no verity; deem many things by opinion, few by the truth it self.*

Envious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of virtue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, favouring the more weak and the more wicked, and wishing all ill they can to men of honour they know not wherefore, except it is because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

Treacherous and untrue, amplifying reports, smothering of truths, and alwayes making things greater then they are, without faith, without hold. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a child, are of like durance, which change not onely as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that every hour of the day may bring forth.

Mutinous, desiring nothing but novelties and changes, seditious, enemies to peace and quietness. *Ingenio mobilis, seditionis discordis sum, cupidum rerum novarum, quietis & eris adversum: Of a mutable disposition, seditious, a breeder of discord, desirous of novelties, enemies to peace and quietness. Especially when they meet with a leader:*

leader : for then even as the calm sea, of nature tumbleth, and foameth, and rageth, being stirred with the fury of the winds ; so do the people swell, and grow proud, wilde, and outragious : but take from them their Leader, they become deject, grow milde, are confounded with astonishment : *Sine Rectori praeceps, pavidus, secors, nil ausira plebs Principibus amoris : Headlong without a Governour, fear'ful, careless, daring nothing in absence of their Princes.*

7. Procurers and favourers of broyls and alterations in houhold affairs , they account modesty , simplicity ; wisdom , rusticity : and contrarywise, they give to fiery and heady violence, the name of valour and fortitude. They prefer those that have hot heads , and active hands , before those that have a settled and temperate judgement , and upon whom the weight of the affars must lie ; boasters and pratlers before those that are simple and stayed.

8. They care neither for the Publick good nor common honesty, but their private good only ; and they refuse no base offices for their gain and commodity. *Privatea cuncte stimulatio, vile decus publicum : Every one hath his private spur, contemning the publick honour.*

9. Always muttering and murmuring against the State , always belching out flanders and insolent speeches against those that govern and command. The meanner and poorer sort have no better pastime , then to speak ill of the great and rich ; not upon cause and reason, but of envy, being never content with their governours, nor the present State.

10. They have nothing but a mouth , they have tongues that cease not , spirits that bowge not : they are a monster, whose parts are all tongues ; they speak all things , but know nothing ; they look upon all, but see nothing ; they laugh at all, and weep at all ; fit to mutiny and rebell , not to fight. Their property is rather to assay to shake off their yoke , then to defend their liberty : *Procacia plebis ingenia, impigra lingue, ignavi animi : the wits of the vulgar sort are shamelesse, talkative, base minded.*

Tacit.
Salust.

11. They never know how to hold a measure , nor to keep an honest mediocrity. Either like slaves they serve over-basely, or like Lords they are beyond all measure insolent and tyrannical. They cannot endure a soft & temperate bit, nor are pleased with a lawfull liberty ; they run alwayes to extremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much distrusting out of fear. They will make you afraid if you fear not them : when they are frightened, you chock them under the chin , and you leap with both feet upon their bellies. They are

are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the cudgel ; and therefore the Proverb is, *Tickle them, and they will prick thee; prick them and they will tickle thee.* *Nisi in vulgo modicum terrere ni paveant, ubi perimur impune consumiri: audacia turbi: um nisi ubi metuat, aut servit humiliiter, aut superbe dominatur: libertatem, qua media, nec spernere, nec habere.*

Very unthankfull towards their benefactours. The recompense of all those that have deserved well of the Common-wealth, have alwayes been banishment, reproach, conspiracy, death. Histories are famous, of *Moses*, and all the Prophets, *Socrates*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lycurgus*, *Demothenes*, *Themistocles*. And the Truth it self hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people, escaped not : and contrarywise, they that oppresse them, are dearest unto them. They fear all, they admire all.

To conclude, the people are a savage beast, all that they think is vanity; all they say is false and eronious; that they reprove, is good; that they approve is naught : that which they praise, is infamous : that which they do and undertake is folly. *Non tam bene cum re-* Seneca. *bus humanis geritur, ut meliora pluribus placeant; argumentum pessimi turba est: It goes not so well in humane affairs, as that the best things do please the most; multitude is an argument of the worst.* The Vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, injustice, inconstancy, idolatry, vanity, which never yet could be pleased : their mote is, *Vox populi, vox Dei: The voice of the people is the voice of God:* but we may say, *Vox populi vox stultorum: The voice of the people is the voice of fools.* Now the beginning of wisdom is for a man to keep himself clear and free, and not to suffer himself to be carried with popular opinions. This belongs to the second book, which is Lib. 2. cap. 1. now near at hand.

*The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawn
from their divers professions and
conditions of life.*

T H E P R E F A C E.

Behold here another difference of men, drawn from the diversity of their professions, conditions, & kinds of life. Some follow the civil and sociable life, others fly it, thinking to save themselves in the solitary wilderness: some love arms, others

12.

13.

others hate them : some live in common, others in private : it pleaseth some best to have charge , and to lead a Publick life ; others to hide and keep themselves private : some are Courtiers , attending wholly upon others, others court none but themselves: some delight to live in the City , others in the fields , affecting a countrey life, whose choise is the better , and which life is to be preferred , it is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They have all their advantages and disadvantages , their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered herein , as shall be said , is , That every man know how to choose that which best besits his own nature, that he might live the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all , by comparing them together : but this shall be after we have spoken of that life which is common to all , which hath three degrees.

C H A P. L I I I .

The distinction and comparison of the three sorts or degrees of life.

T Here are three sorts of life , and as it were three degrees , one private of every particular man within himself , and in the closet of his own heart, where all is hid, all is lawfull : the second in his house and family , in his private and ordinary actions , where there is neither study nor art , and whereof he is not bound to give any reason ; the third , is Publick in the eyes of the world. Now to keep order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare then in the other two ; and in the second then in the third : the reason is, becau'e where there is neither Judge nor Controller , nor regarde , and where we have no imagination either of punishment or recompense we carry our selves more loosely and carelessly , as in private lives , where conscience and reason onely is our guie, then in Publick , where we stand in check, and as a mark to the eyes and judgement of all, where glory, fear of reproach, base reputation, or some other passion doth lead us; for passion commands with greater power then reason) whereby we keep our selves ready, stan'ing upon our guard: for which cause it falleth out , that many are counted holy , great, and admirable in Publick, who in their own private have nothing commendable . That which is done in Publick is but a fable, a fiction, the truth in secret, and in private ; and he that will well judge of a man must converse every day

day with him, and prie into his ordinary and naturall carriage ; the rest is all counterfeit ; *Universus mundus exercet histriomiam : The whole world plays the Comedian :* and therefore said a wiseman, *That he is an excellent man w^o is such mirth and in himself, which he is outwardly for fear of the Lawes, and speech of the World.* Publick actions thunder in the ears of men , to which a man is atten:ive when he doth them ; as exploits in war , sound judgement in coun-sel, to rule a people, to perform an ambassage. Private and dome-sticall actions are quick and sure, to chide, to laugh, to fel, to pay, to converse with his own, a man considers not of them, he doth them, not thinking of them : secret and inward actions much more , to love to hate, to desire.

Again, there is here another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the naturall hypocrisy of men , which we make most ac-count of, and a man is more scrupulous in our:ward actions, that are in shew , but yet are free , of small importance , and almost all in countenances and ceremonies , and therefore are of little cost , and a little effect, then in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessary, and therefore they are the more difficult: of those depend the reformation of the soul, the moderati-on of the passions , the rule of the life : yea , by the attainment of these outward , a man becomes careless of the inward.

Now of these three lives, inward , domesticali, Publick, he that is to lead but one of them , as Hermites, doth guide and order his life at a better rate , then he that hath two : and he that hath but two, his condition is more easy , then he that hath all three.

I C H A P. LIV.

A comparison of the civil and sociable life with the solitary.

They that esteem and commend so much the solitary and reti-red life , as a great stay and sure retrait from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit means to preserve and maintain themselves pure and free from many vices , in as much as the worse part is the greater , of a thousand there is not one good , the num-ber of fools is infinite, contagion in a preas is dangerous; they seem to have reason on their side: for the company of the wicked is a dan-gerous thing, and therefore they that adventure them selves upon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemer, or disso:ue & wicked per-son .

son enter their ship; not onely *Jonas* with whom God was angry, had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him crying out in a great danger for help unto their gods, pleasantly said, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceive not that you are here with me. *Abuquerque* the Vice-roy of the Indies for *Emanuel King of Portugall*, in a great danger at sea, took upon his shoulders a little child, to the end that his innocency might serve as a surety to God for his sinnes. But to think that a solitary life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of virtue, more difficult, sharp, laborious and painfull, as some would make us believe, they grossly deceive themselves: for certainly it is a great discarge and ease of life, and it is an indifferent profession, yea, a simple apprenticeship and disposition to virtue. This is not to enter into businesse, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to fly them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the Epicures (Hide thy self) it is to run to death, to fly a good life. It is out of all doubt, that a King, a Prelate, a Pastour is a far more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult then that of a Monk, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but seminaries and apprenticeships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiasticall charge, and their preparitives to a greater perfection. And he that lives civilly having a wife, children, servants, neighbours, friends, goods, businesse, and so many divers parts which he must satisfie, and truly and loyally answer for, hath without comparison far more businesse, then he that hath none of all these, hath to do with none but himself: Multitude and abundance is far more troublesome, then solitariness and want. In abstinence there is but one thing, in the conduct and use of many, divers things, there are many considerations, divers duties. It is an easier thing to part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, then to govern them well, and well to discharge them. It is easier for a man to live altogether without a wife, then in all points duly to live, and to maintain himself with his wife, children and all the rest that depend upon him: so is the single life more easie then the married state.

2. So likewise to think that solitariness is a sanctuary and an assured haven against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceive themselves; for it is not true in every respect. Against the vices of the world, the stir of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good; but solitariness hath its inward and spirituall affairs

affaires and difficulties: *Tot in deserto ut rursum à diabolo:* He went into the desert as he escaped of the Devil. To imprudent and unadvised young men, solitariness is a dangerous trafffe; and it is to be feared, that whilst he walks alone, he entertains worse company then himself, as *Croesus* said to a young man who walked all alone far from company. It is there where fools contrive their wicked designments, begin their own overthrows, sharpen their passions and wicked desires. Many times, to avoid the gulf of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla*; to fly is not to escape; it is many times to increase the danger, and to loose himself: *Non vitat, sed fugit: magis ansem periculis patemus aversi.* He doth not eschew it, but fleeth it: we live more open to dangers being averted from them. A man had need be wise and strong, and well assured of himself, when he falls into his own hands; for it falls out many tides that there are none more dangerous then his own. *Guarda me dios de mi;* God keep me from my self, saith the Spanish proverb excellently; *Nemo est ex imprudentibus qui sibi relinquat debeat;* solitudo omnia mala persuades. No man should be left alone to himself; solitariness persuades all evill. But for some private and particular consideration, though good in it self (for many times it is for idleness, weakness of spirit, hatred, or some other passion) to fly and to hide himself, having means to profit another, and to do good to the weal-publike, is to be a fugitive, to bury his talent, to hide his light, a fault subject to the rigour of judgment.

*A comparison betwixt the life lead in common, and
in private.*

Some have thought, that the life lead in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may say, that is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth most to perfection, and bath most charity and concord. This may take place in the company of a certain number of people, lead and directed by some certain rule, but not in a State and Common-weal; and therefore *Plato* having once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all passion and difference, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwise advised: for as the proverbs teach; there is not only not any hearty affection towards that that is common-to-all, and as the proverb is, *The common ass is always ill faddled:* but also

Luc.
Acts 6.

also the community draweth unto it self contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is alwayes seen, yea even in the Primitive Church : *Crescente numero discipolorum, factum est murmur Gracorum adversus Hebraeos : The number of the disciples increasing, there grew a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrewes.* The nature of love is such, as that of great rivers, which being overcharged with abundance of waters, being divided, are quit of that charge ; so love being diuided to all men, and all things, loseth its force and vigour. But there are degrees of community ; to live, that is to say, to eat and drink together is very good, as the maner was in the better and most ancient common-weales, of Lacedemon and Crete ; for besides that modesty and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication ; but to think to have all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise advised, is to pervert all.

C H A P. LVI.

*The comparison of the countrey-life with
the Citizens.*

This comparison to him that loveth wisdom is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and advantages are on one side, both spiritual and corporal, liberty, wisdom, innocency, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free, and to it self : in Cities, the persons, the affaires, both their own and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainments, how much time do they steal from us ? *Amici sues tempora & Friends steal away time.* How many troubles bring they with them, avocations, allurements to wickedness ? Cities are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise then cages to birds and beasts. This celestial fire that is in me will not be stopt up, it loveth the air, the fields ; and therefore *Columella* saith, that the countrey-life is the cousin of wisdom, *Genitrix*, which cannot be without beautiful and free thoughts and meditations ; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the City. Again, the countrey-life is more neat, innocent and simple : In cities vices are hid in the root, and are not perceived, they pass and insinuate themselves well, the use, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole heavens lie open to the view, the sun, the air the waters, and all the elements are free, exposed

exposed and open in all parts, alwayes sustaining us the earth discov-
ereth it self, the fruits thereof are before our eyes ; and none of all
this is in cities in the throng of houses : so that to live in cities, is to
be banished in the world , and shut from the world. Again, the
country life is wholly in exercise , in action , which sharpeneth the
appetite , maintayneth health , hardeneth and fortifieth the body.
That which is to be commended in cities , is commodity either pri-
vate , as of merchants and artificers , or Publike , to the managing
whereof few are called , and in ancient times heretofore they were
chosen from the country life , who returned , having performed
their charge.

C H A P. LVII.

Of the military profession.

The military profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is
no commodity more just , nor more universal, then the protec-
tion of the peace & greatnesse of his countrey; noble in the execu-
tion, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroical vir-
tue of all others : honourable , for all humane actions , the greatest
and most glorious is the warriers , and by which all other honours
are judged and discerned ; pleasant, the company of so many noble-
men , young , active , the ordinary view of so many accidents and
spectacles , liberty and conversation without Art , a manly fashion
of life without ceremonie , the variety of divers actions , a coura-
geous harmony of warlike musick, which entertains us, and stirres our
blood , our ears, our soul ; those warlike commotions which ravish
us with their horrour and fear, that confused tempest of sound and
cries , that fearful ordering of so many thousands of men , with so
much fury, ardour, and courage.

1.
*The praise
thereof.*

But on the other side, a man may say , that the Art and experi-
ence of undoing one another, of killing, ruining, destroying our *The dispraise.*
own proper kind , seems to be unnaturall , and to proceed from an
alienation of our sense and understanding ; it is a great testimony
of our weaknesse and imperfection , and it is not found in beasts
themselves , in whom the image of Nature continueth far more en-
tire. What folly , what rage is it , to make such commotions , to
torment so many people , to run thorow so many dangers and ha-
zards both by sea and land , for a thing so uncertain and doubtful
as the issue of war , to run with such greedinesse and fiercenesse af-
ter

ter

ter death, which is easily found every where, and without hope of segurite, to kill those he hateth not, nor ever saw? But whence procedeth this great fury and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What frenzie and madnesse is this, for a man to abindon his own body, his time, his rest, his life, his liberty, and to leave it to the mercy of another? to expose himself to the losse of his own members; and to that which is a thousand times worse then death, fire and sword, to be trodden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cur, to be torn in pieces, broken, and put to the ga'lies for ever? And all this, to serve the passion of another, for a cause which a man knowes not to be just, and which is commonly unjust: for wars are commonly unjust, and for him whom a man knowes not, who takes so little care for him that fightes for him, that he will be content to mount upon his dead body, to help his own stature, that he may see the farther. I speak not here of the duty of Subjects towards their Prince and Countrey, but of voluntaries and mercenary souldiers.

The fifth and last distinction and difference of men, drawn from the favours and disfavours of Nature and Fortune.

THE PREFACE.

THIS last distinction and difference is apparent enough, and sufficiently known, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicity or good fortune, & Infelicity or littleness. To Felicity and greatness belong health, beauty, and the other goods of the body, liberty, nobility, honour, dignity, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicity or littleness, belong all the contraries, which are privations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great cifference, because a man is happy in one of these, or in two, or three, and not in the rest, and that more or less by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happy or unhappy in them all. He that hath the greatest part of chefe goods, and especially three, Nobility, Dignity, or Authority and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many have but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little.

We

We must speak a little of them all:

Of health, beauty, and othes natural goods of the body, hath ^{Chap. 6.} been spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, Sickness, ^{Chap. 11.} Grief.

C H A P. LVIII.

Of Liberty and Servitude:

Liberty is accounted by some a sovereign good, and Servitude an extream evil, insomuch, that many have chosen rather to die a cruel death, then to be made slaves, or to see either the publick good, or their own private, endangered. But of this there may be too much, and of these, too many, as of all other things. There is a two-fold liberty; the true, which is of the mind or spirit, and is in the power of every one, and cannot be taken away, nor indamaged by another, nor by fortune it self: contrariwise, the servitude of the spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serve our own affections, to suffer our selves to be devoured by our own passions, to be led by opinions. O pitiful captivity! The corporal liberty is a good greatly to be esteemed, but subject to fortune: and it is neither just nor reasonable, (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance) that it should be preferred before life it self, as some of the ancients have done, who have rather made choice of death, then to loose it; and it was accounted a great virtue in them: so great an evil was servitude thought to be: *Servitus obedientia est fracti animi & abjecti arbitrio carentis sua: Servitude is the obedience of a base and abject mind, which wanteth his due judgment.* Many great and wise men have served, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes,* even those that were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their own condition, but continued in effect and truth more free then their masters.

C H A P. LIX.

Nobility.

Nobility is a quality every where not common, but honourable, brought in and established with great reason, and for the publick utility.

T.
*The description
of Nobility.*

It is divers, diversly taken and understood, and according to divers nations and judgments, it hath divers kinds. According to

the generall and common opinion and custome , it is a quality of a race or stock. Aristotle saith , that it is the antiquity of a race and of riches. Plutarch calleth it the virtue of a race, *ἀρετὴ γένους*, meaning thereby a certain habite and quality contained in the lineage. What this quality or virtue is , all are not wholly of one accord, saving in this, that it is profitable to the weal-publick. For to some, and the greater part this quality is military , to others it is politick, literary of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the military hath the advantage above the rest : for besides the service that it yieldeth to the weal publick as the rest do , it is painfull, laborious, dangerous ; whereby it is reckoned more worthy and commendable. So hath it carried with us by excellency. the honourable title of Valour. There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobility , profession of this virtue , and quality profitable to the common-weal , which is as the form ; and the race as the subiect and matter , that is to say, a long continuance of this quality by many degrees and races , and time out of mind , whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen , that is to say of a race , house , family , carrying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publick virtue, serving his Prince and Countrey , and being descended of parents and ancestors that have done the same.

3.
The distinction.

There are some that separate these two , and think that one of them sufficeth to true nobility , that is , either onely virtue and quality , without any consideration of race or ancestours. This is a personall and acquired nobility , and considered with rigour, it is rude, that one come from the house of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble , whatsoever service he hath done for the Common-weal. Nevertheless this opinion hath place in many nations, namely , with the *Turki* , contemners of ancient nobility , and esteeming of no other but personall , and actuall military valour ; or onely antiquity of race without profession of the quality ; this is in bloud and purely naturall.

4.
Naturall Nobility.

If a man shoulde compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together , that which is purely naturall (to judge aright) it is the less , though many , out of their vanity have thought otherwise. The naturall is another mans quality and not his own : *Genus & praevoros & quia non fecimus ipsi. vix ea nostra puto : nemo vixit in gloriam nostram ; nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est : I scarce*

ACCONTE.

account those things ours which descend from our lineage or Ancestours, or any thing which we our selves have not done ; no man hath lived for our glory and renown : Neither are we to account that ours which hath been before us. And what greater folly can there be , then to glory in that which is not his own ? This honour may light upon a vicious man , a knave and one in himself a true villain. It is also unprofitable to another ; for it communicateth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it , as science , justice , goodnes, beauty , riches do: They that have nothing else commendable in them but this nobility of flesh and blood , make much of it , they have it alwayes in their mouths , it makes their cheeks swell and their heart too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they have) it is the mark by which they are known and a token that they have nothing else in them , because they rest themselves wholly upon that. But this is vanity , for all their glory springeth from fali instruments , *Ab utero , conceptru , partu ; From the womb , the conception , the birth ;* and is buried under the tomb of their Ancestours. As offenders being pursued have recourse to Altars and the Sepulchres of the dead , and in former times to the statues of Emperours ; so these men being destitute of all merit and subject of true honour, have recourse to the memory and armouries of their Ancestours. What good is it to a blind man , that his parents have been well sighted, or to him that flammereth that his Grand-father was eloquent ? and yet these kind of people are commonly glorious , high minded , contemners of others ; *Contemptor animus & Salust . superbia communis nobilitatis malum : A contemptible and proud mind , are common vices accompanying Nobility.*

The personall and acquired honour hath conditions altogether contrary and very good. It is proper to the possessor thereof, it is always a worthy subject and profitable to others. Again , a man personall honour may say , that it is more ancient and more rare then the naturall, for by it the naturall began ; and in a word , that is true honour which consisteth in good and profitable effects , not in dreams and imagination , vain and unprofitable , and proceedeth from the spirit , not the bloud , which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis geminosus ? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem , cui ex quacunque condicione supra fortunam licet surgere : Who is a gentleman ? a mind well disposed to virtue maketh noble , who , upon what accident or condition soever is able to raise it self above fortune.*

5.

*Acquired and
now.*

Sen.

6.
Natural and
acquired.

But they are both oftentimes, and very willingly together, and so they make a perfect honour: The natural is a way and occasion to the personal; for things do easily return to their first nature and beginning. As the natural hath taken his beginning and essence from the personal, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it; *Fortes creantur fortibus: hoc unum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus impo-
neat necessitudo videatur, ne à majorum viritate degenerent: The va-
liant begets those that are valiant, this is the onely good of nobility, that
necessity seemeth to be imposed on those that are noble, not to degenerate
from the virtus of their ancestors.* To know that a man is sprung from honourable ancestors, and such as have deserved well of the Common-weal, is a strong obligation & spur to the honourable exploits of virtue. It is a foul thing to degenerate, and to be ly a mans own race. The nobility that is given by the bounty and letters patent of the Prince, if it have no other reason, is shameful, and rather dishonourable, then honourable; It is a nobility in parchment, bought with silver or favour, and not by blood as it ought. If it be given for merit, and notable services, it is personal and acquired, as hath been said.

C H A P. LX.

Of honour.

1.
*The descripti-
on of honour.*

SOME say (but not so well) that honour is the price and recompence of virtue or not so ill, an acknowledgment of virtue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of an outward duty towards virtue; It is a priviledge that draweth his principall essence from virtue. Others have called it, the shadow of virtue; which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the body. But to speak truly, it is the rumour of a beautfull and virtuous action, which rebonndeth from our souls to the view of the world, and by reflection into our souls, bringing unto us a testimony of that which others believe of us, which turneth to a great contentment of mind.

2.
Honour is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attain thereto, a man enterpiset, endureth, contemneth whatsoever besides, yea life it self, nevertheless it is a matter of small and slender moment, uncertain, a stranger, and as it were separated in the air, from him that is honoured; for it doth not onely not enter into him, nor is inward and essentiall unto him, but it doth not so

so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent , who feeleth nothing) but setteth it self and stayeth without at the gate , sticks in the name , which receiveth and carrieth all the honours and dishonours , praises and dispraises , whereby a man is said to have either a good name or a bad . All the good or evil that a man can say of *Cesar* , is carried by his name . Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing it is only the image which presenteth it , the mark which distinguisheth it from others , a summarie which containeth in it a small volume , mounteth it , and carrieth it whole and entire , the mean to enjoy it and to use it (for without the names there would be nothing but confusion , the use of things would be lost , the world would decay , as the history of the tower of *Babel* doth richly teach us :) to be brief , the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing , and the honour or dishonour thereof , for it is that that toucheth the thing it self , and receiveth all the good or ill that is spoken . Now honour before it arrive to the name of the thing , it goes a course almost circular , like the Sun , performed and perfected in three principall sites or places , the action or work , the heart , the tongue : for it begins and is conceived , as in the matrix and root , in that beauty , goodnesse , profit of the thing honoured which comes to light and is produced , this is (as hath been said) the rumour of a beautifull or honourable action . *Cœli cœnarant gloriam Dei : pleni sunt cœli & terra gloria tua : The heavens declare the glory of God , the heavens and earth are full of thy glory* (for whatsoever valour , worth , and perfection the thing have in it self , and inwardly , if it produce nothing that is excellent , it is altogether uncapable of honour , and is as if it were not at all) from thence it entreteth into the spirit and understanding , where it takes life , and is formed into a good , haughty , and great opinion ; finally sallying forth from thence , and being carried by the word verball or written it returns by reflexion , and as it were dissolveth , and endeth in the name of the authour of this beautifull work , where it had the beginning , as the Sun in the place from whence it departeth , and then it bears the name of honour , praise glory , and renown .

But the question is , what those actions are to which honour is due . Some think that it is generally due to those that perform their duty in that which belongs to their profession , although it be neither famous nor profitable , as he that upon a Stage playes the part of a servant well , is no less commended , then he that presenteth

the person of a King ; and he that cannot workin statues of gold, cannot want those of leather or earth wherein he may as well shew the perfection of his Art. All cannot employ themselves , neither are they called to the managing of great affairs . but the commendation is , to do that well that he hath to do. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honour, which is not a common and ordinary guest for all persons ; and all just and lawfull actions. Every chaste woman every honest man is not honourable. The wisest men require thereunto two or three things , the one is difficulty , labour or danger , the other is publick utility , and this is the reason why it is properly due to those that administer , and well acquit themselves of great charges , that be the actions as privately and generally good and profitable as they will , they shall have approbation and sufficient renown with those that know them , and the safety and protection of the lawes , but not honour which publick, and hath more dignity,fame, and splendour. Some adde unto these a third, and that is , that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

Desires of honour chap. 10.

*Lib. 3. in the virtue of Tem-
perancy.*

5.
Marks of honour.

The desire of honour and glory, and the approbation of another, is a vicious , violent, powerfull passion ; whereof we have spoken in the passion of ambition ; but very profitable to the weal-publick, to contain men in their duty , to awaken and inflame them to honourable actions , a testimony of weekness and humane insufficiency, which for want of good money useth light and false coin. Now in what , and how forth it is excusable , and when not commendable, and that honour is not the recompence of virtue, shall be said hereafter.

The marks of honour are very divers , but the better and more beautifull are they that are without profit and gain, and are such as a man may not strain, and apply to the vicious, and such as by some base office have served the weal-publick. These are the better and more esteemed: they are in themselves more vain that have nothing of worth in them , but the simple mark of men of honour and virtue, as almost in all policies, crowns, lawrell garlands, oak, a certain form of accoutrements , the prerogative of some surname , precedency in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And it falleth out sometimes , that it is a greater honour not to have the marks of honour, having deserved them,then to have them. It is more honourable unto me , said *Cato* , that every man should ask me , why I have not a statue erected in the market place, then they should ask why I have it.

C H A P. LXI.

Science.

SCIENCE, to say the truth, is a beautifull ornament, a very profitable instrument to him that knows well how to use it; but in what rank to place it, and how to prize it, all are not of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults, some by esteemming it too much, some too little. Some make that account of it, that they preferre before all other things, and think that it is a sovereign good, some kind and ray of Divinity, seeking it with greediness, charge and great labour; others contemn it, and despise those that professe it: the mediocrity betwixt both is the more just and most assured. For my part I place it farre beneath honesty, *se lib. 3. cap. 14.* sanctity, wisdom, virtue, yea, beneath dexterity in affairs: and yet I dare to range it with dignity, naturall nobility, military valour: and I think they may very well dispute of the precedency; and if I were called to speak my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subjects, and matters, in the apprenticeship and acquisition, so are they in their utility, honesty, necessity, as also in their gain and glory: some are Theoricks and in speculations onely, others are Practick & in action: again, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without us, whether they be natural or supernatural; others are particular, which teach the tongues to speak, and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that have most honesty, utility, necessity, and least glory, vanity, mercenary gain, are far to be preferred before others. And therefore the Practick are absolutely the better, which respect the good of man, teaching him to live well, and to die well, to command well, to obey well; and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that indeavoureth to be wise: whereof this work is a brief and summary, that is to say, Morall, Science, Oeconomicall, Politicall. After these is Naturall, which serveth to the knowledge of whatsoever is in the world fit for our use, as likewise to admite the greatness, goodness, wisdom, power of the chief work-master. All other knowledges are vain, and are to be studied cursorily, as appendents unto thele, because they are no wayes beneficiall to the life of man, and help not to make us honest men. And therefore it is a losse and a folly to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we do. It is true that they serve to heap up crowns

and to win reputation with the people, but it is in policies that are not wholly sound goods.

C H A P. LXII.

Of riches and poverty.

1.
*The cause of
troubles.*

These are the two sources and elements of all discords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world: for the excessive riches of some, do stir them up to pride, to delicacies, pleasures, disdain of the poor; to enterprise and attempt: the extreme poverty of others, provokes them to envie, extrem jealousy, fury, despair, and to attempt fortunes. *Plato* called them the plagues of a Commonwealth. But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thoroughly resolved amongst all. According to *Aristotle* it is abundance, for a State needs not doubt of those that desire but to live, but of such as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is poverty, for desperate poor men are terrible and furious creatures; for wanting either bread, or work, to exercise their Arts and occupations, or too excessively charged with imposts, they learn that of the mistresse of the school, Necessity, which of themselves they never durst to have learned; and they dare, because their number is great. But yet there is a better remedy for them, than for the rich, and it is an easier matter to hinder this evil: for so long as they have bread and employment, to exercise their mysteries, and live, their will never stir. And therefore, the rich are to be feared for their own sakes, their vice and condition: the poor, by reason of the imprudency of governors.

2.
*Against the
equality, and
inequality of
riches.*

Now, many Law-makers, and great States-men, have gone about to take away these two extremities, and this great inequality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocrity and equality, which they called the nursing-mother of peace and amity; and others likewise have attempted to make all things common, which could never be, but by imagination. But besides this, it is impossible to establish an equality, by reason of the number of children which increase in one family, and not in another; and that it can hardly be put in practise, although man be enforced, and it cost much to attain thereunto, it were also inexpedient, and to small purpose, and by another way to fall into the same mischief: for there is no hatred more capital then betwixt equals; the envie and jealousy of equals is the seminary of troubles, seditions, and cruel wars.

wars. Inequality is good, so it be moderate. Harmony consisteth not of like sounds, but different and well according.

Nihil est equalitatem iniquitatem :

Nothing can less equal be

Then it self, Equalitatem.

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth from many causes, especially two : the one is from unjust lones ; as usuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other, and grow fat with the substance of another : *Qui devorant plumbum sicut etiam panis :* Who devour the people as a morsell of bread. The other from dispositions, whether amongst the living, as alienations, donations, endowments in marriages ; or testamentaries by reason of death. By both which means some do excessively increase above others, who continue poor. The heirs of rich men marry with those that are rich, whereby some houses are dismembered and brought to nothing, and others made rich and exalted. All which inconveniences must be ruled and moderated by avoiding excessive extremities, and in some mediocrity and reasonable

equality : for to have either intire, is neither possible, nor good, nor expedient as hath been said.

And this shall be handled in
the virtue of Justice.

F I N I S.



OF
WISDOM,
THE SECOND BOOK.

*Containing the generall instructions and
rules of Wisdom.*

THE PREFACE.

Wherein is contained a generall portrait of Wisdom, and
the sum of this Book.



I. Aving in the First Book laid open unto man many
and divers means to know himself, and our hu-
mane condition, which is the first part, and a great
introduction to Wisdom, we are now to enter in-
to the doctrine, and to understand in this Second
Book, the generall rules and opinions thereof, re-
serving the more particular to the Third and last
Book. It is worthiest consideration, and as a Preamble to the rest,
to call man unto himself, to taste, sound, study himself, to the end
he may know and understand his defects and miserable condition,
and so make himself capable of wholesome and necessary remedies,
which are the advisements and instructions of Wisdom.

2. But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care
of its own good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be
utterly careless that his business be well done? Man would onely
live,

live, but he cares not to know how to live well. That which a man should especially and only know is that which he knowes least, and cares least to know.

Our inclinations, designments, studies, are (as we see) from our youth divers, according to the diversity of natures, companies, instructions, occasions, but there is not any that casteth his eyes to the other side, that endeavoureth to make himself wise, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth so much as think thereon. And if perhaps sometimes he doth, it is but by chance, and as it were passing by, and he attendeth it, as news that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleasest some well, but that is all, the thing it self is neither accounted of, nor sought for in this world, of so univerſall corruption and contagion. To understand the merit and worth of Wisdom, some kind of air or tincture of nature is necessary: for men are willing to use, study, and endeavour, rather for those things that have their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and sensible, such as ambition, avarice, passion have, then for wisdom, whose effects are sweet dark, inward, and less visible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loveth better the wind with noise, then the body it self, the essence without it, opinion and reputation, then verity! Man (as hath been said in the first book) is nothing but vanity and misery, uncapable of wisdom. Every man hath a taste of that air which he breatheth, and where he liveth, followeth she train and custome of living followed by all, how then should he advise himself of any other? We follow the steps of another, yea we presse and inflame one another, we invent our vices and passions one into another; no man stayes us, or cryes *holla* unto it, so much do we fail and mistake our selves. We have need of ſome ſpeciall favour from heauen, and withall, a great and dangerous force and conftancy of nature, to note that common error which no man findeth, in advising and consulting of that which no man considereth, and resolving our ſelves quite contrary to the course of other men.

There are ſome though rare, I ſee them, I understand them, I ſmell them with pleasure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites*, or *Heraclites*; the one ſort do nothing but mock and gibe, thinking they ſhew truth & wisdom enough in laughing at error and folly. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleasant, but not good and charitable. The other are weak and poor, they ſpeak with a low voice, their mouthes half open, they disguise their.

The Preface.

their language, they mingle and stuff their propositions, to make them passe more currantly, with so many other things, and with such Art, that they are hardly discerned. They speak not distinctly, clearly, assuredly, but doubtfully like oracles: I come after them, and under them, but I speak in good sooth that which I think, and believe clearly, and perspicuously.

I give here a picture, with certain lessons of wisdom, which perhaps my seem to some new and strange, and such as no man in former time bath given in such a fashion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who have neither patience, nor power to judge truly and wisely of things, maliciously condemn whatsoever agrees not with their palate, and with that which they have already received. But that is all one, for who is he that can assure himself of the good opinion of all? But my hope is, that the simple and debonaire, the *Aetherian* and sublime spirits will judge indifferently. These are the two extremities and stages of peace and serenity; In the middle are the troubles, tempests, and meteors, as hath been said.

Lib. 1.

*The division of
this book into
4 parts.*

1.
Preparatives.

To the end we may have some rude and general knowledge of that which is handled in this book, and the whole doctrine of wisdom, we may divide this matter into four points or considerations. The first are preparatives to wisdom, which are two: the one an exemption and freedom from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the external errors and vices of the world; or inward, as passions: the other is a plain, entire, and universall liberty of the mind. These two first, and the more difficult, make a man capable and apt for wisdom, because they empty and cleanse the place, to the end it may be more ample and capable to receive a thing of so great importance as Wisdom is. *Agens & spatio res est Sapientia, vacuo illi loco opus est, super vacuo ex animo tamen sunt: Great and spacious is Wisdom, and had need of large room: the mind must be freed from things superfluous.* And this is the first. Afterwards they make him open, free, and alwayes ready to receive it. This is the second.

2.
Fonudations.

The second are foundations of wisdom, which are likewise two, true and essentiall probity, and to have a certain end and course of life. These two respect nature, they rule and accommodate us thereunto, the first to the universall nature, which is reason; for probity or honesty, as shall be said, is no other thing: the second to the particular of every one of us; for it is the choice of the kind of life proper and fit for the nature of every one.

The

The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to say, Offices and functions of wisdom, which are six, whereof the three Offices first are principally for every one in himself; which are piety, inward government of our selves and thoughts, and a sweet carriage in all accidents of prosperity and adversity: the other three respect another, which are such an observation as is necessary of Laws, Customes, and Ceremonies, a sweet conversion with another, and prudence in all affairs. These six do correspond and comprehend the foure morall virtues, the first, fourth, and fifth, do properly appertain to *justice*, and to that which we owe to God and our neighbour; the second and third, to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, the sixth to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the matter and subject of the third Book, which handleth at large the foure morall virtues, and in particular the offices and duties of a wise man, but in this book they are handled in generall.

The fourth, are the effects and fruits of wisdom, which are two: To be alwayes ready for death, and to maintain a mans self in true Fruits, tranquillity of spirit, the crown of wisdom, and the sovereign good.

These are in all twelve rules and lessons of wisdom, divided into so many Chapters; which are the proper and peculiar foot steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found else-where. I mean in that sense wherein we take them, and now describe them: For although some of them, as honesty, the observation of the Laws, seem to be found in others of the common and profane sort, yet not such as we here require and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who maintaining himself truly free and noble, is directed in all things according to nature, accommodating his own proper and particular to the universall, which is God, living and carrying himself before God, with all, and in all affairs, upright, constant, chearfull, content, and assured, attending with one and the same foot, all things that may happen; and lastly, death it self.

C H A P. I.

*Exemption and freedom from errors, and the vices of the world, and from Passions. The first dispositi-
on to Wisdom.*

J T is here necessary for the first lesson and instruction unto Wisdom, to put the knowledge of our selves and our humane condition

dition: for the first in every thing, is well to know the subject, wherewith a man hath to do, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be already done, for it is the subject of our first Book: We can onely say here, as a summary repetition of all that hath been spoken, that a man aspiring unto wisdom, should above all things, and before all other works, sufficiently know himself, and all men besides. This is the true science of man, very profitable, a matter of great study, fruit, and efficacy, for man is all in all. It is proper to a wise man: for, onely he that is wise knows himself, and he that knows himself well, is wise. It is very difficult, for a man is extreamly counterfeited and disguised, not onely man with man, but every man with himself. Every one takes a delight to deceive himself, to hide, to rob, to betray himself, *Ipsi nobis surto subducimur*, flattering and tickling himself to make himself laugh, extenuating his defects, setting a high price of whatsoever is good in himself, winking of purpose lest he should too clearly see himself. It is very rare and sought for by a few, and therefore no marvell if wisdom be so rare; for they are very few that do well know this first lesson, or that do study it; there is not a man that is master to himself, much less to another. In things not necessary and strange, there are many masters, many disciples. In this point we are never with, nor within our selves, we alwayes muse of outward things, and man better knoweth all things then himself. O misery! O madness! To the wise in this point, it is necessary that we know all sorts of men, of all airs, climates, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serves the traveller and the history) their motions, inclinations, actions, not onely publick, (they are least to be regarded, being all fained and artificall) but private, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and naturall jurisdiction; as likewise all those that concern them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwaads that we conser them all together to make an entire body and universall judgement; but especially that we enter into our selves, taste and attentively sound our selves, examine every thought, word, action. Doubtless we shall in the end learn, that man is in truth on the one side a poor, weak, pityfull, a miserab'e thing, and we cannot but pity him; and on the other, we shall find him swollen and puffed up with wind, presumption, pride, desires, & we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now he hath been suffiently decyphered and presented unto us even unto the life, in the first Book

Book, by divers means in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why we speake no more of this knowledge of man, and of our selves in this place; but we set down here for the first rule of wisdom, the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first Book, might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preserve men from the contagion of the world, and of themselves; these are the two evils and formall hindrance of wisdom, the one outward; as popular opinions and vices, the generall corruption of the world; the other inward, that is our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himself against these two. Wisdom is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the onely endeavour that we have to attain unto it, is to set at liberty, and to free our selves from that miserable double captivity, Publick and domesticall, of another and of our selves: this being attained, the rest will be easie. Let us speak of these two evils distinctly and apart.

As concerning the outward, we have before sufficiently displayed the vulgar nature, and strange humours of the world, and the common sort of people: whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them; for since they are worshippers of vanity, envious, malicious, unjust, without judgement, discretion, mediocrity, what can they deliberate, think, judge, resolve, speak, do well and justly? We have likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the misery of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in judgement and will, whereby it is easie to know that it is wholly composed of error and vice, whereunto all the sayings of the wisest in the world do accord, affirming, that the worser part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good; the number of fools are infinite, and contagion is most dangerous in a press.

2.

*Exemption of
vulgar errors.*

And therefore they counsell us, not onely to preserve our selves neat and clear from popular opinions, designements, and affections, as being all base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect: but also to fly above all things the multitude, the company and conservation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach near unto it, without some losse and impeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous, even to the wisest and best settled men that are: for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices, coming with so

3.

great

great a troop? One example of covetousnes; or incontinency doth much harm. The company of one delicate, effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little, those that live with him. One rich neighbour gives light and life to our covetousnesse. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and appliceth his vice, like rust, into the nearest and purest mind. What then can we look for from such manners, after which the world runneth, and as it were with a loofe bridle?

But what? it is very rare and difficult so to do. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearances of goodnes and justice, to follow the way approved by all: the great beaten way doth easily decive: *Lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in morte ligno possumus: Broad is the way to death and many walk therein: The world is given unto wickedness: we go one after another like beasts for company; we never dive into the reason, the merit, the equity of the cause; we follow examples and customes, and as it were of envy and emulation, we stumble, and fall one upon another; we throng one another, and draw every one to a head long downfall. We borrow our own overthrow, and perish upon credit: Alienis primus exemplia; We perish by other mens example.* Now he that would be wile, must alwayes suspect whatsoever pleases, and is approved by the people, by the greater number, and must look into that that is true and good in it self, and not into that which seemeth to them; and that is most used and frequented, and not suffer himself to be cunny-catcht and carried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one *Qui mihi pro populo, & populus pro uno: One is to me for the people, and the people for one.* And when to strop his mouth, and to beat him down at a blow, it shall be said, That the whole world saith it, believes it, doth it; he must say in his heart, It is so much the worse, it is but a simple and wicked caution; I esteem it the less, because the world esteems it so much: likewise Phocion, who seeing the people highly to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said unto them, *Hast any folly unwiting of my self escaped my mounth, or any loose or wicked word, that all this people do so approve me? Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis arbitris queritur popularis favor: Who is he to whom virtue is pleasing, that can please the people? The favour of the people is attained by ill means.* We must then as much as is possible fly the haunt and company of the sottish, illiterate, ill-composed people, but above all

all preserve our selves from their judgements, opinions, vicious behaviour, and without any stirre keep alwayes our own thoughts apart by themselves: *Quod scio non probat populus, quod probat populus ego nescio: Sapiens non respicit quid homines judicent: non it quid populus, sed ut fidetur mundi contrarium iter intendunt, it à hic adversus opiniones omnium vadit: What I know the people allow not: what the people allow, I know not: A wise man respecteth not what men judge of him: He goes not the same way with the people, but, as the starrs run a contrary course to the world, so he to the opinions of all men.* Remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidnies covered with fat, but have none themselves. *Non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus: Odi profanum vulgus & arceo: You are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you: The profane multitude, I both hate and abandon.* This is that solitariness so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soul of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captivitie, to draw it to it self, and to set it at libertie.

The other evill and hinderance to wisdom which a man must carefully avoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captivity of his passions, and turbulent affections; whereof he must disfurnish and free himself, to the end he may be empty and neat, like a white paper, and be made a subject more fit to receive the tincture and impressions of wisdom, against which the passions do formally oppose themselves; and therefore the wisest were wont to say, that it was impossible even for Jupiter himself to love, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdom is a regular managing of our soul with measure and proportion: It is an equability, and sweet harmony of our judgements, wills, manners, a constant health of our mind; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of folly, violent and rash fallies and motions.

We have sufficiently decyphered the passions in the first Book, and said enough to bring us into horrour, and detestation of them: the generall means and remedies to overcome them (for the particular in every one; are in the third book, in the virtue of Fortitude and temperance) are many and different, good and evil. And not to speak of that goodness and felicitie of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh us calm and clear, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions and keepeh us in good

5.
The second part, Exemplification of passions.

6.
Generall remedies against the passions.

Exemption and freedome from erroours

ease, equall, united, firm, and as strong as steel against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare : for this is not a remedy against this evil, but an exemption of evil, and health it self: but of the remedies against them we may note soure,

7.
Stupidity.

The first improper, and by no means commendable, is a kind of stupidity and insensiblenesse in not perceiving and apprehending of things, a brutish pampering food of base minds, or such as have their apprehension wholly dulled, a spirituall leprosie, which seemeth to have some shew of health, but it hath not: for it is not possible, there should be wildome and constancie, where there is not knowledge and understanding, and imployment in affaires : so that it is onely a complexion, and not a virtue. This is not to feel the disease, and therefore not to cure it: nevertheless this state is nothing so bad, as to know and feel, and understand, and yet to suffer himself to be gulled and overcome.

— *Pratulerim deliriu*s* inersque videri,
Dum mea delectans me, vel denique fallant,
Quam sapere & ringi.* — —

*I rather choose to seem a fool with ease,
Then to be wise indeed, and yet displease.*

8.
Counterpassion.

The second remedie is little better then the evill it self, but yet more in use, that is, when a man conquereth and extinguisheth one passion by a stronger then it : for passions are never of equall force, but there is always one or another (as in the humours of the bodie) which is the predominant, which ruleth and devoureth the rest; and we attribute many times very untruly that unto virtue and wildome, which ariseth from passion: but it is not enough in these men, when those passions that bear sway in them, are not of the worst.

9.
Precussion.

The third remedie and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificiall, whereby a man avoideth, flieth and hideth himself from all such accidents whatsoever, as may stirre, awaken, or kindle his passions. This is a kind of studie and Art, whereby a man prepareth himself before the occasions, in diverting of evills, and providing that we feel them not; like that King, who brake a beautifull and rich cup that one gave him, to take away in a good hour all matter of brawl and anger that might happen about it. The prayer of these kind of people is, *N^e nos inducas in temptationem: Lead us not into temptation.* By this remedie, he that sets himself forward to the sport, sports not himself:

Men

Men of honour, prompt and cholericke, flie contentions, altercations, and stay themselves at the first onset and occasion of passion: For when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carry himself wisely and discreetly. We guide our affections in the beginning, and hold them at our mercy; but after they are once afoot and thoroughly heated, they guide and carry us. Passions are farre more easily avoided, then moderated, *exscinduntur animo facilis quam temperantur*: because all things are in their first birth seable and tender. In their weaknesse we discover not the danger, and in their full growth and strength we know not how to withstand them; as we may see in divers, who easily and lightly enter into quarrels, and law and contentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can, with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it never so base and dishonourable, yea to seek false interpretations, to belie themselves, to betray their own hearts, to plaister and cover the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times worse then the evil they go about to heal; *Meliis non incipient, quam desinent: They shall not begin better, then they end*: from the want of wisedome, they fall into the want of heart: This is contrary to that saying of Bias, *Enterprise coldly, pursue ardently*. It is like fools, who, out of a vicious shame, are easily perswaded to agree to whatsoever a man demands, and as easily flie from their words, and revoke that they have spoken. We must therefore in all our affairs and commerce with men, from the beginning be prudent and advised.

The fourth and best remedie of all, is a lively Virtue, resolution, and constancie of the mind, whereby a man seeth and confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and entreth into a combate with them. It is valiant, noble, and glorious impassibilitie, quite contrary to the first, which we have spoken of, base stupidicie. Now, to form it, and to attain unto it, there is nothing more necessary then a precedent discourse. Discourse is the master of our Passions, premeditation is that which giveth the temper to the soul, and makes it hard, and steely, and impenetrable, against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. The proper means to appease and sweeten these passions, is, to know them well, to examine, to judge what power they have over us, and we over them. But above all, the sovereigne remedie is to believe, and not to suffer himself to be carried with opinion, which is that which cherisheth and kindleth our passions, and is (as hath been said) false, foolish, in-

10.
Virtue.

inconstant, and uncertain, the guide of fools and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himself to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and settled. But hereof, hereafter more at large.

II.
*Presumpti-
on.*

But above all other passions, it is necessary that we do carefully guard and defend our selves from Self-love, presumption, and foolish dotage of our selves, the plague of mankind, the capitall enemy of wisdome, the true gangrene and corruption of the soul, whereby we adore our selves, and rest contented with our selves, we hearken to none other, and believe none other but our selves. Now we should know that we are not in greater danger in the bands of any, then of our selves. It is an excellent motto originally come from the Spanish tongue, *O God keep my self from my self.* This presumption and foolish love of our selves, proceeds from the ignorance we have of our selves, of our weaknesse, and that little that is in us. Not onely in generall of the infirmite and misery of mankind, but also of our own proper and personall imperfections: but whosoever he be that hath the least grain or touch of this folly, shall never attain unto wisdome. Faith, modestie, a hearty and serious acknowledgement of that little that we have, is a great testimony of a good and sound judgement, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition unto wisdome.

CHAP. II.

The other disposition unto wisdome, which followeth the first (which doth quit us from this outward and inward captivitie and confusion, popular and passionate) is a plain, entire, generous, and lord-like liberty of the minde which is twofold, that is to say, of Judgement, and Will.

The first, of Judgement, consisteth in the consideration, judgement, examination of all things, and not in tying himself to any one, but remaining free in himself, universall, ready, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper law and true privilege of a wise and active man. But few they are that will understand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should: and this is the reason why we must here establish it, against such as

1. *The first
part, libertie
of Judgement.*

are incapable of wisdome. And first, to avoid all misconings, we explain the words, and give the sense. There are here three things which maintain, cause, and conserve one the other, that is, to judge of all things, not to be married or bound to any, to continue open and ready for all. When I say, to judge, my meaning is not to resolve, affirm, determine: this were contrary to the second, which is, not to bind themselves to any thing: but it is to examine, and weigh the reasons and counter-reasons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby work out the truth. So likewise, not to bind our selves to any thing, is not, to settle our selves, and to remain short of that we should, bleating in the ayr, and to cease our endeavours, and to proceed in our necessary actions and deliberations: For I will that in all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatsoever is ordinarily used, a man should agree and accommodate himself to the common sort; for our rule extendeth not it self to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and secret and inward judgment: yea and therein likewise I content, that a man settle and apply himself to that which seemeth most agreeable to the truth, most honest and profitable; but yet that it be without determination, resolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrary or divers judgments, old, and new, but alwaies to hold himself ready to entertain better if it appear; yea, not to be offended, if another shall contest with him against that which he thinketh better, but rather desire to hear what may be laid; for this is the mean, to exercise the first, which is to judge, and alwaies to enter into the search of the truth. These three, I say, do maintain, and conserve one the other; for he that judgeth well, and without passions of all things, findeth in every thing appearances of reason, which hinder his resolution, whereby he feareth to settle his judgment, and so remaineth undetermined, indifferent, and univerall; whereas contrariwise, he that resolveth, judgeth no more, but setteth and resteth himself upon that which he holdeth, and so makes himself a partaker, and a particular. To the former, fools, simple and weak people are contrary: to the second, obstinate opinative affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practised by the wise, modest, discreet, and temperate searcher of the truth and true Philosophy. It remaineth for the explication of this our proposition, that I let you know, that by all things, and some thing, (for it is said, to judge of all things, not to be assured of any,) we understand not those divine

vine verities which have been revealed unto us, which we are to receive simply with all humilitie and submission, and, without all controverie and discussion, submit our selves, and captivate our minds thereunto *capivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei* : Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith: but we understand hereby, all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perwade an indifferent spirit to receive this rule of wildome: but I see and perceive a sort of people, glorious, affirmative, which would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod; and, as others in former times have sworn to certain principles, and married themselves to certain opinions, so they would that all others should do the like, whereby they oppole themselves to this noble libertie of the spirit. It shall be necessary therefore to establish it more amply, and by order to confirm and handle these three points and members thereof.

The first is, To judge of all. It is the propertie of a wise and spirituall man, saith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spirituallis omnia dijudicat & à nemine judicatur: The spirituall man judge-eth all, and is judged of none.* The true office of man, his most proper and naturall exercise, his wortliest profession is, To judge. Why is he a man discouling, reasoning, understanding? Why hath he a spirit? to build (as they lay) castles in the air, and to feed himselft with fooleries and vanities, as the greare st part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit? Who had ever eyes given him to keep them shut?* No doubtlesse, but to understand, to judge of all things, and therefore he is called the governour, the superintendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the works of God. To go about to deprive him of this right, is to make him no more a man, but a beast; to do it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man; if, not to judge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it do in a wise man, who is as farre above the common sort of men, as a common man is above beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speake not of ideots, and the weaker sort, who have not the facultie and mean to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of understanding and sufficiencie, deprive themselves willingly of this right and authoritie so naturall, so just, and excellent, who without the examining or judging of any thing, receive and approve whatsoever is presented, either because it hath a fair semblance and appearance, or because it is in authoritie, credit, and practice; yea, they think that it is not lawfull

lawfull to examine or doubt any thing ; in such sort do they debase and degrade themselves : they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearfull and submisse, though it do justly appertain unto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth , a thousand opinions of one and the same thing , and but one that is true , why should not I examine with the instrument of reason, Which is the better , the truer , the more reasonable, honest and profitable ? Is it possible, that amongst so many laws, customes, opinions, different manners, and contrary to ours , as there are in the world , there are none good but ours ? Hath all the world besides been mistaken ? Who dares to say so ? and who doubteth but others say as much of ours , and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had been there born and brought up, would think them better , and preferre them before those he now accounteth the onely good, and all because he hath been accustomed unto them ? To conclude, to him that shall be so fool-hardie to say it; I do answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they judging and examining all may find ours to be the better. Go to then, the wiseman shall judge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the barre, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of profane men and beasts, to suffer themselves to be lead like oxen. I will that men live, and speak, and do, as others and the common sort do ; but not that they judge like the common sort, but judge them. What can a wise man, or a holy man have above a profane, if he must have his spirit, his mind, his principle and heroicall part, a slave to the vulgar sort ? The publick and common should content it self , if a man conform himself thereunto in all apparent things ; what hath it to do with our inside, our thoughts, and judgements ? They shall govern as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit; for that, by their leave, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the libertie of the spirit ; and if a man would do it, it is the greatest tyrannie that may be : a wise man will take heed thereof actively and passively , will maintain himself in his libertie, and not trouble that of other men.

Now a wise man enjoying this his right to judge and examine all things, it many times comes to passe, that the judgement and the ^{2.} *The effect of this first treatise.* chard, the mind and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carry himself outwardly after one manner, and judge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do to preserve equitie and justice *out.* *A wise man is one within, another without.*

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in all. That generall saying, *Universus mundus exercet histri-
nem, All the world carrieth two faces in one hood*, should properly
and truly be understood of a wise man, who is another man within,
than he outwardly shews. If he were without, such as he is
within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the
world: If he were within, such as without, he should be no more
a wise man, he should judge amisse, be corrupted in his mind. He
must do, and carry himself outwardly, for publike reverence, and
so as he offend no man, according to the law, custome, and cere-
mony of the countrey; and inwardly judge of the truth as it is, ac-
cording to the univerſall reason, whereby it many times comes to
passe, that he condemneth that which outwardly he doth. *Sapiens
faciet que non probabit, ut ad majora transiūm inveniat, nec relinquat
bonos mores, sed tempori aptabit omnia: qua imperiti faciunt &
luxuriosi, faciunt; sed non eodem modo, nec eadem proposito: multa sapientes
faciunt quā homines sunt, non quā sapientes.* A wise man
will do that which himself will not allow, to make a way unto greater
matters thereby: neither will he forsake good manners, but accommo-
date all things to the time: What unskillfull and dissolute persons do,
that will he do; but not in the same manner, or to the same purpose.
Many things wise men do as they are men, but not as wise men. He
will carry himself in things and actions as Cicero in words, who
said, I leave the use or custome of speech to the people, and observe
the true science and knowledge of words: *Loquendum & extra
vivendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci: We must speak and carry our
selves outwardly as the greater number, and be wise as the smaller,*
Some few examples hereof; and first of things of lesse moment. In
all humility I take off my hat, and keep my head uncovered before
my superior, for so doth the custome of my countrey require; but
yet I will not leave to judge, that the custome of the East is far bet-
ter, to salute and do reverence, by laying the hand upon the breast,
without uncovering the head, to the prejudice of our health, and
other inconveniences. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would
take my repast sitting upon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or
half-lying, looking upon the table side-waies as they do there, and as
our Saviour with his Apostles did use to do, *recumbentibus, discum-
bentibus*: and yet I would not cease to judge, that the manner of
sitting upright at table, our faces towards it, as the custome is here,
is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of
small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let us take an-
other

ther of better importance. I will, and I yield my consent, that the dead be interred and left to the mercy of the worm of rottennesse and stench, because it is now the common custome almost every where: but yet I will not cease to judge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble, and more neat, to commit and commend to the fire, the excellentest element, enemy to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heaven it self, a signe of immortality, a shadow of the divinity, and whereof the use is proper and peculiar unto man; rather then to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sink of the world, the mother of corruption; and to the worms, which is the extremest ignominy and horrour, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it self teacheth and commandeth to dispose after this manner, of all things, as of the paschal lamb which might not be eaten, and (where Popery beareth sway) the consecrated host, and divers the like; why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies? What can a man do that is more dishonourable to the body, then to cast it into the earth there to corrupt? It seemeth to me, to be the uttermost punishment that can be inflicted upon infamous persons and hainous offenders, and that the carcasses of honest and honourable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtlesse of all the manners in disposing of dead bodies, which may be reduced to five, that is, to commit them to the four elements, and the bowels of wild beasts; the vilest, and basest, and most shamefull, is to interre them; the most noble and honourable, to burn them. Again, I will and consent, that this my wife man in things natural be modest, that he hide and cover thole parts and actions that are called shamefull, dishonourable; and he that should do otherwise, I would detest, and think hardly of him, because it is almost the custome of the whole world; but yet I will neverthelesse, that he judge that simply in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shamefull then the nose or the mouth, to drink and to eat. Nature, that is, God, having made nothing shameful; but it is from another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is Sin. Divinity also more chaste then Philolophy telleth us, that to entire nature, not yet altered by the sin of man, these parts and actions were not shamefull, for then shame was not; it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sin. I consent to apparel my self like thole of my countrey and profession; and if I had been born in those countries where they

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go naked, I would have gone so too : but yet I cease not to judge ; that neither of the two fashions is very good ; and if I were to choose and ordain, I would choose a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those counties where they cover themselves with one only and simple covering, light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost ; For our manner of attiring is not good, yea worse then to go naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and variety of coverings of divers stuffes, even to the number of foure, five, six, one upon another, and whereof some are double, that they hold us prest and packt up with so many ties, bindings, burnings (not to speak of that dissolute and abominable excess condemned by all good laws) that we can hardly stirre our selves in them. I will content my self with these examples. The self-same, a man may say of all laws, customes, manders ; and of that which is *de facto* ; and much more of opinions, and that which is *de jure*.

4.
An Objection.

If any man shall say, that I have judged amisse in these examples, and that generally, it liberty be given to judge of all things, the spirit will wander and lose it self, filling and furnishing it self with follies and false opinions : I answer to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is overboldnesse to accuse any man ; for it is as much as if he shoule say, that a man knowes where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectly know or judge of ? Now not to find the truth, is not to judge amisse ; to judge amisse, is to weigh and ballance, and compare amisse, that is to say, not to examine the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and universall nature, (both which though a man do, yet it followeth not, that he must needs find out the truth.) Now I believe nothing that is but simply affirmed, if it be not likewise proved ; but if any man by contrary reasons more strong and forcible shall make good what he saith, of all others he is the welcomest man unto me, and the man I look for : Oppositions and contradictions well urged, and with reason, are the true means to exercise this judging-office. I had never set down these opinions, but that I looked that some one or other should abrogate them, and help me to better, and to answer more effectually, and to that general objection of the danger that there is in this liberty, besides that which hath been spoken, and shall more expressly be said in the third lesson of Wilsonie and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in judging, and in all things, is Nature, natural and universal Reason, following

ing which a man can never erre. See here the other member of this judicious liberty which we are about to handle, which will furnish us with a remedy against this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like liberty of spirit, is an indifference of taste, and a deferring of a settled resolution, whereby a wise man considering coldly, and without passion, all things, as is laid, is not obstinate, doth not sweare, tye, bind himself to any opinion ; keeping himself alwaies ready to receive the truth, or that which seems to him to have best semblance of truth, and saying in his inward and secret judgement, that which our ancients were wont to say in their outward and publick, *Ita videtur, It seemeth so,* there is great appearance of truth on this side ; and if any man do contradict and oppose, himself with patience he is ready to understand the contrary reasons, and to receive them, finding them more strong and better ; and when he hath heard what he can hear, he still thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans judgement, is founded first upon those propositions so much celebrated among the wise, *That there is nothing certain, that we know nothing, that there is nothing in nature but doubt, nothing certain but incertainty.* *Solum certum, nihil esse certi; hoc unum scio, quod nihil scio:* *The only thing certain, is that nothing is certain;* this one thing know I, that I know nothing : That of all things a man may dispute alike; that we do nothing but search, enquire, and grope after appearances : *Scimus nihil opinamur verisimilia: we know nothing, and imagine likelihoods.* That verity is not a thing of our own invention and purcha'e, and when it yields it self into our hands, we have nothing in our selves whereby we may challenge it, possesse it, or assure our selves of it : That truth and falsehood enter into us by one and the same gate, and there hold the same place and credit, and maintain themselves by the same means : That there is no opinion held by all, or currant in all places, none that is not bated and disputed, that another hath not held and maintained quite contrary unto it : That all things have two handles and two visages, and there is reason for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrary, it is of Lead, it turneth and accommodateth it self to whatsoever a man will have it : To be short, It is the doctrine and practice of all the wisest, greatest, and most noble Philosophers, who have made profession of ignorance, doubting, inquiring, searching. Others, notwithstanding they have been dogmatists, and affirmers, yet

yet it hath beene of gestures and words onely, and that to shew how far they could wade in the purchase and search of the truth, *Quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt*: Which the learned rather imagine, then know: giving unto all things no other nor stronger title, then probabilitie and true likelihood, and handling them diversly, sometimes with one visage and in one sente, sometimes in another, by problematicall questions, rather enquiring then instructing; and many times shewing that they speak not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise: *Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materia difficultate voluisse videntur*. They will seem not so much to think what they say, as to exercise their wits with the difficultie of the matter. And who will believe that it was the purpose of Plato to tie men to his Common-wealth, and his *Idea's*; of Pythagoras, to his numbers; of Epicurus, to his *Atoms*, or to give them for currant coin? They took pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtle inventions, *Qua ex ingenio finguntur, non ex scientie vi*: which they rather feigne wittily, then know skillfully. Sometimes likewise they have studied after difficultie, to cover the vanitie of their subject, and to employ the curiositie of their spirits. And Aristotle, the most resolute of all the rest, the Prince of dogmatists, and peremptory affirmers, the god of pedantries, how often hath he been croft in his opinions, not knowing what to resolve in that point of the Soul, wherein he is almost alwayes unlike to himself; and in many other things more base, which he knew not how to finde or understand, ingenuously confessing sometimes the great weakness of man in finding and knowing the truth.

6.
Objects.

They that have come after, of a pedanticall and presumptuous spirit, who make Aristotle and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions then ever they were, disallowing those for Disciples that faint in their opinions, hate and arrogantly condemn this rule of wisdome, this modeltie, and Academical stayednesse, glorying in their obstinate opinion, whether they be right or wrong, loving better a headie foward affirmer against their own opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, then a modest peaceable man, who doubreth and maketh stay of his judgement, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say, a fool then a wise man: like to women, who love better to be contradicted, even with injurie, than that a man either out of the coldnesse of his nature, or contempt, should say nothing to them; where-

whereby they imagine they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquity. For why should it not be as lawfull to doubt, and consider of things as doubtfull, not determining of any thing, as it is to them to affirm? Why should it not be lawfull ingenuously to confess that which a man knoweth not, since in verity he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspence that which he is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions? It is certain according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more then we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing in regard of that we know not: the causes of our ignorances are infinite, and both in respect of the things themselves, either too far from us or too neer, too great, or too little too durable, or not durable enough, perpetually changing, and in respect of our selves, and the manner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficiently learned. And that which we think we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from us; and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacy in opinion is strong, yet we are uncontented with it, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or lesse; if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selves in certain things, and in such manner, that we seek no farther, nor to examine any more that which we think to hold? They think this suspension a shame and a weaknesse, because they know not what it is, and they perceive not that the greatest men that are, have made profession thereof; they blush, and have not the heart freely to say, I know not; so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science: and they know not that there is a kind of ignorance and doubt, more learned, and more certain, more noble and generous, then all their science and certainty. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renowned, and held for the wisest man: It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies: it is a modest, milde, innocent, and hearty acknowledgement of the mystical height of truth, and of the poverty of our humane condition full of darknesse, weaknesse, uncertainty. *Cogitationes mortalium timida, incerta a inventiones nostra; Deus novit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vana sunt. Mans thoughts are fearfull, and our inventions uncertain: God knowes the thought of man, how vain it is.* Here I would tell you, that I caused to be graven over the gate of my little house which I built at *Condom*, in the year 1600, this word, *I know not.*.

But

But they will needs that we submit our selves in all dutie to certain principles, which is an unjust tyrannie. I yield my consent, that a man employ them in all judgement, and make use of them, but yet not so, as that a man may not spurn against them, for against that opinion I oppose my self. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and give laws to the world, to subject the spirits of men, and to give principles, which may be no more examined, than a man may no more denie or doubt of; but God himself, the sovereign spirit, and true principle of the world, who is onely to be believed, because he saith it? All other things are subject to triall and opposition, and it is weaknesse to subject our selves unto it. If they will that I submit my self to principles, I will say to them, as the Curate said to his Parishioners in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of religion; Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my self unto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions; in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*; whereby there are so many sects amongst them, that if I yield my self to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction, not to be resolved, to remain alwayes in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficultie for a man to continue long in that state. They have reason to say it, for they find it so in themselves, being the property of fools, and weak minds, of presumptuous fools, passionate and obstinate in certain opinions, who condemn all others; and although they be overcome, never yield themselves, vexing and putting themselves into choler, never acknowledge any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered they are as resolute and obstinate in their new, as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion, and never disputing to learn and find the truth, but to maintain that which they have sworne and bound themselves unto. These kind of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they think to know and to hold the truth in their sleeves. Because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man; *Si quis existimet se scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat cum scire: He that thinks he knows something, knows not yet what he ought to know.* It is fit that weak men that have not strength to keep themselves upright upon their feet, be kept up with props; they cannot live but in bonds, nor maintain themselves

John 9.

2 Cor. 8.

themselves free, a people born to servitude, they fear Bug-bears, or that the Wolf will eat them if they be alone. But in wile, modest, and staid men, it is quite contrary, the surest stay and most happie estate of the spirit, which by this means keepeth it self firm, upright, constant, inflexible, alwayes free and to it self: *hoc liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis judicandi potestas manet: Herein we are free, because in our selves we have full power to judge.* It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant sojourn or delay, where a man feareth not to fail or miscount himself, where a man is in the calm, under covert, and out of danger of participating to many errors produced by the phantasie of man, and whereof the world is full, of entangling himself in complaints, divisions, disputes, of offending divers parties, of belying and gainstaying his own belief, of changing, repenting, and re-advising himself. For how often hath time made us see that we have been deceived in our thoughts, and hath enforced us to change our opinions? To be brief, it is to keep the mind in peace and tranquillitie, farre from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we think to have in things; for from thence do spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires obstinacie in opinion, presumption, love of novelties, rebellion, disobedience. From whence come trouble, sects, heresies seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate and resolute in opinion? not from Academicks, neuters, modest, indifferent, stayed, that is to say, wise men. Moreover let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more service to pietie, religion, and divine operation, then any thing whatsoever: I say, service as well in the generation and propagation, as the conservation thereof. Divintie, yea, the mytical part thereof, teacheth us, that well to prepare our souls for God and the receiving of his holy spirit, we must emptie, cleanse, purifie them, and leave them naked of all opinion, belief, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it self and to the world, that God might live & work in it, drive away the old master, to establish the new; *Expurgate vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem: Purge the old leaven, and put off the old man.* So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianitie among Infidels, or misbelieving people, as in these dayes in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and persuasions: That all the wisdome of the world is but vanitie and leasing: That the world is wholly composed, torn, and vilified with the forged phantasticall opinions of every private mans brain: That God hath created man.

man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himself, not by any humane means : And, that it is necessary that God himself, in whose bosome it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reveal it as he doth. But, The better to prepare himself for this revelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beliefs, wherewith the spirit is alreadie anticipated and besotted, and present himself white, naked, and ready to receive it. Having well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academicks and Pyrrhonians, it is necessary that we propose the principles of Christianitie as sent from heaven, brought by the Embassadour and perfect messenger of the Divinitie, authoriséd and confirmed in his time by so many marvellous proofs and authenticall testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great means to true piety, not onely to receive it, as hath been said, but to preserve it; for with it there never are heresies, and selected particular extravagant opinions. An *Academick* or *Pyrhonian* was never heretick, they are things opposite. It may be some man will say, that he will never be either good Christian or Catholick, because he will as well be a neuter and irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to understand amisse that which hath been spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to judge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God ; but we must suffer him to put and engrave that which pleaseth him, and none other. I have made here a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let us now return to the matter.

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3. The third
part, univer-
sality of spirit.

After these two, To judge of all, To be slow in determining, there cometh in the third place, the Universality of spirit, whereby a wise man taketh a view, and entreth into consideration of the whole Universe : he is a citizen of the world, like *Socrates*, he containeth in his affection all humane kind, he walketh through all, as if they were near unto him, he seeth like the Sunne, with an equal settled, and indifferent regard, as from a high watch-Tower, all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himself, but alwayes continuing one and the same, which is a livery of the divinitie, and a high priviledge of a wiseman, who is the image of God upon earth; *Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos sibi ponit nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem, qui ceteros, terminus includit; omnia illi secula, ut Deo, servium. Nullum seculum magnis ingenii clausum,* *nullum non*

non cogitatione pervium tempm. Quam naturale in immensum mente suam extendere, in hoc à natura formatus homo, ut paria diis velit, ac se in spatiis suum extendat. Great and generous is the mind of man; it endureth no bounds, but such as belong to God himself. The same holdeth not a wise man, which includeth all other things; all times obey him as God himself. No times are hid from great wits, nor any not subject to their thoughts. It is natural for mans mind to reach beyond the moon, wherein nature hath framed in man a desire to be equal to the gods, and to extend himself to his greatness. The most beautifull and greatest spirits are the more univerial, as the more base and blunt are the particular. It is a sortish weaknesse to think that a man must believe, do, live, in all respects as at home in his own village and countrey; or that the accidents that fall out here, concern, and are common with the rest of the world. A fool, if a man tell him that there are diverse manners, customes, laws, opinions, contrary to those which he seeth in we, either he will not believe them, and iath they are fables, or he presently refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partial is he, and so much enthralled with those his municipal manners; which he accoureneth the only true, natural, univerial. Every man calleth that barbarous, that agreeith not with his palat and custome; and it seemeth that we have no other touch of truth and reason, then the example and the *Idea* of the opinions and customes of that countrey where we live. These kind of people judge of nothing, neither can they; they are slaves to that they hold, a strong prevention and anticipation of opinions, doth wholly possess them. They are so besotted, that they can neither say, nor do, otherwise. Now partiality is an enemy to liberty, and over-ruleth the mind already tainted and preoccupied with a particul'ar custome, that it cannot judge aright of others; an indifferent man judgeth all things. He that is fastned to one place, is banished and deprived from all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receive any. A Judge that hears a cause with a prejudicte opinion, and inclineth to one part more then to another, caniot be a just, upright, and true Judge. Now a wise man must free himself from this brutish blockishnes, and present unto himself as in a table this great image of our Mother-nature in her entire majesty, mark and consider her in a realm, an empire, yea in this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and there read that general and constant variety in all things, so many humours, judg-

ments, beliefs, customes, laws, so many alterations of States, changes of fortune; so many victories and conquests buried and forgotten, so many pomps and greatnesses vanished, as if they had never been. Hereby a man may learn to know himself, to admire nothing, to think nothing new, or strange, to settle and reolve himself in all things. For the better attaining of this universall spirit, this generall indifferencie, we are to consider these four or five points.

1. The great inequality and difference of men in their nature, form, composition, whereof we have spoken.

2. The great diversity of laws, customes, manners, religions, opinions, whereof we will speak hereafter.

3. The divers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers, touching unity and plurality, the eternity and temporality, the beginning and end, the durance and continuance, the ages, estates, changes, and interchangeable causes of the world, and the parts thereof: The Egyptian Priests told *Herodotus*, that since their first King, (which was above eleven thousand years before; the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawn to the life) the Sun had changed his course four times. The Chaldeans in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) and *Cicero*, had a register of seven hundred thousand years. *Plato* saith, they of the city of *Sais* had memorials in writing of eight thousand years, and that the City of *Athens* was built a thousand years before the said City of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Pliny*, and others have affirmed, that *Socrates* lived six thousand years before the time of *Plato*. Some have said, that the world hath been from all eternitie, mortal, and growing, and being again by interchangeable courses. Others, and the more noble Philosophers, have held the world for a god, made by another god greater then it; or, as *Plato* averreth, and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature compoled of a body, and of a soul, which soul lodging in the center thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it self by musical numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heaven, the stars, composed of bodies, and of a soul, mortal, by reason of their composition; immortal, by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects, that the heaven, the stars, the sun change and quite alter by turnes their motion, in such sort, that that which was first, is last, the East is made the West; and recording to the ancient and most authenticall opinion, and of the more famous

famous spirits, worthy the greatnesse of God, and founded upon reason, there are many worlds, in somuch, that there is nothing one and only in this world, all kinds are multiplyed in number, whereby it seemeth not to have semblance of truth, that God hath made this onely world, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *individuum*; at the least, Divinity saith, that God could make many, and infinite worlds; for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which we have learned of the discovery of the new world, the East and West-Indies, we see first, that all our ancient Writers have been deceived, thinking to have found the measure of the habitable earth, and to have comprehended the whole *Cosmographie*, except some scattered Islands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all upon firm land inhabited, peopled, politickly governed, distinguished by Realms, and Empires, beautified with cities, that excell in beauty, greatnesse, opulency, all those of *Asia*, *Africa*, *Europe*, many thousand years ago: And who doubteth, but that in time hereafter, there will be discovered divers others? If *Ptolemy*, and other our ancient Writers, have been heretofore deceived, why should not he be likewise deceived that affirmeth, that all is already found and discovered? Say it he that will, I will believe him as I list.

Secondly, we see that the *Zones*, which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessive heat and cold, are habitable.

Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteem of here, and hold that they were first revealed and sent from heaven, were commonly believed and observed, (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them were in use a thousand years before we heard any tidings of them, both in the matter of Religion, as the belief of one only Man, the father of us all, of the universal deluge, of one God who sometimes lived in the form of a man undefiled and holy, of the day of judgment: the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the *Jews*, and *Mahumet*: And in the matter of policy, as that the elder son should succeed in the inheritance, that he that is exalted to a dignity, loseth his own name, and takes a new; tyrannical subsidies, armories, tumblers, musical instruments, all sorts of sports, Artillery, Printing. From all these discourses, we may easily draw these conclusions: That this great body which we call

the world, is not that which we think and judge it to be ; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is alwaies the same, but in perpesual flux and reflux ; That there is nothing said, held, believed at one time, and in one place, which is not likewise said, held, believed in another, yea and contradicted, reproved, condemned elsewhere; the spirie of man being capable of all things, the world alwaies tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes divers ; That all things are settled and comprehended in their course and revolution of nature, subject to increase, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climates, heavens, aires, countries. And from these conclusions we learn, to marry our selves, to swear, to nothing ; to admire, to trouble our selves at nothing ; but whatioever shall happen, whatsoever men talk of and trouble themselves about, to resolve upon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things ; but yet wisely to provide that nothing hurt us by our own weaknes and dejection of mind. Enough is said of this perfect liberty of judgment, established by these three parts, To judge of all, To judge nothing, To be univerfall: wherein I have the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palat of the world ; it is an enemy to pedantry as well as wisdome, but it is a fair flower or ornament of wisdome, which preserveth us from two contrary rocks, whereon the vulgar sort do commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being heady, opinative, shameful gainsayers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himself in a tweet, peaceable, and assured modesty, and great liberty of spirit, noble and magnifical universality. This is that great quality and sufficiency of *Socrates*, the *Coryphaeus* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is laid, as *Plutarch* discourteth, That he never brought forth, but serving as a Midwife, he made others to bring forth. This is very neer, and in some sense, the disorder of the *Pyrbonians*, the neutrality and indifference of the *Academicks*, from whence proceedeth, not to be astonished at any thing, nor to admire any thing, the sovereign good of *Pythagoras*, the magnanimity of *Aristotle*.

*Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque, quæ possit facere, & servare beatum.
One thing, at nothing wonder up to take,
It is, that may you happy keep and make.*

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea is offended to hear speech thereof, loveth better to continue a slave, to run

run from one part to another, then to be to himself, to live of his own, to be above all, and to passe equally thorow all. 5. Hath he not reason to cry with Tiberius, and sat more justly, *O homines ad servientem natum! O men born to servitude!* What monster is this, to desire to have all things free, his body, his members, his goods, and not his spirit, which nevertheless is onely born unto liberty? A man will willingly make benefit of whatsoever is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and service of his body, nourishment, health, ornament, and accommodate it all unto his use, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit and enriching; giving his body the liberty of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison.

The other liberty which is of the Will, must likewise be in high esteem with a wise man. We speak not here of the free will of ^{2. The second} man, according to the manner of Divines: we say, that a wise man ^{part, the liberty of Will.} to maintain himself in rest and liberty, must manage his will and his affections, in giving himself to and affecting but few things, and those just (for the just are but few in number, if a man judge well) and that without violence and asperity. There enter here into combat (or to speak more mildly, there are to be explicated and understood) two popular and plausible opinions in the world; the one teacheth to be ready and willing in the service of another, to forget our selves or our neighbour, and principally for the weal-publick, in respect whereof, the particular is not to be respected; the other to carry our selves courageously with activity, zeal, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused, not to have any charity: He that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend, and not to have that zeal of sufficiency that he ought. Some would have these two opinions to prevail beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not been spoken hereof: for the heads or chieftains many times preach things according to that use for which they serve, not according as they are: And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selves too much to our selves, and with a tie too naturall, they would distract us and draw us along, as they that go about to streighten a crooked staffe, bend it as much more the contrary way.

But these opinions ill understood and ill taken, as they are by divers, bring with them injustice, trouble, pain, and much evil, as a man may see in those who back-bite, and detract from all, giving themselves

themselves to hire, and the service of another : They do not onely suffer themselves to be carried, and seized upon, but they likewise thrust themselves into ill matters, as well into those that concern them not, as those that do ; as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and busie themselves ; *In negotiis sunt, negotiis causa* : That busie themselves, because they would be busie : And because they cannot hold and stay themselves, as if they had nothing to do, with and within themselves, and that for want of inward, essential, proper and domestical affairs, they seek and undergo those that are strange unto them. They are good husbands and frugal enough of their purse, but prodigal of their souls, their lives, their time, affection, and wills ; the good husbandry whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they give themselves to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their own men, so wholly do they engage and insinuate themselves therewith. Great men seek after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselves for them, and they allure them with fair promises and much Art, to win them unto them ; and they alwaies find tools enough that believe them : but they that are wise will take heed of them.

9. This is first unjuit, it wholly troubleth the State, drives away the rest and liberty of the spirit, It is, not to know that which every one ought to know, and by how many offices every man is obliged unto himself ; whilst they seek to be officious and serviceable to another, they are unjust to themselves. We have all businesse enough with and within our selves, and need not seek meanes to lose our selves without, and to give our selves unto others : every man must hold him to himself. He that knowes not how to live honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill advised, and takes an ill and unnatural course, if he think to do it by serving another. He must affect and tie himself but to a few things, and those just.

10. Secondly, this sharp intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindereth the conduct of thole affairs to which he so much giveth himself ; as in a precipitate pace, too much haste makes a man stumble, and enterfier, and so staies him whether he will, or no ; *Ipsa se velocitas impicit, unde festination tarda est* . *Qui nimium properat, serius absolvit* : Haste makes waste, and binders it self : He that maketh too much speed, dispatcheth too late. So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entangleth and setteth himself, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, growes into hard

hard conceits and suspitions of others, becomes impatient in crosse or slow occurrents, that fall not out according to his own deere : *Malè cuncta ministrat Imperium : Violence doeth nothing well.* This is seen not only in serious affairs, but also vain and trifolous; as in play, where he that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubl eth himself; and the more he troubleth himself, the more he loseth. He that walks moderately, is alwaies with himself, directeth his busynesse with better advantage, and more surely and cheerfully : he directeth, applyeth, deferreth all to his own leisure, and as his occasions shall fall out: if he chance to be contradicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being alwaies ready for a new change : he alwaies marcheth with the bridle in his hand, *festinat lemīt.*

Thirdly, this violent affection infecteth and corrupteth even the judgment it self : for following one part, and desiring the advantage thereof, they wax mad if they be contradicted, attributing to their party false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusations ; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their own pleasure, and making them serve their own designments. All that are of the contrary part, must needs be wicked and of contrary conditions ; yea and they that speak any good, or descry any good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possibly be, that a man honest in all things else, or at least in some thing, may follow a wicked person, maintain a wicked cause? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it carry likewise the judgment, and make that a fool, this is too much. It is the sovereign and last part that should alwaies maintain its own authority : and we must ingenuously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our adversaries, and the evil that is in those whom we follow. The ground and foundation of the controverie being laid aside, we must keep moderation and indifference, and out of the business it self banish all choler, all discontent. And thus we see the evils that this over-great affection to any thing whatsoever bringeth with it ; of all, yea of goodness and wisdome it self, a man may have too much.

But for a rule herein, we must remember, that the principall and most lawful charge, that we have, is, in every man, the conduct and guide of himself. The reason why we are here, is, that we should maintain our selves in tranquillity and liberty. And to do this, the best remedy is, to lend our selves to others, and to give

12.
*An adverse-
ment.*

An univerſall and plain liberty

our ſelves to none, but to our ſelves, to take our affaires into our hands, not to place them in our hearts; to take buſineſſe upon us, but not incorporate them into us; to be diligent, not paſſionate; not to tie our ſelves but to a few, but rather alwayes to reſerve our ſelves unto our ſelves. This counſel condenmeth not thole offices due to the weal-publick, to our friends, our neighbours; yea it is fo far from it, that a wiſe man muſt be officious and charitabile, apply unto himſelf the cuſtomes of other men and the world. And the rather to do it, he muſt contribute to publick ſociety, thole offices and duties which concern him. *Quis ibi amicus eſt, hunc omnibus ſcito eſſe amicum*: *He that is a friend to himſelf, is a friend to all.* But I require a double moderation and diſcretion herein; the one, that a man apply not himſelf to a thing that is preſented unto him, but to that which is juſt and neceſſary; and that is not hard to be done: the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He muſt deſire little, and that little moderateſy; buſie himſelf little, and that peaceably: and in thole charges that he undertaketh, employ his pate, his ſpeech, his attentions, his iugement, his means, and, if need be, his blood, his liue: but yet without vexation and paſſion, keeping himſelf alwayes to himſelf, in health and tranquillity. A man may per- form his duty ſufficiently without this ardency, and this ſo great contention of Will. And they deceiue themſelves very much, that think that a buſineſſe not well done, and there is no mauner of affection, if it be not done with tempeſt, clamour, and clatter: for conterariwile it is, that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduct thereof, as hath been ſaid. O how many men hazard their liues every day in thole warrs which no way concern them, and thrust themſelves into the danger of that battel, the losſ whereof doth no way trouble their ſleep: and all to the end they may not fail in their duty! whileſt there is another in his own houſe, that dares not enter the danger, or look the enemy in the face, is more affected with the iſſue of that War, and hath his mind more troubled, then the ſouldier that adventureth his blood and life in the field.

Finally, we muſt know how to diſtinguiſh and ſeparate our ſelves from our publick charges: Every one of us playeth two parts, two persons; the one ſtrange and apparent, the other proper and eſſentiall: we muſt diſcern the ſkin, from the ſhirt. An active man will perform his charge, and yet withal not leave to judge of the folly, vice, deceit that is therein: he will conform himſelf to every thing, because

because the custome of his countrey requireth it, it is profitable to the weal-publick; the world liveth so, and therefore it must be done. A man must serve and make use of the world such as he findeth it; in the meane time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it self, know how to keep and carry himself apart, and to communicate himself to his own trusty good, howsoever things fall out with himself.

CHAP. III.

True and essential honesty, the first and fundamental part of Wisdome.

Having prepared and disposed our scholar to wisdome, by these precedent advisements; that is to say, having purified and freed him from all evils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and universal liberty, to the end he may have a perfect view, knowldg, and power over all things (which is the priviledge of a wise and spiritual man : *Spirituallis omnia dijudicat : The spiritual man judgeth all things:*) it is now time to give him instructions and generall rules of wisdome. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations; whereof the first and principall is Honesty or probitie.

I.

It will not be perhaps, any matter of difficulty, to make good this proposition, *That honesty is the first principal and fundamental part of Wisdome*: for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or fear to say the contrary) do applaud it; they alwaies honour it in the first place, confessing them selves servitors and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to shew and perswade, Which is that true and essential probitie we here require. For that which is in authority and credit, wherewith the whole world contenteth it self; that which is onely known, sought for, and possessed, (except some few of the wiser) is basstardly, artificial, false, and counterfeit.

2.

First, we know that many times we are lead and pricked forward to virtue and honourable actions, by wicked and condemned means *Mark of honesty.* by default and natural impotencie, by passion, and vice it self; chafity, sobriety, temperance may be in us, by reason of our corporall imbecillity: the contempt of the world, patience in adversity, constancy in danger; proceed many times from want of apprehension and judgment: valour, liberality, justice it self; from ambition: discretion, prudence, from fear, from avarice. And how many beautiful

beautiful actions have presumption and temerity brought forth: So that the actions of virtue are many times no other but masks; they carry the outward countenance, but they have not the essence; they may very well be termed virtuous, in consideration of another, and of the visage they carry outwardly and in publick, but in truth and with the actor himself they are nothing so; for it will appear at the last, that profit, glory, custom, and other like strange causes, have induced him to do them.

Sometimes they arise from stupidity and brutish sottishness, and therefore it is said, that wisdom and sottish simplicity do meet in one and the same point, touching the bearing and uttering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to judge of the probitie or improbitie of a man by his actions: we must sound him within, from what foundation these motions do arise: wicked men perform many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and evil preserve themselves alike from doing evil: *Oderunt peccare boni & mali: Both good and evil fear to offend.* To discover therefore, and to know which is the true Honesty, we must not stay in the outward action; that is but the sign, the simplest token, and many times a cloak and mask to cover villainie: we must penetrate into the inward parts, and know the motive which causeth the strings to play, which is the soul and the life that giveth motion to all. It is that whereby we must judge, it is that wherein every man should prove to be good and entire, and that which we seek.

3.
*Vulgar honesty
and according
to the style of
the world.*

That honesty which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make express profession, who have the title and publick reputation to be men of honesty, and settled constancy, is scholastical, and pedantical, servant to the lawes, enforced by hope and fear, acquired, learned and practited out of a submission to, and a consideration of, the religion, laws, customes, commands of superiors, other mens examples; subject to prescript forms, effeminate, fearful, and troubled with scruples and doubts: *Sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet: Innocency without fear likes not some;* which is not onely in respect of the world divers and variable, according to the diversity of religions, lawes, examples, forms, (for the jurisdictions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it self unequal, wavering, deambulatotie, according to the access, recess, success of the affairs, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath

hath to do, as a ship driven with the winds and the oars, is carried away with an unequal tottering pale, with many blows, blasts, and billowes. To be brief, there are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange events, and not in verity and essence: they understand it not, and therefore it is easie to discover them, and to convince them, by shaking of a little their bridle, and sounding them somewhat nearer; but above all, by that inequality and diversity which is found in them: for in one and the same action they will give divers judgments, and carry themselves altogether after a divers fashion, going sometimes a slow pale, sometimes running a main gallop. This unequal diversity proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which move and stir them, do either putt them up, multiply and increase them, or make them luke-warm, and deject them, more or les, like accidents, *Quæ recipiunt magis & minus.*

Now that true honesty, which I require in him that will be wife, is free, manly and generous, pleasant, and cheerful, equal, uniform, and constant, which marcheth with a staid pale, stately and haughty, going alwaies his own way, neither looking on this side, or behind him, without staying or altering his pale, or gate for the wind, the times, the occasions, which are changed; but that is not, I mean in judgment and will, that is in the soul, where honesty resideth and hath its seat. For outward actions, especially the publick, have another jurisdiction, as shall be laid in his place: his honesty I will describe in this place, giving you first to understand, that following the designation of this book declared in the Preface, I speak of humane honesty and wisedome, as it is hamang, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wife, not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to speak a word or two thereof.

4.
The description of true honesty.

The jurisdiction of this honesty is nature, which bindeth every man to be, and to make himself such as he ought, that is to say, to *Nature en-conform* and rule himself according unto it. Nature is together *joyneth both* a mistris which enjoyneth and commendeth honesty, and a law nesty. and instruction which teacheth it unto us. As touching the first, there is a natural-obligation inward, and universal in every man to be honest, just, upright; following the intention of his Author and Maker. A man ought not to attend or seek any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motive of this honesty; and he can never know how to have a more just and lawful, more powerful, more ancient; it is altogether as soon as himself, born with himself.

5.

Every

Every man should be, or should desire to be, an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such, is a monster, renounceth himself, by which, destroyeth himself; by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desir to be a man. It is necessary that honesty grow in himself, that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a just and regular will, anything that is depraved, or corrupt, or other then its own nature requireth, it implyeth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would have all his parts good and sound, his body, his head, his eyes, his judgment, his memory, yea his hose and shooes; and why will he not likewise have his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be wholly good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and have his will firm and resolved to equity and honesty for the love of himself, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himself; and to his honesty shall be proper, inward, essential, even as his own essence is unto him, and he unto himself. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it be, for such a cause being accidental and outward, may happen to fail; grow weak, and alter, and consequently all that honesty that is grounded thereupon, must do the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence; being in a solitary place, where he hath no hope to be known, he either ceaseth to be honest, or purgeth it in practice very coldly and negligently. If for fear of the laws, magistrates, punishments; if he can deceive the laws, circumvent the Judges, avoid or disprove the proofs, and hide himself from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honesty. And this honesty is but frail, occasioned, accidental and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authority and use, no man knowes of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or invited by some cause, or occasion; *Nemo gratis bonus est: Non man is freely good.* Now I would have in this my wise man, an essential and invincible honesty, which dependeth of it self, and ariseth from its own root, and may as hardly be separated, and rooted out, as humanity from a man. I will that he never consent unto evil; and though his honesty be not made known to any, yet if he know himself, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much: *Quid tibi prodest non*

non habere conscientiam, haberi conscientiam? What is it to thee that hast a conscience, not to have a witness of thy conscience? And what though he receive no great recompence for it? For what may it be that concerneth him to hear, as his own proper essence? This were, not to care how bad the horse is, so the saddle be fair. I will then that these things be inseparable, to be, and to consent to live a man; to be, and to be willing to be an honest man. This first hath been sufficiently pressed. Let us come to the second.

Now the pattern and rule to be honest, is this nature it self, which absolutely requireth that we be such; It is, I say, this equity and universal reason which shineth in every one of us. He which worketh *honestie*, according to it, worketh truly according to God; for it is God, or at least his first fundamental and universal law, which hath brought it into the world, and which came first from God, for God and nature are in the world, as in a State; the king, the author and founder, and the fundamental law which he hath made for the preservation and government of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the divinity, a stream and dependance of the eternall law, which is God himself and his will: *Quid est natura nisi Deus, & divina ratio toti mundo, & partibus ejus in inserta? What is nature, but God, and divine reason inserted to the whole world, and all the parts thereof?* He worketh also according to himself, for he worketh according to the spirit, and animated instinct, which he hath within himself moving and stirring him: and to he is an honest man essentially, and not by accident and occasion. For this law and light is essential and naturall in us, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequent an honest man alwaies and perpetually, uniformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equity, and natural reason is perpetuall in us, *Editio perpetuum, A perpetuall editio, inviolable, which can never be extinct nor defaced.* *Quam nec ipsa delet iniurias; vermis eorum non morietur;* Which neither iniquity it self may deface; their worm shall never die. Universal and constant in all things, and alwaies the same, equal uniform, which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiveth neither accessse nor recessse, more nor lesse, *Substantia non recipit magis & minus.* What seekest thou else-where either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alledge, which thou hast not about thee and within; if thou wilt but feel and hearken to thy self? A man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is, and will see the bill which he hath about

True and essential honesty, the first

Rom. i.
August.

about him, *Quod peti, imus habes; What thou demandest is within thy self;* Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy own bosome, *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus sui.* Gentes naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; Lex scripta in cordibus nostris. The light of thy countenance is sealed in us. People naturally observe the law: they shew the work of the law written in their hearts: the law is written in our hearts. The law of Moses in his decalogue, is an outward and publick copie, the law of the twelve tables, and the Romane law, the mortall instructions of Divines and Philosophers, the advisements and counsells of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but pietie and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if there be any law, that strayeth the least that may be from this first and originall mistris, it is a monster, falsehood, and errour. To be brief, all the lawes of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into judgement against thee that holdest hidden the originall and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lieth this light, which enlightneth thee within, *Qui veritatem Dei detinunt in iustitia, Who detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse,* for these lawes had never been published abroad, but because that law which was inward, wholly celestiall and divine, hath been too much contemned and forgotten. These are all rivers, but such as neither have so much water, nor so pure as the source and invisible fountain, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perish, and to be lost: I say, not so much water, *Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, qua extra tabulas sunt!* Piety, humanity, liberality and faith require many things that are not in the tables. O the miserable honestie of formalists, who hold themselves to the words of the law, and so think themselves discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quam angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse: latius officiorum patet quam juris regula.* What a strict innocence is required, according to the law, the rule of duty extendeth it self further then the rule of the law. The rule of our dutie is far larger then that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so lively, witnessse this one thing, that well to understand and know their intention, to quit ou selves of ambiguitie, difficultie, contrarietie, we must bring them to the source, and re-entering into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature: *Animus legis, ratio; Reason is the life of the law.* Behold then an essentiall, radicall, and fundamentall honestie, sprung in us from its own proper roots by the

the seed of that universall reason which is in the soul, as the spring and ballance in a clock, as the natural heat in the body, maintaining it self strong of it self and invincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himself, nature, the univeriall order and policie of the world, quietly, sweetly and as silently without noise, as a shig that is not driven but by the natural and ordinary course of the water : All other is ingraited by Art and accidentall discipline, as the heat and cold of fevers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamour and clatter,ambitiously.

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, 7.
that to live well, is to live according to nature, that the chiefeſt *We must fol-*
good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature *low nature,*
as our guide, and misſis, we we can never erre, *Naturam si sequa-*
ris ducent, nusquam aberrabis : bonum est quod secundum naturam;
omnia via contra naturam sunt : Idem beatē vivere & secundum
naturam : If thou follow nature as thy guide, thou shalt not erre. All
goodneſſe is naturall; vices unnaturall : it is one and the ſame thing to
live blesſedly, and according to nature : understanding by nature that
equitie and universall reaſon which shineth in us,which containeth
and hathceth in it the ſeeds of all virtues, probitie, justice, and is the
mat: ix from whence all good and excellent laws do ſpring and arrie,
yea thoſe true and just judgements that are ſometimes pronounced
by the mouth of an ideot. Nature hath diſpoſed all things in the beſt
ſtate that they could be, and hath given them the firſt motion to
good, and the end which they ſhould ſeek in ſuch loſt, that he that
will follow her, need not obtain and poſſeſſe his own good and his
own end, *Sapiensia est in naturam converti, & ea reſtitui unde pub-*
licus error expulerit : Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplumq;
formari, sapientia eſt. It is wiſdome to be conformable to nature, and
to yield unto it, whereby he may expell all publick and groſſe erroſſe;
From which not to wander, but to fashion and apply himſelf thereto, is
wiſdome. Men are naturally good, and follow not evill, but for
profit or pleasure, and therefore Law-makers, to induce them to fol-
low their naturall and good inclination, and not to enforce their
wills, have propoſed two contrary things, punishment and re-
ward,

Doubtleſſe, Natiue in every one of us is ſufficient, and a ſweet 8.
miſtris and rule to all things, if we will hearken unto her, employ *As a good*
and awaken her, and we need not ſeek elſe-where, nor begge of *and ſufficient*
miſtris.

Art and the Sciences, the means, the remedies, and the rules which we have need of : Every one of us, if he will, may live at his pleasure, of his own. To live content and happy, a man need not be wise, a Courtier, nor so active ; all his sufficiency that is beyond the common and naturall is vain and superfluous, yea it bringeth more evill with it then good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, lead their lives more sweetly and chearfully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, then the wised men and most active. And if a man mark it well, he shall find among peasants and other poor people, examples of patience, constancy, equanimity, more pure then all those that are taught in Schools ; they follow simply the reason and condic^t of nature, they travel quietly and contentedly in their affaires, not enflaming or elevating themselves, and consequently more soundly. Others mount themselves upon their great horses, play the light horsemens, bandie themselves one against the other, keep their brains alwaies in work and agitation. A great master and admirable Doctor in Nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in Art and science. *Socrates* by simple and natural discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a countrey Swain, did furnish us with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all evils, so substantial and strong, that all the Art and science of the world could not devise better or the like.

But we do not only not hearken unto it, believe and follow it according to the counsel of the wise, but also (not to speak of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and perverse delights and pleasures, suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the seed thereof) we endeavour to avoid it, we suffer it to sleep and to cease, loving better to beg elsewhere our first rudiments, to run to study any Art, then to content ourselves with that which is bred within us. We have a busie troublesome spirit which ofreth it self to rule and govern in all things, and which carrieth it self after our own wills, dignereth, changeth, and troubleth all, will adde, invent, alter, and cannot stay it self in home-born simplicit, it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtilit. Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solerter scientiam & sa est : That simple and open virtue is ever turned into obscure & crafty cunning. And it is a vice common amongst us, not to account of any thing that is in us, we esteem only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from far:

By Art.

far : we prefer Art before Nature, we shut the windows at high-noon, and light candles. This fault and folly proceedeth from another; that is, that we esteem not of things according to their true and essentiaill value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positive and municipal law, then the natural? Truly al-most all, yea even in the ceremonial, and law of civility, which we have framed to our selves, in respect whereof we diddain and are ashamed of nature. We speak little, we make a fair shew, and carefully keep a *decorum* or decency ; and make no difficulty to go directly against nature, duty, conscience. So that the shadow is more unto us then the body, the root; the countenance more then the substance and sound verity. That we may not offend a ceremony, we cover and hide things natural ; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we do in no sort fear to do, both lawfull and unlawfull. We dare not speak that which is permitted to do, we dare not directly to name our own proper members, and yet we fear not to employ them in all manner of wickednesse : we pronounce, speak, and do, without fear and without shame, wicked things, and such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, assaile, kill, deceive; and we blush to speak of things good, natural, necessary, just and lawfull. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open view of the world, then to kill, lye, assaile ; nor a woman that will not rather utter any wickednes in the world, then name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully do. Even to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the laws of a ceremony, and there fasten their devoires. A strange thing that injustice should complain of incivility, malice of indiscretion ! The act of a ceremony doth it not prevail against nature ? The Ceremony forbiddeth us to express natural things and lawfull, and we give credit thereunto : Nature and reason forbiddeth us things unlawfull, and no man believes it : A man sends his conscience to the Brothel-house, and keeps his outward countenance in Order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found among beasts. I will not for all this say, (as I perceive malice doth already mutter) that Ceremony and decency ought not carefully to be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conversations. *Amo verecundiam ; in ea, ornatus* Cicero.
vita, & vis decori : I love modesty, for in it, is the ornament of our life, and the force of comeliness. But I say to them, as our Saviour

Math. 23.

10.
In such sort,
that it is no
more known
in man.

11.
And we must
seek it else-
where.

12.
True honestie.

True and essentiall honestie, the first

to men of the like spirit : O hypocrite, excolante scilicet, camolum deglutientes, qui minus curatis, graviora spernitis. Hac oportet primum facere, tum illa non omittere. O ye hypocrites, that strain a gnat, and swallow a camel, which are carefull for small things, and despise greater matter. These ought ye first to do, and also not to omit the rest.

From this general come to passe, that we must say what the we are much hindred universitie of approbation ordained for us, without doubting; and by person.

Now there is not thing so strange and not approved and at little care of having himself, marriage or of their libertie and by publick use in ma-

and universall alteration and corruption it is nothing of nature known in us. If we see thereof are, and how many they are, The ensign and mark of a naturall law is the nation : for that which Nature shall have truly with a common content shall follow without onely every nation, but every particular

ly thing in the world which is not denied and contradicted, not by one nation, but by divers: and there is not any naturall in the opinion of divers, which is raised in many places by common use. The oldren, the murther of parents, of children, of nearelt in blood, theft, publick marchandise, as well of males as females, are received by nations.

Doubtlesse there maineth no more any image or trace of nature in us, we must seek it in beasts, where this troublesome and unquiet spirit, this quick-silver, neither Art, nor beautifull ceremony hath power to alter ; they have it pure and entire, if it be not corrupted by our usages, and contagion, as sometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the first and universall rule which the authour thereof hath given and stablished, except man onely; who troubleth the policie and state of the world with his gentle spirit, and his free will to wickednesse, he is the onoly irregular creature, and enemie of nature.

So then the true honestie (the foundation and pillar of wisdom) is to follow nature, that is to say, reason. The good and the end of man, in whom consisteth his rest, his libertie, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is, to live and do according to nature, when that which is the most excellent thing in him commandeth, that is to say, reason. True honestie is a right and firm disposition of the will to follow the counsel of reason : And as the needle touched with the adamant never resteth it self untill he

see.

see the north-point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the navigation; so a man is never well, yea, he is as it were undone, and dislocated until he see this law, and directeth the course of his life, his manners, his judgements and wils, according to the first, divine, naturall law which is an inward domesticall light, whereof all the rest are but beams.

But to effect it, and to come to the practice, it is farre more easie to some, then to others. There are some that have their particular nature, that is to say, their temper, and temperature so good and pleasing (which especially proceedeth from the first formation in the womb of the mother, and afterwards from the milk of the nurse, and this first and tender education) that they find themselves, without endeavour, and without Art or discipline, wholly carried and disposed to goodness and honestie, that is to say, to follow and conform themselves to the universall nature, whereby they are termed wel-born; *gaudeant bene nati.*

This kind of naturall and easie honestie, and as it were born with *Naturall us*, is properly called goodness, a qualitie of a soul well born and *goodnesse*, wel governed; it is a sweetnesse, facultie, and debonair mildnesse of nature : and not (lest any body should be deceived) a softnesse, a feminarie, softish calmnesse and vicious facilitie, whereby a man delighteth to please all, and not to displease or offend any, although he have a just and a lawfull cause, and it be for the service of reason and justice; whereby it comes to passe, that they will not employ themselves in lawfull actions, when it is against those that take offence thereat; nor altogether refuse the unlawfull, when they please thereby those that content thereunto. Of these kind of people it is said (and this commendation is injurious), He is good, since he is good even to the wicked; and this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not evil to those that are evil? We should rather call this kind of goodness innocencie, as men call little children sheep, and the like innocent creatures. But an active, valiant, manly, and effectuall goodness is that I require, which is a ready, easie, and constant affection unto that which is good, right, just, according to reason and nature.

* There are others so ill born and bred that it seems that (like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were, in despight of the universall nature, so croesse and contrary are they thereunto. In this case the remedy to correct, reform, sweeten, make tame, and amend this evil, rough, savage and crooked nature, to bend it and

13.
The distinction of true honestie,

Acquired
virtue.

apply it to the rule of th' generall and great mistris the universall Nature, is,to have recorde to the studie of Philosophie (as Socrates did) and unto virtue, which is a combate and painfull endeavour against vice , a laboriou study , which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in aro & circa difficile : ad januam virtutis excubant labor & sudor.* *Pli mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio viderunt.* Virtue is alwayes employed about things difficult ; at whose gate attends labour and pain. God for great pain and travell hath sold virtue unto men. This is not to bring in a new , strange , or artificiall honestie, and so accidentall, and such, as I have said before, is not the true; but it is by taking away the lets and hindrances, to stirre up and enlighten this light almost extinct and languishing, to revive those seeds almost choaked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particluar person ; as, by taking away the moat from the eye, the light is recovered; and the dust from off the glasse, a man seeth the clearer.

14.
Three de-
grees of per-
fection.

By all this that hath been said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honestie ; the one naturall, sweet, easie, just, called goodnessse ; the other acquirid, difficult, painfull, and laborious, called virtue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is, as it were, composed of the two, and to there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facil and debonair nature, distasted by it self, by reason of vice ; we have named it goodnessse, innocencie. The second more high, which we have named virtue, is with a lively force to hinder the progresse of vice , and having suffered himself to be surpried, with the first motions of the passions, to arm and bind himself to stay their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiftest is out of an high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well named , that temptations cannot so much as grow in him , and the seeds of vice are wholly rooted out, in so much that his virtue is refined into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called, perfection. That and the first, which is called goodnessse , do resemble one another, and differ from the second, in that they are without stir, pain, or endeavour. This is the true tincture of the soul, her naturall and ordinary course , which costeth nothing. The second, is awyayes in care and aw. The last and perfect, is acquired by the long study and serious exercise of the rules of Philosophie, joyned to a beautifull and rich nature. For both are necessary, the naturall and the acquired. This is that, those two sects did so much study, the Stoicks, and much more the Epicure-

(which)

(which would have seemed strange, if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testify it, who are rather to be credited, then all the other more modern) who made a sport and play-game of shame, want, sickness, griefs, tortures, death : They did not onely contemn, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties; but they sought them, they took pleasure and delight in them ; and all to keep their virtue in breath, and in action, which made them not only firm, constant, grave, and severe, as *Cato* and the Stoicks; but cheerfull, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, foolhardy too.

By the comparison of these three together, it seemeth to some (who understand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call Virtue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeavours thereof, carrieth the honour; and that, as *Motellus* said, to do evil is an idle and a base thing; to do good where there is neither pain nor danger, is a common thing and too easie; but to do good where there is danger and pain, is the part of an honest man, and of virtue: it is the Motto of that divine Philosopher, *Xalena et nata*. But to speak in truth that which it is; besides, that difficulty (as elsewhere hath been said) is no true, nor just and lawful cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed; it is certain, that in the like thing the naturall is more worth then the acquired; that it is far more noble, more excellent, and divine to work by nature then by Art; easily, equally, uniformly, then painfully unequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first manner, that is, the natural and essential goodness; we dare not call him virtuous, nor the Angels and spirits fortunate; they are called good. But because virtue maketh a greater clamor and stir, and worketh with greater vehemency and goodness, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish Judges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extravagant productions, which seem to be all zeal and fire, are no part of the Play, and do not in any sort appertain to true honesty; they are rather maladies and furious entrances, far distant from that wisdome we here require, which is sweet, equal, and uniform.

Thus much be spoken in gross, of honesty; for the parts thereof, and the duties, shall be handled in the third book, especially in the virtue of Justice. I will here adde a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of detraction, and to stay the plaints of thole, that dislike, that I attribute so much to nature,

True and essential honesty, the first

(although it be God, as hath been said, and this book speaketh not but of the naturall and hu[m]an]e) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required. Wherefore besides all that hath been said, there remaineth yet one thing to make this work compleat and perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this honesty, goodnessse, virtue, hath life, is brought forth in his due time, and receiveth its last and perfect portraict, it is elevated, christened, crowned that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthy its due reward. Honestie is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and truly according to Art: the grace and spirit of God, is the last and wind which expresseth the touch, giveth life, and maketh the instrument to speak, and to make a pleasant melodie. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our own proper act and labour, it is a free gift from above, whereof it taketh the name, Grace: but we must desire it, ask, implore it, both humbly and ardently. O God, vouchsafe of thy infinite goodnessse to look upon me with the eye of thy clemencie, to accept and to like of my desire, mine essay, my little work, which comes originally from thee, by that obligation and instruction, which thou hast given me in the law of nature, which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may return unto thee, and that thou maist end that thou hast begun, that so thou maist be both my ~~end~~ and ~~end~~. Sprinkle me with thy grace, keep me, and account me thine, and so forth. The better to obtain it, that is to say, to inclin God unto us, is this honestie (as hath been said in the Preface, whither (that I may not iterate it) I resend the Reader) the matter being well prepared, is the fitter for the form; the grace, if too contrary, neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it relieveth and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it self whereunto as to its contrary, but put it on as a Crown. They are both of God, they must not therefore be confounde, every one hath his jurisdiction, his action a part: The Organist, and he that worketh at the bellows, are two, so are honestie and grace, the action good in it self naturally, morally, humerely, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those Philosophers and great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kind of morall virtue, and is likewise found in misbelievers or infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more then the covering, the Crown and perſon can be without the entire body. The player or Organist

against may in every point exercise his Art, without the bellows, blower; and so likewise honestie without grace. It is true that this cannot be but *as sonans*, and *cymbalum tintinnans*, but this requireth that, wherein I see many to mistake themselves very grossly, who never have any talle, or do ever conceive the image of true honestie, and continue puffed up with a perswasion of grace, which they think to practie, to attract, to attain by certain easie and idle meaus; after the manner of the Pharisees, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any further for the true honestie, *Promoti per saltum*, Masters vwithout apprenticeship, Doctors and Nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kind of people in the vworld, but very few such as *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Cato*, *Regulus*, *Socrates*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true and solid morall virtue, and Philosophicall probitie. That complaint and reproach so frequent of the soveraign Doctor of the truth, against hypocriticall Pharisees, vwill alwayes have place, for such people will never be wanting, no not amongst the Censors and reformers of the world. Now having spoken much of honestie, vve must likevise in a vword or tvvo touch the contrary thereunto.

Wickednesse is against nature, it is soule deformed and unprofitable, it offendeth every good judgement, it breedeth a hatred of it self being well knowvn; vwhereupon some have said, that it was bred and brought forth by idlenesse and ignorance. Again, vwicklungnesse engendreth offence and repentance in the soule, vwhich like an ulcer in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth up torments against it self : *Malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit : malum consilium consoloris pessimum : Malice it self suppeth up the greatest part of his own poison : Evil counsel is worst to him that giveth it*: like the wasp, vwhich vwith his sting offendeth another, but much more himself, for he leaveth behind him, and that for ever, both his sting and his strength : vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be received, nor find place in the world, *Nemo enim animi causa malus est : No man is wicked for his mind's sake*; bnt it doth vwithall ingender displeasure and offence, pain follovving sin saith *Plato*; yea it growveth vwith it, saith *Hesiodus*: vwhich is quite contrary to the will and to virtue, vwhich rejoyceth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment and satisfaction in vwell-doing; it is the true and essentiall reward of a good soule, which can never fail him, and wherewith he must content himself in this world.

17.
The descrip-
tion of wick-
ednesse,

18.
whether it be
never permit-
ted to sin.

Llib. 3. cap. 2.

19.
whether all sin-
ingender re-
pentance.
*The distinction
of vice or
wickedness.*

20.
*Their compa-
rison.*

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be avoided, and hated above all things; but it is a question whether there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carry with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sin. It seemeth to divers, that there may: Touching profit, if it be publick, there is no doubt, (but yet with limitation,) shall be said in the virtue of politick prudence: but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. A man might speak and judge hereof more certainly, if some certain fact or example were propounded. But to speak simply, we are firmly to hold the negative.

That sin cannot inwardly furnish us with such pleasure & content, as honesty doth, there is no doubt; but that it tormenteth (as hath been said) it is not universally and in all senses true: we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickedness and wicked people: some are incorporated into evil, by discourse and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their understanding it self approveth it and conenteith thereunto. This falleth out, when sin having met with a strong and rigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there formed, and as it were naturalized, and the soul infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others contrariwise do ill by impulsions, according as the violent wind of temptation troubleth, stirreth, and precipitateth the soul unto sin, and as they are surprised and carried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemn it, contrary to the first; and they are not carried by passion or temptation, as the second; but in cold blood, having well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certain price and measure they yield thereunto, and they think they have some excuse to do it. Of this sort of sins are usuries, obscenities or venereous pleasures, and other sins many times resumed, consulted, deliberated; as also the first of complexion.

Of these three, the first do never repent, without some extraordinary touch from heaven: for being settled and hardened in wickedness, they feel not the prick and sting thereof: for since the understanding approveth it, and the soul is wholly tainted therewith, the will hath no will to gainsay it. The third repent, or seem in a certain fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it self; but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all: and to say the truth, And to speak properly, they do.

do not repent, since both their reason and conscience willeth and consenteth to the fault. The second, are they that repent and advise themselves, and of whom properly it is called repentance: whereof I will here take occasion to speak a word or two.

Repentance is a disavowing or deniall, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or griefe ingendred in us by reason, which driveth away all other sorrows and griefs, which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong then any other, as the heat and cold of a seaver, is more violent then that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soul, the death of sinne, the cure of our wills and consciences: but it is necessary, that we well know it. First, it is not of every sin, as hath been said; not of that which is inveterate, habituated, authorized by the judgement it self; but of the accidentall, and that which happeneth either by surprise, or by force: nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are sorry we cannot repent: neither can it be in us, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and desaignments. If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, conceit and advice; for that he must not repent him of his counsell and advice, if he therein carrie himself as he ought; for a man cannot divine of events, and if a man did know them, yet hath he no place to consult of them; and we never are to judge of counsells by their issues; neither must it grow in him by age, impotencie, and distaste of things; this was to suffer his judgement to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, because we are changed, by age, sicknesse, or other accidents. The growing-wise, or amendment, which comes by anxietie, distast, or feeblenes, is not true and religious, but idle and languishing. The weakness of the body is no fit Post to carrie us to God, and to our duty, and repentence; but true repentance is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow in us not by the weakness of the body, but by the force of the soul, and of reason.

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and religious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the body we see two kinds of remedies; the one which healeth, taking away the cause the root of the maladie; the other which doth onely cover it, and bring it a sleep: and therefore the former is more forcible, and more wholesome. So likewise in the maladies of the soul, the true remedie which cleanseth and healeth, is a serious and modest confession of our faults; the other false, which doth onely disguise and cover.

To have a certain end and form of life.

cover, is excuse, a remedie invented by the authour of evill it self whereof the Proverb is, *That sin soweth it self a garment*, that is, Excuse, the garment made of figleaves by the first offenders, who covered themselves both with words and deeds, but it was a garment without warmth. We should therefore learn to accuse our selves, boldly to confess all our actions and thoughts : for besides that it were a fair and generous liberty, it were likewise a mean not to do or think any thing, which were not honest and fit to be published: for he that will be content to be bound to tell all, will be likewise content to bind himself to do nothing that a man is constrained to hide; but contrarily, every man is discreet and secret in confession, but not in actions. Boldnesse to sin, is in some sort bridled by boldnesse to confess. If it be undecent to do a thing, it is farre more undecent not to dare to avouch it. Many great and holy men, as St. Austin, Origen, Hippocrates, have published the errors of their opinions, and we should do the like of our manners. But going about to hide them, a man falleth many times into great evils, as he that solemnly denieth that he hath abused his bodie with another, by thinking to mend the matter, marres it, at leastwise multiplieth his sin. This is not to excuse vice, but to adde thereunto.

CHAP. IIII.

To have a certain end and form of life, the second foundation of wisdome.

After this first foundation of true and inward honestie, there cometh, as it were by way of preamble, a second foundation, necessary for the government of our life; which is, to prepare and frame our selves to a certain and assured course of life, to make choice of that calling which doth best besit us, and is proper unto us; that is to say, which our particular nature (following alwayes the universall, our great and generall mistress and governour;) doth willingly accommodate and apply it self unto. Wisdome is a sweet and regular conduct and carriage of our soul, guiding it with measure and proportion, and consisteth in an equalitie of life and manners.

2.
This choice, a
difficulte thing,
wherein a man
carrieth him-
self diversly.

This choice then is a matter of great difficulty, wherein a man carrieth himself very diversly, and wherein he findeth himself hindered by divers considerations, which draw him into divers parts; and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happy there-

therein, who by a great goodnessse and felicity of nature, have known both speedily and easily how to choose, and either by a certain good hap, without any great deliberation, are, as it were, wholly carried into that course of life, which doth best besit them ; in such sort that fortune hath been their chooser, and led them unto it, or by the friendly and provident hand of another, they have been guided and directed. Others contrarily are unhappy, who having failed even from the entrance, and wanting the spirit, or industry to know themselves, and in a good hour to be re-advised, how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in the midst of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconvenience and repentance.

¶ But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himself well, and presuming too much of himself whereby it falleth out that he must either shamefully desist from that which he hath undertaken, or endure much pain and torment in persisting therein. He must remember that to carry a burthen, it is necessary there be more strength then burthen ; otherwise, a man is constrained either to leave it, or to sink under it. A wise man doth never charge himself with more busyness, then he knoweth how to go through : or in not setteling himself in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they do that are never pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they have not ; every thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as busyness, to command as to obey. These kind of people live miserably, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet, they cease not to go and come to no purpose, they seem to do much and do nothing ; the actions of a wise man do alwaies tend to some certain end. *Magnam rem puta, unum, hominem agere ; prater sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus.* Think it a great matter for a man to do one thing : No man, but a wise man, doth one thing : for we are of many and divers fashions and shapes. But the most part do not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be lead like oxen, or carried according to the times, companie, occasion, and then know not how to give a reason, why they are rather of this calling then another, except it be because their father profest the same, or that they were unawares carried into it, and so have continued therein, in such sort, that as they did never well consider of their entrance, so they know

not which way to get out. *'Pauci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponant; ceteri, eorum more qui flumimib[us] innatant, non eunt sed feruntur.* Few dispose advisedly of themselves or their affaires: others do it in that manner as men swim: who go not, but are carried with the water and course of the stream;

3. Now, that a man may carry himself well herein, choole well, and well acquit himself, he must know two things, and two natures: his own, that is his complexion, his port and capacity, his temperature, in what a man excelleth, in what he is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is unfit: For to go against his own nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heavens, to leave the busyness undone because he cannot do it, *Nec quidquam sequi quod asegni nequeas, Attempt not any thing, that thou canst not attain to, and to expose himself to laughter and mockery.* Afterward he must know that which belongs to his affaires, that is to say, the state, profession, and kind of life that is proposed. There are some, wherein the affaires are great and weighty; others, where they are dangerous; others, where they are not so great, but are mingled and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other businesses: These charges do much afflict the spirit. Every profession requireth more specially one certain faculty of the soul, one the understanding, another the imagination, another the memory. Now, to know these two natures, his own, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath been said of the divers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will help much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well joyn and endure together; for it is necessary that they agree: if a man be to contest with his own nature, and to enforce it for the service and performance of a function and charge which he undertaketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and intensib[ly] it draw him, a man happen to fail or erre in his duty, what disorder is there? Where is equity? Where is decency? *Si quiquam decorum, nihil profecto magis quam aquabilitas vita universa, & singularium actionum; quam conservare non possis, si aliorum imiteris naturam, omittas tuam.* If any thing be comely, nothing is more comely then the equability of the whole life, and of every particular action; which thou canst not preserve, if thou wilt follow the nature of other men, and omit thine own. This is the account we must make when we think to do any thing

thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it self be wanting.

Tu nihil invita dicas faciesve Minerva.

If thy nature bend not to,

Never think to speak or do,

Id quemque decet quod est sumus maximè : sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam universam nil contendamus, è servatâ propriam se-quamur. That becomes every man best, that is his own : so ought we to carry our selves, as we contend not against universal nature, but, that being kept, follow our own. And if it fall out, that by mishap, imprudency, or otherwise, a man find himself engaged in a vocation and course of life painful and unprofitable, and that a man cannot flie back ; it is the part of wisdome, to resolve to bear it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it unto himself as much as he can, doing as in a game at hazzard, according to the counsel of Plato, wherein if the die or card fall not out to be good , a man taketh it patiently, and endeavoureth to mend his ill chance by his good play; and like Bees, who from Thyme, a sharp and dry herb, gather sweet honie, and as the Proverb is, make a virtue of necessity.

CHAP. V.

To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdome.

THe preparatives made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set down the rules of Wisdome, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the religion and worship of God. Piety holdeth the first place in the rank of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessary therefore to be advised, and to know how he that studieth wisdome should govern himself, which we purpose to do , having a little discoursed of the state and success of religions in the world , referring the rest unto that which I have said in my three Verities.

It is first a very fearfull thing, to consider the great diversity of ^{I.} *Diversity of* religions which have been and are in the world , and much more of *religions.* the strangenesse of some of them, so fantastical and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the understanding of man should be so much besotted and made drunken with impostures ; for it seemeth , that there is nothing in the world, high or low, which hath not been deified in some place or other, and that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped, They

To studie true Pietie, the first office of Wisdome.

2.
That all agree in many principles.

They all agree in many things, and have likewise taken their beginning in the same climate. *Palestina* and *Arabia* which joyn together (I mean the more renowned and famous Mistresse of the rest) have their principles and foundations almost alike : The belief of one God the author of all things, of his providence and love towards mankind, the immortality of the soul, reward for the good, chasiment for the wicked after this life, a certain outward profession of praying, invocating, honouring and serving God. To winne them credit, and that they may be receiv'd, they alledge and furnish themselves ; whether indeed and in verity, as the true, or by imposture and faire semblance, with revelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodiges, holy mysteries, Saints. All have their fountain and beginning small, feeble, humble; but by little and little, by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictions as forerunners, they have taken footing, and been authorised ; insomuch that they all are held with affirmation and devotion, yea, the absurdest among them. All hold and teach, that God is appeased and won by prayers, presents, vows, and promises, and the like : All believe that the principall and most pleasant service of God, and the powerfuller means to appease him, and to obtain his grace, is to punish, to cut themselves, to impose upon themselves some painful and difficult labour: witness throughout the world, and almoft in all religions, and rather in the false then in the true; in Mahumetisme, then Christianitie, so many orders, companies, hermitages, and Friaries, destinated to certain and divers exercices, very painfull, and of a strict profession, even to the lancing and cutting of their bodies, thinking thereby to merit much more then the common sort, who purifie not themselves with afflictions and torments as they do, and every day they provide new : and the nature of man doth never cease to invent means of pain and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion, that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures, which opinion is founded upon the sacrifices, which were universall throughout the world, before the birth of Christianity, and exercised not onely upon innocent beasts, which were massacred with the effusion of their blood, for a precious present unto God; but (a strange thing that man should be so sottish) upon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest, as offenders, a custome practised with great religion almost in all nations : As the *Grecs*, a people of *Scythia*; who among other ceremonies and sacrifices dis-

patched

patched unto their god *Zamolxis*, from five years to five, a man amongt them to demand things necessary for them. And because it was thought necessary that one should die sudden'y, at an instant, and that they did expose themselves unto death after a doubtfull manner, by running themselves upon the points of three javelins, whereby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order until there came one that lighted upon a mortall wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest favour with their god, and not the rest: As the *Persians*, witnesseth the fact of *Amenesris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at an instant buried alive fourteen young men of the best houses, according to the religion of the countrey: As the ancient *Gauls*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturn* their children, their fathers & mothers being present: the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddess *Diana*, by whipping their youths in favour of her, many times even to death: the *Greeks*, witnesseth the sacrifice of *Iphigenia*: the *Romanes*, witnesseth the two *Daci*: *Quae fuit tanta iniquitas deorum ut placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent?* Was the offence of the gods so great & so unjust, as it could not be appeased, but by the death of such men as these? *Turkes*, who so massacre their viilage, their breasts, their members, to gratifie their prophet: the new *East* and *West Indies*; and in *The-messian*, where they cement their idols with the blood of children. What madnes was this, to think to flatter the Divinity with inhumanities: to content the Divine goodness with our affliction, and to satisfie the justice of God with cruelty! Justice then thirsting after humane blood, innocent blood, drawn and shed with so much pain and torment: *Ut sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem saviant:* As if the divinity shoud be satisfied by our inhumanity. From whence can this opinion and belief spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath been abolished throughout Christendom, as before hath been laid.

They have also their differences, their particular articles, whereby they are distinguished among themselves, and every one prefers it *They differ.*
self above the rest, assuring himself it is the better, and more true than the rest, reproaching the one the other with some things, and so condemn and reject one another.

But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labor to know who
is the truest; the Christian religion having so many advantages and
priviledges, so high and so authenticall above others, and especially
Christian religi-
on above all.

To study true Piety, the first office of wisdom.

ly these. It is the subiect of my second veritie, where is shewed how far all others are inferiour unto it.

5.
The latter are built upon the former.

Now as they spring up one after another, the yonger doth alwayes build upon the more ancient, and next precedent, which from the top to the bottom it doth not wholly disprove and condemn; for then it could not be heard or take footing; but it onely accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, and that therefore it cometh to succeed it, and to perfect it, and so by little and little overthroweth it, and enricheth it self with the spoils thereof: as the Judaicall, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Egyptian Religion the elder, the Hebrews not being easily purified of their customes: the Christian built upon the verities and promises of the Judaicall: the Turkish upon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Jesus, except the first and principal, which is his Divinity: so that if a man will leap from Judaism to Mahumetism, he must passe by Christianity: and such there have been among the Mahumerists as have exposed themselves to torments, to maintain the truth of Christian religion, as a Christian would do to maintain the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient do wholly condemn the younger, and hold them for capitall enemies.

6.
All are strange to nature.

All Religions have this in them, that they are strange and horrible to the common sense: for they propose and are built and composed of part, whereof some seem to the judgement of man base, unworthy, and unbefiting, wherewith the spirit of man, somewhat strong and vigorous, jesteth and sporteth it self; others too high, bright, wonderfull, and mysticall, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things; it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no marvell, if it be hardly persuaded at the first onset, to receive all religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, and therefore must be drawn therento by some occasions: for if it be strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *Predicamus Iesum crucifixum, Judas scandalum, gentibus stultitiam: We preach Jesus crucified, a scandal to the Jews, to the people folly.* Whereof it comes to passe, that there are so many misbelievers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their own judgements, thinking to examine and judge of the affairs of religion, according to their

own capacity, and to handle it with their own proper and naturall instrument. We must be simple, obedient, and debonair, if we will be fit to receive religion, to believe and live under the law, by reverence and obedience to subject our judgment, and to suffer our selves to be led and conducted by publick authority; *Captivantes in celatum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected, and had in admiration as it ought; now it is necessary that be received and sworn to, as well authentically and reverently, as difficultly; If it were such as were whollie pleasing to the palate and nature of man without strangenesse, it would be thought more easilly, yet less reverently received.

Now the religions and beliefs being such as hath been said, strange unto the common sense, very far exceeding all the reach and understanding of man, they must not, nor cannot be gotten nor settled in us, by natural and humane means, (for then among so many great minds as there have been rare and excellent, some had attained thereto) but it must needs be, that they be given us by extraordinary and heavenlie revelation, gotten and received by divine inspiration, and as sent from heaven. In this manner likewise all do affirm, that they hold their religion and believe it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

7.
Why they are
not to be got-
ten by humane
means.

But to say the truth, and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing they are, whatsoever some say, held by humane hands and means, which is true in every respect, in false religions, being working but prayers, and humane or diabolical inventions: The true, as they have another jurisdiction, so are they both received and held by another hand; nevertheless we must distinguish. As touching the receiving of them, the first and general publication and installation of them hath been, *Domino co-operante, sermonē confirmante, sequen-
tibus signis; God working, his word confirming, and signes following,* divine and wonderfull: the particular is done by humane hands and means; the nation, countrey, place, gives the religion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place, and among those persons where he is born, and where he liveth: He is circumcised, baptised, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man; for religion is not of our choice or election, but man without his knowledg is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is born in Judaisme or Christianity: and if he had been both elsewhere among the Gentiles,

8.
And yet they
are gotten by
humane means.

tiles, or Mahumetans, he had been likewise a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the observation, the true and good professors thereof, besides the outward profession, which is common to all, yea to misbelievers, they attribute to the gift of God, the testimony of the Holy Ghost within : but this is a thing not common nor ordinary, what fair colour soever they give it, witness the lives and manners of men, so ill agreeing with their belief, who, for humane occasions, and tho're very light, go against the tenour of their religion. If they were held and planted with a divine hand, nothing in the world could shake us ; such a tie would not be so easily broken. If it had any touch or ray of divinity, it would appear in all, it would produce wonderful effects that could not be hid, as Truth it self hath said ; *If you have but as much faith as a mustard-seed, you should remove mountains.* But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the persuasion of the immortality of the soul, and a future reward so glorious and blessed, or so inglorious, and accursed, and the life that a man leadeth ? The only apprehension of those things that a man hath he doth firmly believe, will take his senses from him : The only apprehension and fear to die by justice, and in publick place, or by some other shameful and dishonourable action, hath made many to lose their sensess, and cast them into strange trances : and what is that in respect of the worth of that which religion teacheth us is to come ? But it is possible in truth to believe, to hope for this immortality so happy, and yet to fear death a necessary passage thereunto, to fear and apprehend that infernal punishment, as we do. These are things as incompatible as fire and water. They say they believe it, they make themselves believe they believe it, and they will make others believe it too ; but it is nothing, neither do they know what it is to believe. For a belief, I mean such as the Scripture calleth historiall, is diabolical, dead, informed, unprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt then good. Such believers (faith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impostors, and another faith, that they are in one respect, the most fierce in glorious, in another the most loose, dissolute, and villainous in the world ; more then men in the articles of their belief, and worse then swine in their lives. Doubtless if we hold our selves unto divine grace as we should, as we believe a hit place then far above,

that shineth in them, at the least, they should be put in the same rank or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that do not fear less to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, than against his father, his master, his friend, his equals. All this hurterth not the dignity, purity, and heighth of Christianity, no more then the dunghill infecteth the beams of the Sun, which shines upon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contra.* But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Ve* against thole false hypocrites, whom Verity it self so much condemneth, as they belch out of their own mouthes against themselves.

Mat. 2. 3.

The better to know true piety, it is necessary first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfeit, to the end, we way not equivocate as the most part of the world doth. There is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater pains to resemble true piety and religion; and yet that is more contrary and enemy thereto then superstition: like the Woolf, which doth not a little resemble the dog, but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrary: and the flatterer who counterfeiteith a zealous friend and is nothing les: or like false coin, which maketh a more glittering shew then the true; *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa: The people is subject to superstition, contrary to true religion.* It is likewise envious & jealous, like an amorous adulteress, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, and care of the husband, then the true and lawfull wife, whom she endeavoureth to make odious unto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loveth and honoureth God, settleth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberal, free, and generous soul: Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wild, and injureth God himself, teaching to fear with horror and astonishment, to hide himself, and to fly from him, if it were possible; it is a weak, poor, and base malady of the soul; *Supersticio error insanus, amandos timeret, quos colit violat: morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest.* Varro ait *Deum à religioso vereri. à supersticio timeri:* Superstition is a frantic error, it feareth friends; corrupteth those that love it: It is the disease of a weak mind, which being infected with superstition, can never be at rest. Vagio saith, religious men fear God for love, the superstitious for punishment. Let us speak of them both apart.

*A distinction
betwixt the
true and false
religion.*

Tacit.

August.

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to live in peace. He apprehendeth God as one anxious, spightful; hardly contented,

ID.

*Superstition
described.*

tented, easily moved, wistons after the humane fashions; which he provereth is all after one fashion. Having he he never doth wend undone, by the omission done; he doubteth who to flatter him, to the end tuneth him with prayers miracles, easily believeth others, and interpreteth presly sent and done by God faith with all the care that misitumor, nimis'culius too much fear, too much hon himself, vilely, basely, and mechanically, then a man rally all superstition, and we make not that accoun and compel him into order we put upon him our hunc.

11.
It is natural.

Now this vice and malice all a kind of inclination thety of man, who never kne himself upon his feet: for superstition and vanity, qvine things. We are like couzened with the coyning he converseth more by reh his honest spouse who hot natural shamefathness: an then true religion.

12.
Popular.Plutarch in
Sertorio.

It is likewise vulgar, if and ignorance or mis-kno therefore it is most commafick, and such as have been brief, it is in barbarou tionebarbari: Barbarou this then it is said, and no affirmeth, that the weaknes and idleness of men hath brought in

the first office of wisdom.

Faculty appealed, examining our acti-
of a severe Judge, that watcheth our
by his manner of serving him, which
embelth for fear, he is never secure, fear-
tough, and that he hath left something
of all is worth nothing that he hath
God be well content, and laboureth
may appease and win him: he impor-
s, offerings: he saineth to himself
receiveth such as are counterfeited by
hings though purely natural, as ex-
and runneth after whatsoever a man
be; *Duo superstitionis propria, ni-*
two things are proper to superstition,
What is all this but by punishing
worthily to deal with God, and more
uld do with a man of honour? Gener-
in religion, proceeded from this, that
God that we should, we revoke him,
we judge of him according to our selves,
ars. O what blasphemy is this!

is almost natural unto us, and we have
unto. Plutarch deploreth the infirmi-
eth how to keep a measure, or to settle
leaneth and degenerateth either into
to a contempt and carelessness of di-
an ill advised husband, besotted and
subtilties of a light woman, with whom
in her artificial flatteries, then with
breth and serveth him with a simple and
even so, superstition pleasereth us more

roceedeth from a weakness of the soul,
edg of God, and that very grosse, and
y found in children, women, old men,
taunted with some violent accident. To
natures; *Inclinant naturam ad supersti-*
tiones incline soonest to superstition. Of
of true religion, that it is true that Plato
in

in religion, and made it prevail, whereby children, women, and old men, should be most capable of religion, more scrupulous, and devout : this were to wrong true religion, to give it so poor and frail a foundation.

Besides their seeds of natural inclination and superstition, there are many that shake hands with it, and favour it greatly for the great gain and profit they receive by it. Great men likewise and mighty, though they know what it is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a very fit instrument to lead a people withal, and therefore they do not only enflame and nourish that which is already grafted in nature, but when need requires, they forge and invent new, as *Scipio, Sertorius, Sylla*, and others : *Qui faciunt animos humiles formidine Divum, Depressisque premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficacem regit, quam superstitione.* Which makes their minds humble for offending the gods, and lowly prostrate themselves to the ground. Nothing more forcibly carrieth a multitude than superstition.

Now quitting your selves of this base and foul superstition, (which I would have him to abhor whom I desire to instruct unto wise-
dome) let us learn to guide our selves to true religion and piety, whereof I will give some grounds and pourtrays, as lesser lights thereunto. But before we enter thereinto, let me here say in general, and by way of preface, that of so many divers religions, and manners of serving God, which are or may be in the world, They seem to be the most noble, and to have greatest appearance of truth, which without great external and corporal service, draw the soul into it self, and raise it by pure contemplation, to admire and adore the greatness and infinite majesty of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his service; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodness, perfection, and infiniteness, wholly incomprehensible and not to be known, as the *Pythagorians*, and most famous Philosophers do teach. This is to approach unto the religion of the Angels, and to put in practise that word of the Son of God, To adore in spirit and truth ; for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another extremity, who will have a visib'e Deity, capable by the senses. Which base and gross error hath mocked almost all the world, even *Israell* in the desart, in framing to themselves a molten Calf. And of these they that have chosen the Sun for their god,

<sup>Nourish dand
maintained by
humane rea-
son. Curius,</sup>

13.

An entrance to
the discourse of
true religion.

To studie true piety, the first office of Wisedome.

seem to have more reason than the rest, because of the greatnesse, beauty, and resplendent and unknown virtue thereof, even such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reverence of it self. The eye seeth nothing that is like unto it, or that approacheth neer unto it in the whole universe, it is one Sun, and without companion. Christianity, as in the middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, serving God with spirit and body, and accomodating it self to great and little, whereby it is better established, and more dureable. But even in that too, as there is a diversity, and degrees of souls, of sufficiency, and capacity of divine grace; so is there a difference in the manner of serving of God: the more high and perfect, incline more to the first manner, more spiritual and contemplative, and lesse external; the lesse and imperfect, *Quasi sub pede iugogo, As it were under a Tutor,* remain in the other, and do participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

15.
*Divers de-
scriptions of
Religion.*

Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selves; (for it is a relative action between both) the office thereof is to extol God to the uttermost of our power, and to beat down man as low as may be, as it he were utterly lost; and afterwards to furnish himself with means to rise again, to make him feel his misery and his nothing, to the end he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16.

The office of religion is to joyn us to the Author and principall cause of all our good, to re-unite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his root, wherein so long as he continueth firm and settled, he preserveth himself in his own perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly fainteth and languisheth.

17.

The end and effect of religion is faithfully to yield all the honour and glory unto God and all the benefit unto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essential and inward good, is due unto poor, wretched, and in all points miserable man: The glory, which is an outward ornament, is due unto God alone, who is the perfection and suenesse of all good, whereunto nothing can be added: *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus: Glory be to God on high, and peace with men upon earth.*

18.

*An instrucion
to Piety.*
1. To know
God.

Thus much being first known, our instruction to piety is first to learn to know God: for from the knowldg of things proceedeth that honour we do unto them. First then we must believe that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodness, wisdom, and

and that by it he governeth it ; that his providence watcheth over all things , yea the least that are ; that whatsoever he sendeth us , is for our good , and that whatsoever is evil proceedeth from our selves . If we account those fortunes evil that he sendeth us , we blaspheme his holy name , because naturally we honour those that do us good , and hate those that hurt us . We must then resolve to obey him , and to take all in good part which cometh from his hand , to commit and submit our selves unto him .

19.

2. To honour him .

Secondly , we must honour him : and the most excellent and devoutest way to do it , is first , to mount up our spirits from all carnal , earthly , and corruptible imagination ; and by the chaltest , highest , and holiest conceits , exercise our selves in the contemplation of the Divinity ; and , after that we have adorned it with all the most magnifical and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine , that we acknowledg that we have presented nothing unto it worthy it self : but that the fault is in our weakness and Imbecillity , which can conceive nothing more high . God is the last endeavour and highest pitch of our imagination , every man amplifying the Idea , according to his own capacity : and to speak better , God is infinitely above all our last and highest endeavours and imaginations of perfection .

20.

3. To serve him in spirit .

Again , we must serve him with our heart and spirit , it is the service answerable to his nature : *Dens spiritus est : si Dens est animus , sit tibi pura mente colendus : God is a Spirit ; if God be a Spirit , worship him in purity of spirit .* It is that which he requireth , that which pleaseth him : *Pater tales querit adoratores : The Father desireth such worshippers .* The most acceptable sacrifice unto his Majesty , is a pure , free , and humble heart : *Sacrificium Deo spiritus purus : A pure heart is a sacrifice unto God .* An innocent soul , an innocent life : *Optimus animus , pulcherrimus Dei cultus : religiosissimus cultus imitari : unicrus Dei cultus , non esse malum : A pure mind is the best service of God , the most religious worshipping of God is to follow him ; the only honouring of God is not to be evil .* A wise man is the true sacrifice of the great God , his spirit is his temple , his soul is his image , his affections are his offerings , his greatest and most solemn sacrifice is to imitate him , to serve and implore him : for it is the part of those that are great , to give ; of those that are poor , to ask : *Beatus dare quam accipere : It is better to give than to take .*

Sence .
Lectan .
Mere .
Trism .

Nevertheless , we are not to contemn and disdain the outward and publick service , which must be as an assistant to the other , by *with our observing bodies .*

21.

To studie true Praise, the first office of wisdome.

obseruing the ceremonies, ordinances, and customes, with moderation, without vanitie, without ambition, or hypocrisie, without avarice, and alwayes with this thought, That God will be served in spirit : and that that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selves, then for God, for humane kinny, and edification, then for divine verticie : *Quae potius ad mortales quam ad rem pertinent; Which rather belong to manners and custome, then to the thing it self.*

22.

5. To pray unto
him.

Our vows and prayer unto God should be all subject unto his will ; we should neither desire nor ask any thing, but as he hath ordained, having alwayes to our bridle, *Fiat voluntas tua.* To ask any thing against his providence, is to corrupt the Judge and Governour of the world; to think to flatter him, and to win him by presents and promises, is to wrong him. God doth not desire our goods; neither (to say the truth) have we any : all is his. *Nos accipiam de domo tua vitulos.* &c. *meum est enim orbis terra,* & plentitudo ejus : *I will not take the calves from thy house,* &c. for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein. But his will is, that we onely make our selves fit to receive from him, never exspecting that we should give unto him, but ask and receive : for it is his office to give, as being great, and it belongs to man as being poor and needy, to beg and to receive : to prescribe unto him that which we want, and we will, is to expose ourselves to the inconveniences of Midas; but that is alwayes best, which pleasest him best. To be brief, we must think, speak, and deal with God ; as if all the world did behold us ; we must live and converse with the world, as if God saw us.

23.

Well to use his
name.

It is not with respect to honour the name of God as we ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him over: we must speak of God and his works soberly, but yet seriously, with shamefalsness, fear, and reverence, and never presume to judge of him.

24.

The conclusion

And thus much Summarily of piety, which should be in high esteem; contemplating alwayes God, with a free, chearsfull, and filiall soul ; not wild, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the belief as observation, it is necessary that we tie our selves to the Christian, as to the True, more rich, high and honourable to God, commocious and comfortable to man, as we have shewed in our second verity; and therein remaining, we must

must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selves to that which the Catholick Church in all times hath univerſally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our ſelves with novelties, or ſelected and particular opinions, for the reaſons ſet down in my third Veritię, and eſpecially in the firſt and laſt Chapters, which may ſuffice unto him, that cannot, or will not read the whole book,

Let me onely give this one advice, neceſſary for him that intendeth to be wiſe, and that is, not to ſeparate piety from true honeſty, whereof we have ſpoken before, and ſo content himſelf with one of them; much leſſe to conſound and mingle them together. 25.
An aduifement
to joyn pietie
and probicie
together.

There are two things very diſferent, and which haue diuers jurisdictions; piety and probicie, religion and honeſty, devotion and conſcience: I will that both of them be joyned in him whom I here instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confuſed. Behold here two rocks whereof we muſt take heed, and few there be that know them, to ſeparate them, and to reſt contented with the one, to conſound and mingle them, in ſuch ſort, that the one be the jurisdiction of the other.

The firſt that ſeparate them, and that haue but one of them, are of two ſorts; for ſome do wholly give themſelves to the worship and ſervice of God, taking no care at all of true virtue and honeſty, whereof they haue no taste; a vice noted as natural to the Jewes especially, (a race above all other ſuperfluous, and for that caue odious to all) and muſch diſplayed by their Prophets, and afterwards by the *Meffiaſ*, who reproached them, that of their Temple they had made a den of thieves, a cloak and excufe for many wickedneſſes, which they perceiued not; ſo were they beſotted with this outward devotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themſelves discharged of all duty; yea, they were made more hardie to do any wickedneſſeſ. Many are touched with this ſeminine and popular ſpirit, wholly attentive to thoſe ſmall exerciſes of outward devotion; whereby they are made never the better, from whence came the Proverb, *An angel in the Churche, a devil in the houſe*: they lend the ſhew and outward part unto God, like the Phariſies; they are ſepulchres, white walls: *Populus hic labitur me honoraſ, cor eorum longe à me*: *This people honour me with their lips, but their heart is far from me*: yea, they make pietie a cover for impieſty, they make it (as they ſay) an occupation or a merchandife, and alledge their offices of devotion, to extenuate and recompence their ſonne and iniquitie. Others quite contrary make no account but of virtue

To study true Piety, the first office of wisdom.

27.
A comparison.
virtue and honestie, little caring for any thing that belongs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common among our Atheists, These are two vicious extremities; but which is the more or the less extreme, or which of the two is the more worthy, Religion or Honestie, it is not my purpose to determine; I will only say, (to compare them in three points) that the first is far more easie, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is far more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew, of spirits valiant and generous.

28.
*Against those
that confound
piety and pro-
bitie.*
I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They pervert all order, and trouble all, confounding honestie, religion, the grace of God, (as hath been said before) whereby it comes to passe, that they have neither true honestie, nor true religion, nor consequently the grace of God, as they think: a people onely content with themselves, and ready to censure and condemn others; *Qui infiduli in se, & aspernanti alios: Who trust in themselves, and contemn others.* They think that religion is a generality of all good, and of all virtue; that all virtues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other virtue, nor honestie, but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrary; for religion, which is the latter, is a speciaill and particular virtue, distinguished from all other virtues, which may be without them, and without probity, as hath been said of the Pharisees, religious and wicked: and they without religion, as in many Philosophers good and virtuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all divinitie teacheth, a morall humane virtue, appertaining to justice, one of the four cardinall virtues, which teacheth us in general to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him, reserving to every one his place. Now God being above all, the universal author and master, we must give unto him all sovereign honour, service, obedience, and this subalterne Religion, and the *Hypothesis of Justice*, which is the generall Thesis, more ancient and naturall. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex audiū*; *Quomodo credent sine predicante? by hearing, how can they believe, without preaching?*) ingendreth honestie, which we have shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into us, from our first beginning. This is an inverted order, These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hell so that if

*T hom. p. 2.2.
q. 81.*

if they did not fear God, or fear to be damned (for that is often their language) . they would make a goodly piece of work. O miserable honestie ! What thanks deservest thou , for what thou doest ? O cowardly and idle innocency ; que nisi metu non places : which pleaseth nos without fear ! Thou keepest thy self from wickednes , because thou darest not be wicked , and thou fearest to be beaten , and even therein art thou wicked. Oderunt peccare mali formidine pana : The wicked forbear to offend , for fear of punishment. Now I will that thou dare , but yet that thou wilt not , though thou be never cbidden : I will that thou be an honest man , nor because thou would'nt go to Paradise ; but because nature , reason , God willeth it ; because the Law , and the gnerall policie of the world , whereof thou art a part , requireth it ; so as thou canst not consent to be any other , except thou go against thy self , thy essence , thy end . Doubtlesse such honestie occasioned by the spirit of religion , besides that it is not true and essentiall , but accidentall ; it is likewise very dangerous , producing many times very base and scandalous effects (as experiance in all times hath taught us) under the fair and glorious pretext of pietie . What execrable wickednesse hath the zeal of Religion brought forth ? Is there any other subject or occasion , that hath yielded the like ? It belongeth to so great and noble a subject , to work great and wonderfull effects .

Tantum rell gio potuit suadere malorum ,

Que peperit sape scelerosa atque impia facta :

So ill is good abus'd , and so accurst ,

As the corruption of the best is worst :

For the unjustest warre we undertake ,

Inconsciente religion's brought to stake ,

So Luther , Hungarie was cause to loose ,

So Christ himself became a block to Jews .

Not to long him , yea to look upon him with a wicked eye , as a man should look upon a monster , that believeth nor as he believeth . To think to be polluted by speaking , or converising with him , is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kind of people . He that is an honest man by scruple , and a religious bridle , take heed of him , and account of him as he is . And he that hath religion without honesty , I will not say , he is more wicked , but farre more dangerous then he that hath neither the one nor the other : Omnis qui interficiet vos , peribit se obsequium praestare Deo : Who so killeth you , thinks he doth an acceptable service unto God ; nor because religion teach-

To govern his desires and pleasures.

teacheth or any way favoureth wickednesse, as some very foolishly, and maliciously from this place do obje^t; for, the most absurd and falset religion that is, doth it not; but the reason is, that having no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honestie, but by imitation, and for the service of religion, and thinking, that to be an honest man is no other thing, then to be carefull to advance religion, they believe all things whatsoever, be it treason, treacherie, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onely lawfull and sufferable, being coloured with zeal and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea, worthy canonization, if it serve for the progresse and advancement of religion, and the overthrow of their adversaries. The Jews were wicked and cruell to their parents, unjust towards their neighbours, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gave unto the Temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and rejecting the whole world by saying, *Corban*.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wise man, a true honestie, and a true pietie, joyned and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall ask it of him. *Denuo datur spiritum bonum omnibus peccatis enim. God giveth a good spirit to all that ask it of him:* as hath been said in the Preface, article the 14.

CHAP. VI.

To govern his desires and pleasures.

IT is a principall duty of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures; for who so to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wise man, that I hold this opinion to be not onely fantasticall, but vicious and unnaturall. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and wholly condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learn how to govern them.

It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seem to be men of understanding, and professors of singular sanctitie, generally to contemn and tread under foot all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the body, retiring the spirit unto it self, not having any commerce with the body, but elevating it self to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensibly, neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kind of people that ordinary phrase of passing

I.
The first part.

*An opinion of
the contempt
of the world.*

passing the time, doth very well agree : for it seemeth to them, that well to use and employ this life, is, silently to passe it over, and as it were to escape it, and rob themselves of it, as if it were a miserable, burthensome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide thorow the world, as that not onely recreation and pastimes are suspected, yea odious unto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but unwillingly ; and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection: and, to be brief, their life is offensive unto them, and death a solace, pleasing themselves with that saying, which may be as well ill taken and under-flood, as well, *Vitam habere in patientia, mortem in desiderio : Not impatient of life, but rather to desire death.*

But the iniquity of this opinion may many wayes be shewed. First, there is nothing so fair and lawfull, as well and duly to play *Rejected.* the man, well to know how to lead this life. It is a divine knowledge and very difficult, for a man to know how he should lawfully enjoy his own essence, lead his life according to the common and naturall model, to his proper conditions, nor seeking those that are strange ; for all those extravagances, all those artificiall and studied endeavours, those wandring waies from the naturall and common, proceed from folly and passion : these are maladies, without which whilst these men would live, not by playing the men, but the divines, they play the fools ; they would transform themselves into Angels, and they turn themselves into beasts : *aut Deus, aut bestia; homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto : Either a God or a beast; I am a man, and I account my self no other then humane.* Man is a body & a soul, and it is not wel done to dismember this building, to divide and separate this brotherly and naturall conjunction; but contrariwise, we should renue it by mutuall offices, the spirit must awaken & revive the heavy body, the body must stay the lightness of the spirit, which many times proves but a trouble-feast ; the spirit must assist and favour the body, as the husband the wife, and not reject it, nor hate it. It must not refuse to participate the naturall pleasures thereof, which are just, and such as befit that marriage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wife, a true moderation. A man must studie, know, and mediate on this life, to the end he may return condign thanks unto him who hath lent it. There is nothing which God hath made for us in this present life unworthy our care, and we are accountable for them, even to the

very

To govern his desires and pleasures.

verie hairs of our head ; for it is no strivous warrant or commissi-
on, for a man to direct himself and his life according to his natural
condition, but God hath given it him seriously and expressly.

3.
Lib. 3. cap. 38. But what great folly is there, and more against nature, then to
account our actions vicious, because they are natural; unworthy,
because they are necessary? Now this necessitie and pleasure is an
excellent mariage, made by God himself. Nature willeth very
wisely, that those actions which it hath enjoyned us for our necessitie
be also delightful, inciting us therunto not onely by reason,
but also by appetite ; and these rules these kind of men go about to
break. It is an equal fault and injustice, to loath and condemn all
pleasures, and to abuse them, by loving them overmuch ; we must
neither run to them, nor flee from them, but receive them, and use
them discreetly and moderately, as shall presently be laid in the rule.
Temperance, which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well
the insensibility and privation of all pleasure, *suprem naturae*, which
is the failing extremity, as intemperancie, *Libidinem*, which is the
exceeding extremite. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, fa-*
ciles edisse munditiias & sibi alloreum appetere : delicatas recuperare, lux-
uria est ; usitatas & non magnis parabiles fugere, dementia est : It is
against nature to enforce our selves to hate & contemn neat and neces-
sary things, and to desire filthiness and deformity : It is wantonness to
desire delicate things ; and mere madness to avoid those that are common
and needfull.

4.
He that desirereth to discard his soul, let him boldly do it if he can,
when his body is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the
end he may disburthen himself of that contagion : but he cannot do
it ; as likewise he ought not to do it : for to speak according to
right and reason, it shold never abandon the body ; it is apishness
to do it, it shold behd pleasure and sorrow with a like settled
countenance ; in the one live severely, in the other cheerfully :
but in all cases it shold assit the bodie, to maintain it always
in order.

5.
To contemn the world, is a brave proposition, and many delight,
nay glory to speake, to discourse thereof, but I cannot perceive that
they well understand it, much lesse that they practise it : what is it to
contemn the world? What is this world? Is it the heaven, the earth,
and in a word, the creatures that are therein? No, I think not so :
What then? Is it the use, the profit, the service, and commodity
that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against
the

the author that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to condemn them? If (in the end) thou wilt say, that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, follie, excesse, and wickednesse that is in the world; I may answer, that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so; but against the world, and the policie thereof; they are thine own addicions, not naturall, but artificiall. To preserve thy self from them, as widdome and the rule following teacheth, is not to condemn the world, which remaineth wholly entire without it; but it is well to use the world, well to govern thy self in the world, and as Divinity teacheth, to make use and benefit of the world, and not to enjoy it, *ut, non frui.* Now these kind of people think to practise the contempt of the world, by certain outward particular manners and rasshions, separated by the common course of the world; but this is but mockery. There is nothing in the world so exquisite, the world laugheth not, and is not so wanton within it self, as without; in tho'e places where men make profession of flying it, and tramping it under foot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who have so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in form, at the least in matter, which serveth them for no other to use, then to puff them up, to make them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrary to their institution; *Va nobis qui circumis mare & aridam, ut facias unum profelyum, & cum factus fuerit, facias filium Gehenna:* Wo be to you that compass sea and land to make one of your profession; and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it self, which is the school of true and holy Philosophy. It is then a phantasticall and unnaturall opinion, generally to reject and condemn all desires and pleasures, God is the creatour and authour of pleasure; *Plantavit Dominus Paradisum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiſo voluptatis, protulit omnem lignum pulchrum, suave, delectabile:* God planted the Paradise of pleasure, wherein he placed man, which brought forth all kind of beautifull, sweet, and delectable trees, as shall be said. But we must first learn how to carry our selves therein.

6.

This instruction may be reduced to four points (which if these ^{The second} mortified men, and great contemners of the world did know how part of the rule to put in practice, they would work wonders) to know little, natu^{in our pleasures} rally, moderately, and by a short relation to himself. These four go ^{and desires,} almost

To desire little.

almost alwayes together, and make an entire, and perfect rule, and he that will, may gather and comprehend all these four in this world, Naturally; for nature is the fundamentall & sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter, more clear and easie, we will distinguish these four points. The first point of this rule, is to desire little: A short good, but an assured means to brave fortune, taking from it all accidents, and all power over us to hinder the happie content of our life: and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he have nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end: *Nihil interest an habere, an non concupisces*: It is all one whether thou hast it, or no, if thou desirest it not: and therefore it was well said, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and enricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poor in desires, is rich in contentment, *Summa opes, inopia cupiditatum*: The want of desires, is great riches. To be brief, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like unto God, and those that are already blessed, who are happy and blessed, not because they have and possesse all, but because they desire nothing: *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Jove de felicitate contendit*: Who brideth his desire, contendeth even with Jupiter in felicite. Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacie, we shall continue in perpetual pain and labour; superfluous things will become necessary, our souls will be made slaves to our bodies, and we can live no longer, then that we live in pleasure and delight. If we moderate not our pleasures and desires, and measure them not by the compass of reason, opinion will carry us into a headlong downfall, where there is neither bottom nor brink: as for example, we will make our shoes of velvet, afterwards of cloth of gold, and lastly of embroidery with Pearls and Diamonds; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of jasper, and porphyrie. Now this mean for a man to enrich himself, and to make him content, is very just, and in the power of every man: he need not to seek his contentment elsewhere and without himself, let him but ask it, and he presently obtaineth it of himself. Let him stay the course of his desires, it is injustice to importune God, Nature, the world, by vows and prayers, to give him any thing, since he hath so excellent a mean in his own power to attain thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to give unto me, then my self not to desire? *Quare potius a fortuna*

*fortuna impetum ut det, quam à me nē petam? quare autem petam
oblitus fragilitatis humana? Wherefore should I rather desire fortune
to give unto me, then I seek it of my self? but wherefore should I de-
sire the oblivion of humane fragility? If I cannot or will not ob-
tain of my self not to desire, how and with what face can I presie
another to give, over whom I have no right nor power? The first
rule then touching our desires and pleasures is, that this (little) or at
least a mediocrity and sufficiency is that which doth best content a
wise man, and keeps him in a peace. And this is the reason why I
have chosen for my device, *Peace and Poverty*. With a fool nothing
sufficeth, nothing hath certainty or content: he is like the Moon, who
asketh a garment that may fit it; but it was answered, That that was
not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and
alwayes changeable.*

7.

The other point conson-german to this, is (naturally): for we *Naturally.*
know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one na-
tural, and these are just and lawfull, and are likewise in beasts li-
mited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no
man is indigent, for every thing yields something to content. Na-
ture is contented with little, & hath so provided, that in all things,
that which sufficeth is at hand and in our own power, *Parabile est Seneea.*
quod natura desiderat & expositum; ad manum est, quod sat est. Ro-
ady and at hand is it, that nature desires; and at hand also, that which
sufficeth. It is this which nature demandeth for the preservation of
its own essence, it is a favour for which we are to thank nature,
that those things that are necessary for this life, it hath made easie to
find; and such as are hardly obtained, are not to necessary; and that
seeking without passion that which nature desirereth, fortune can no
way deprive us of it. To these kind of desires a man may adde
(though they be not truly natural, yet they come very near) those
that respect the use and condition of every one of us, which are
somewhat beyond, and more at large then those that are exactly
natural, and so are just and lawfull in the second place. The other
desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and phan-
tasie, artificiall, superfluous; and truly passions, which we may, to
distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, where-
of we have spoken before at large in the passions: from which a wise
man must wholly and absolutely defend himself.

8.

The third, which is moderately and without excesse, hath a large
field, and divers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads; that
Moderately. *See lib. 3. c. 38.*

is to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himself : of another without his scandall, offence, losse, prejudice; of himself, without the losse of his health, his leature, his functions and affairs, his honour, his duty.

^{9.}
By relation.
The fourth, is a short and essentiall relation to himself; besides that the career of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, & shornd; their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it self; but in a circle, the two points whereof do meet and end in our selves. Those actions that are directed without this reflexion, and this short and essential turning, as of covetous and ambitious men, and divers others, who run point-blank, and are alwayes without them, are vain and unsound.

CHAP. VII.

*To carry himself moderately and equally in prosperity,
and aduersitie.*

^{2.}
*The opinion of
the vulgar.*
There is a twofold fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperity and aduersity; there are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth us upon to stand upon our guard, and to gather our wits about us: they are the two schools, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

The vulgar ignorant sort do acknowledge but one: they do not believe that we have any thing to do, that there is any difficulty, any fight or contradiction with prosperity and good fortune, wherein they are so transported with joy, that they know not what they do, there is no rule with them: and in affliction, they are as much astonished and beaten down, as they that are dangerously sick, and are in continual anguish, not being able to endure either heat or cold.

^{3.}
*which of the
two is more
difficult to
bear, prosperi-
ty or aduersity.*
Arist.
Senec.
The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and impute it to one and the same vice and folly, not to know how to command in prosperity, and how to carry our selves in aduersity: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, some saying it is aduersitie, by reason of the horrour and bitterness thereof: *Dificilius est tristitiam sustinere, quam à delectatibus abstinere: magis est difficultia perstringere, quam leta moderari.* Harder it is to sustain grief, then to abstain from pleasures, but more hard to pass through difficult things, then to moderate our pleasures.

sures. Some affirming it to be prosperity, which by her sweet and pleasing flatterie, doth abate and mollifie the spirit, and sensibly robbeth it of its due temperature, force, and vigour, as *Dalila* did *Samson*; in such sort, that many, that are obdurate obstinate and invincible in aduersity, have suffered themselves to be taken by the flattering allurements of prosperity, *Magni laboris est ferre prosperitatem : segetem nimia sternit libertas, sic immoderata felicitas rumpit.* Great labour it is to live in prosperity : too much plentie plasheth down the corn ! so too much felicity casteth us down. And again, affliction moveth even our enemies to pittie ; prosperity our friends to envie. In aduersitie, a man seeing himself abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced unto himself, he taketh heart at grasse, he rouzeth himself, calls his wits about him, and with all his power adds his own endauours to his own help : In prosperitie seeing himself assited by all that laugh at him, and applaud all he doth, he groweth lasie and careless, trusting in others, without any apprehension of danger or difficulty, and perswading himself that all is in safetie, when he is many times therein much deceived. It may be, that according to the diversity of nature and complexions, both opinions are true: but touching the utility of either, it is certain that aduersity hath this pfeherminence, it is the seed, the occasion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroicall vertues, *Virescit vulnere virtus : agra fortuna sana consilia melius in malis sapimus : secunda rectum auferunt.* Virtue flourisbeth by aduersity : we better know sound advice by the difficult fortune of dysastrous things; prosperitie blindeth the truth.

Now wisdom teacheth us to hold our selves indifferent and upright in all our life, and to keep always one and the same countenance, pleasant and constant. A wise man is a skilfull artificer, who maketh profit of all ; of every matter he worketh and formeth virtue; as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all manner of images: whatsoever lighteth into his hands he maketh it a fit subj & to do good, and with one and the same countenance he beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad utrosq; casus sapiens aptus est, bonorum rector, malorum vitor: In secundis non confidit, in adversis non desicit; nec avidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non exspectans, ad seruumque paratus; adversus uirumque intrepidus, nec illius tumultu, nec bujus fulgore percussus.* Contra calamitates fortis & contumax, luxuria non adversus tantum, sed & infestus: hoc praecipuum, in huminis rebus erigere animum supra minas & promissa fortuna. A wise man

4.
The advice of
the wise upon
both.

himself for all fortunes; he governeth the good, subdueth the evil; He presumes not in prosperity, nor despairs in adversitie; he neither dreads danger, nor shuns it; he expecteth not prosperity, but is ready at all assyes; fearing neither felicity nor aduersity: not moved with the clamour of the one, nor the glory of the other. Strong and despising all miseries, not onely against all superfluite and excesse, but even an enemy unto it; who in wordly things, hath a spirit erected above fortune's threats, or promises. Wisedome furnisheth us with arms and discipline for both combats; against adversitie with a spurre, teaching us to raise, to strengthen, and incite our courage; and this is the virtue of fortitude: against prosperitie, it furnisheth us with a bridle, and teacheth us to keep and clap down our wings, and to keep our selves within the bounds of modestie; and this is the virtue of temperancie: these are the two morall virtues, against the two fortunes, which that great Philosopher *Epicetus* did very well signifie, containing in two words all morall Philosophie, *Sustine & Abstine*, bear the evil, that is, adversitie; abstain from the good that is, from pleasure and prosperitie. The particular advisements against the particular prosperities and adversities shall be in the third book following, in the virtues of Fortitude and Temperancie. Here we will onely set down the generall instructions and remedies against all prosperitie and adversitie; because in this book we reach the way in generall unto wisedome, as hath been said in the preface thereof.

5. Of prosperity.

Against all prosperitie, the common doctrine and counsel consisteth in three points: The first, that honours, riches, and the fauours of fortune, are ill and wrongfully accounted and called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reform a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastened our felicitie to a rotten cable, and ankred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more uncertain and inconstant, then the possession of such goods, which come and go, passe and run on like a river? like a river they make a noise, at their coming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment; and when they are quite dried up, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

The second point is to remember, that prosperitie is like a hained poyson, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous; whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and every thing falleth out according to our own hearts, then should we fear most, and stand

Stand upon our guard, bridle our affections, compose our actions by season, above all avoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the favour of the time. Prosperitie is a slipperie pase, wherein a man must take sure footing, for there is no time wherein men do more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to find a man who doth willingly attribute unto him the cause of his felicitie. And this is the cause why in the greatest prosperitie we must use the counell of our friends, and give them more authoritie over us, then at other times; and therefore we must carry our selves as in an evil and dangerous way, go with fear and doubt, desiring the hand and help of another. In these times of prosperitie, aduersitie is a medicine, because it leadeth us to the knowledge of our selves.

7.

The third is to retain our desires, and to set a measure unto them. Prosperitie puffeth up the heart, spurreth us forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they do, that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth us beyond our selves, and in this state it is where a man loseth himself, drowneth and maketh a mockery of himself. He plaieth the Monkie, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then fneweth his tail. O how many have been lost, and have perished miserably, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperitie! We must therefore either stay our selves, or go forward with a flower pase, if we will enjoy the benefit of our prosperitie, and not hold our selves alwayes in chase and purchase. It is wisdome to know how to settle our own rest, our own contentment; which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Sicut finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: What cannot be determined is beyond wisdome.*

Against all aduersitie, these are the generall advisements. In the first place, we must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwayes different from true reason: for, to discredit and to bring into hatred and horrour all aduersitie and afflictions, they call them evils, dysasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor evil. Never did aduersitie make a man wicked but hath rather served as a means to amend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked.

8.
Of aduersity
and that it is
no evil.

Doubtlesse, crosses and heavie accidents are common to all, but they work divers effects, according to that subiect whereupon they light. To fools and reprobate persons they serve to drive them into despair, to afflict and enrage them: Perhaps they enforce them

9.
It is common
to all, but di-
verfly.

(if they be heavy and extreme) to stoop, to cry unto God, to look up unto heaven, but that is all : To sinners and offenders they are so many lively instructions, and compulsions to put them in mind of their duty, and to bring them to the knowledge of God : To virtuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their virtue, to win unto themselves greater commendations and a nearer alliance with God : To wise men, they are matter of good, and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to pass and mount up to all height and greatness, as we see and may read of divers, who being assailed by such and so great crosses, as a man would have thought them their utter overthrow and undoing, have been raised by the self-same means to the highest pitch of their own desires, and contrariwise without that infelicity had still remained under hatches; as that great Athenian Captain knew well, when he said, *Perrissimus nisi perissimus : We should utterly have perished, if we had not perished.* A very excellent example hereof was Joseph the son of Jacob. It is true that these are blowes from heaven, but the virtue and wisdome of man serveth as a proper instrument; from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *To make of necessity a virtue.* It is a very good husbandry, and the first property of a wise man, to draw good from evil, to handle his affaires with such dexterity, and so to win the wind, and to let the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good use, and better his own condition.

10.

It hath three causes, and three effects.

Afflictions and adversities proceed from three causes, which are the three authors and workers of our punishment : fin the first inventor which hath brought them into nature : the anger and justice of God, which setteth them a-work as his Commisaries and Executioners : the policy of the world troubled and changed by sin; where, as in a general revolt, and civil tumult, things not being in their due places, and not doing their office; all evils do spring and arise ; as in a body the dis-joynting of the members, and dislocation of the bones, bringeth great pain, and much unquietness. These three are not favourable unto us : the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be avoided as an impostor. That a man may the better defend and quit himself from all three, there is no better way then to use their own proper arms, wherewith they punish us, as David cut off Goliath's head with his own sword, making of necessity a virtue, profit of pain and affliction, turning them against themselves. Affliction is the

the true fruit or sience of sin, being well taken, is the death and runine thereof; and it doth that to the author thereof, which the viper doth to his dam that brought him forth. It is the oyl of the Scorpion, which healeth his own sting, to the end it may perish by its own invention: *perit arte sua: patimur quia peccavimus; patimur ut non peccemus: He perisheth by his own Art: we suffer because we have sinned; we suffer that we should not sin.* It is the file of the soul, which scourseth, purifieth and cleanseth it from all sin. And consequently it appeaseth the anger of God, and freeth us from the prisons and bands of Justice, to bring us into the fair and clear sun-shine of grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth us from the world, iplucketh us from the dug, and maketh us distaste with the bitterness thereof (like worm-wood upon the teat of the nurse) the sweet milk and food of this deceitful world.

A great and principal mean for a man to carry himself well in adversity, is to be an honest man. A virtuous man is more peaceable in adversity, than a vicious in prosperity: like those that have a fever, who feel and find more harm and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremity of their fits, than such as are found, in the heat and cold of Summer & Winter. And even so they that have their consciences sick, are much more tormented, than they that are sound, that are honest men: For, having the inward part whole and healthful, they can no way be endamaged by the outward, especially opposing against it a good courage.

11.
A general advice.

Adversities are of two sorts: some are true, natural; as sickness, grief, loss of those things we love: others are false and fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in verity that it is so. Man hath his spirit and body, as much at command, as before they hapned. To these kind of men, only this one word; That which thou complainest of, is neither painful nor troublesome, but thou makest it such, and makest thy self to believe it.

12.
An advice more special.

As touching the true and natural, the more prompt and popular and more sound opinions are, the more natural and more just. First Natural. we must remember, that a man indureth nothing against the humane and natural law, since even at the birth of man all these things are annexed, and given as ordinary. To endure is In whatsoever doth afflict us, let us consider two things, the nature of that that happeneth unto us, and that which is in our selves: and using things according to nature, we can receive no tediousnesse or offence thereby.

13.
To endure is natural and humane.

For offence is a maladie of the soul contrary to nature, and therefore should by no means come near unto us. There is not any accident in the world which may happen unto us, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptness in us to receive it, & to turn it to our contentment. There is no manner of life so strait, that hath not some solace and recreation. There is no prison so strong and dark, that gives not place to a song sometimes to comfort a prisoner. *Jonas* had leasure to make his prayer unto God even in the belly of the whale, and was heard. It is a favour of nature that it findeth a remedie and ease unto our evils in the bearing of them, it being so that man is born to be subject to all sorts of miseries, *Omnia ad que gerimus, qua expavescimus, tributa vita sunt: All things that afflict or grieve us, are the tributes of life.*

14.

*If toucheth
but the lesser
part of man,*

Secondly, we must remember, that there is only the lesser part of man subject to fortune; we have the principall in our own power, and it cannot be overcome without our own consent. Fortune may make a man poor, sick, afflicted; but not vicious, dissolute, dejected; it cannot take from us probitie, courage, virtue.

15.

*It is against
reason and
justice.*

Afterwards we must come to fidelitie, reason, justice. Many times a man complaineth unjustly; for though he be sometimes surprised with some ill accident, yet he is more often with a good; and so the one must recompense the other. And if a man consider well thereof, he shall find more reason to content himself with his good fortune, then to complain of his bad. And as we turn our eyes from those things that offend us; and delight to cast them upon green and pleasant colours, so must we divert our thoughts from heavie and melancholick occurrents, and apply them to those that are pleasant and pleasing unto us. But we are malicious, resembling cupping glasses, which draw the corrupt blood, and leave the good; like a covetous man who selleth the best wine, and drinkest the worst; like little children, from whom if you take away one of their play-games, in a fury they cast away all the rest. For if any misfortune happen unto us, we torment our selves, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort us: yea, some there are that for small losses term themselves unfortunate in all things, and forget that they ever received any good, in such sort, that an Ounce of aduersitie brings them more hearty grief then ten pound of prosperity, pleasure or delight.

16.

*It is little in
comparison.*

We must likewise cast our eyes upon those that are of a far worse condition then our selves, who would think themselves happy if they were in our place.

Eum.

*Cum tibi displicescat rerum fortuna tuarum,
Alterius specta, quo si discrimine peior.*

*If thou griev'st thou art not such
As thy neighbour, over much;
Straight reflect upon the poor,
Think the rest, and grieve no more.*

It were good and necessary that these complainers did practise the saying and advice of a wise man, That if all the evils that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enjoy; the division being equally made, they may see by the over-plus of that good they enjoy, the injustice of their complaint.

17.

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all evils and adversities, which may be reduced almost to one; Custome for the vulgar and baser sort, and Meditation for the wiser. Both of them have their force from time, the common and strongest salve against all evils; but the wise take it before hand, this is his fore-sight; and the feeble and vulgar sort, after hand. That custome prevaleth much it doth plainly appear, in that those things that are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby easie and pleasing, *Natura calamitatum mollimentum conseruandinem inventis: Custome mitigateb calamitie.* Slaves weep when they enter into the gallies, & before three moneths be ended they sing. They that have not been accustomed to the sea, are afraid, though it be the calmett, when they weigh anker; whereas the Mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of her husband, and before a year be expired she loves another. Time and custome bring all things to passe; that which offendeth us, is the novelty of that which happeneth unto us *Omnia novitate graviora sunt: All new and unexpected crosses, are intolerable.*

18.

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinary: *Qua alii providence.* *diu patiendo levia faciunt, sapiens levia facit diu cogitando;* That which some make light by long suffering, a wise man makes light and ease by long cogitation. He considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth unto himself whatsoever may happen unto him most grievous and insupportable, as sicknesse, povertie, exile, injuries, and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. — For foresight or providence is a great remedie against all evils, which cannot bring any great alteration

alteration or change, happening to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrarily they wound and hurt him greatly, that suffereth himself to be surprised by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giveth the true temper to the soul, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steelly, impenetrable against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soever, can give no great blow to him that keeps himself upon his guard, and is alwayes ready to preceive them. *Premeditati mali molles ictus venit : quicquid exspectatum est diu , levius accidit : The hurt is small, if the harm before be known; whatsoever we do long expect, doth happen the lighter.* Now to attain this foresight, we must first know, that nature hath placed us here as in a thorny and slippery place; that that which is happened unto another, may also light upon us; that that which hangeth over all, may fall upon every one of us; and that in all the affairs that we undertake, we pre-meditate the inconveniences & evil encounters which may happen unto us, to the end we be not surprized unawares. O how much are we deceived, and how little judgement have we, when we think, that that which happeneth to others, cannot likewise fall upon us! When we will not be wary and provident, for fear lest we should be thought fearfull. Contrariwise, if we take knowledge of things as reason would have us, we would rather wonder that so few crosses happen upon us, and that those accidents that follow us so near, have stayed so long before they catch us, and having caught us, how they should handle us so mildly. He that taketh heed, and considereth the adversity of another, as a thing that may happen unto himself, before it shall happen is sufficiently armed. We must think of all, and expect the worst; they are fools and ill-advised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, That he that is suddenly surprised, is half beaten; and he that is warned is half armed, nay it is two against one. A wise man in time of peace, makes his preparation for war: A good mariner before he go forth of the haven makes provision of what is necessary to resist the violence of a tempest: it is too late to provide against an evil, when it is already come. In whatsoever we are prepared before-hand, we find our selves apt and admirable, what difficulty soever it have, and contrariwise, there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder us, if we be but novelists therein: *Id videndum ne quid inopinatum sit nobis , quia omnia novitata graviora sunt : We ought to foresee that nothing happen unto us unlooked for , because all novelties are the more*

more grievous. Doubtless it seetheth, that if we were so provident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is happened unto thee, why then wondrest thou? Let us then take a course that accidents do not surprize us; Let us ever stand upon our guard and foresee what is to come. *Animus, adversus omnia firmandus; ut dicere possimus,* Non ulla laborum, O virgo, nova mibi facies inopinative surgit: Omnia percepisti, atque animo mecum ante peregi. Tu hodie ista denuncias; ego semper denunciavi mibi: hominem paravi ad humana. The mind must be armed for all things, that we may hold nothing tedious or painful. O virgin, there seems to me no new and unexpelted countenance to appear. I have considered of all things, and am resolved thereof in mind. To day hast thou shewed me all these things, which always I foretold to my self: I have framed man for humane things.

CHAP. VIII.

To obey and observe the Laws, Customes, and Ceremonies of the Countrey, how and in what sense.

Even as a savage and untamed beast, will not suffer himself to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flieth and hideth himself from him, or armeth himself against him, and with furie assaulteth him, if he approach near unto him; in such sort that a man must use force mingled with art and subtiltie to take and tame him: So folly will not be hand-ed by reason, or wisdome, but striveth and stirreth against it, and addeth folly unto folly: and therefore it must be taken, and lead, like a wild beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wiseman is to a fool) astonisched, feared, and kept short, that with the more ease it may be instructed and won. Now the proper mean or help thereunto, is a great authority, a thundering power and gravitie, which may daile it with splendour of his lightning, *Sola autoritas est Augst.* I.
The beginning,
institution and
authority of
the Laws. *qua cogit stultos ut ad sapientiam festinent:* It is onely authoritie that inforceth fools to apply themselves to wisdome. In a popular fight or sedition, if some great, wise, ancient, and virtuous personage come in presence, that hath won the publick reputation of honour and virtue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendour of his authority, are quieted, attending what he will lay unto them.

—Volunti

—Veluti magno in populo cum sepe coorta
 Seditio est, savitque animis ignobile vulgus,
 Jamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:
 Tum pietate gravem ac mortis, si forte virum quem
 Conspexere, silent, arrestisque auribus affant.
 Ille regit ditis animos, & pectora mulcat.

Even as when tumults to sedition grow,
 And Hobhorn mad, though cause he none do know
 Without himself: example so encharms
 This headlong rout, whose fury gives it arms:
 As fire-brands, stones, and all things fly about,
 Their rage encounters: so there is no doubt
 Of certain harm; unless (as seem from God)
 Some grave, censorious Cato with his rod
 Appear in time, at whose authority
 They silent stand, and hear him speak, well nigh
 An hour together, till their fury die.
 So all is hicht: the same that now do sing,
 Each to his tent, now cry, God save the King.

There is nothing greater in this world then authority, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heaven: if it be sovereign, it is called Majestie; if subalterne, Authority: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and fear mingled together. Now this Majestie and Authority is first and properly in the person of the Sovereign Prince and Law-maker, where it is lively, actuall, and moving; afterwards in his commandments and ordinances, that is to say, in the Law, which is the head of the work of the Prince, and the image of a lively and original Majestie. By this, are fools reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight necessity, and utiltie, Authority and the Law is in the world!

2. The next authority, and that which is likeliest to the Law, is *Of Customes*, stome, which is another powerfull and imperious Mistress: It seizeth upon this power, and usurpeth it traicterously and violently; for it planteth this authority by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing, and humble beginning; having settled and established it self, by the help of time, it discovereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more liberty or power left, so much as to lift up ones eyes: It taketh its authority from the possession and use thereof, it encreaseth and ennobleth it self by continuance like a river; it is dangerous to bring it back to his originall fountain,

Law

Law and Custome establish their authority diversly. Custome by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, by the common consent of all, or the greater part; & the author thereof are the people. The Law springeth up in a moment with authority and power, and taking his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the liking of the subject, whereupon some compare It to a Tyrant, and Custome to a King. Again, custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment; nevertheless they may mutually help and hinder one another. For custome, which is but of sufferance, authorized by the Sovereign, is better confirmed: and the law likewise settleth its own authority by possession & use; and contrariwise custome may be cashiered by a contrary law, and the law loseth the force thereof by suffering a contrary custom: but ordinarily they are together, that is, law and custome; wise and ipiritual men considering it as a law, and simple men as a custome.

There is not a thing more strange, then the diversity and strangeness of some laws and customes in the world; Neither is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so mad, which is not established by laws and customes in some place or other: I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of belief herein, how far this proposition doth go. Yet omitting to speak of those things that belong to religion, which is the subject where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceived, I will not meddle with it. See then a brief of those that for the strangeness are best worth the noting: To account it an office of piety in a certain age, to kill their parents and to eat them. In Innes to pay the shot, by yielding their Children, wives and daughters, to the pleasure of the host: publick brothel-houses of males: old men lending their wives unto young: women common: an honour to women to have accompanied with many men; and to carry their locks in the hemmes of their garments: daughters to go with their privy parts uncovered, and married women carefully to keep them covered: to leave the daughters to their pleasures, and being great with child to enforce an abort in the sight and knowldg of all men; but married woman to keep themselves chaste and faithfull to their husbands: women the first night before they company with their husbands, to receive all the males of the estate and profession of their husbands, invited to the marriage.

To obey and observe the Lames, Customes,

marriage, and ever after to be faithful to their husband : young married women to present their virginity to their Prince, before they lie with their husbands : marriages of males : women to go to war with their husbands : to die and to kill themselves at the decease of their husbands, or shortly after : to permit widows to marry again, if their husbands die a violent death, and not otherwise : husbands to be divorced from their wives without alledging any cause : to sell them if they be barren, to kill them for no other cause but because they are women, and afterwards to borrow women of others at their need : women to be delivered without pain or fear to kill their children because they are not fair, well featured, or without cause : at meat to wipe their fingers upon their privities and their feet : to live with mans flesh : to eat flesh and fish raw : many men and women to ly together to the number of ten or twelve : to salute one another by putting the finger to the ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heaven : to turn the back when they salute, and never to look him in the face whom a man will honour : to take into the hand the spittle of the Prince : not to speak to the King but at a peep hole : in a mans whole life never to cut his hair nor nails : to cut the hair on ~~the~~ side, and the nailes of one hand, and not of the other : men to pisse sitting, women standing : to make holes and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang ring and jewels in : to contemn death, to receive it with joy, to sue for it, to plead in publick for the honour thereof, as for a dignitie and favour : to accuse it an honourable burial to be eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in pieces and pounded, and their powder to be cast into their ordinary drink.

5.
*Examination
and judgment.*

When we come to judge of these customes, that is the complaint and the trouble : the vulgar sort and pedants, are not troubled here-with ; for every seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoever pleaseth not their palate, that is to say, the common use and custome of their countrey. And if a man shall tell them, that others do speak and judge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as we with theirs ; they cut a man short after their manner, terming them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more advised, as shall be said, he maketh not such haste to judge, for fear lest he wrong his own judgment : and to say the truth, there are many laws and customes which seem at the first view to be savage, inhumane, and contrary to all reason, which if they were without passion and soundly consider-

sidered of, if they were not found to be altogether just and good, yet at the least they would not be without some reason and defence. Let us take amongst the rest for example the two first which we have spoken of, which seem to be both the strangest and farthest off from the duty of piety: to kill their own parents at a certaine age, and to eat them. They that have this custome, do take it to be a testimony of piety and good affection, endeavouring thereby first of mere piety to deliver their old parents, not onely unprofitable to themselves and others, but burthensome, languishing and leading a painful and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease: afterwards giving them the most worthy and commendable sepulcher, lodging in themselves and their own bowels, the bodies and reliques of their parents, in a manner reviving them again, and regenerating them by a kind of transmutation into their living flesh, by the means of digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seem over-light to him that is not possessed with a contrary opinion: and it is an easie matter to consider, what cruelty and abomination it had been to these people, to see their parents before their own eyes to suffer such grief and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and rotteness and the food of worms, which is the worst that can be done unto it. Darius made a tryal, asking some Greeks, for what they would be persuaded to follow the custome of the Indians, in eating their dead fathers. To whom they answered, That they would not do it for any thing in the world. And on the other side assaying to periwade the Indians to burn the bodies of their dead parents, as the Greeks did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficulty and horrour, as that they would never be drawn unto it. I will adde onely one other, which concerneth onely matter of decency and comeliness, and is more light and more pleasant: One that alwaies blew his nose with his hand, being reprehended for incivility, in the defence of himself, asked what privilege that filthy exrement had, that a man must afford it a fair handkerchief to receive, and afterwards carefully wrap and fold it up, which he thought was a matter of greater loathsomnesse, then to cast it from him. So that we see that for all things there may be found some seeming reason, and therefore we are not suddenly and lightly to condemn any thing.

But who would believe how great and imperious the authority of custome is? He that said it was another nature, did not sufficiently

6.
The authority thereof.

To obey and observe the Laws, Costumes,

ently expresse it; for it doth more then nature, it conquereth nature for hence it is that the most beautifull daughters of men draw not unto love their naturall parents ; nor brethren, though excellent in beautie, win not the love of theiſt sisters. This kind of chauſtie is not properly of nature, but of the ſe of lawes, and costumes which forbide them, and make of iinceſt a great ſinne , as we may ſee in the fact not onely of the children of *Adam*, where there was an enforced neceſſity, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren ; of *Jacob* and *Judas* Patriarchs, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other ho-ly men : And it is the law of *Moses* which forbade it in theſe firſt degrees ; but it hath alſo ſometimes diſpenſed therewith, not onely in the collaterral line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wifes which was a commandment , and not a diſpenſation : and which is more, between the naturall brother and ſiſter of divers wombs . but alſo in the right line of alliance, that is to ſay , of the ſon with the motheſ in law ; for in the right line of blood , it ſeemeth to be altogether againſt nature , notwithstanding the fact of the daugh-ters of *Lot* with their father , which nevertheleſſe was produced purely by nature, in that extreme apprehenſion and fear of the end of humane kind , for which cauſe they have been excused by great and learned Doctours. Now againſt nature there is not any diſpenſation , if God the onely ſuperior thereunto give it not. Fi-nally, of cauſual iinceſts and not voluntary the world is full, as *Tertullian* teacheth. Moreover , cuſtome doth enforce the rules of na-ture, witneſſe thoſe Phyſitians who many times leave the naturall reaſons of their Art by their own authority, as they that by cuſtome do live and ſustain their liues with poſſon, Spiders, Emmets, Ly-zards, Toads, which is a coſmon practice amoungt the people of the *West Indies*. It likewiſe dulleth our ſeſſes, witneſſe they that live near the fall of the river *Nilus* , near clocks, armories, mills, and the whole world according to ſome Philofophers, with the ſound of a heavenly king of muſick, & the con tinual and divers motions of the heavens dulleth our ſeſſes, that we hear not that which we hear. To conclude, (and it is the principall fruit thereof) it overcometh all diſſicultie, maketh things eaſie that ſeem imposſible, fwerneseth all fowr, and therefore by the means hereof a man liues in all things content, but yet it maſteſt our ſouls, our beliefs, our jndgements, with a moſt unjuſt and tyraſical authority. It doth and undoeth, authoriſeth and diſ-authoriſeth whatſoever it pleaſe , without rhythme or reaſon, yea miſſy times againſt all reaſon. It eſtabliſh-
eth

Chryſtſt.
Ambroſ.
August.
In *Apolog.*

eth in the world against reason and judgement all the opinions, religions, beliefs, oblidgances, manners, and sorts of life, most phantastical and rude, as before hath been said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degradeth, robbeth, beateth down in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation, and maketh them base and vile.

Nil adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam

Principio, quod non cessent mirari omnes

Paulus.—

Nine dayes a wonder; nought so wonderful

At first; but time and frequencie will dull,

And so the Rain-bow, Manna, Moon and Sun,

Have not the same respect, that first was done,

So that we see that custom is a thing great and powerful. *Plato* having reprehended a youth for playing at cob-nut, or cherry-pit, and receiving this answer from him; That he controlled him for a matter of small moment, replied; My child, custom is not a matter of small moment. A speech well worth the noting, for all such as have youth to bring up. But it exerciseth its power with so absolute authority, that there is no striving against it, neither is it lawful to reason, or call into question the ordinances thereof: it enchanter us in such sort, that it maketh us believe, that what is without the bounds thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and just, but what it approveth; *ratione non componimur, sed consuetudine abducimus: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus: We are not made by reason, but misled by custom; we hold that most honest, that is most used. Error hath place in us before Right.* This is tolerable with idiors, and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiencie to look into the depth of things, to try and to judge, do well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonly held and received: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to be carried with customs.

Now the advice which I here give unto him, that would be wise, is to keep and observe, both in word and deed, the Lawes and Customs which he findeth established in the Countrey where he is: and in like manner, to respect and obey the Magistrates, and all Superiors; but alwayes with a noble spirit, and after a generous manner, and not servilely, pedantically, superstitiously; and withall, not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange Lawes and Customs,

To obey and observe the Lawes, Customs,

stomes, but freely and soundly judging and examining the one and the other, as hath been said, and not binding his judgement and beliefe, but unto reason only. Hierof, a word or two.

1.
*Lawes and
Customes are to
be observed.*

In the first place, according to all the wi^elst, the rule of rules, and the general Law of Laws, is to follow and observe the Laws and Customs of the Countrey where he is *vbius ἐπειδατιον ἐγχέρων καλῶν*, avoiding carefully all singularity, and strange extravagant particularity, different from the common and ordinary; for whatsoever it be, it alwayes hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of folly, hypocrisy, ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceed from a sick and weak soul. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se novitate vite convertet: He that is wise, will not seek to alter the manners of the people; neither pull men upon him with his innovations.* We must alwayes walk under the covert of the Laws, Customs, Superiors, without disputation or tergiversation, without undertaking sometimes to dispense with the Laws, sometimes like a frugal servant, to enhance the price.

2.
*Not for their
justice and e-
quity.*

But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good minde, and after a good manner, nobly and wisely, neither for the love nor fear of them, nor for the justice or equity that is in them, nor for fear of that punishment that may follow for not obeying them: to be brief, not of superstition, nor constrained, scrupulous, fearful servitude. *Eadem quo populus, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens: A wise man doth those things that other men do, but not in that fashion, nor to the same end, but freely and simply for publick reverence, and for their authority.* Laws and Customs are maintained in credit, not because they are just and good, but because they are Laws and Customs: this is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other; and so is it with Superiors, because they are superiors: *Quia supra cathedram sedens: Because they sit in the Chair of Authority, not because they are virtuous and honest: qua faciunt, nolite facere: what they do, do not you.* He that obeyeth them for any other cause, obeyeth them not because he should; this is an evil, and a dangerous subject, it is not true obedience, which must be pure and simple. *Unde vocatur depositio discretionis, mera execu-
tio, abnegatio sui: From whence it is named, a putting off of his own
reason, a mere obedience in the execution, and a denying of himself.* Now to go about to measure our obedience by the justice and goodness of Laws and Superiors, were by submitting them to their judgment, to serve them with process, and to call our obedience into doubt and

and disputation ; and consequently, the State and Policie , according to the inconstancie and diversity of judgements. How many unjust and strange Laws are there in the World, not only in the particular judgements of men, but of universal reason, wherewith the World hath lived a long time in continual peace and rest , with as great satisfaction, as if they had been very just and reasonable? And he that should go about to change or mend them, would be accounted an enemy to the Weal-publick , and never be admitted : The nature of man doth accommodate it self to all with the times , and having once caught his fish, it is an act of hostility, to go about to alter any thing: we must leave the World where it is ; these troublous, and new-fangled spirits , under a pretext of reformation, marre all.

All change and alteration of Laws, Beliefs, Customs, and Observances, is verie dangerous , and yieldeth always more evil than good; it bringeth with it certain and present evils, for a good that is uncertain and to come. Innovators have always glorious and plausible Titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they cannot escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they think to see more cleerlie then others , and that to establish their opinions, the State, Policie, Peace, and publick quiet , must be turned topsy turvie.

I will not say for all this that hath been said before, that we must absolutelie obey all Laws, all Commandments of Superiours : for such as a man knoweth evidentlie to be either against God or nature, he is not to obey, and yet not to rebel and trouble the State ; how he should govern himself in such a case, shall be taught hereafter, in the obedience due unto Princes : for to say the truth, this inconvenience and infelicite, is rather, and more common in the commandments of Princes, then in the Laws : neithet is it sufficient to obey the Laws and Superiours, because of their worth and merit, nor servilely and for fear , as the common and profane sort do ; but a wise man doth nothing by force or fear; *Soli hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat invitus; recta sequitur, gaudet officio:* This is only incident to wise men, that they do nothing by constraint; they follow the right, and perform their duty : he doth that which he should, and keeps the Laws, not for fear of them, but for the love of himself, being jealous of his dutie ; he hath not to do with the Laws, to do well ; that is that wherein he differeth from the common

To obey and observe the Lawes, Customes, &c.

sort, who cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without Lawes; *At justo & sapienti non est lex posita: The Law was not ordained for the just and righteous.* By right, a wise man is above the Lawes, but, in outward and publick effect, he is their voluntary and free obedient subject. In the third place therefore, it is an act of lightness, and injurious presumption; yea, a testimony of weakness and insufficiency; to condemn that which agreeeth not with the Law and Custom of his Countrey. This proceedeth either from want of leisure, or sufficiency to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his own judgement, whereby he is enforced many times to recant; and not to remember, that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eye of his spirit to be hood-winked, and brought a sleep by a long custome, and prescription to have power over judgement.

4. *wisely to examine all things.* Finally, it is the office of a generous spirit and a Wise man (whom I here endeavour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together, all the Lawes and Customs of the World, which shall come to his knowledge, and to judge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath been said, but to exercise his office, since he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth and universal reason, and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himself, or staining his judgement with error: and to content himself to yield obedience unto those whereunto he is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall have cause to complain of him. It may fall out sometimes, that we may do that, by a second particular, and municipal obligation (obeying the Lawes and Customs of the Countrey) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, universal nature and reason; but yet we satisfie nature by keeping our judgements and opinions true and just according to it. For we have nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the World hath nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publick course of the World, and must give an account thereof; so that many times, we do justly that, which justly we approve not. There is no remedie, for so goes the World.

5. * *of ceremonies.* After these two Mistresses, Law and Custom, comes the third, which hath no lesse authority and power with many; yea, is more rough and tyranical to thole that too much tie themselves thereto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth, is for the

the most part but vanity, yet holdeþ such place, and usurpeth such authoritie, by the remilenesse and contagious corruption of the world, that many think that wisdom consisteth in the observation thereof, and in such sort do voluntarily enthrall themselues thereunto, that rather then they will contradict it, they prejudice their health, benefit, businesse, libertie, conscience and all; which is a very great folly, and the fault and infelicite of many Courtiers, who above others are the idolaters of Ceremonie. Now my will is, that this my wise man, do carefully defend him self from this captivitie; I do not mean, that out of a kind of looþ incivilite, he abuse a ceremonie, for we must forgive the world in someting, and as much as may be outwardly conform our selves to that which is in practice; but my will is, that he tie not, and enthrall himself thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse he know how to leave it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such manner, as that he give all men to know, that it is not out of carelesse, or delicacie, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seem ignorant how to esteem of it as is fit, nor suffer his judgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanitie; and that he lendeth himself to the world when it pleaseth him, but never giveth himself.

C H A P. IX.

To carry himself well with another.

THIS matter belongeth to the virtue of justice, which teacheth how to live well with all, and to give to every one that which appertaineth unto him, which shall be handled in the book following, where shall be set down the particular and divers opinions according to the diversitie of persons. Here are onely the generall, following the purpose and subject of this book.

1.

There is here a twyfold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two manners of conversing with the world, the one is simple, general and common, the ordinary commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affaires, the voyages, and encounters do daily lead, and change acquaintance from those we know, to those we know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntary consents: the other speciall is in affected and desired company and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath been embraced; and that either for spirituall or corporall profit or pleasure, wherein there is

2.

To carry himself well with another.

conference, communication, priority, and familiarity : each of them have their advisements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse by way of preface, to give you some general and fundamentall advice of all the rest.

3. It is a great vice (whereof this our w^e man my^t take heed) and a defect & inconvenient both to himself and to another, to be bound and subject to certain humors and comp'lexions to one only course; that is, to be a slave to himself, so to be captivated to his proper inclinations, that he cannot be bent to any other a testimony of an anxious scrupulous mind, and ill breed, too amorous, and too partiall to it self. These kind of people hath much to endure and to contest: and contrarywise it is a great sufficiency and wⁱsdomē to accommodate himself to all. *Istud est sapere qui ubicumque opera sit animum possit fletere: It is wisdome to frame the mind, as occasion shall still require.* To be supple and maniable, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himself into order, when there is need. The fairest minds, and the best born, are the more universal, the more common, appliciable to all understandings, communicative and open to all people. It is a beautiful quality, which resembleth and imitateth the goodnesse of God, it is the honour which w^t is given to old Cato. *Huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcumque ageret: Whose mind was apt for all things; wh^t generally was such; as whatsoever he did, he was said to be born to the same purpose.*

4. Let us see the advisements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conversation, I will here set down some, whereof the first shall be, to keep silence and modesty.

5. The second, not to be over-formal in not applying himself to the follies, indiscretion, and lightnesses, which may be committed in his presence: for it is an indiscretion to condemn all that pleaseth not our palar.

6. The third, to spare, and thrifily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiency that he hath attained, and to be more willing to hear then to speak, to learn then to teach: for it is a vice to be more ready and forward to make himself known, to talke of himself, and to shew all that is in him, then to learn knowledge of another; and to spend his own stock then to get new.

7. The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a duty and respect; nor agaist our inferiors, where the match is not equal.

The

The fifth, to be honestly curious in the enquiry of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugally, to make profit by them.

8.

The sixt and principall is, to employ his judgement in all things, which is the chief part which worketh, ruleth, and doth all : without the understanding all other things are blind, deaf, and without a soul, it is least to know the history, the judgement is all.

9.

The seventh is never to speak affirmatively, and imperiously, with obstinacy and resolution ; That hurteth and woundeth all.

10.

Peremptory affirmation and obstinacy in opinion, are ordinary signs of senslei-nesse and ignorance. The style of the ancient Romans was, that the witnesses deposing, and the Judges determining that which of their own proper knowledge they knew to be true, they expressed their mind by this word, *It seemeth* (*Ita videtur.*). And if these did thus, what should others do ? It were good to learn to use such words as may sweeten and moderate the temerity of our propositions ; as, It may be, It is said, I think, It seemeth, and the like ; and in answering, I understand it not, What is that to say ? It may be, It is true. I will shut up this general part in these few words : To have the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his mind and thought covered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discreet, alwayes to keep himself to himself, and to stand on his guard, *frons aperta, lingua parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere* : His face open, his tongue silent, his mind secret, and to trust none : to see and hear much, to speak little, to judge of all, *Vide, audi, judica.*

The conclusion.

Let us come to the other consideration, and kind of conversation more special, whereof the instructions are these. The first is to seek, to confer, and converse, with men of constancy and dexterity ; for thereby the mind is confirmed and fortified, and it is elevated above it self, as with base and weak spirits it is debased, and utterly lost : *the contagion herginis, as in the body, and also more.*

11.

The second is, not to be astonished at the opinions of another ; for how contrary soever to the common sort, how strange, how frivolous or extravagant they seem, yet they are suitable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, and therefore it is weakness to be astonished at them.

Part.

The third is, not to fear or to be troubled with the rude incivility and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustome himself. Gallant men bear them with courage; this tenderness, and fearful and ceremonious mildness, is for women. This

Of special conversation.

12.

13.

To carry himself well with another.

societie and familiaritie must be valiant and manly, it must be courageous both to give hard speeches, and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to have to do with a people that yeilde, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

14. The fourth is, to alwaies at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingenuously and chearfully to yeild unto it, of what side soever it be, using alwaies and in all things sincerity, and not as many, especially pedanties, by right or by wrong to defend him self and to quell his adversary. It is a fairer victorie to range him self according to reason, and to vanquish himself, then to overcome his adversarie, whereunto his own weakness doth many times help, being far from a l passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confess his doubt and ignorance, to yeild when there is occasion, are acts of judgement, gentlenesse, and sinceritie, which are the principall qualities of an honest and wise man; whereas obstinacie in opinion accuseth a man of many vices and imperfections.

15. The fifth is, in disputation not to employ all the *medium's* that a man may have, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent and pressing, and that with brevity; for even in a good cause a man may say too much: for long discourses, amplifications, and repetitions, are a testimonie of ostentation, of a desire to speak, and tedious to the whole company.

16. The sixth and principall is, in all things to keep a form, order and aptnesse. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and conferre with a fool, a trifler, that uttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter! It is the only just excuse to cut off all conference: for what can a man gain but torment, that knows not how, nor what to speak as he shold? Not to understand the argument that is made to wed himself to his own opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himself to words, and to leave the principall, to mingle and trouble the conference with vain amplifications, to denie all, not to follow the form of disputation, to use unprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouth it out, to tie himself to forms, and never to dive into the bottome; are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See here how wisdome is discerned from follie; this is presumptuous, raw, obstinate, absurd, that never satisfieth it self, is fearfull, advised, inodest: this pleaseth it self, goes forth of the lists merily and gloriosly, as having wonne the victory, when it never came near it.

The seventh, If there be a place of contradiction, he must take heed that he be not bold, obstinate, bitter; for either of these three makes it unwelcome, and doth more hurt himself, then another. That it may winne good entertainment of the companie, it must arise from that very hour of the controversie that is handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsewhere, not from any former precedent ground; neither must it touch the person, but the matter onely, with some commendation of the person if there be cause.

CHAP. X.

This doth properly belong to the virtue of prudence, whereof we shall speak in the beginning of the book following, where shall be set down in particular divers counsels and advisements according to the divers kinds of prudence and occurrents in our affaers. But I will here set down the principall points and heads of wisdom, which are generall and common aduilements, to instruct in grosse our disciple, to carry himself well and wisely in the traffick and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affaers; and they are eight.

The first consisteth in understanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deal, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, designment, and intention, their proceedings: to know likewise the nature of the busynesse which he hath in hand, and which is proposed unto him; not only in their superficiale and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof; not only to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and conseqnents that belong thereunto. The better to do this, he must look into them with all manner of visages, consider them in all sensis; for there are some that on one side are very precions and pleasing, and on the other, base and pernicious. Now it is certain, that according to the divers natures of the persons and affaers, we must change our stile and manner of proceeding, like a Sea-man, who according to the divers flate of the sea, and the diversitie of the winds, doth diversly turn and guide his sails and his oars. For he that in all things shall direct and carry himself after one and the same faſtſion, would quickly marre all, play the fool, and make himself ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge

i.
Knowledge of
the persons
and affaers.

ef

of the persons and affairs is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited; but the way to attain thereunto, is, to consider them attentively and advisedly, resolving them many times in our mindes, and that without passion.

2.
*Eſtimation of
things.*

*Not according
to the vulgar
udgementis.*

*But according
to the wife.*

*Difficult.
Excellent.
Necessary.
Seneca.*

We must likewise learn to esteem of things according to their true worth, giving unto them that price and place which appertaineth unto them, which is the true office of wi'dome and sufficiency. This is a high point of Philosophie; but the better to attain thereunto, we must take heed of passion, and the judgement of the vulgar sort. There are six or seven things which move and lead vulgar spirits, and make them to esteem of things by false ensigns, whereof wise men will take heed; which are, novelties, rarities, strangenesse, difficulty, Art, invention, absence, and privation, or denyall, and above all, report; shew, and provision. They esteem not of things if they be not polished by art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and naturall, of what value soever they be, they attend not; they escape and drop away insensibly, or at least are accounted plain, base, and foolish, a great testimony of humane vanity and imbecility, which is paid with wind, with false and counterfeit money, instead of currant, from whence it is, that a man preferreth art before nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie; vehement motions and impulsions, before comp'exion, constitution, habit; the extraordinary before the ordinary; ostentation and pomp before true and secret verity, another mans; and that which is strange, which is borrowed; before that which is proper and naturall. And what greater folly can there be then all this? Now the rule of the wife is, not to suffer them selves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and judge and esteem of things, first by their true, naturall, and essentiall value, which is many times inward and secret, and then by their profit and commodity; the rest is but deceit or mockery. This is a matter of difficulty, all things being so disguised and sophisiticated: many times the false and wicked being more plausible, then the true and good. And Aristotle saith, That there are many falsehoods, which are more probable, and have a better outward appearance, then verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and divine. *Si separaveris preciosum à vili,
quasi os meum eris: If thou wilt separate the precious from those things
that are base and vile, thou shalt be as it were my mouth: And necessary
before all works; quam necessarium precia rebus imponere? how neceſſary*

sary is it to put a price upon things? for to small purpose doth a man endeavour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what rank to place things; riches, health, beauty, nobility, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedence and preheminence of things, is a high and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult; especially when many present themselves: for plurality hindereth, and herein men are never of one accord. The particular tales and judgements of men are divers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all run not together after one and the same thing, and to be a let or hindrance to another. For example, let us take the eight principall heads of all goods spirituall and corporall, four of each kind, that is to say, *Honesty, Health, Wisdome, Beauty, Ability or Aptness, Nobility, Science, Riches.* We do here take the words according to the common sense and use; Wisdome for a prudent and discreet manner of life and carriage with and towards all; Ability for sufficiency of affairs; Science for the knowledge of things acquired out of books: the other are clear enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many divers opinions are there? I have told my own, and I have mingled, and in such sort interlaced them together, that, after and next unto a spirituall, there is a corporall correspondent thereunto, to the end we may couple the soul and body together. Health is in the body, that which honesty is in the soul; the health of the soul, is the honesty of the body: *Mens sana in corpore sano: A perfect mind in a sound body:* Beauty, is as Wisdome, the measure, proportion, and comeliness of the body; and wisdome a spirituall beauty. Nobility is a great aptnes and disposition to virtue. Sciences are the riches of the spirit. Others do range these parts otherwise, some place all the spirituall first, before they come to the first corporall, and the least of the spirit above the greatest of the body: some place them apart, and all diversly, every one aboundeth in his own sense.

After and from this sufficiency and part of prudence, to know well how to esteem of things, doth spring and rise another, that is, to know well how to chooze, where not onely the conscience, but also the sufficiency and prudence is likewise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficulty, and of a vice, of that which is honest, and that which is commodious, of duty and of profit: for the preheminence of the one is so great above the other that when they come to encounter, honesty alwaies winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circum-

From hence
cometh the
knowledge of
things.

Eight princip-
al heads of
goods spirituall
and corporall.

3.
Choice and c-
lection of
things.

stance,

stance, and in publick affiis on ly, as shall be said hereafter in the virtue of Prudence: but there are other choices far more hard, and troublelome, as when a man is caught and driven into a narrow strait between two vices, as was that Doctor, *Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to prostitute himself to the carnall pleasure of a base impure Ethiopian. The rule is, that when a man findeth himself in any doubt or perplexity, touching the choice of those things that are not evil, he must choose that part that hath most honesty and justice in it: for though it fall out otherwise then well, yet it shal be alwayes some comfort and glory to a man, to have chosen the better; and besides, a man knoweth not (if he had chosen the contrary part) what would have hapened, or whether he had escaped his destiny: when a man doubteth which is the better and shortest way, he must take the straightest. And in those things that are evil (whereof there is never any choice) a man must avoid the more base and unjust; this is a rule of conscience, and belongeth to honesty. But to know which is the more honest, just, and profitable; which the more dishonest, unjust, and unprofitable; it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and sufficiency. It seemeth that in such like straits and extremities, the surer and better way is to follow Nature, and to judge that the more just and honest, which cometh nearell unto nature, that the more unjust and dishonest which is fartheit from it. Before we leave this discourse of the choice and election of things, in two words let us remove this question: From whence, cometh in our souls the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The Stoicks say, from an extraordinary, immoderate, strange, and rash operation of the soul. But a man may say, That never do two things present themselves unto us, wherein there is not some difference or other, be it never so little; and that there is alwayes something in the one, which moveth us to that choice, although it be unsensib'e, and such as we cannot expresse. He that is equally ballanced betwixt two desires, can never choose; for every choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality.

Another precept in this matter, is to take advice and counsell of another, for a man to believe himself, and to trust onely in himself, is very dangerous. Now here are required two advertisements of Prudence, the one is in the choice of those, to whom a man must adesse himself for counsell; for there are some whose counsel we should rather avoid, and flie from. First, they must be honest

honest and faithful men (which is here all one): and secondly, men sensible, advised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellors, honesty, and sufficiency. A man may add a third, and that is, That neither they, nor their nearest and inward friends, have any particular interest in the busines: for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to give good counsel, being, as is said, honest men: yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophical honestie, which is no way touched with its own proper interest, be very rare; it is also a great point of folly, to bring it into doubt and anxiety, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other advertisement is, well to hear, and entertain the counsels, receiving them without attending the event, with judgement and gentlenes, delighting in the free delivery of the truth. Having entertained and followed it as good, and coming from a good hand and a friendly, he must not repent himself of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels have bad events. But a wise man must rather content himself to have followed good counsel, which hath brought forth bad effects, than bad counsel, which hath had a happy event, as *Marius*: *Sic correcti Marii temeritas gloria ex culpa invenit: So the rashness and temerity of Marius, received glory and honour, even from his fault: and not to do like fools*, who having advisedly deliberated and chosen, think afterwards to have chosen the worse, because they weigh only the reasons of the contrary opinion, never counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereto. Thus much briefly besaid of those that seek counse: of those that give it, we shall speak in the virtue of Prudence, whereof the counsel is a great and sufficient part.

Lib. 3. cap. 2. art. 17.

5.
Temperature
betwixt fear
and assurance.

The fifth advice which I here give, to carry himself well in his affairs, is a temperature and mediocrity betwixt too great a confidence and distrust, fear and assurance. To trust and secure himself, doth many times hurr, and to distrust, offendeth; he must take special heed of making any shew of distrust, even when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea, offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemy. But yet a man is not to be over-credulous, and confident, except it be of his best assured friends; he must always keep the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose, nor too strait. He must never speak all, and let that which he speaketh be ever true. He must never deceive, but yet let him take heed he be not deceived. He must ever temper and moderate that columbine innocence.

To carry himself wisely in his affairs.

innocency and simplicity, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdom and subtily, and keeping himself upon his guard and preserving himself from the deceits, treasons, and ambuscments of another. Subtilty to defend, is as commendable, as it is dishonest to offend. He must never therefore advance and engage himself so far, but that he have always a mean when he will, and when it shall be necessary to retire himself without great damage or dislike. He must never forsake his own hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himself, that he fall into a kind of presumption and carelessness of his affairs, like those that think that no man sees so clear as themselves, that every man should yield unto them, that no man should dare to entertain a thought to displease them; and by that means become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end, they are blinded, surprised, and deceived.

*To take time
and occasion.
Against precipita-
tion.*

Idlenesse.

Another advice and times and seasons, and above all things avoid mother to all good youthful people. It is to apply every thing to and commodities, to All things have their do without purpose, contrary hereunto, where *Canis festinans cacos blind whelps*; It proceedeth us; *Nam qui: cupio improvida & ceca:* For who so desires, doth therefore is improvident and greatest adversaries to sufficiency. The contrarieth sometimes to have pernicious and dangerous. That it is lawful to be on, but not in the excess, man must consult slow and with speed accordingly is practised with the event, though h

ry important, is to take all things in their good purpose, and for that cause, he must precipitation, an enemy to wisdom, the stepsons, a vice much to be feared in young and truth the work of a skilful and active man, is true end, well to mannage all occasions make use both of the times and the meanes, sons, and even the good which a man may now too much speed and precipitation is troubleth, marrieth, and confoundeth all: *et catulos: A forward Bitch bringeth forth* commonly from that passion which car-estinat: *qui festinat, evertit: unde festina-* adversissima recta mentis, celeritas & ira: *En;* who hasteth, destroyeth; hastiness there-*nde: hastiness and anger,* are two of the threee minde: and often enough, from insuf-*fice, laziness, sloth, carelessness, which seem-* me air of maturity and wisdom, is likewise especially in the execution. For it is laid, *w and long in deliberation and consulta-* tion; and therefore the wisest say, That a execute speedily, deliberate with leisure, accomplish. It falleth out sometimes, that the good succels, and that a man is happy in have been sudden and rash in his delibera-*ration;*

Idlenesse.

ratiōnē; Subītis consiliis, eventū felicēs; Sudden counsels, happy events. But this is very seldom, and by chance or fortune, according to which we must not rule and direct our selves, but take heed, lest envy and emulation overtake us ; for commonly, a long and unprofitable repentance, is the reward of headlong hastiness. Behold then two Rocks and extremities which we must equally avoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be ready, whilst they be green and raw , as to suffer them to grow till they be over-ripe , and past the taking. The first fault, young men, and forward hot-spurs commit, who for want of patience, give no leisure to time and the Heavens to do any thing for them ; they run , but they catch nothing : The second, heavie, lasie, and dull-spirited men do commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it , a man must know his spirit valiant and vigilant, and likewise patient : he must foresee it, watch, attend it, see it comming, and prepare for it , and so take it just at that instant when it is ready.

The seventh advice is , well to carry himself with these two Masters, and Superintendents of the affairs of the World, which are Industry or virtue, and Fortune. It is an ancient question , which of these two hath the most credit, force, and authority : for it is out of all doubt, that both have; and it is clearly false , that one only doth all, and the other nothing : It were perhaps to be wished , that it were true, and that one only had the whole Empire , the busines would go the better, a man would wholly attend that , whereby it would be the more easie ; the difficulty is to joyn them together, and to attend them both. Commonly , they that settle themselves unto the one, contemn the other ; the younger and bolder sort, respect and trust to fortune, hoping much good from it , and many times by them it worketh great matters , insomuch , that it seems to favour them ; the more ancient and staid, trust to their industry; and these of the two, have the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two , industry is the more honest, the more certain, glorious ; for though fortune be contrary to it, and shall make all industry and diligence vain, yet nevertheless , there remaineth great contentment , in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or duty , hath carried himself like a man of courage. They that follow the other part , are in danger to attend in vain, and though perhaps, things succeed according to their own desires , yet they want that honour and glory that the former hath. Now the advice of wisdom, is not wholly, and so much to settle.

7.
*Industry and
Fortune.*

settle our selves to the one, that we contemn, and exclude the other; for they have both a good part, yea many times they help, and do mutually attend one the other. A wife man then, must carry himself with them both, but yet unequally, for the advantage and prehension must be given, as hath been said, to virtue, industry, *Virtue duce, comite fortuna: Virtue the guide, fortune the companion, the follower.* This advice likewise, is required to keep discretion, which seasoneth, and giveth a taste or relish to all things: this is not a particular quality, but common, whiah minglith it self in all: Indiscretion marreth all, and taketh away the grace from the best actions, whether it be to do good to another, for all gratifications are not well bestowed upon all sorts of people; or to excuse himself, for inconsiderate excuses serve for accusations; or to play the part of an honest and courteous man, for a man may exceed and degenerate into rusticity; or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

C H A P. XI.

*To keep himself always ready for death, a fruit
of Wisdom.*

I:
*The day of
death.*

THe day of death is the master-day, & Judge of all other dayes, the tryal and touchstone of all the actions of our life. Then do we make our greatest assay, & gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that judgeth the life of a man, must look how he carrieth himself at his death: for the end crowneth the work, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an evil defameith and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well judge of any, without wronging of him, before he hath played the last act of his Comedy, which is without all doubt, the most difficult. *Epaminondas*, one of the wise men of Greece, being demanded whom of three men he esteemed most, Himself, *Chabrias*, or *Ephicrates*, answered; We must first see all three die, before we resolve that question: the reason is, because in all the rest, a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble,

*Nam vera voces tum a nunc gestore ab imo
Eiiciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.
Then only, only then, and then no doubt
Do men unmask, and then the truth comes out.*

Fortune from far leemeth to watch, and lie in wait for us, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her

her power, and in a moment overthrow all that we have built, and gathered together in many years, and to make us cry out with *La-berins*: *Nimirum hac d^e una pliss vixi, mibi quām vivendum fuit: Surely I have lived more to my losse in this one day, then in all the time before.* And so was it well and wisely said of Solon to Crœsus; *Anie obium nemo beatus: Before dea: h no man is happy.*

It is an excellent thing to learn to die, it is the studie of wifdom, which aimeth wholly at this end: he hath not spent his life ill that hath learned to die well; and he hath lost his whole time, that knows not well how to end it. *Male vivit, quisquis nescit* Seneca. ^{To know how to die.}
bene mori: non frustra nascitur qui bene moritur: nec innobiliter vixit,
qui feliciter desit: Mori totā vitā discendum est. & praeipuum ex
vita officiis est. He liveth badly, that knoweth not how to die well;
he was not born in vain, that dieth well; neither hath he lived unpro-
fitably, that departeth happily: To die, is the study and learning of all
our life, and the chiefeſt thing, and duty of life. He shoots not well,
that looks not on the mark; and he cannot live well that hath not
an eye to his death. To be brief, the science of dying is the science
of liberty; the way to fear nothing, to live well, contentedly and
peaceably: without this knowledge there is no more pleasure in
life, then in the fruition of that thing which a man feareth alwayes
to lose.

First, and above all, we must endeavour that our sins die before our selves: Secondly that we be alwayes ready and prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that hour he have no other thing to do, but to die! that he have no more need of any thing, nor of time, nor of himself, but sweetly and contentedly departeth this life, saying:

Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi:

I have done, my task is set: or

Scilicet videlicet.

To live's a gift; to die's a debt.

Thirdly, we must endeavour, that our death be voluntary; for to die well, is to die willingly.

It seemeth that a man may carry himself in death five divers wayes: He may fear and flie it, as a very great evil; attend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing natural, inevitable, reasonable; contemn it, as a thing indifferent, and of no great importance; desire and seek after it, as the onely haven of rest from all the torments of this life;

4.

A five-fold manner of ending in death.

Y

yea,

yea, a very great gain; give it to himself, by taking away his own life. Of these five, the three middle most are good, befitting a good and settled soul, although diversly and in a different condition of life; the two extremes are vicious and out of weakness, though it be with divers vices. A word or two of them all.

5.
To fear death. The first is not approved by men of understanding, though by the greater part it be practised: a testimony of great weakness, Against these kind of men, and for your better comfort, either against your own death, or the death of another, thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men fear more, or have more in horrour then death: nevertheless, there is not a thing where there is less occasion or matter of fear, or that contrarily yieldeth greater reasons to perswade us with resolution to accept of it. And therefore we must lay, that it is a mere opinion, and a vulgar errour that hath wonne the world thus to think of it. We give too much credit to the inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell us, That it is a very great evil: and too little credit to wisdom it self which teacheth us, That it is a freedome from all evils and the haven of life. Never did a present death do hurt to any man; and some that have made triall, and partly knew what it is, complain not of it: And if death be counted an evil, it is of all the evils, the onely that doth no harm, that hath no evil in it: It is the imagination onely of death before it comes, that maketh us to fear it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not verity; and it is truly where opinion bandeth it self most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in us, with the mask of death. There cannot be any eason to fear it, because no man knows what it is, that he should fear it: for why, or how should a man fear that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely laid he, that of all others was counted the wisest, That to fear death is to make shew of greater understanding and sufficiency than can be in a man, by seeming to know that, that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himself: for being solicited at his death by his friends, to plead before the judges, for his justification, and for his life, this oration he made unto them: My masters and friends, if I should plead for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speak against my self, and desire my own loss and hinderance because I know not what it is to die, nor what good or what ill there is in death: they that fear death, presume to know it; as for my self, I am utterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired;

It is opinion.

desired. Those things that I know to be evil, as to offend my neighbour, I fly and avoid ; those that I know not to be evil as death, I cannot fear. And therefore I commit my self unto your selves ; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for me to die, or not to die, determine you thereof as you shall think good.

For a man to torment himself with the fear of death, it is first great weaknes and cowardlines : There is not a woman that in few daies is not appeased and content with the death, yea the most painfull that may be, either of her husband or her child. And why should not reason and wisdome do that in an hour, at an instant (as we have thousand examples) which time performeth in a fool, in the weakest lex ? What use is there of wisdome and constancy in man to what end serve they, if they speed him not in a good action, if he can do no more with their help , then a fool with his folly ? From this weaknesse it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolve themselves, that it is their last hour , and there is not any thing where this deceitful hope doth more busy man, which it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter , and that all things have an interest in us, and at our death must suffer with us: so much do we esteem our selves.

Again, a man sheweth himself herein unjust, for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he fear it ? If an evil thing , why doth he make it worse, and add unto death evil upon evil , sorrow and grief where there is none ? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest into the sea, to let men know how little he is grieved with his losses.

Finally, to fear death, is for a man to be an enemy to himself, and to his own life : for he can never live at ease and contentedly, that ^{To be enemy to his own life.} feareth to die. This man is onely a free-man , which feareth not death : and contrarily, life is but a slavery, if it were not made free by death : For death is the onely stay of our liberty, the common and ready receptacle of all evils : It is then a misery (and miserable are all that do it) to trouble our life with care and fear of death , and our death with the care of life.

But to say the truth , what complaints and murmuring would there be against nature, if death were not; if we should have continued here, will we, nill we, with and against our own wills? doubtless men would have cursed nature for it. Imagine with thy self how much more insupportable, and painfull, a durable life would have been, then a life with a condition to leave it. ^{Chiron refused}

To keep himself always ready

immortality, being informed of the conditions thereof by the god o Time, *Saturn* his athen. Doubtlesse death is a very beautifull and rich invention of nature: *Optimum naturae inventum, nusquam satiuslandatum: The best invention of nature, never sufficiently to be praised;* and a very proper and profitable necessitie to many things. If it were quite taken from us, we shoud desire it more then now we fear it; yea thinke after it more then lie it selfe; such a remedy is it against so many evils, such a mean to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitternesse? doubtles men would run unto it with great desire and indiscretion. To keep therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither love life too much, nor flee it; fear death, nor run after it; both of them, sweetnesse and sharppenesse, are therein temperated together.

10.
Remedies not
to fear death.

The remedie that the vulgar sort do give herein, is too simple; and that is, Never to think or to speake thereof. Besides, that such a kind of carelesnesse cannot lodge in the head of a man of understanding, it would likewite at the last colt him dear: for death coming unawares, and unexpected, what torments, out-cries, furies, and despairs are these commonly seen? Wisdome advileth much better; that is, to attend and expect death with a constant foot, and to encounter it: And the better to do this, it giveth us contrary counsel to the vulgar sort, that is to have it alwaies in our thoughts; to practise it, to accustome our selues unto it, to game it, to present it unto us at all hours, to expect it, not onely in places suspected and dangerous, but in the midst of seats and sports: that the burden of our song be, *Remember thy end,* that others are dead, that thought to have lived as long as our selves; that that which happened then to them, may happen now to us; following herein the custome of the *Egyptians*, who in their solemn banquets placed the image of death before their eyes, and of the *Christians* and all other, who have their Church-yards near their temples and other publick and frequented places, that men might alwaies (as saith *Lycurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is uncertain in what place death attends us, and therefore let us attend death in all places, and be alwaies ready to receive it.

*Omnem orede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,
Grata superveniet qua non sperabimus hora
Think every day thy last; each ready be,
And so th' uncertain hour shall welcome thee.*

But

But let us consider the excuses and grievances that these poor people alleadge to cover and colour their complaints, which are all vain and frivolous : It grieveth them to die young, and they complain as well in regard of others as themselves, that death prevented them, and cutteth them off in the flower and strength of their yeirs. The complaint of the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account nothing precious, but that which is long and durable; whereas contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin, fine, and delicate. It is the mark of a skilfull work-maister to enclose much in a little space : and a man may say, that it is fatall to great and gloriouſ men, not to live long : Great virtue, and great or long life do ſeldome or never meet together, Life is measured by the end, provided that that be good, and all the rest hath a proportion thereto : the quantity is nothing to make it more or leſſe happy, no more then the greatness of a circle makes the circle more round then the leſſe ; the figure here doth all; a little man is as perfect a man as a greater : Neither men nor their lives are measured by the ell.

1.

The grievances
and excusēs of
ſearful men
are/wered.

1.

Again, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends, or to be slain, and to remain unburied; they desire to die in peace, in their beds, amongst their friends being comforted by them, and comforting them. All they that follow the warrs, and ride polt to be in the battell, are not of this mind; these men run willingly to their end, and ſeek a tombe amongst the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children fear men when they are masked : diſcover their faces and they fear them no more : And even ſo, believe it, fire and ſword astoniſh us, when we think of them ; take off their mask, the death wherewith they threaten us, is but the ſame death wherewith women and children die.

2.

They are troubled to think they muſt leave all the world. And why? They have ſeen all, one day is like another, there is no other light, nor other night, no other Sun, nor other course of the world. One year telleth us that all things grow every year worse and worse, they have ſeen the childhood, the youth the virility, the old age of the world: there is no art, no way to begin again.

3.

Yea, but they leave their parents and their friends. Where they go they ſhall find more, and ſuch as they have never yet ſeen, and those they leave behind them and deſire ſo much, ſhall ſhortly follow them.

4.

But what ſhall become of their ſmall children and orphans left without

5.

To keep himself always ready

without guide, without support? As if those their children were more theirs then Gods, or as if they could love them more then he that is their first and their truest father; and how many such so leit, have risen to higer place and greater ability then other men?

6. But it may be they fear to go alone. This is great simplicity, so many people dying with them, and at the self-same hour.

7. Finally; they go into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawfull to resume it, they would refuse it, and if a man were worthy to know what it is before he receive it, he would never accept of it: *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus: No man would accept of life, if he knew what he received.* Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either wholly nothing, as miscreants believe, or in far better state then before, as the wisest of the world do affirm? why then are they offended with death, since it quits them of all grief? The self-same journey they have made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without fear, they make again from life unto death, *Rever-ri unde venis, quid grave es? To return from whence thou camest, what burthen, what grief is it?*

8. But it may be that the spectacle of death displease them, because they that die look gashly. It is true, but this is not death, but the mask of death, that which is hid under it, is very beautifull, for death hath nothing in it that is fearfull: we have sent idle and poor spies to know it; who report not what they have seen, but what they have heard, and what they fear.

9. But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh us from them, and us from our selves; it taketh us from that we know, and have been accustomed unto, and bringeth us to an estate unknown: *At horremus ignota: But we abhor things unknown;* it taketh us from the light, to bring us into darknesse; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution. There are the weightiest objections: whereunto in a word a man may answer, That death being the inevitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we need not dispute so much thereof; for it is a folly to fear that which a man cannot avoid. *Dementis est timore mortem, quia certa exspectantur, dubia metuntur, mors habet necessitatem aquam & suavitatem:* It is mere folly to fear death, because things certain are expected; doubtful things are feared; the necessity of death is most just and invincible. But these kind of people make not their count well; for it is quite contrary to that which they lay; for instead of taking any

any thing from us, it giveth us all ; in stead of taking us from our selves, it ets us in liberty , and makes us free to our selves; in stead of bringing us into darknesse, it taketh it from us, and puts us into the light ; and it doth the same to us, that we do to all fruits, spoiling them of their barks, their shels, their foldings, their speres, their skinns to bring them into sight, use, nature ; *Ita solet fieri, pereunt semper velamenta nascentium : So it was wont to be done, for always the veil and covering of every thing doth perish.* It taketh us from a strait, incommodious, rheumatick, dark place, where we see but a small part of the heavens, and the light but a farre off, through the two narrow holes of our eyes, to bring us into an open liberty, an assured health, a perpetuall light ; into such a place, such an estate where we may wholly see the whole heavens, and the light in his naturall place. *Equaliter tibi splendebit omne cœli latum, totam lumen suo loco prope totum aspicies quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intueris & miraris :* Every part of heaven shall together shine upon thee, who wholly shalt behold all the glory thereof in his due place, which now through the straight and narrow passage of the sight, thou dost but see and discern afar off. To conclude, It taketh us from that death, which began in the wombe of our mother, and now endeth ; to bring us to that life which shall never end. *Dies iste quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est :* This day which thou fearest as thy last , is the birth day of Eternity.

The second manner of carriage of men in this matter of death , is of a good, sweet, and moderate soul, and is justly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content themselves to endure it, by governing themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it cometh. This is a well tempered mediocrity, suitable to such a condition of life, between the extremities (which are to desire and fear, to seek and to flee, vicious and faulty : *Summum nec metuas diem, nec optes (mortem concupiscentes, & timentes aquæ obiurgat Epicurus) :* Fear not thy last day, neither wish for it (for both to desire death, and to fear it, is alike condemned by Epicurus) : if they be not covered and excused by some reason, not common and ordinary, as shall be said in his place. To seek and desire death is ill; it is injustice to desire death without a cause, and to be out of charity with the world, which our lives may be beneficiall unto. It is to be unthankfull to nature, to contemu it, and not to make the best

IT.
To attend
death is good.

use thereof: to be over anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that state that is not burthenome, and we are called unto. To flee and fear death on the other tide, is against nature, reason, justice, and all duty.

13.
Death is natural.

For to die, it is a thing natural, necessary, and inevitable, just, and reasonable: Natural, for it is a part of the order of the whole Universe, and of the life of the world: wilt thou then that the world be ruined, and a new made for thy self? Death holdeth a high place in the policie and great common-wealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the works of nature: the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others: *Sic rerum summa novatur:* And it is not only a part of this great whole Universe, but of our particular essence, nor lesse essentiall then to live, to be born. In flying death, thou liest thy self; thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieveth thee to die, why wert thou born? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to go forth again; and therefore he that is not willing to go forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to death, as to life.

Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet.
Man born to die, doth oftentimes do so,
Even (if he could) before he can say, no:
His birth and death, concurring so together,
As do a dogs two ends in coldest weather.

Sola mors ius equum est generis humani; vivere noluit qui mori non vult; vita cum exceptione mori data est; tam est stultus qui timet mortem, quam qui senectutem: Death only is mans due right: he should not desire to live, that would not desire to die; life is given to us with exception of death; As foolish is he that feareth to die, as to be old.

To be unwilling to die, is to be unwilling to be a man, for all men are mortall: and therefore a wise man laid, and that without passion, having received news of the death of his sonne; I knew I begot, and bred him up a mortall man. Death being then a thing so naturall and essentiall, both for the world in grosse, and for thy self in particular, why should it be horrible unto thee? Thou goest against nature, the fear of grief and pain is naturall, but not of death: for being so serviceable to nature, and nature having instituted

ted it, to what end should it imprint in us a hatred and horrour thereof? Children and beasts fear not death, yea, many times they suffer it cheerfully: it is not then nature that teacheth us to fear it, but rather to attend and receive it, as being sent by it.

Secondly, it is necessary, fatall, inevitab'le; and this thou knowest, that fearest and weepst. What greater folly can there be, then for a man to torment him self for nothing, and that willingly and of purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knows to be inexorable; to knock at that door that cannot be opened? What is there more inexorable and deaf then death? We must therefore fear things uncertain; do our best endeavours in things that are not remedisse; but such us are certain, as death, we must attend, and grow resolute in things past remedie. The fool feareth and flieth death; the fool seeks and runs after it; the wise man attendeth it: It is folly to grieve at that, that cannot be mended; to fear that, that cannot be avoided: *Feras, non culpes, quod vitari non posse?* Wilt thou not bear the blows thou canst not avoid? The example of *David* is excellent, who understanding of the death of his dear child, put on his best apparell, and made himself merry, saying to those that wondered at this kind of carriage, that whilst his sonne lived, he importuned God for his recovery; but being dead, that care was ended, and there was no remedy. The fool thinks he maketh a better answer, to say, that that is the caue of his grief, and that he tormenteth himself; because there is no remedy; but he doubleth and perfeeth his own folly thereby. *Scienter frustra niti extrema demencia est:* It is extreme madnesse to labour willingly, and on set purpose, in vain. Now death being so necessary and inevitable, it is not onely to no purpose to fear, but making of necessity a virtue, we must welcome it and receive it kindly; for it is better for us to go to death, then that death should come to us; to catch that, before that catch us.

Thirdly, to die is a thing reasonable and just, it is reason to arive to that place, to vards which we are alwayes walking; and if a man ^{Just and reasonable.} fear to come thither, let him not walk, but lay himself or turn back again, which is impossible to do. It is reason that thou give place to others, since others have given place to thee; If thou have made thy commodity of this life, thou must be satisfied and be gone, as he that is invited to a banquet, takes his re'ection and departeth. If thou have not known how to make use and profit thereof, what needest thou care if thou lose it? or to what end wouldest thou:

thou keep it? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawn that must be restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy own schedule, thy faith, thy duty? It is then against reason to spurn against death, since that thereby thou acquittest thy self of so much, and dischargest thy self of so great an account. It is a thing generall and common to all, to die; why then troublest thou thy self? Wilt thou have a new priviledge, that was yet never seen, and be a lone man by thy self? Why fearest thou to go whither all the world goeth? where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee? Death is equally certain to all, and equality is the first part of equity; *Omnes eodem cogimur: omnium versatur urna; serius ocyus for exitura, &c.* We all are driven thereunto: men daily die, even as their lot falleth forth, &c.

^{I.}
To contemn
death is good,
if it be for a
thing that de-
serves it.

The third is the part of a valiant and generous mind, which is practised with reason, in a publick, elevated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters go, a man must more account thereof then of his life, which is placed upon the stage and scaffold of this world: he most runne his race with resolution, that he may give a lustre to his other actions, and perform those things that are profitable and exemplary. He must lay down his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemn death, shall never not onely perform any thing of worth, but he exposeth himself to divers dangers; for whilst he goeth about to keep his life safe and sure, he layeth open and hazardeth his devoir, his honour, his virtue and honestie. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldeit, and most honourable exploits whether in good or evil. He that feareth not to die fears nothing; he doth whatsoever he will, he makes himself a master both of his own life, and of anothers: the contempt of death, is the true and lively source of all the beautifull and generous actions of men: from hence are derived the brave resolutions and free speeches of virtue uttered by so many great personages. *Elvidius Priscus*, whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the Senate; or coming to speak as he would have him, answered, That he was a Senatour, it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there, he were required to give his advice, he would speak freely that which his conscience commanded him. Being threatned by the same

same man, that if he spake he should die; Did I ever tell you (saith he) that I was immortall? Do you what you will, and I will do what I ought: it is in your power to put me unjustly to death, and in me to die constantly. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned with much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yeild themselves to *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into thir country with a great power; one for the rest answered, *What hard dealing can they suffer that fear not to die?* And being told by the same *Philip* that he would break and hinder all their designments; What say they, will he likewise hinder us from dying? Another being asked by what means a man may live free, answered, *By contemning death.* And another youth being taken and sold for a slave, said unto him that bought him. *Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a fool to live a slave whilst I may be free, and whilst he spake, cast himself down from the top of the house.* A wise man said unto another, deliberating with himself how he might take away his life, to free himself from an evil that at that time pressed him sore; Thou dost not deliberate of any great matter, it is no great thing to live: thy slaves, thy beasts do live, but it is a great matter to die honestly, wisely, constantly. To conclude and crown this article, Our religion hath not had a more firm and assured foundation, and wherein the author thereof hath more insisted, then the contempt of this life. But many there are that make a shew of contemning death, when they fear it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it grieveth them to die: *Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil astimo: I would not die, but I make little account of death.* Many deliberate in their health and soundeit judgements to suffer death with constancy, nay to murther themselves, a parte played by many, and for which end *Heliogabalus* made many sumptuous preparations; but being come to the point, some were terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poisoned himself. Others have turned away their eyes and their thoughts, as if they would fleal upon it, swallowing it down insensibly as men take pills, according to that saying of *Cesar*, *That the best death was the shortest:* and of *Pliny*, *That a short death was the happiest hour of mans life.* Now no man can be laid to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eyes open, as *Socrates* did, who had thirty whole daies to ruminante & to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeavour, mildly

and

and chearfully, *Pompon. Atticus, Tullius Marcellinus Romans, Cleantes the Philosopher*, all three almost after one manner: for having assaied to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those Maladies that did torment them; but finding themselves rather cured thereby, nevertheless they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Otho* and *Cato* having prepared all things fit for their death, upon the very point of the execution settled them selves to sleep, and slep profoundy, being no more astonisched at death, then at any other ordinary and light accident.

17.
To desire death.

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute mind, practised in former times by great and holy personages, and that in two cases: the one the more naturall and lawfull, is a painfull and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a farre worse death. To be brief, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedy. This is to desire death as the rrait and onely haven from the torments of this life, the soveraign good of nature, the onely stay and pillar of our liberty. It is imbecility to yeild unto evils, but it is folly to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to live is rather a burthen then a blessing, and there is more ill in life then good; for, to preserve our life to encrease our torment, is agaist nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to avoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more then to flie those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farre worse then death, for which we shoule rather die and not live at all, then live. And therefore the *Lacedemonians* being cruelly threatened by *Antipater*, if they yeilded not to his demand, answered, If thou threaten us with any thing that is worse then death, death shall be welcome unto us. And the wisest were wont to say, *That a wise man liveth as long as he shoulde, not so long as he can*, death being more at his command and iij his power, then life. Life hath but one entranee and that too dependeth upon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our own wills, and the more voluntary it is, the more honourable; and there are a thousand wayes unto it. We may want means thereby to live, but not to die. Life may be taken away from every man, by every man, but not death: *Ubique mors est, optimò hoc carit Deus; eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, at nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patient: Death is every where: God best foresaw this; one man, may bereave another of life, but of death*

death no man ; whereunto there are infinite wayes and meanes : The most favourable present that nature hath bestowed upon us, and that taketh away from us all means of complaint is, that it hath left unto us the key of the clost, liberty to die when we will. Wherefore complainest thou in this world ? it holdeth thee not ; if thou live in pain, thy idleness and fear is the caus ; for to die, there is nothing necessary, but a will.

The other case is a lively apprehension and desire of the life to come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after a great gain, the seed of a better life, the bridge unto Paradise, the way to all good, and an earnest penny of the resurrection. A firm belief and hope of theire things is incomparible with the fear and horrour of death : it persuadeth us rather to be weary of this life, and to desire death *Vt am habere in patientia, & mortem in desiderio ; To endure our life with patience, but rather to desire death :* To have life in affliction, and death in affection : their life is a croesse, their death a comfort, and therefore their vowes and their voices are ; *Cupio dissolvi : mihi mors lucrum : quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius ? I desire to be dissolved, for death is profitable unto me : who shall then free me from death ?* And for this cause those Philosophers and Christians have been justly reproached (which is to be understood of those that are weak and idle, and not of all) that play the publick dissemblers, and do not in verity believe that which they so much talk of, and so highly commend touching that happy immortality, and those unspeakable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, and fear death so much, the necessary passage thereunto.

> The fist and last, is the execution of this precedent desire, which is for a man to be his own executioner, and the authour of his own death. This seemeth to proceed from virtue and the greatness of a mans courage, having been anciently practised by the greatest and most excellent men & women of every nation and religion, *Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Persians, Medes, French, Ind'ans.* Philosophers of all kinds *Jews,* witnessesse that good old man Razis, called the father of the *Jews* for his virtue ; and his wives, who under *Antiochus*, having circumcised their children, cast them selves head-long from the rock with them : And Christians too, witnessesse those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius and Sophronia*, whereof the first, with his mother and sisters, cast himself into the river, and the other killed her self with a knife, to avoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour :

To keep himself always ready

Emperour : Yea witness divers people and whole citiles, as *Cayenn* in *Italy*, *Astapa*, *Numantia* in *Spain* besieged by the *Romans*; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip*, a city in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approved and authorized by many common-weals, by laws and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the Ile of *Cea*; in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean Islands*; and justified by many great reasons, drawn from the precedent article, which is of the just desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to ask, to seek after death, why should it be an ill act to give it unto our selves? If a mans own death be just in the will, why should it not be as just in the hand, and the execution? Why should I expect that from another, which I can do my self? and why should it not be better to give it, then to suffer another to give it; to meet, then to attend it? for the fairest death is the more voluntary. Finally, I offend not the law made against thieves and robbers, when I take but my own goods, and cut but my own purse; neither am I guilty of the lawes made against murtherers by taking away my own life. But this opinion is reproved by divers, not only Christians, but Jewes, as *Josephus* disputeth against his Captains in the cave *du Puis*: and Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not only for a vice of cowardlinesse and impatiencie; for it is for a man to hide himself from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and lively virtue must never yeild, for evils and crosses are nourishments therunto; and it is greater constancy well to use the chain wherewith we are tied, then to break it; and more settled resolution in *Regulus*, then in *Cato*.

*Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam,
Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.*

Si fractus illabatur orbis

Impavidum ferient ruina.

'Tis no virtue to despise.

A life long led in miseries :

But to smile in fortune rude,

Is the mor of fortitude.

*The ruinous world, should it on this man fall,
Kill him it may, daunt him it never shall.*

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commandement of him that gave it him; we are not here for our selves, not our own masters. This then

then is not a matter beyond all doubt or disputation.

It is first beyond all doubt, that we are not to attempt this last exploit without very great & just cause, (may I cannot see how any cause should be great and just enough) to the end that it be as they say, *εὐλογητής εἰσαγωγή*, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoever some say, that a man may dy for light caules, since they that hold us in life are no s weighty. It is ingratitude to nature, not to accept and use her present, it is a sign of lightnesse to be too anxious and scrupulous, to break company for matters of no moment, and not for such as are just, and lawfull, if there be any such. And therfore they had nor a sufficient excuse, and just cause of their death, of whom I made mention before, *Pomponius, Atticus, Marcellinus* and *Claudius*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this only reason, because they were already near unto it. The wives of *Perrus*, of *Scaurus*, of *Larbio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and divers others, who died only to accompany their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Cato* and others, who died because their businesse succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill usage at their hands. They that have murthered themselves because they would not live at the mercy, and by the grace and favour of those whom they hated; as *Gravius Silvanus*, and *Statius Proximus*, being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recover a shame and dishonour past, as that Roman *Lucretia*, Sparazapizes the son of Queen *Tomyris*, Boges the Lieutenant of King *Xerxes*. They that for no particular caule, but only because they see the weal-publick in a bad and declining estate, murther themselves, as *Nerva* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Virius, Jubelius*, in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with living, or for priuate cause loath to live any longer. Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and just, but that it be necessarily and remediless, and that all manner of means to preserve life be first put in practise. For precipitation and anticipated despair is very vicious, as in *Brunus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reuques of the Roman liberty whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Clementes*, must manage his life, and make use thereof to the uttermost? for to take it away, a man never wants time, it is a remedy which he hath alwaies in his own hands; but the state of things may change and grow better. *Joseph* and divers others have to their

great

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great benefit practised this counsel: things that seem altogether desperate, do many times change, and have a happy success; *Aliquis carnifici suo superstes fuit: Some men have out-lived their miseries.*

Multa dies varijsque labor mutabilis est.

Rerum in melius.

Have patience, man, and be content to live.

That which a day denies, a day may give.

A man must carry himself in his place and calling, as a defendant against him that assaileth him, *cum moderamine inculpat a tutela: with the government of blameless protection:* he must trie all manner of means before he come to this extremity. Secondly, and without doubt it is far better, and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firme to the end, then fearfully and cowardly to flee or die; but forasmuch as it is a gift not given unto all, no more than continence is: *Non omnes capiunt verbum istud, unde melius nubere quam uriri: All men take not this saying.* Better to marry then to burn: the question is, whether an insupportable and remediless evil happening, which may utterly undo and turn topsy turvey our whole resolution, and drive us into despair, de'ight, and murmuring against God, it be more expedient, or a lesse evil for a man courageously to deliver himself, having his senses sound and settled, then by standing to it, for fear of failing in his duty, expose himself to the danger of sinking, and being utterly lost. It is not a lesse evil to quit the place, then to be obstinate and perish; to flee, then to be taken. It is true that it seemeth by all humane and philosophicall reason to be practised, as hath been said, by so many famous people of all countries and climates. But Christianity doth no way approve it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

Finally, it is a great point of wisdome to learn to know the point and period, to choose a fit hour to die: Every man hath his time and season to die; some prevent it, others prolong it: there is weakness and valour in them both; but there is required discretion. How many men have survived their glory, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, have darkned it again, and lived to help to bury their own honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no relish or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthy clout sowed to the hem of a rich and beautiful ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteth and grows worse and worse; and the losse is

is as great too, if it be gathered too soon. Many Saints and holy men have fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the Church and Weal-publick, though in respect of their own particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charity to desire to live for the benefit of another ; *Si populo tuo sim necessarius, non recuso laborem : If I am needfull to thy people, I refuse not labour.*

I.
Forms of
death, divers.

Death hath divers forms, some more easie then other, and taketh divers qualities according to the fantasie of every one. Among those that are naturall, they that proceed from weakness and a numness of the members are the sweetest and the easiest : among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, and the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplary and demonstrative death of constancy and sufficiency ; this is to consider another thing, and to seek their own reputation : but this is vanity, for this is no act of society, but of one onely person, who hath enough to do with himself, to minister to himself inward comfort, and hath no need to trouble himself with what belongeth to another, especially all the interest he hath in his reputation ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it self, quiet, solitary, and attendeth wholly to that, which at that time is fittest. That great assistance of parents and friends, bringeth a thousand discommodities ; it oppreseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his ears, another his eyes, another his mouth; their cries and complaints, if they be true, rifle the heart; if faigned, afflict and torment it. Many great personages have sought to die far from their friends, to avoid this inconvenience, accounting it a childish thing, & a foolish humor, to be willing by their miseries to move sorrow and compassion in their friends ; we commend constancy to suffer bad fortune, we accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our own case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with us, but they must afflict themselves too : A wise man that is sick, should content himself with the settled countenance of his assistants.

C H A P. XII.

To maintain himself in true tranquillity of spirit, the fruit and crown of wisdom, and the conclusion of this Book.

The tranquillity of the spirit is the sovereign good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wilest seek by sea and

by land, on foot, and a horseback; all our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labours and studies, the crown of wisdom. But least a man should mistake himself herein, you must know that this tranquillity is not a retreat or vacation from all affairs, a delightful solitariness and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelessness of all things: if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enjoy as great a good as the wisest can aspire unto with all their studys. Neither multitude nor scarcity of busines doth any thing herein. It is a beautiful, sweet, equal, just, firm and pleasant estate of the soul, which neither businesse nor idleness, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time, can any way trouble, alter, mend, or deprese; *Vera tranquillitas non concusat: Nothing troubles true tranquillity.*

2. The means to attain thereto, to get and preserve it, are the points that I have handled in this second Book, whereof this is a brief collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets & impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertain and preserve it. The things that do most hinder and trouble the rest and tranquillity of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous; and secondly desires and passions, which engender in us a kind of delicacy and difficulty: which are the cause that a man is never content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrary fortunes, prosperity and adversity, as with two violent and mighty winds: and finally, that vile and base captivity, wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the judgement and will) is enthralled like a beast under the yoke of certain local and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himself from the stocks and unjust subjections, and bring his spirit into liberty, restore himself to himself free, universal, open, seeing into all; and wandering through the beautiful and univeral circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus, mundum ut unam dominum spectans, toti se inferens mundo, & in omnes ejus actus contemplat onem suam mittens: He that is begotten generally, holds this world but as one house, applying himself to the whole world, and exercising his contemplation in all the actions thereof.*

3. The places being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are, a true honesty, and to live in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fit. The principall parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and settle this building, are first true piety,

piety, whereby, with a soul not astonished, but settled, pure, free; devout, a man contemplates God, the great Sovereign, and absolute work-master of all things, who can neither be seen, nor known: but yet he must be known, adored, worshipped, served with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all manner of good, and so fear no evil: afterwards he must walk roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the laws and customes, live with a heart open both to the eyes of God and the world; *Conscientiam suam aperiens, semperque tanquam in publico vivens, se magis veritus, quam alios: Shewing his conscience, and always living as it were in publick, more afraid of himself, than of others.* Again, he must keep in himself and with others, and generally in all things, in his thoughts, speeches, designments, actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillity, laying aside all pomp and vanity, rule his desires, content himself with a mediocrity and sufficiency: *Quod sit esse velit, nihilque malit: Would be as he is, and rather nothing then so; rejoice in his fortunes.* A tempest hath a great deal less force, and doth less hurt when the sailes are taken down, then when they are hoised up, and laid open to the winds. He must be constant against whatsoever may wound or hurt him, raise himself above & beyond all fear, contemning all the blows of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all evils, and not the cause of any; *Contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia que contingunt accidentemq; eminens, Imperurbatus, intrepidus: A contemner or despiser of all things, where-with mans life may be afflicted, raising himself above all things that may chance or happen, without perturbation, without fear.* And so hold himself firm unto himself, agree with himself, live at else without any pain or inward contention, full of joy, of peace, of comfort and content in himself: *Sapiens plenus gaudio, bilaris, placidus cum diis ex pari vivit: Sapientia effectus gaudii equalitas, solus sapiens gaudet: A wise man is full of joy, merry, peaceable, liveth in equal pleasure with the gods: the effect of wisdom, is the equality of joy, wherein only a wise man delighteth.* He must I say entertain himself, and continue content in himself, which is the proper fruit and effect of wisdom: *Nisi sapienti sua non placent: omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat: No man, but a wise man is content with his own: every fools travels dislike him. No man is happy, but he that so thinks himself.*

To conclude, to this tranquillity of spirit two things are necessary, innocency and a good conscience; this is the first and princi-

pall part which doth marvellously arm and confirm him with assurance; but, this is not always sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seen in divers that are troubled and lost: *Erit tanta tribulatio ut seducantur iusti: There shall be so great tribulation, that even the righteous shall be seduced.* And therefore the other is likewise necessary, which is force and constancy of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is marvellous, it makes us to betray, to accuse our selves, and for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against us.

Occlum quatiens animo tortore flagellum.

Shaking a double relish with a whip

That strikes the soul, where at the devils skip.

It frameth an enditement, condemneth, and executeth us, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith Epicurus, because they never can assure themselves to be hid, their own conscience alwaies discovering them to themselves, *Prima est hac ultio, quod, se Judice nemo nocens absolvitur: This is the first revenge of sin, that every man being his own Judge, no sinner is quit.* So likewise neither a weak and fearfull soul, be it never so holy, nor a strong and courageous; if it be not sound and pure, can never enjoy this so rich and happy tranquillity; but he that hath them all worketh wonders; as Socrates, Epaminondas, Cato, Scipio, of whom there are three admirable exploits touching this subject. These two Romans being publickly accused, made their accusers to blush, won the Judges and the whole assembly, being stricken with an admiration.

He had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius*

of Scipio, to know how to be faulty, and to debase himself so much, as to defend his own innocence.



O F W I S D O M E.

The third Book.

Wherein are handled,

*The particular advisements of Wis-
dom, by the four Moral Virtues.*

THE PREFACE.

Forasmuch as our purpose in this Book, is, by piece-meal to instruct unto Wisdome, and to give the particular advisements after the general, handled in the second Book ; that we may the better hold a certain course and order therein, we have thought that we cannot do better, then to follow the four Mistresses of moral Virtues, *Prudence*, *Justice*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance* : for in these four, almost all the duties of our life are comprehended. *Prudence*, is, as a general guide and conduct of the other Virtues, and of our whole life, though properly it be exercised in the affairs that belong thereto. *Justice* concerneth the persons of men ; for it is to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him. *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, concern all accidents good and evil, pleasant & painful, good & ill fortune. Now in these three, persons, affairs, and ac-

Of Prudence in general

accidents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the traffick of this world.

Of Prudence, the first Virtue.

CHAP. I.

Of Prudence in general.

¹ *The excellency thereof* Prudence is with Reason put in the first Rank, as the general Queen, superintendent, and guide of all other Virtues, *Anriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautiful, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our Affairs, and in a word, the Art of our Life, as Physick the Art of our Health.

² *The definition.* It is the knowledge and choice of those things we must either desire or fly; it is the just estimation or tryal of things; it is the Eye that feeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one rank; to consult and deliberate well, to judge and resolve well, to conduct and execute well.

³ *It is universal.* It is an universal Virtue, for it extendeth it self generally to all humane things, not onely in gross, but by piece-meal to every particular thing, and is as infinite, as are the Individuals.

⁴ *Difficult. Senec.* It is very difficult, both by Reason of the aforesaid infiniteness, for the particulars are without knowledg, as without number; *Sique finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: Things infinite, and that cannot be defined are beyond wisdom:* And of the great uncertainty and inconstancy of humane things, which are the greater, by reason of their accidents, circumstances, appurtenances, dependencies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one onely, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it self is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together, and temperature of contrary things, the distinction and trial of those that are like one another; the contrariety and resemblance hindreth much.

⁵ *Obscure. Plin, in paneg.* It is very obscure, because the causes and jurisdictions of things are unknown, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such as the Nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seek after. *Occultat eorum semina Deus, & plerunque bonorum malorumque causa sub diversa specie latent: Their seeds God keepeth unknown, and for the most part the causes of good and evil lie hid under divers similitudes:* Moreover, fortune,

fortune, destiny, (use what words you will) a sovereign, secret, and unknown power and authority, hath always the advantage, and main- taineth it against all Counsels, foreights, and preventions whatsoe- ver : whereby it many times comes to pass, that the best Counsels have the worst issues, that one and the same Counsel doth very hap- pily succeed to one, unhappily to another, in one and the same case, and with one & the same man, things went luckily yesterday, unluck- ily to day. It is an opinion justly received, that we ought not to judge of Counsels, nor of the sufficiency and capacity of Persons by the events. And therefore one answered those well, that marvelled and astonished at the ill success of their busines, considering with how wise and mature deliberation they were undertaken, That they were masters of their deliberations, not of the success of their At- fairs ; for that was in the power of Fortune, which seemeth to sport it self with all our fairest designments and counsels, overthroweth in a moment that which hath a long time been projected and delibe- rated, and seemeth to be strongly fortified, chocking, as they say, our Artillery. And indeed, Fortune to shew its Authority in all things, and to abate our presumption, not being able to make men wise, that are not apt therennto, maketh them nevertheless happy in despite of Virtue, whereby it many times comes to pass, that simple men bring to a happy end great matters both publick and private. Pru- dence then is a Sea without either bottome or brink, and which can- not be limited and prescribed by Precepts and Advisements. It doth but compass things, and goeth about them, like a dark Cloud, many times vain and frivolous.

Nevertheless, it is of such weight and necessity, that alone, and of it self, it can do much, and without it all the rest is nothing, no not riches, means, force : *Vix consilii expers mole ruvit suā : mens una sapi- ens plurimum vincit manus : Et multa qua naturā impedita sunt, consilio expediuntur : Strength void of Counsel falleth to ruine even of it self ; One wise mind overcometh the hands of many : And many things that are hindred by Nature, are ended by Counsel.* And the principal cause of this necessity is the perverse Nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other Creatures ; *Impatiens equi, sedum servitus ; Impatient of equity, much more of servitude* ; and which must be hand- led with art and industry, for it doth not more willingly set it self a- gainst any, then against those that would contemn it. Now Prudence is the Art to handle it, and a gentle Bridle that holdeth it within the compass of Obedience,

6

Necessary.

Horat. 3. od.

Euripid.

Lixius.

Senec. 1. de
clement.Xenophon in
Pædag.

7.
*The acquisition
thereof.*

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other Virtues, be in us by Nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more then any other, and that in some sort by precepts and advisements; this is the Theorick: but much more and principally (though with more time) by experience and practice, which is two-fold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personal whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we have seen and handled: the other is strange by the act of another, this is History, which we know by relation or by reading. Now Experience and use is more firm and more assured; *Usus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister: Use and Experience is a most effectual master of all things,* the Father and Mistress of all the Arts, but more long; it is old, *Seris venit usus ab annis:* Experience cometh in a man's latter days; more difficult, painful, rare. The knowledge of History, as it is less firm and assured, so it is more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his own charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience, and History, doth Prudence arise: *Usus me genuit mater, puerit memoria: sememoria anima & vita, Historia: Experience begat me, my Mother memory bare me; the soul and life of Memory, is History.*

8.
The distinction. Now Prudence may and must be diversly distinguished according to the persons and the affairs. In regard of the persons there is private Prudence, whether it be solitary and individual, which can hardly be termed prudence; or sociable and Oeconomical, among a small company; and Prudence publick and politick. This more high, excellent, difficult, and unto which those aforesaid qualities do properly belong, and it is two-fold, Peaceable and Military.

In regard of the Affairs, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinary, easie; the other extraordinary. There are accidents which bring with them some new difficulty and ambiguity. A man may likewise say, that there is an ordinary and easie prudence, which walketh according to the Laws, Customs, and course already established; another extraordinary and more difficult.

There is likewise another distinction of Prudence, both in respect of the persons and of the affairs, which concerneth rather the degrees, then the kinds thereof: that is to say, proper prudence, whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsel of himself: The other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsel of another. The wise say, that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men: the first

Method.
Livius.
Cicero.

and chieftest is of those that have a clear insight into all things, and know of themselves how to find the remedies and helps: but where are these to be found? Doubtless they are rare and singular. The other is of those that know how to take, to follow, to make use of the good counsels of another, for they that know neither how to give, nor to take counsel, are Fools.

The general and common advisements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affairs, hath been touched and briefly delivered in the second Book, and they are eight: first, knowledge of the persons and affairs: Secondly, estimation of things: Thirdly, choice and elections: Fourthly, from them to take counsel upon all: Fifthly, temperature between fear and assurance, confidence and diffidence: Sixthly, to take all things in their season, and to seiz upon the occasion: Seventhly, to carry himself well, with industry and fortune: Lastly, discretion in all. We must now handle the particulars, first of publick wisdome, which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which respecteth the affairs.

Of the Politick Prudence of a Sovereign, so governing States.

THE PREFACE.

THIS DOCTRINE BELONGETH TO SOVEREIGNS AND GOVERNOURS OF STATES. IT IS UNCERTAIN, INFINITE, DIFFICULT, AND ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO BE RANGED INTO ORDER, TO BE LIMITED AND PRESCRIBED BY RULES AND PRECEPTS: BUT WE MUST ENDEAVOUR TO GIVE SOME SMALL LIGHT, AND BRIEF INSTRUCTION THEREOF. WE MAY REFERRE THIS WHOLE DOCTRINE TO TWO PRINCIPAL HEADS, WHICH ARE THE TWO DUXIES OF A SOVEREIGN. THE ONE COMPREHENDETH AND INTRACETH OF THE PROPS. AND PILLARS OF A STATE, PRINCIPAL AND ESSENTIAL PARTS OF PUBLICK GOVERNMENT, AS THE BONES AND FINEWS OF THIS GREAT BODY, TO THE END THAT A SOVEREIGN MAY PROVIDE FOR HIMSELF AND HIS STATE; WHICH ARE SEVEN PRINCIPALL, THAT IS TO SAY, KNOWLEDGE OF THE STATE, VIRTUE, MANNERS, AND FASHIONS, COUNSELLS, TREASURE, FORCES, AND ARMS, ALLIANCES. THE THREE FIRST ARE IN THE PERSON OF THE SOVEREIGN; THE FOURTH IN HIM, AND NEAR HIM, THE THREE LATTER WITHOUT HIM. THE OTHER IS TO ACT, WELL TO EMPLOY, AND TO MAKE USE OF THE FORESAID MEANS, THAT IS TO SAY, IN GROSSE, AND IN A WORD, WELL TO GOVERN AND MAINTAIN HIMSELF IN AUTHORITY, AND THE LOVE BOTH OF HIS SUBJECTS AND OF STRANGERS, BUT DISTINCTLY 22 THIS PART IS TWO-FOLD, PEACEABLE AND MILITARY. BEHOLD HERE SUMMARILY,

The first Part of this Politick Prudence

and grossly the work cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled hereafter. We will divide then this politick matter, and of State, into two parts ; the first shall be of provision, that is to say, of the seven necessary things : the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the Prince. This matter is excellently handled by Lipsius, according as he thought good : the marrow of his Book is here. I have not taken nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this general division, and more you shall hereafter : I have likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of mine own, and other mens.

C H A P. I I.

*The first Part of this Politick Prudence and Government
of State, which is of Provision.*

I
*The chief
point of this
provision, to
know the
State.*

Senec.

TH E first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the State : for the first rule of all Prudence consisteth in Knowledge, as hath been said in the second Book. The first in all things is to know with whom a man hath to deal. For inasmuch as this ruling and moderating prudence of States, which is a knowledge and sufficiency to govern in publick, is a thing relative, which is handled between the Sovereign and the Subjects; the first duty and office thereof, is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the People, and the Sovereignty, that is to say, of the State. First, then the Humours and Natures of the People must be known. This Knowledge formeth, and giveth Advice unto him that should govern them. The Nature of the People in general hath been described at large in the first Book, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vain, a lover of novelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperity, cowardly and dejected in adversity) but must it likewise be known in particular ; to many Cities and Persons, to many divers humours. There are People choleric, audacious, Warriers, fearful, given to wine, subject to women, some more then othes : *Noscenda natura vulgi est & quibus modis temperanter habebatur* : The nature of the vulgar sort is to be known and by what meanes it may be temperately ruled. And in this sente is that saying of the wise to be understood : He that bath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command. *Nemo bene imperat, nisi gaudente parvus impetrat*.

Not because Sovereigns shoule or can alwayes take upon them the name

name of Subjects; for many are born Kings and Princes; and many States are successive: bne that he that will well command, should acquaint himself with the humours and wills of his Subjects, as if himself were of their Rank, and in their place. He must likewise know the nature of the State, not onely in general, such as it hath been described; but in particular, that which he hath now in hand, the Form, Establishment, Birth thereof, that is to say, whether it be old or new; fallen by Succession, or by Election; obtained by the Laws, or by Arms; of what extent it is, what neighbours, means, power it hath; for according to these, and other circumstances, he must diversly manage the Scepter, loosen and straiten the Rains of his Government.

After this knowledge of the State, which is as a Preamble, the first of those things that are required, is virtue, necessary in a Sovereign, as well for himself, as for the State. It is first necessary and convenient that he that is above all should be better then all, according to the saying of *Cyrus*: and then it standeth him up nior his credit

²
The second
head of this
provision, is
virtue.

and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth and spreadeth abroad the speeches and actions of him that governeth. He is in the Eye of all, and can no more hide himself then the Sun: and therefore what good or ill soever he doth, shall not want means to blazon it, shall be talked of enough. And it importeth him much, both in respect of himself and his State, that his Subjects have a good opinion of him. Now a Sovereign ought not onely in himself, and in his life and conversation to be virtuous, but he must likewise endeavour that his Subjects be like unto himself. For as all the wittē of the world

have ever taught, a State, a City, a Company cannot long continue nor prosper, where Virtue is banished; and they do groily equivocate, who think that Princes are so much the more astured in their States by how much the more wicked their Subjects are, because, ay

they, they are more proper, and as it were born to servitude and the yoke; *Patientiores servitūris quos non decet nō esse servos: very patient of servitude whom is becomeb not to be other then servants.* For contrariy, wicked men bear their yoke impitiently, and they that are good

Salust. ad Cæ.

and debonair fear much more then their caue is, *Tessimus quāq; a sperrime rectorē patitur: contrā facile imperium in bonos q; i metuentes magis quam metuend.* The most wicked are most impatient of Authority: contrariy the best men are most obedient, fearing others more then they are feared themselves. Now the most powerful meane to induce them, and to form them unto vittue, is the example of the Prince, for as ex-

perience

Plin. Pan.

Salust. ad Cæ.

Phi Paneg.

telleth us, all men do frame themselves to the pattern and model of the Prince. The reason is, because example preleth more then Law. It is a mute Law which carrieth more credit then a command; *Nec tam imperio nobis opus quam exemplo: & mitius jubetur exemplo: Nei-*
ther do we so much need commandment, as example; and it is more gentle
to command by example. Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesser are
 always upon the great; they admire and simply believe, that all is
 good and excellent that they do: and on the other side, they that
 command, think they sufficiently enjoyn and bind their Inferiours
 to imitate them by acting onely. Virtue then is honourable and
 profitable in a Sovereign, yea, all virtue.

3.
Especially four
virtues.

But especially and above all, Piety, Justice, Valour, Clemencie. These are the four principal and princely virtues in principality. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that Piety and Justice did deifie Princes. And *Senecca* saith, that Clemency agreeith better with a Prince, then any other. The piety of a Sovereign consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preservation of Religion, as the Protector thereof. This maketh for his own honour, and preservation of himself: for they that fear God dare not attempt, nay think of any thing, either against their Prince, who is the Image of God upon Earth, or against the State. For as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is Religion that maintaineth humane Society, which cannot otherwise subsist, and would soon be filled with all manner of wickedness and savage cruelties, if the respect and fear of Religion did not bridle men, and keep them in order. The state of the Romans did increase and flourish more by Religion, saith *Cicero* himself then by all other means. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeavour that Religion be preserved in its purity, according to the ancient Laws and Ceremonies of the Countrey, and hinder all innovation, and controversies therein, roughly chastising those that go about to break the peace thereof. For double's change in Religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and a declination of the Common-wealth, as *Mecenus* well discouereth to *Augustus*.

Dion.

4.
Justice.

After Piety, cometh Justice, without which States are but Robberies, which a Prince must keep and practise both in himself and others: In himself, for he must defest all those tyrannical and barbarous speeches, which dispense with Sovereigns quitting them from all Laws, Reason, Equity, Obligation; which tell them that they are not bound unto any other duty, then to their own wills and pleasures

sages, that there is no law for them; that all is good and just that serveth their turns; that their equity is their force; their duty is in their power. *Principi leges non scripsi: licet, si liber,* In summa fortuna, id aquius quod validius: nihil injustum quod fructuosum: Plin. Pan. Sanctitas, pietas, fides, privata bona sunt: qua jurost, reges eant: Tacitus. None habet written lawes for the Prince: his will is his law. In the highest degree of fortune, that is most just, which is of most force: Senec. in tra. Nothing is unjust, which is profitable: Sanctity, piety, faith, are private goods, and go that way that may benefit the Prince. And he must oppole against them those excellent and holy counsels of the wise, that he that hath most power in him to break lawes, should take most care to keep them, and live most in order. The greatest power should be the straightest bridle; the rule of power is duty; ministrans debet libera, cui nimis licet; non fas potentes posse, fieri quod nefas: he that hath power to do too much, ought to be least free; It is not lawfull that mighty men should do that, which is unlawfull to be done. The Prince then must first be just, keeping well and inviolably his faith, the foundation of justice, to all and every one who soever he be. Then he must cause that his justice be kept and maintained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cause he is installed. He must understand the causes and the persons, give unto every one that which appertaineth to him, justly according to the lawes, without delay, labyrinths of suites and controversies, involution of processe, abolishing that villainous and pernicious mystery of pleading, which is an open Fair, or Merchandize, a lawfull and honourable robbery, *concessum latrociniuum;* avoiding the multiplicity of lawes and ordinances, a testimony of a sick Common-weal, *Corruptissima reipublica plurima leges:* The most corrupted Commonwealths abound with most lawes; as medicines and plasters of a body ill-disposed: and all this to the end that that which is established by good lawes be not destroyed by too many lawes. But you must know, that the justice, virtue, and probity of a sovereign goeth after another manner, then that of private men: it hath a gate more large and more free by reason of the great weight and dangerous charge which he carrieth and swayeth, for which cause it is fit to march with a pace, which seemeth to others un-easie and irregular, but yet it is necessary and lawfull for him. He must sometimes step aside, and go out of the way, mingle prudence with justice, &c as they say, cover himself with the skin of the Lion, if that of the Fox serve not the turn. But this is not always to be done, and in all cases, but

Senec.
Euripides.Colum.
Tacit.
Plin. Pan.

An advertisement.

The first part of this politick prudence

For the weal-publick.

but with these three conditions, that it be for the evident & important necessity of the weal-publick, (that is to say, of the State and of the Prince, which are things conjoyned) unto which he must run; this is a naturall obligation, and not to be dispensed with: and to procure the good of the common-weal, is but to do his duty.

Salus populi suprema lex esto.

*Princes consells, love and hate,
Do homage to the Law of state,
That peoples safety have no mate.
Other lawes do very well,
But peoples safety bears the bell.*

*For defence
and conserva-*

tion.

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preserve himself, and not to increase his greatnesse, to save and shield himself either from deceits and subtillties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprises, and not practise them. It is lawfull by subtillty to prevent subtilltie, and among Foxes to counterfeit the Fox. The world is full of Art and malicious cozenage; and by deceits and cunning subtillties, States are commonly overthrown, saith Aristotle. Why then should it not be lawfull, nay why should it not be necessary to hinder, and to divert such evil, and to save the weal publick by the self-same means that others would undermine and overthrow it? Alwayes to deal simply and plainly with such people, and to follow the freight line of true reason and equity, were many times to betray the State, and to undo it.

5.
*Discreetly
without wick-
ednesse.*

Thirdly, it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to give credit and countenance to their own wickednesse. For it is never permitted to leave virtue and honesty, to follow vice and dishonesty. There is no composition or compensation betwixt these two extremities. And therefore away with all injustice, treachery, treason, and disloyalty. Cursed be the doctrine of those, who teach (as hath been said) that all things are good and lawfull for Sovereigns: but yet it is sometimes necessary and required, that he mingle profit with honesty, and that he enter into composition with both. He must never turn his back to honesty, but yet sometimes go about and coast it, employing therein his skil and cunning, which is good, honest and lawfull, as saith that great S. Basil, *καλῶς πραγματεύεσθαι*; and doing for the weal-publick like as mothers and physicians, who feed their children, and patients, with fair speeches, and deceive them for their health. To be brief, doing that closely

closely which he may not do openly, joyn wisdome to valour, art and spirit, where nature and the hand sufficeth not; be, as *Pindarus* saith, a Lion in his blows, a Fox in his counsels; a Dove and a Serpent, as divine verity speaketh.

And so this matter more distinctly, there is required in a Sovereign, distrust, and that he keep himself close, yet so, as that he be still virtuous and just. Distrust which is the first, is wholly necessary, as the contrary, which is credulity, and a careless trust or confidence, is vicious, and very dangerous in a Sovereign. He watcheth over all, and must answer for all; his faults are not light, and therefore he must be well advised. If he trust much, he discovereth himself, and is exposed to shame and many dangers, *opportunitus fit in-juria*, yea, he encourageth such as are false and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickednesse, *Aditum nocendi perfido præstat fides*: Trust maketh way for Seneca. the treachers to do mischief. It is necessary therefore that he cover himself with his buckler of distrust, which the wittē have thought to be a great part of prudence, and the sinews of wisdome, that is to say, that he watch, believe nothing, take heed of all: and hereunto doth the nature of the world induce him, wholly composed of lies, coloured, counterfeit, and dangerous, namely such as are near unto him in the court and houles of great personages. He must then tru t but few, and those known by long experience and often tryals: Neither is it necessary that he abandon them, and in such sort leave all the cord, that he still hold it not by one end, and have an eye unto them: But he must cover and disguise his diffidence, yea, when he distrusteth, he must make a shew and countenance of great trust and confidence. For open distrust wrongeth, and inviteth, as much to deceive, as an over-careless confidence; and many by making too great a shew of fear to be deceived, shew the way how they may be deceived. *Multi fallere docerunt dum timent* Senec. falli: Many have taught to deceive, whilst they fear to be deceived: as contrarily, a professed and open trust hath taken away the desire to deceive, hath obliged loyalty, and engendred fidelity; *Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem*: Every man would be believed; and, to be credited for the most part bindeth trust the more.

From distrust comes dissimulation the science or seed thereof; for if that were not, and that there were trust and fidelity in all, dissimulation which openeth the front, and covereth the thought, could have

6.
Distrust re-
quired in a
Prince.

Ephichar.
Euripid.
Cicer.

7.
And dissimu-
lation.

have no place. Now dissimulation which is vicious in private persons, is very necessary in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to command: And they must many times dissemble, not only in warre, with strangers and enemies, but also in time of peace, and with their subjects, though more sparingly. Simple and open men, and such as carry (as they say) their hearts in their foreheads are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their State: But yet he must play this part with art and dexterity, and to the purpose, neither so openly or so simply as that it may be discerned. For to what purpose doth thou hide and cover thy self, if a man may see thee obliquely or side-wayes? Wily devices and cunning subtleties, are no more deceits and subtilties, when they are known and vented out. A Prince then the better to cover his art, must make profession of loving simplicity, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies to dissimulation: and in matters of lese importance, he must proceed openly, to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

8.
Pratice.

All this is in omission, in retaining himself, not acting: but it is likewise required sometimes, that he passe farther, and come to action, and this is twofold. The one is to make and frame secret practises and intelligences, cunningly to win and draw unto him the hearts and services either of the officers, servants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and forrein Lords or of his own subjects. This is a subtilty which is much in request and authority, and very common among Princes, and a great point of prudence, saith Cicero. It is wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especially by presents and pensions, means so powerfull, that not onely the Secretaries, the chiefe of the Councel, the most inward friends and favourites, have been thereby drawn to give advice, and to divert the designtions of their Master; yea, great Captains to give their helping hand in the warre; but also wifes have been won to discover the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtil policie is also allowed and approved by many, without difficulty or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subject whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelity and amity, it is not greatly to be doubted. But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kind of treachery, which is never permitted.

9.
Subtilties.

The other is to win some advantage, and to obtain his purpose,
by

by close and covert means, by equivocations and subtleties, to circumvent by fair speeches and promises, letters, ambassages, working and obtaining by subtle means, that which the difficultie of times and affairs will not permit him otherwise to do, and to do that closely which he cannot do openly. Many great and wise men say, that this is lawful and to be permitted : *Credo mendacio & fraude* Plato
uti imperantes debent ad commodum subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est : Great commanders ought to use lying and fraud for the commoditie of their subjects. To deceive according to the state and condition of time, is wisedome. It were over-boldness simply to affirm that it is permitted. But a man may say, that in case of great necessity, in a troublesome and tumultuous time, when it is not only to procure a great good, but to divert a great mischief from the state and against such as are wicked and traitorous, that it is no great fault, if it be a fault.

But there is a greater doubt and difficultie in other things, because they have a smell of much Injustice in them. I say much, and not wholly, because with their Injustice there are mingled in them some grains of justice. That which is wholly and apparently unjust, is reprobated of all, even of the wicked, at leastwise in word and shew, if not in earnest and in deed. But of these actions ill mingled, there are so many reasons and authorities on the one side and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to resolve himself. I will reduce them here to certain heads. To dispatch, and secretly to put to death, or otherwise, without form of justice, some certain man that is troublesome and dangerous to the state, and who well deserueth death, but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterprised & repressed by an ordinary course: herein there is nothing violate but the form: and the Prince, is he not above the form?

To cut the wings, and to lessen the great means of any one that shall raise and fortifie himself too much in the State, and maketh himself fearfull to his Sovereign; not staying till he be invincible, and ab'e to attempt any thing against the state, and the head of his Sovereign when it pleaseth him.

To take by authority the riches of the richest in a great necessity and poverty of the state.

To weaken and cancel the laws and privileges of some subjects, who hold them to the prejudice and diminution of the authoritie of the Sovereign.

To take by prevention, and to possesse himself of a place, city, or a

The first part of this politick prudence.

province, very commodious for the State, rather than to suffer another strong and fearful neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, subjection, and perpetual alarum of the said State.

All these things are approved as just and lawful by many great and wise men provided that they succeed well and happily, of whom these are the sayings and sentences : *To do justice in great matters, a man may sometimes go astray in small : and, To execute justice in grosse, it is permitted to do wrong by retail: for commonly the greatest actions and examples have some Injustice, which satisfieth particular men, by the profit which arileth to all in general: Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod adversus singulas utilitatem publicam reperitur.*

Plutarch.
Tacit.

*Plutarch,in
Plam.*

Senee.

*Aristot. in
Politie.
Democrit.*

That a prudent and wise Prince should not onely know how to command according to the Laws, but also the Laws themselves, if necessity require; and they must make the Laws to will it, when they cannot do that they would. In confused and desperate affairs, a Prince must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that which is necessary to be executed. Necessity, a great support and excuse to humane fragility, infringeth all law, and therefore he is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint: *Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humana patrociniuum, omnem legem frangit: non est nocens quicunque non sponte est nocens.* If a Prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be halfe good, and that he be not wholly wicked; That it cannot possible be, that good Princes should commit no Injustice. To all this, I would add for their justification, or diminution of their faults, that Princes finding themselves in such extremities, they ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great unwillingnes and grie^t of mind, acknowledging that it is an infelicity and a disfavour from heaven, and so carrying themselves therein as a father, when he is enforced to cauterise or cut off a member of his child, to save his life; or to pluck out a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bold, which refer all to profit, which they either equall or prefer before honestie, an honest man must ever abhor them.

We have staid long upon this point of the virtue of Justice, because of the doubts and difficulties that arise from the accidents and necessities of States, and which do many times hinder the most resolute and best advised.

After justice cometh Valour; I mean that military virtue; wisdom, courage, and sufficiency to play the warriour, necessary in a Prince for the defence and safetie of himself, the State, his subjects,

*II
Valour.*

of

of the publick peace and liberty, and without which he can hardly deserve the name of a Prince.

12

But let us come to the fourth princely virtue, which is Clemency, *Clemencie*, a virtue which inclineth the Prince to a sweet kind of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lessenneth and qualifieth the rigour of justice with judgement and discretion, it moderateth, and sweetly manageth all things, delivereth those that are faulty, relieveth those that are fallen, saveth thole that are like to be lost. It is that in a Prince, which humanity is in a common person. It is contrary to cruelty, & extreme rigour, not to justice, from which it differeth not much, but it sweetneth and moderateth it. It is necessary by reason of our humane infirmitie, the frequency of offences, the facility to offend: for an over-great and continual rigour and severity, ruinateth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Severitas amissit affidante authoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor, moveth rebellions, and men by despight are made wicked. For fear, that keepeth men in their duty, must be sweet and temperate; if it be too sharp and continual, it is changed into rage and revenge: *Temperatus timor est qui cobibet, affidans & acer in vindictam excitat*: Temperate fear is *Senec*, that which restraineth, but continual stirreth up revenge. It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and State, it winneth the love and good will of his subiects, and consequently confirmeth and assureth the State, *Firmissimum id imperium quo obediunt gaudent*: That *Tir. Liv.* Empire is most firm, where the subjects so obey, as they rejoice, as cap. 3. shal be said hereafter. It is likewile very honourable to a Sovereign, beginⁿ for his subjects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutour, their father; and instead of fearing him, they will fear all for him, least any ill happen unto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to believe all; yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to have found good subje^tts, then to have made them such; to pardon light faults, to lessen the rigour of the great; not to be over-straight and exact in punishing (which is as great a dishonour and infamy to a Prince, as to a Physician many Patients that die un^r his hand) to content himself many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

* —ignoscere palchrum

Jam misero, paneque genus vidisse precantem.

Tis foul and fair enough: for them and thee,

To pardon, where the Lord afflicts, not we.

And let him not fear that which some object very untruly, that it

A 2 deba-

*Salust, ad
Cæsar.*

debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authoritie of the Sovereign and of the State, for it contrarily fortifieth it, and gives credit and vigour thereweto: And a Prince beloved, shall do more by love; then by fear, which makes men fear and tremble, but not obey: and, as *Salust* discoursed to *Cesar*, Those states that are governed with fear, are never durable. No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise fear many, and that fear which he would put upon all, falleth upon his own head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behind, nor on any side is covered, but is alwayes in agitation, in danger, in fear. It is true, as hath been said in the beginning, that it must be with judgement; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remiss, it is very pernicious.

13
*After which
are required
also liberality.*

After these four principal and royal virtues, there are also others though lesse worthy and necessary, yet in a second place very profitab'e, and requisite in a Sovereign; that is to say, liberalitie, so fit and necessary for a Prince, as it is lesse befitting him to be vanquished by arms, then by magnificence. But yet there is herein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtful then commodious.

*Liberality
twofold.*

There is a twofold liberalitie, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serves to small purpose. For it is an idle thing in Sovereigns, and to little end, to endeavour by great and excessive charges to make shew of themselves, or to increase their credit, especially with their subjects, where they have power to do what they list. It is a trifflerie of puillanimite, and that they understand not what they are; and besides that, it seemeth to their subjects, the spectators of these triumphs, that they make this glorious shew with their own spoils, that they least it at their charges, that they feed their eyes with that, that shold feed their bellies.

And again a Prince shold think that he hath nothing properly his he oweth himself to another. The other liberality, consisteth in gifts bestowed upon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well governed, and he must be well advised to whom, how, and how much he must give. He must give to those that have deserved it, that have done service to the weal publick, that have run thet fortunes, and spent themselves in the warres. No man will envy them, if they be not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect and merit, shame the giver, and purchase envy to the receiver, and is received without

without thankfulness and acknowledgement. Some tyrants have been sacrificed to the malice of the people, even by those whom they have advanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making known how much they contemn and hate him, from whom they received them. Again, this liberality must be with measure; for if it be not, and that he give unto all, and upon all occasions, the ruine of the State and Sovereigne mult needs ensue: This is to play and to lose all. For men will never be satisfied, but be as excessive in asking, as the Prince shall be in giving, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasury shall fail, he shall be enforced to lay hands upon the goods of another, and supply by Injustice, that which ambition and prodigality did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per sceleram supplendum.* Now it is far better not to give at all, then to take away to give: for a man shall never enjoy in so high a degree the love and good will of those whom he hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoyled. And again, this liberality without measure, worketh the ruine of himself: for a fountain drieth up, if it be over-much drawn.

Liberalitate liberalitas perit: By liberality liberalities perisheth. Li- Hieronym.

berality likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little and little and not altogether: for that which is done over-speedily, be it never so great, is in a manner intensible, and soon forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must be exercized with ease and leasure, that a man may have time to tast them: Things rude and cruel (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily. There is then Art and prudence in giving, and in the practise of liberality.

Falluntur quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi scient, donare nesciunt. They are deceived whom riot blindeth in skew of liberality: many know how to waste, but not how to give. And to lay the truth, liberality is not properly any of the royal virtues; for it agreeth and carrieth it self well with tyrannie it self. And such as are the governours of young Princes do wrong, in working so strong an impression of this virtue of bounty in their minds and wills, that they should refuse no means to put it in practise, and think nothing well employed, but that which they give (this is their common language); but they do it either for their own benefit, or else they know not to whom they speak it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberality in the mind of him that hath means to furnish himself as much as he will at the charges of another.

The first part of this politick prudence,

ther. A prodigal or liberal Prince without discretion and measure, is worse then a covetous : but if this liberality be well ruled and ordered, as hath been said, it is well beleeming a Prince, and very profitable both to himself and the estate.

¹⁴
*Magnanimitie
and moderati-
on of choler.*
Senec.

Tacit.

Tacit,

*The third head
of this provisi-
on. The man-
ners of the
Prince.*

Another virtue requisite in a Prince, in a second degree, is Magnanimity, and greatness of courage, to contemn injuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; never to vex himself for the outrages and indiscretions of another: *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; injurias & offendiones superne despicere, indignas Casaris ire.* A great mind becometh a great fortune; and highly to despise injuries, and offences, which be unworthy the anger of Cesar. For a man to afflict himselv, and to be moved, is to confess himself to be fawtie, whereas by neglect and light account it easily vanitheth. *Convictia, & irascere, ag sinata videntur; spreta exolescant.* Thou seemest to confess those accusations being angry; which contemned, either vanish of themselves, or return upon the Author. And if there be fit place, and a man must be angry, let it be openly and without dissimulation, in such sort that he give not occasion to suspect a hidden grudge, and purpose of revenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best besetting the baser sort: *Obscuri- & irrevocabiles reponunt odia: Sava cogitationis indicium secreto odio satiari.* Base persons and unrecoverable do conceal their hatreds: It is a token of a barbarous and cruell mind, to be glutted with secret grudge. It doth better become a great personage to offend, then to hate. The other virtues are lesse royal and more common.

After Virtue come the manners, carriages, and countenances that become and belong unto Majestie, very requisite in a Prince. I will not stand upon this point: I onely say, as it were passing by, that not onely nature helpeth much hereunto, but also art and study. Hereunto do appertain the good and beautiful composition of the visage, his port, pale, speech, habiliments. The general rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate, and venerable gravitie, walking betwixt fear and love, worthy of all honour and reverence. There is likewise his residence, and conuerstation or familiarity. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, and eminent place, and as near as may be in the middle of the whole state, to the end he may have an eye over all, like the Sun which from the middle of heaven giveth light to all; for keeping himself at one end, he giveth occasion to those that are farthest from him to rise against him, as he that standeth upon one end of the table,

maketh

maketh the other end to rise up. His conversation and company, let it be rare; for to shew and to communicate himself too much, breedeth contempt and dejecteth majestie: *Continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa sordetate facit: Majestatis major ex longinquu reverentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est.* Often *Lucius.* and dayly aspect canseth great men the lesse to be feared: But the rareness of their presence procures the greater reverence; because all strange and unknown things seem stately and magnificent.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, virtue, and manners, which are in the person of the Prince, come those things which are near and about the prince: That is to say, in the fourth place Counsel, the great and principal point of this politick Doctrine, and so important, that it is in a manner all in all, It is the soul of the state, and the spirit that giveth life, motion and action to all the other parts: and for that cause it is said, that the managing of affaires consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a Prince had in himself counsel and prudence sufficient to govern and to provide for all, which is the first and highest degree of wisdome, as hath been said; and if so it were, the affaires would go far better: but this is rather to be wished then hoped for, whether it be for want of good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one only head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters. *Nequid princeps suā scientiā cuncta complecti, nec unius mentis tanta molis est capax.* The Prince cannot comprehend all things by his own knowledge, neither is the mind of one alone capable of so much greatness. A lone man feeth and heareth but little. Now Kings have need of many eyes, and many eares; and great burdens, and great affaires have need of great helps. And therefore it is requisite that he provide and furnish himself with good counsel, and such men as know how to give it: for he whosoever he be, that will take all upon himself, is rather held to be proud, then discreet or wise. A Prince then had need of faithful friends and servitours to be his assistants, *quos assumat in partem curiarum, whom he may take to bear part of his cares.* These are his true treasures, and proper instruments of the state: In the choice whereof he should especially labour and employ his whole judgement, to the end he may have them good. There are two sorts of them; the one aid the Prince with their duty, counsel, and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serve him with their hands and actions, and may be called Officers. The first are farre more honourable: For

16

The fourth head of this provision,

Chap. I.

Tacit.

Tit. Livius.

Tacit:

Plin.

the two greatest Philosophers say, that it is a sacred and divine thing, well to deliberate, and to give good counsel.

The condition of good counsellors, Fidelity. Plin. Sufficiency. Now Counsellers must first be faithful, that is to say in a word, honest men. *Optimum quemque fidelissimum puto: Every man that is truly honest, I hold to be most faithful.* Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilful in the State, diversly experimented and tryed (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions; *Mibi fortuna multis rebus erexit usum dedit bene suadendi: Fortune having taken from me many things, hath given me the faculty of well persuading.*) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quick, and not over sharp: for such kind of men are too moveable; *novantis quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illaignea: These fiery wits are fitter for innovation, than administration.* And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they be old and ripe; for, besides that young men by reason of the soft and delicate tenderness of their age, are easily deceived, they do easily believe, and receive every impression: It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtle; but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times, the subtle onely sometimes for necessity. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giving good and wholesome counsel, they carry themselves freely and courageously, without flattery, or ambiguity, or disguisement, nor accommodating their language to the present state of the Prince; *Ne cum formam à potius principis loquuntur quam cum ipso: Lest they speak rather with the fortune of the Prince then with himself;* but without sparing the truth, speak that which is fit and requisite. For although liberty, roundnesse of speech and fidelity, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it self, yet afterwards it is reverenced and esteemed. *In praesentia quibus resistis, offendis; deinde illis ipsis suspicitur laudaturque: For the present thou offendest them whom thou contradictest, but afterwards thou art even of them respected and praised.* And fourthly, Constantly, without yeelding, varying and changing at every meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure, and passion of another; but without opinative obstinacy, and a spirit of contradiction, which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, he must sometimes change his opinion, which is not in constancy, but Prudence. For a wise man marcheth not awaies with one and the same pace, although he follow the same way; he changeth not, but accommodateth himself;

Curtius.

Liberty.

Facit.

Non semper in uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed aptat: As a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and the Senec. wind; it is necessary many times to turn and wind, and to arrive to that place obliquely, by fetching a compas, when he cannot do it directly, and by a streight line. Again; a religious dexterity to Silence, keep secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing ver-
y necessary in the managing of affaires; *Res magna sustineri ne-Curtius.* queunt ab eo cui tacere grave est: Great affaires cannot be sustained by him, who cannot be secret. And it sufficeth not to be secret, but he must not pry and search into the secrets of hi Prince; that is an ill, and a dangerous thing, *Exquirere abditos principis sensus, illicium Tacit.* & anceps: yea he must be unwilling and avoid all means to know them. And these are the principal good conditions and qualities of a Counsellor, as the evils which they must warily avoid, are pre-
sumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and de-
termine over boldly and obstinately; for a wise man in deliberating, ^{The vices that} counsellors thinketh and rethinketh, doubting whatsoever may happen, that ^{must avoid.} he may be the bolder to execute. *Nam animus vereri qui scit, scit Presumptuous ruto ag gredi:* For the mind that knoweth how to fear, knoweth how confidence, with safety to execute. : Contrarily the fool is hardy and violent in Tit. Livius. his deliberation: but when he comes to the issue, his nose falls a bleeding: *Consilia calida & audacia primâ specie leta sunt, tractata dura, eventu tristia:* Hasty and audacious counsels at the first shew, are plausible, but in the managing prove hard, and in the end full of Passion. discontent. Secondly, all passion of choler, envy, hatred, avarice, concupiscence, and all private and particular affection, the deadly poison of judgment and all good understanding: *Private res semper offecere, officiisque publicis consilii, pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum sua cuique utilitas:* Private affaires have ever been buriful, and do hinder the publick counsels: and every mans particular profit is the worst poison of true affection and judgment. Lastly, pre-
cipitation. See l. 2. ap. 10. Tacit. An enemy to all good counsel, and onely fit to do mis-
cheif. And thus you see what manner of men, good Counsellors ought to be.

Now a Prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his own knowledge and judgment, or if he cannot so do by their reputation which doth seldom deceive, whereupon one of them said to his Prince. Hold us for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam* ^{The duty of} *consiliorum* ^{the Prince in} *singuli decipere & decipi possunt: nemo omnes, neminem omnes fideliterunt:* For every one may deceive, and be deceived: no man ell; all have,

have deceived none : And let him take heed that he choose not his minions and favourites, Courtiers, flatterers, slaves, who shame their masters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous then the counsele of the cabinet. And having chosen and found them, he must wisely make use of them, by taking counsel of them at due times and hours, not attending the event and execution, and losing the time whilst he hearkeneth to them ; and this must he do with judgment, not suffering himself to be carried over-loosly by their counsels, as that simple Emperour *Cladinius* was ; and with maledicence, without roughnesse, it being more reasonable, as that wise *Ma. Antonius* was wont to say, to follow the counsel of a good number of friends, than such as are constrained to bend unto his will. And making use of them, to do it with an indifferent authority, neither rewarding them with presents for their good counsele, left by the hope of the like presents he draw such as are wicked unto him, nor use them over-roughly for their bad counsels ; for he shall hardly find any to give him counsel, if there be danger in giving it : and again, many times bad counsel hath a better success then good, by the provident care and direction of the Sovereign. And such as give good counsel, that is to say, happy and certain, are not therefore alwaies the best, and most faithful servitors, nor for their liberty of speech neither, which he should rather agree unto, looking into such as are fearful and flatterers with a wary eye. For miserable is that Prince with whom men hide or disguise the truth. *Cujus aures ita formata sunt, ut aspera qua utilia, & nil nisi jucundum & lesurum accipiant : Whose ears are so framed, that they will not hearken to profitable things that are harsh, nor any thing but what is pleasing though hurtful.* And lastly, he must conceal his own judgment and resolution, secrecie being the soul of counsel : *Nulla meliora confilia, quam que ignoraverit adversariis antequam fierent : They are the best counsels which the adversary knoweth not before they be affected.*

Curtius.

Tacit.

Veget.

19
of Officers.

As touching officers which are in the next place, and who serve the Prince and State in some charge, he must make choice of honest men, of good and honest families. It is to be thought that such as serve the Prince, are the best sort of people, and it is not fit that base people should be neer him, and command others, except they raise themselves by some great and singular virtue, which may supply the want of nobility : but by no means let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of some odious condition. So likewise they shou'd be men of understanding, and employed according to their natures.

natures. For some are fit for the affaires of the War, others for Peace. Some are of opinion, that it is best to choose men of a sweet carriage, and indifferent virtue: for thole excellent surpassing spirits, that keep themselves alwaies upon the point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affaires; *Ut pares negotiis, neque supra fint; recti non erunt i;* Men sufficient for their employment, nor fastidious; equal in their affaires, and not much above them.

After counsel, we place Treasure, a great and puissant mean. This is the sinews, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharp and penetrable, as that of silver, nor master so imperious, nor oratour that winneth the hearts and wills of men or conquereth castles and cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must provide that his treasury never fail, never be dried up. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to employ them well, to have alwaies a reservation, and to lay up some good part thereof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince must avoid two things, Injustice, and base Niggardliness; in preserving right towards all, and honour for himself.

Touching the first, which is to lay the foundation, and to increase the treasury, there are divers means, and the sources are divers which are not all perpetual, nor alike assured, that is to say, the demain and publick revenue of the State, which must be managed and used, without the alienating of it in any sort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Conquests made upon the enemy, which must be profitably employed, and not prodigally dissipated, as the ancient Romans were wont to do, carrying to the Exchequer very great sums, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countreys, as Livie reporteth of *Camillus Flaminus*, *Paulus Emilinus*, of the *Scipios*, *Lucullus*, *Cesar*; and afterwards receiving from thole conquered countries, whether from their natural country men left behind them, or from colonies sent thither a certian annual revenuesPresents, gratuities, pensions, free donations, tributes of friends, allies, and subjects, by testaments, by donations among the living, is the Lawyers term it, or otherwise. The entrance, coming and going, and passages of merchandize, into docks, havens, rivers, as well upon strangers as subjects, a means just, lawful, ancient, general, and very commodious; with these conditions: Not to permit the traffick and transportation of things necessary for life, that the subjects may be furnished; not of raw unwrought wires, to the end the subject may be set on work, and gain the profit of his

The fifth head
of provision,
Treasure.

Exchequer-
knowledge in
three points.

21

1. To lay the
foundation.

1

2

3

4

own

own labours. But to permit the traffick of things wrought and dressed, and the bringing in of such wares as are raw, and not of such as are wrought ; and in all things to charge the stranger much more then the subject. For a great forrein imposition increaseth the treasure and comforteth the subject ; to moderate nevertheless the imposts upon those things that are brought in, necessary for life.

Anton. Pius **Severus.** **Augustus.** These four means are not onely permitted, but just, lawful, and honest. The fifth, which is hardly honest, is the traffick which the Sovereign useth by his factors, and is practised in divers manners more or leſſe base ; but the vileſt and moſt pernicious is of honours, estates, offices, benefices. There is a mean that cometh near to traffick, and therefore may be placed in this rank, which is not very dishonest, and hath been practised by very great and wise Princes, which is, to employ the coin of the Treasure or Exchequer to ſome ſmall profit, as live in the hundred, and to take good ſecurity for it, either gages, or ſome other ſound and sufficient assurance. This hath a threefold uſe, it increaseth the treasure, giveth means to particular men to traffick, and to make gain ; and which is beſt of all, it ſaveth the publick Treasure, from the paws of our theevyng Courtiers, the importunate demands and flatteries of favourites, and the over-great facility of the Prince. And for this onely cauſe, ſome Princes have lent their publick treasure without any profit or intereſt, but onely upon pain of a double forſeiture, for no payment at the day. The ſixth and laſt is in the lones and ſubſidies of ſubjects, whereunto he muſt not come but unwillingly, and then when other means do fail, and neceſſity preſteth the State. For in this caſe it is just, according to that rule, *That all is just that is neceſſary.* But it is reuine, that theſe conditions be added after this firſt of neceſſary, To levie by way of lone (for this way will yeeld moſt ſilver, because, of the hope men haue to recover their own again, and that they ſhal lose nothing, beſides the credit they receive by ſuccouring the weal-publick) and afterwards the neceſſity being paſt, and the warres ended to repay it again, as the *Romanes* did, being put to an extremitie by *Hannibal*. And if the common treaſury be ſo poor that it cannot repay it, and that they muſt needs proceed by way of impoſition ; it is neceſſary that it be with the conuent of the ſubjects, making known unto them their poverty and neceſſtie, and preaching the word of that King of kings, *Dominus iis opus habet : The Lord hath need of them :* in'omuch that they make them ſee, if need be, both the receit, and the charge. And, if it may be, let per-

perswasion prevail without constraint; Themistocles said, *Imperare melius est, quam imperare: It is better to obtain by request, than by command.* It is true, that the prayers of Sovereigns are commandments; *Satis imperat qui rogat potentia: armata sunt prius regum: He commandeth sufficiently that intreateth with power: the requests of Kings are armed:* but yet let it be in the form of a free donation, at the least that they be extraordinary moneys, for a certain prefixt time and not ordinary; and never prescribe this law upon the subjects, except it be with their own consent. Thirdly, that such impositions be levied upon the goods, and not the heads of men, (capitation being odious to all honest people) the real and not personal (it being unjust that the rich, the great, the nobles, should not pay at all, and the poorer people of the countrey should pay all). Fourthly, that they be equally upon all. Inequality afflieth much; and to these ends these moneys must be bestowed upon such things as the whole world hath need of, as Salt, Wine, to the end that all may contribute to the present necessity. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay extraordinary imposts and great, upon such merchandize and other things as are vicious, and that serve to no other end, then to corrupt the subjects, as whatsoever serveth for the increase of luxury, insolency, curiosity, superfluity in viands, apparel, pleasures, and all manner of licentious living, without any other prohibition of these things. For the denial of a thing sharpeneth the appetite.

The second point of this science, is well to employ the Treasure, 22
And these in order are the articles of this employment and charge; *To employ the treasure.* The maintenance of the Kings house, the pay of men of war, the wages of officers, the just rewards of those that have deserved well of the common weal, pensions and charitable succours to poor, yet commendable, persons. These five are necessary; after which come those that are very profitable, to repair cities, to fortifie and to defend the frontiers, to amend the high-wayes, bridges, and passages, to establish Colledges of honour, of virtue and learning; to build publick houses. From these five sorts of reparations, fortifications, and foundations, cometh very great profit, besides the publick good: Arts and Artificers are maintained; the envy and malice of the people because of the levy of monies ceaseth, when they see them well employed: and these two plagues of a common weal, idleness and poverty, are driven away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and unreasonable gifts, to some particuler favourites; the great, proud,

The first part of this politick prudence.

proud, and unnecessary edifices, superfluous and vain charges, are odious to the subjects, who murmur that a man should spoil a thousand to cloath one; that others should brave it with their substance, build upon their blood and their labours.

23

3. To make
spare and re-
sevation.

Essay 30.

2 Paralip.

24

The sixth head of this provi-
sion.

An armed
power.

The third point consisteth in the reservation, which a man must make for necessarie, to the end he be not constrained at a need, to have recourse to heady, unjust, and violent means, and remedies: this is that which is called the Treasury or exchequer. Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and silver, though it be by honest and just means, is not alwayes the best; because it is an occasion of warre active or passive; either by breeding envy in others to see it done, when there is no cause, there being plenty of other means; or else because it is a bait to allure an enemy to come, and it were more honourable to employ them as hath been said: So to spend all and leave nothing in the Exchequer is farre worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise Princes take heed of this. The greatest treasures that have been in former times, are that of *Darius* the last King of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found fourscore millions of gold. That of *Tiberius*, 67 millions; of *Trajan*, 55 millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *David* did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small a State) wherein there was six score millions. Now to provide that these great treasures be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowls, as the *Persians* and *Romanes*: or they put them into the temples of their gods, as the safest places; as the *Greeks* in the temple of *Apollo*, which nevertheless hath been many times, pilled and robbed; the *Romanes* in the temple of *Saturn*. But the best and surest way and most profitable is, as hath been said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, upon good gages, or sufficient security. So likewise for the safer custodie of the treasures from thievs and robbers, the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanical persons, but given to gentlemen, and men of honour, as the ancient *Romanes* were accustomed to do, who chose out young men from amongst their Nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honours and charges of the common-wealth.

After counsel and treasure, I think it not amisse to put Arms, which cannot submit, nor be well and happily levied and conducted without these two. Now an armed power is very necessary for

a Prince to guard his person and his State : for it is an abuse to think to govern a State long without Arms. There is never any surety between the weak and the strong ; and there are always some that will be stirring either within or without the State. Now this power is either ordinary at all times, or extraordinary in times of warre. The ordinary consisteth in the persons and places ; The persons are of two sorts ; the guard for the body and person of the Sovereign, which serve not onely for the surety and conservation, but also for his honour and ornament : for that good saying of *Agesilans* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to try and trust unto it, That a Prince may live safely enough without guard, if he command his subjects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of men stayeth not it self in so fair a way.) And certain companies, maintained and always ready for those necessities and sudden occurrences that may fall out. For at such times to be buſied in levying powers is great imprudencie. Touching the places, they are the fortresses and citadels in the frontiers, in the place of which, some, and the ancient too, do more allow of the colonies. The extraordinary force consisteth in arms, which he must levie and furnish in times of warre. How he should govern himself therein, that is to say, enterprise and make warre, it belongeth to the second part, which is of the act on : this first belongeth to provision. Onely I here say, that a wise Prince should besides the guard of his body, have certain people always prepared, and experienced in arms, either in great number or lesse, according to the extent or largenesse of his State, to reppresse a sudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his State, reserving the raising of greater forces, untill he must make warre, either offensive or defensive, willingly and of purpose : and in the mean time keeping his arsenals and store-houses well furnished, and provided with all sorts of offensive and defensive arms, to furnish both foot and horsmen, as likewise with munitions, engines, and instruments for warre. Such preparation is not onely necessary to make warre (for these things are not found and prepared in a short time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is so fool-hardie as to attempt a State, which he knoweth to be ready to receive him, and thorowly furnished. A man must arm himself against warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it : *Qui cupit pacem, paret bellum : He that desireth peace, let him provide for warre.*

In the chapter
following.

Alex.

The first part of this politick prudence,

After all these necessary and essential provisions, we will lastly put Alliances or Leagues, which is no small prop and stay of a State. But wisedome is very necessary in the choice thereof, to build well, and to take heed with whom and how he joyn in alliance; which he must do with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weak and far off, wherewith can they give aid? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, from their ruine ours may follow. For then are we bound to succour them, and to joyn with them because of this league, whosoever they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledge of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treachery and wickednes, which is utterly forbidden, but not wisedome and policy, especially for the defence and surety of his State.

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of Leagues and alliances; the lesser and more simple is for commerce, and traffick only, but commonly it comprehendeth amity, commerce, and hospitality; and it is either defensive on'y, or defensive and offensive together, and with exception of certain Princes and States; or without exception. The more strait and perfect is that which is offensive and defensive towards all, and against all, to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies: and such it is good to make, with those that are strong and puissant. And by equal alliance, Leagues are likewise either perpetual, or limited to certain times, commonly they are perpetual, but the better and surest is, to limit it to certain times, to the end he may have means to reform, to take away, or add to the articles, or wholly to depart if need be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would judge them to be such, as should be perpetual, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must do, before the time be expired) than to make them perpetual. For they languish and grow old; and whosoever findeth himself aggrieved, will sooner break them, if they be perpetual, than if they be limited, in which case he will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seven necessary provisions.

CHAP. III.

*The second Part of this Politick Prudence, and Government
of the State, which concerneth the Action and
Government of the Prince.*

Having discoursed of the provision, and instructed a sovereign with what, and how he should furnish and defend himself and his State, let us come to the action; and let us see how he should employ himself, and make use of these things, that is to say, in a word, well to command and govern. But before we come to handle this distinctly, according to the division which we have made, we may say in gross, that well to govern and to maintain himself in his State, consisteth in the acquisition of two things, Good-will, and Authority. Good-will is a love and affection toward the Sovereign and his State; Authority is a great and good opinion, and honorable esteem of the Sovereign and his State. By the first, the Sovereign and the State is loved: By the second, feared. These are not contrary things, but different, as love and fear. Both of them respect the subjects and strangers; but it seemeth that more properly, Benevolence belongeth to the Subject, and Authority to the stranger; *Amorem apud populares metum apud hostes querat: The Prince must seek love from his own, fear from enemies.* To speak simply and absolutely, Authority is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The temperature and harmony of both is a perfect thing, but according to the diversity of States of Peoples, their Natures and Humours, the one is more easie and more necessary in some places than in others. The means to attain them both, are contained and handled in that which hath been said before, especially of the manners and virtue of a Sovereign: nevertheless of each, we will speak a little.

Benevolence or Good will (a thing very profitable, and almost wholly necessary, insomuch that of it self it prevaleth much, and without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained by three means, gentleness or clemency, not onely in words and deeds, but much more in his commands, and the administration of the State; for so do the Natures of men require, who are impatient both of serving wholly, and maintaining themselves in entire liberty, *Nec totam servitutem patitur; nec totam libertatem: Neither to endure wholly servitude, nor altogether liberty:* They obey willingly as Subjects,

Sense.

jects, not as slaves, *Domini ut pareant, non ut serviant.* And to say the truth, a man doth more willingly obey him which commandeth gently and mildly; *Remissus imperanti melius paresur; qui vult amari languida regnet manus.* He that will be beloved, let him reign with a soft hand. Power (saith Cesar, a great Doctor in this matter) indifferently exercised preserveth all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commands, is never beloved nor assured. But yet it must not be an over-loose, and soft effeminate mildness, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse then fear. *Sed incorrupto ducis honore: The Leaders honour being both wayes inseverate.* It is the part of Wisdome to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himself terrible, nor loved by too much debasing himself.

Tacit.

3.
Beneficence.

The second mean to attain benevolence is beneficence, I mean first towards all, especially the meaner people, by providence & good policy, whereby Corn and all other necessary things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound, if it be possible, that dearness and dearth afflict not the subject. For the meaner sort have no care for the publick good, but for this end, *Vulgo una ex republica annona cura: The only care the vulgar sort have of the Common-wealth, is the provision of vi-*

Tacit.

Etual and other necessaries.

4.
Liberality.Chap. 2.
art. 23.

Tacit.

The third mean is Liberality (Beneficence more special) which is a bait, yea an enchantment, to draw, to win, and captivate the wills of men: So sweet a thing is it to receive, honourable to give. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a State did better defend it self by good deeds, than by Arms. This virtue is always requisite, but especially in the entrance, and in a new State. To whom, how much, and how liberality must be exercised, hath been said before. The means of Benevolence hath been wisely practised by Augustus; *Qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit: Who won the soldiers with gifts, the people with provision of victuals, and all with the sweetness of rest and peace.*

5.
Authority.By what it is
required.

Authority is another Pillar of State; *Majestas imperii salutis tutela: The majesty of Empire, is the guardian of safety.* The invincible fortres of a Prince, whereby he bringeth into Reason all those that dare to contemn or make head against him: Yea, because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and favour with him. It is composed of fear and respect, by which two, a Prince and his State is feared of all, and secured. To attain this Authority, besides the provision of things above-named, there are three means which

which must carefully be kept in the form of commanding.

The first is severity, which is better, more wholesome, assured, durable, than common lenity, and great facility: which proceedeth first from the nature of the people which as Aristotle saith, is not so well born and bred, as to be ranged into duty and obedience by love, or shame, but by force and fear of punishment: And secondly, from the general corruption of the manners, and contagious licentiousnes of the world, which a man must not think to mend by mildnes and lenity, which doth rather give aid to ill attempts. It engendreth contempt, and love of impunity, which is the plague of Common-weals and States: *Illecebra peccandi maxima, spes impunitatis: Hope of impunity, is the greatest allurement to offend,* ⁶ Cicero. It is a favour done to many, and the whole Weal-publick, sometimes well to chasise some one, And he must sometimes cut off a finger, least the Gangrene spread it self through the whole arm, according to that excellent answer of a King of Thrace, whom one telling that he played the mad-man, and not the King, answered, That his madness made his subjects sound and wise. Severity keepeth Officers and Magistrates in their devoir, driveth away Flatterers, Courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demanders, and petty Tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise, too great felicity openeth the Gate to all these kind of people, wherupon followeth an exhausting of the Treasuries, impunity of the wicked, impoverishing of the people, as Rheums and Fluxes in a rheumatick and diseated body fall upon those parts that are weakest.

The goodness of Perinax, the licentious liberty of Heliogabalus, are thought to have undone and ruined the Empire: The severity of Severus, and afterwards of Alexander, did re-establish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this severity must be with some moderation intermission, and to purpose, to the end that rigour towards a few, might hold the whole world in fear; *Ut pena ad paucos, metus ad omnos: That as the punishment lights upon a few, so the fear may invade all.*

And the more seldom punishments serve more for the Reformation of a State, saith an ancient Writer, then the more frequent. This is to be understood, if Vices gather not strength, and men grow not opinatively obstinate in them; for then he must not spare either sword or fire: *Crudelem medicum intemperans ager facit: An intemperate sick person maketh a cruel Physician.*

The second is Constancy, which is a stayed Resolution, where-² by the Prince marching always with one and the same pace, with- *Constancy,*

out altering or changing, maintaineth always, and enforceth the observation of the ancient Laws and Customs. To change and to be re-advised, besides that it is an Argument of inconstancy and irresolution, it bringeth both to the Laws, and to the Sovereign, and to the State, contempt and sinister opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort do so much forbid the change, and recharge of any thing in the Laws and Customs, though it were for the better: for the change or remove bringeth always more evil and discommodity, besides the uncertainty and the danger, then the novelty can bring good. And therefore all Innovators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great evident, and certain utility, or publick necessity. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were steilingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little, and almost insensibly, *leviter & lentè*.

8

Aristot.

The third is to hold always fast in the hand the Stern of the State, the Rains of Government, that is to say, the honour and power to command and to ordain, and not to trust or commit it to another, referring all things to his Councel, to the end that all may have their Eye upon him, and may know that all dependeth upon him. That Sovereign that loseth never so little of his Authority marreth all. And therefore it standeth him upon; not over-much to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatus, neminem unum magnum facere: The common and surest guard of principality is to make no one man too great.* And if there be already any such, he must draw him back, and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently; and never make great and high charges and offices perpetual, or for many years, to the end, a man may not get means to fortifie himself against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nihil tam utile, quam brevem potestatem esse, qua magna sit. Nothing so profitable, as short Authority if it be great.*

Senec.

9
Against unjust Authority and Tyranny.

Beho'd here the just and honest means in a Sovereign to maintain with benevolence and love his Authority, and to make him self to be loved and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhor a tyranical Authority, and that fear that is an Enemy to love and benevolence, and is with a publick hate, *Oderint quem metuant:* They will hate whom they fear, which the wicked seek after, abusing their power. The conditions of a good Prince and of a Tyrant, are nothing alike, and easily distinguishe'. They may be all reduced to these two points,

points, the one to keep the laws of God and of nature, or to trample them under foot; the other to do all for the publick good and profit of the subject, or to employ all to his particular profit and pleasure. Now a Prince, that he may be such as he should, must alwaies remember, that, as it is a felicity to have power to do what a man will, so it is true greatness to will what a man should; *Cesari Plin.de Tras.* *cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possit, vel potius quantum debet.* Seeing all things are lawfull for Cesar to do, it is therefore the less lawful for him to do it: As it is a felicity to be able to do whatsoever thou wilt, so it is a point of greatness to will what thou shouldest, or rather what thou oughtest. The greatest infelicity that can happen to a Prince, is to believe that all things are lawfull, that he can, and that pleaseth him. So soon as he contenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is settled in them by the help of flatterers, who never cease alwaies to preach unto them the greatness of their power; and very few faithful servitors there are, that dare to tell them what their duty is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, then that wherewith a man flattereth himself; when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same, there is no remedy for this disease. Nevertheless it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good King must do those things which in outward appearance may seem tyrannical, as when it is a question of repressing another tyranny, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious liberty of whom is a true tyrannie: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize over the poor and meaner people: or, when the King is poor and needy not knowing where to get silver, to raise loans upon the richest. And we must not think that the severity of a Prince is alwaies tyrannie, or his guards and fortresses, or the majesty of his imperious commands, which are sometimes profitable, yea necessary, and are more to be desired then the sweet prayers of tyrants.

These are the two true stayes and pillars of a Prince, and of a State, if by them a Prince know how to maintain and preserve himself from the two contraries, which are the murtherers of a Prince and State, that is to say, Hatred and Contempt: whereof, the better to avoid them, and to take heed of them, a word or two. Hatred contrary to benevolence, is a wicked and obstinate affection of subjects against the Prince and his State: It ordinarily proceedeth

The second part of this politick prudence

Cicero.

from fear of what is to come , or desire of revenge of what is past , or from them both . This hatred when it is great , and of many , a Prince can hardly escape it ; *Multorum odis nulla opes possunt resistere : No power or riches can resist the hatred of many.* He is exposed to all , and there needs but one to make an end of all . *Multa illis manus , illi una cervix : They have many hands , he but one neck.* It standeth him upon therefore to preserve himself , which he shall do by flying those things that engender it , that is to say , crueltie and avarice , the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of benevolence .

11 .
Hatred pro-
ceedeth from
cruelty.
Cap. 2. art. 12.

He must preserve himself pure and free from base crueltie , unworthy greatness , very iniamous to a Prince : But contrarily he must arm himself with clemencie , as hath been said before , in the virtues required in a Prince . But forasmuch as punishments , though they be just and necessary in a state , have some image of crueltie , he must take heed to carry himself therein with dexteritie , and for this end I will give him this advice : Let him not put his hand to the sword of justice , but very seldome and unwillingly : *Libenter damnat , qui cito : ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis : He condemneth willingly , that doth it hastily ; therefore he is to be sparing even of the basest blood.* 2. Enforced for the publick good , and rather for example , and to terrifie others from the like offence : 3. That it be to punish the faulty , and that without choler , or joy , or other passion : And if he must needs shew some passion , that it be compassion : 4. That it be according to the accustomed manner of the Countrey , not after a new ; for new punishments are testimonies of cruelty : 5. Without giving his assistance , or being present at the execution : 6. And if he must punish many , he must dispatch it speedily , and all at a blow ; for to make delayes , and to use one correction after another , is a token that he taketh delight , pleaseth and feedeth himself therewith .

An advice for
punishments.
Seneca.

12
Avarice.

He must likewise preserve himself from avarice , a sinne ill besetting a great personage . It is shewed either by exacting and gathering overmuch , or by giving too little . The first doth much displease the people , by nature covetous , to whom their goods are as their blood and their life . The second , men of service and merit , who have laboured for the publick good , and have reason to think that they deserve some recompence . Now how a Prince should govern himself herein , and in his treasure and exchequer affairs , either in laying their foundation , or spending or preserving them , hath been

been more at large discoursed in the second Chapter. I will here only say, That a Prince must carefully preserve himselfe from three things: First from resembling, by o'er-grat and excessive imposition, those tyrants, subject-mongers, Cannibals; *Qui devorant plebem sicut escam panis, synapsos, quorum ararium spoliarium civium cruentarumque pradarum receptaculum;* Who devour the people as a morsel of bread, and whose store-house is the receptacle of the spoils of the Citizens, and bloody preys: for this breeds danger of tumult, witness so many examples, and miserable accidents: Secondly, from base dishonest partimonie, as well in gathering together, (*indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari;* & ut dicitur, etiam à mortuo anferre; To smell unworthy gaine out of every occasion; and, as it is said, to take away even from the dead: and therefore he must not serve his turn herein with accusations, confiscations unjust spoiles) as in giving nothing, or too little, and that mercenarily and with long and importunate suit: Thirdly, from violence, in the levie of his provision, and that, if it be possible, he never seiz upon the moveables and utensils of husbandrie. This doth principally belong to receivers and purveyers, who by their rigorous courses, expose the Prince to the hatred of the people, and dishonour him, a people subtil, cruel, with six hands and three heads, as one saith. A Prince therefore must provide that they be honest men, and if they fail in their duties, to correct them severely, with rough chafisement, and great amends; to the end they may restore and disgorge like sponges, that which they have sucked and drawn unjustly from the people,

Let us come to the other worse enemie, contempt; which is a sinister, base, and abject opinion of the Prince, and the State: This is the death of a state, as authoritie is the soul and life thereof. What doth maintain one onely man, yea an old and worn man, over so many thousands of men, if not authoritie, and the great esteem of his person: which if it be once lost by contempt, the Prince and State must necessarily fall to the ground. And even as authority, as hath been said, is more strong and large then benevolence, so contempt is more contrary and dangerous then ha tred, which dareth *art. 5.* not any thing, being held back by fear, if contemt which shaketh off fear, arm it not, and giveth courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not so common, especially if he be a true and lawfull Prince, except he be such a one, as doth wholly degrade and profite himself, *Et videatur exire de imperio;* And seem to give over his *Plin. in Pan.*

Empire. Nevertheless we must see from whence this contempt doth come, that we may the better know how to avoid it. It proceedeth, from things contrary to those means that win and beget authoritie, and especially from three, that is to say, from too loole, effeminate, milde, languishing, and careles, or very leight form of government, without any hould or stay; this is a state without a state; under such Princes, the subjects are made bold and insolent; all things being permitted, because the Prince takes care of nothing. *Malum, principem habere sub quo nihil nullum erat: peius sub quo omnia omnibus:* It is an evil thing to have a Prince, under whom nothing is lawfull for any man: But worse, to have him, under whom all things are lawfull for all men. Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicity of the Prince, whether it be in his affairs which succeed not well; or in his line and issue, if he have no Children, who are a great prop and stay to a Prince; or in the uncertainty of his successors, whereof Alexander the great complained: *Orbitas meas quid sine liberis sum, spurnitur: Munimur aula, regis liberi:* My want of Children makes me to be despised: Royall Children, are a defence to the Kings house. Thirdly from manners, especially dissolute, loose, and voluptuous, drunkennes, gluttony, as also rusticity, childishness, scurrillity.

14

The distinction of the action of a Prince. Thus in grosse have I spoken of the action of a Prince. To handle it more distinctly and particularly, we must remember, as hath been said in the beginning; that it is twofold, peaceable and military: by the peaceable I here understand that ordinarie action, which is every day done, and at all times of peace and of warre: by the military, that which is not exercised, but in time of war.

Of the peaceable. The peaceable and ordinary action of a Sovereign, cannot be wholly prescribed; it is an infinite thing, and consisteth as well in taking heed to do, as to do. We will here give the principall and more necessary advisements. For therefore a Prince must provide that he be faithfully and diligently advertised of all things. This (all things) may be reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two sorts of advertisements and advertisers, who must be faithfull and assured, wise and secret, though in some there be required a greater libertie and constancy then in others. Some are to advertise him of his honour, and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kind of people in the world, who have so much need of such friends, as Princes have; who neither see nor understand, but by the eyes and ears of another. They maintain and hold up a publick life, are to satisfy so many people, have so many things bid from them, that

*All ill form of government.**Infelicity.**Manners.*

An advice.

that before they be aware, they fall into the hatred & detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had been in time advertised of them. On the other side free advertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are pernicious about Sovereigns, though Princes be over-delicate, and shew great infirmity, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free advertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power whatsoever they heare, to doe what they list: others are to advertise the Prince whatsoever passeth, not only amongst his subjects, and within the circuit of his state, but with his bordering neighbour; I say, of all, that concerneth either a far off, or neare at hand, his owne state or his neighbours. These two kind of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, of whom the one loved the King, the other *Alexander*; that is to say, the one the state the other the person.

Secondly, a Prince must alwayes have in his hand a little book or memorial containing three thing: first & principally a brief register of the affairs of the state; to the end he may know what he must do, what is begun to be done, and that there remain nothing imperfect, and ill executed: A catalogue or bed-roll of the most worthy personages that have well deserved, or are likely to deserve well of the weal-publick: A memorall of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom, and wherefore; otherwise, without these three, there must necessarily follow many inconveniences. The greatest Princes and wilest Politicians have used it, *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Vespasian*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, the *Antonies*.

Thirdly, inasmuch as one of the principall duties of a Prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is favorable, the other odious, a Prince must retaine unto himself the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces, and favours; and leave unto his Officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, deprivations, and other punishments.

Fourthly, in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwayes be ready and willing to give them before they be asked, if he can; and not to look that he should refuse them: and he must give them himself, if it may be, or cause them to be given in his presence. By this meanes gifts and good turnes shall be better received, and given to better purpose; and he shall avoid two great and common inconveniences, which deprive men of honour and worth

15
2. To have a memorial of the 1. Affairs.

2. Persons.
3. Gifts.

16
3. To appoint rewards and punishments.

17.
4. To distribute rewards.

worth of those rewards that are due unto them : the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must undergo, to obtain that which he wou'd, and thinketh to have deserved, which is no small grief to honourable minds, and men of spirit. The other, that after a man hath obtained of the Prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one half, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

18.

Of the military action which consisteth in three points. To enterprises where two things are required.

Let us come to the military action, wholly necessary for the preservation and defence of a Prince, of the subjects, and the whole state, let us speak thereof briefly. All this matter or subject may be reduced to three heads. To enterprise, make, finish war. In the enterprise, there must be two things, justice and prudence, and an avoidance of their contraries, injustice and temerity. First, the war must be just, yea justice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution. These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred, *That right consisteth in force; That the issue or event decideth it; That the stronger carrieth it away.* But a Prince must look into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue : Warre hath its Laws and Ordinances as well as Peace. God favoureth just warres, and giveth the victory to whom it pleaseth him ; and therefore we must first make our selves capable of this favour, by the equity of the enterprise. Warre then must not be begun and undertaken for all causes, upon every occasion : *Non ex omni occasione querere triumphum: Not to seek triumph for every occasion.* And above all a Prince must take heed that ambition, avarice, choler, possesse him not, and carry him beyond reason, which are alwayes, to say the truth, the more ordinary motives to warre : *Una & ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperii & divitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant: Rupere fædus impius luxurior, & ira preceps: One, and that an ancient cause of war is, the greedy desire of rule and of riches: they esteem the greatest glory in the greatest command: the wicked rage of gain, breaketh leagues, and stirs up wrath.*

19.

Three things make an enterprise just.

That a war may be in all points just, three things are necessary ; that it be denounced and undertaken by him that hath power to do it, which is onely the Sovereign.

20.

Cic. pro Milo.

That it be for a just cause, such as a defensive war is, which is absolute just, being justified by all reason amongst the wise, by necessity amongst the barbarians, by nature amongst beasts : I say defensive, of himself, that is, of his life, his liberty, his parents, his country : of his

Plin. in Pan.

Salust.

his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath given, In officiis.
of such as are unjustly oppressed. *Qui non defendit, nec obsistit, si po-*
tes, iniuria; tam est in vicio, quam si parentes, am patr iam, aut socios
deserat: He that defendeth not, nor resisteth injury, if he can, is as much
in fault, as if he betrayed his parents, his country, or his friends. These
3. heads of defence are within the bounds of justice, according to
S. Ambrose; *Fortitudo, qua per bella tuerit à barbaris patriam, vel de-*
fendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena justitia est: It is fortitude
full of justice, which by wars defendeth the Country from barbarians, or pro-
tecteth the weak, or companions or friends from robbers. Another more
briefly, divided it into two heads, faith and safety; *Nullum bellum à*
civitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute: No war is
undertaken by any worthy city, but either for faithfulness, or for safety.
And to offensive war he puts two conditions; that it proceed from
some former offence given; as outrage or usurpation, and having re-
demanded openly by a Herald that which hath been surprised and ta-
ken away (*post claricationem*) and sought it by way of justice, which
must ever go foremost. For if men be willing to submit themselves
unto justice, and reason, there let them stay themselves; if not, the
last, and therefore necessary, is just and lawfull: *Iustum bellum qui-*
bui necessarium, pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes: That
war is just, to whom it is necessary; arms are honest and righteous to
them, that have no other hope or refuge left, but only in arms.

Plin. I. 22. nat.
hip. cast. 2.
Livius,

Thirdly, to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnesse. *Sapien-*
tes pacis causa bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otii sustentant: ut in pace fi-
ne injuria vivant: Wise men wage war for peace sake, and sustain la-
bor in hope of rest: that they may live in peace without injury.

After justice cometh prudence, whereby a man doth advisedly Prudence.
deliberate, before, by sound of trumpet, he publisheth the war. And
therefore, that nothing be done out of passion, and over-rashly, it
is necessary that he consider of the points; of forces and means, as
well his own, as his enemies: secondly, of the hazzard and danger-
ous revolution of humane things, especially of arms, which are vari-
able, and wherein fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more
her Empire then in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such,
that in an hour it carrieth all: *Simul parva ac sperata, de cora unius ho-*
re forunna vertere posset: The fortune of one hour may overthrow all ho-
nour both gotten and hoped for.

22.

Livius:

Thirdly,

Thirdly, of those great evils, infelicities, and publick and particular miseries, which war doth necessarily bring with it, and which be such as the only imagination is lamentable. Fourthly, of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproaches that are spread abroad against the authors of the war, by reason of those evils and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing more subject to the tongues and judgments of men than War. But all lighteth upon the Chieftain. *Iniquissima bellorum conditio hac est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant, adversa uni impunitur: This is a most unjust condition of war, when all do challenge to themselves the prosperous events, and the unhappy successes are imputed to one alone.* All these things together make the jultest war that may be, detestable, saith S. Augustine; and therefore it standeth a Sovereign upon, not to enter into wars but upon great necessity, as it is laid of *Augustus*; and not to suffer himself to be carried by those incendiaries and firebrands of warr, who for some particular passion, are ready to kindle and inflame him, *Quibus in pace durius servitium est, in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios finant: They to whom service is hard in peace, are born to this, that neither themselves can be quiet, nor yet suffer others.* And these men are commonly such, whose noses do bleed when they come to the fact it self, *Dulce bellum inexpertis: War is sweetest to them that have not known it.* A wise Sovereign will keep himself in peace, neither provoking, nor fearing war, neither disquieting either his own state, or anothers, betwixt hope and fear, nor coming to those extremities of perishing himself, or making others to perish.

23.

The second
head to make
war, whereunto
three
things are re-
quired.
Provision, and
Munition.

The second head of military action, is, To make war, whereunto are required three things, Munitions, Men, Rules of war. The first is provision and munition of all things necessary for war, which must be done in good time and at leisure: for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and provision of those things which he should have alwaies ready; *Dim apparandum est, ut vincas celorius: It must be long preparing, that thou mayest be speedier overcome.* Now of the ordinary and perpetual provision required for the good of the Prince and the State at all times, hath been spoken in the first part of this Chapter, which is wholly of this subject. The principal provisions and munitions of war are three, Money, which is the vital spirit, and sinews of war, whereof hath been shewed in the second Chapter. 2. Arms both offensive and defensive, whereof likewise heretofore. These two are ordinary,

Tacit.

Pinder.

nary, and at all times, 3. Victuals, without which a man can neither conquer, nor live; whole armies are overthrown without a blow strucken, souldiers grow licentious and unruly, and it is not possible to do any good, *Disciplinam non servat jejunnus exercitus, A fasting and hungry Army observeth no discipline.* But this is an extraordinary provision, and not perpetual, and is not made but for War. It is necessary therefore, that in the deliberating of War, there be great Store-houes made for Victuals, Corn, powdered Flesh, both for the Army which is in the field, and for the Garrisons in the Frontiers, which may be besieged.

The second thing required to make War, are men fit to assail and to defend; we must distinguish them. The first distinction is, into Men. Souldiers, and Leaders or Captains, both are necessary. The Souldiers are the Body, the Captains the Soul, the life of the Army, who give motion and action: We will speak first of the Souldiers, who make the Body in gros. There are divers sorts of them: There are Footmen and Horsemen; natural of the same Countrey, and strangers; ordinary and subsidiary. We must first compare them all together, to the end, we may know which are the better, and to be preferred; and afterwards we will see how to make our choice; and lastly, how to govern and discipline them.

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especiall y rude and barbarous people, prefer horsemen before footmen; others quite contrary. A man may say that the foot are simply and absolutely the better, for they serve both throughout the War, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hilly, rough, craggy, and straight places, and in Sieges, the Cavalry is almost unprofitable. They are likewise more ready and less chargeable: and if they be well lead and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the shock of the horsemens. They are likewise preferred by such as are Doctors in this Art. A man may say that the Cavalry is better in Combat, and for a speedy dispatch; *Equestrium virium proprium, cito parare, cito cedere victoriam: It is proper to the Troops of Horsemen quickly to get, and quickly to lose the victory.* For the Foot are not so speedy, but what they do, they perform more surely.

As for natural Souldiers and strangers, divers men are likewise of divers opinions touching their precedency; but without all doubt the natural are much better, because they are more loyal then mercenary strangers.

25 •
Rather Foot
then Horse.

26
And natu-
ral then
Strangers.

The second Part of this Politick Prudence,

Venalesq; manus ubi fas, ubi maxima merces.

These mercenary hands that use to fight,

For greatest wages, not for greatest right.

More patient and obedient, carrying themselves with more honour and respect towards their Leaders, more courage in Combats, more affection to the Victory, and good of their Countrey: They cost less, and are more ready then strangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greatest necessities, making more stirre, then doing service, and the most part of them are importunate, and burdensome to the Common-weal, cruel to those of the Countrey, whom they forrage as enemies. Their coming and departure is chargeable, and many times they are expected and attended with great losis and inconvenience. It is some extremity there be need of them, be it so, but yet let them be in far leis number then the natural, and let them make but a member and part of the Army, not the Body. For there is danger, that if they shall see themselves equal in force, or more strong then the natural they will make themselves their masters that called them, as many times it hath fallen our. For he is master of the State, that is master of the Forces. And again, if it be possible, let them be drawn from Allies and Confederates, who bring with them more trust and service then they that are simple strangers. For to make more use of strangers, or to employ them more then natural Subjects, is to play the Tyrants, who fear their Subjects; and because they handle them like Enemies, they make themselves odious unto them, whereby they fear to arm them, or to employ them in the Wars.

As well ordinary as subsidiary as
subsidiary. 27 As touching ordinary Souldiers and subsidiaries, both are necessary, but the difference between them is, that the ordinary are less in number, are alway afoot and in arms both in peace, and in warre: and of these we have spoken in the provision, a people wholly destinatated and confined to the Wars, formed to all exercite of Arms, resolute. This is the ordinary force of the Prince, his honour in peace; his safeguard in War: such were the *Romane Legions*: These should be divided by Troops in times of peace, to the end they raise no commotions. The subsidiaries are in far greater number, but they are not perpetual, and wholly destinatated to War: they have other Vocations: At a need and in times of War, they are called by the sound of a Trumpet, enrolled, mustred, and instructed to the Wars; and in times of peace they return, and retire themselves to their Vocations.

We

We have understood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them: A matter whereof we must be carefully advised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the Victory, but Valour; and commonly they are but few that give the Overthrow. An unbridled multitude doth more hurt then good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potius impedimentum quam auxilium: It is not of force, but a burden; a hinderance rather than a help.* Victory then consisteth not in the number, but in the force and valour; *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus: In War there is need of hands, not of many names.* There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell-mell) that they be not voluntary Adventurers, ignorant of War, taken forth of Cities, corrupt, vicious, dissolute in their manners, arrogant Boasters, hardy and bold to pillage, far enough off from blowes, leverets in dangers; *Assuti latrociniis bellorum insolentes, galeatil eiores, purgamenta turbibus, quibus ob egestatem & flagitia maxima peccandi necessitas: Accustomed to pillage and the Robberies of the Wars, insolent, armed bares, the off-scum of the City, on whom want and the crimes they be subject unto, have brought a necessity of offending.*

To chuse them well, there needs judgment, attention and instruction, and to this end five things must be considered of, that is to say, the place of their birth and education. They must be taken out of the fields, the mountains, barren and hard places, Countries neer adjoining to the Sea, and brought up in all manner of labour. *Ex agris supplenaum praecipue robur exercitus, aptior armis rusticis plebs sub dio & in laboribus ensuita ipso terra sua solo & caelo acris animantur.* Et minus mortem timeri qui minus deliciarum novit in vita: The strength of the Army is chiefly to be supplied out of the field; Country people are fitter for Arms, being trained up abroad in the air and in labours, are more eagerly encouraged by the soyl and open air of the fields. And he feareth dearest least, who hath least tasted of delights in his life. For they that are brought up in Cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gain, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; *Vernaculo multitudine, lascivia sueta, laborum intolerans. The home-bred multitude, used to sloath and wantonness, are impatient of labour.* Secondly, the age, that they be taken young, at eighteen years of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, and not fit for Discipline.

Thirdly, the bodies, which some will have to be of great stature,

29
Edition of
soldiis con-
sisteth in five
things.
1. Countrey.
Veget.

Tacit.

2. Age.

3. Bodies.

The second part of this Politick Prudence.

as *Marius* and *Pirrbus*: But though it be but indifferent, so the body be strong, dry, vigorous, sinewie, of a fierce look, it is all one. *Dura corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus, major animi vigor, Hard bodies, well knit joyns, a fierce and threatening countenance, great courage and vigour of spirit.*

4. Spirit.

Fourthly, the Spirit, which must be lively, resolute, bold, glorious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproach.

5. Condition.

Fifthly, the condition, which importeth much; for they that are of a base and infamous condition, or dishonest qualities, or such as are mingled with effeminate Arts, serving for delicacy, and for women, are no way fit for this Profession.

After the choice and Election, cometh Discipline: for it is not enough to have chosen those that are capable, and likely to prove good Souldiers, if a man make them not good; and if he make them good, if he keep and continue them not such. Nature makes a few men valiant, it is good Institution and Discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessary and profitable good Discipline is in War: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that won it the Signory of the world: yea, it was in greater account, than the love of their Children. Now the principal point of Discipline is Obedience, to which end served that ancient Precept, That a Soldier must more fear his Captain then his Enemy.

Now this Discipline must tend to two ends; to make the soldiers valiant, and honest men: and therefore it hath two parts, Valour, and Manners. To Valour, three things are required; daily Exercise in Arms, wherein they must always keep themselves in practice without intermission; and from hence cometh the Latine word *Exercitus* which signifieth an Army. This Exercise in Arms, is an instruction to manage and use them well, to prepare themselves for Combats, to draw benefit from Arms, with dexterity to defend themselves, to discover and prevent unto them whatsoever may fall out in the fight, and come to the triall, as in a ranged battail: to propose Rewards to the more active, and to enflame them.

Secondly, travel or pains, which is as well to har'ren them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *Exercitus labore proficit, otio consenescit;* An Army profiteth by labour, and decayeth with ease and idleness, as for the good and service of the Army, and Fortification of the Field, whereby they must learn to digge, to plant a Pallisade, to order a Barricado, to run, to carry heavy Burthens. These are necessary things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprise the Enemy.

30
Well disci-
plined.

Veget.

31
Discipline
hath two
parts.
1. Valour,
which is at-
tained by
Exercise.

2. Travel.

Enemy. Thirdly, Order, which is of great use, and must be kept in 3. Order. War for divers causes, and after a divers manner. First, in the distribution of the Troops, into Battalions, Regiments, Ensigns, Camerades. Secondly, in the situation of the Camp, that it be disposed into quarters with proportion, having the places, entries issues, lodgings fitted both for the horsemen and footmen, whereby it may be easie for every man to find his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field, and against the Enemy, that every one hold his Ranck; that they be equally distant the one from the other, neither too near, nor too far from one another. Now this Order is very necessary, and serves for many purposes. It is very pleasing to the eye, cheareth up friends, astonisheth the Enemy, secureth the Army, maketh all the Removes and the Commands of the Captains easie; in such sort, that without stir, without confusion the General commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purposes come even to the least. *Imperium ducis simul omnes copia sentiunt; & ad unum regem sine tumultu respondent. All the Army together know their Leaders command; and answer, without tumult, the will of the General.* To be brief, this order well kept, maketh an Army almost invincible; and contrarily many have lost the field for want of this good order, and good intelligence.

The second part of this Military Discipline concerneth manners, 32 which are commonly very dissolute, and in Arms hardly ordered, *As fiducia dimicantibus difficile morum custodire mensuram:* It is a hard the second matter for soldiers, that are in continual employment, to keep a measure part of in their manners. Nevertheless, there must be pains taken, and especially to entall (if it may be) three Virtues; Continencie, where- by all Gluttony, Drunkenness, Whoredome, and all manner of dishonest pleasures are chased away, which do make a Souldier loose and licentious. *Degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum;* Tacit. A Soldier degenerateth from courage and virtue, by custome of sensual pleasures; witness, Hannibal, who by delicacie and delights in a Winter was effeminated, and he, by Vice, was vanquished, that was invincible, and by Arms vanquished all others. Modesty in words, driving away all vanity, vain boasting, bravery of speech; for true valour stirreth not the tongue, but the hands, doth not speak, but execute. *Viri nati malitia, factis magni, ad verborum linguaq; certamina rudes: discrimin ipsum certaminis differunt: viri fortes, in opere acres, ante id placidi.* Men that are born for Warfare be stout in deeds, and rude in words: prolong the danger

of the conflict : valiant men are fierce in execution, And contrarily great speakers are final doers. Nimiis verbis, lingua feroce. Now the tongue is for counsel, the hand for combat, saith Homer; Modesty in action, (that is, a simple and ready obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the Captains :) Hac sum bone militiae, velle, vereri, obedire : These things are fit in good Souldiers, to stand in fear, and ready to obey. Abstinencie, whereby souldiers keep their hands clean from violence, foraging, robbery. And this is a brieie summe in the military discipline ; that which the Generall must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good and valorous, and by severe punishments against offenders : for indulgence undoeth souldiers.

33
of Captains.

of the Gene-
rall.

Tacit.

Tacit.

Tacit.

Senior in
Plut.

Let this suffice of souldiers : Now a word or two of Captains, without whom the souldier can do nothing : they are a body without a soul, a ship with oars without a Master to hold the stern : There are two sorts, the Generall and first, and afterwards the subaltern, the Master of the Camp, Collonels : But the Generall (who must never be but one, under pain of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that an army can do as much as a Generall can do ; and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest : *Plus in duce repone, quam in exercitu : Repose more in the Generall, than in the army.* Now this Generall is either the Prince himself and Sovereign, or such as he hath committed the charge unto, and made choice of. The presence of a Prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victory ; it doubleth the force and courage of his men ; and it seemeth to be requisite when it standeth upon the safeguard and health of his state, and of a Province. In warres of lesse consequence he may deperte another ; *Dubius praliorum exemplius summa rerum & imperii seipsum reservet : In a doubtful battle he may exempt himself from the danger, and reserve himself for the securtie of himself and state.* Finally, a Generall must have these qualities ; he must be an experienced in the Art military, having seen and suffered both fortunes ; *Secundarum ambiguaruntq[ue] rerum sciens eorum interitus ; Having tasted both good and bad fortune, and therefore fearlesse.* Secondly, he must be provident and well advised, and therefore staid cold, and settled ; farre from all temeritie, and precipitation, which is not onely foolish, but unfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended : *Non licet in bello his peccare ; Faults may not twice be committed in warre.* And therefore he must rather look back, then before him ; *Ducem oportet potius*

us respicere, quam prospicere. Thirdly, he must be vigilant and active, and, by his own example, teaching his soldiers to do his will. Fourthly, happy ; good fortune comes from heaven, but yet willingly it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

34.

After the munitions and men of warre, let us come to the rules head *The third and and-generall advilements to make warre.* This third point is a very *of the rules and counsels to great and necessary instrument of warre, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies ; Plura confilio quam vi perficiuntur : More things are brought to passe by counsel then by force.* Now to prescribe certain rules and perpetuall, it is impossible ; For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, and whereunto a man must accommodate himself, wherenpon it was well said, That men give not counsel to the affairs, but the affairs to men, that a man must order his warre by his eye. A man must take his counsel in the field, *Consilium in arena :* for new occurrents yield new counsels. Nevertheless there are some so generall, and certain, that a man cannot fail in the delivery and observation of them. We will briefly set downe some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be observed throughout a warre, which we will speak of in the first place, others are for certain occasions and affaires.

1. The first is carefullly to watch and to meet the occasions: not to *Rules for the lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his : Oc-* whole time of *casion hath a great place in all humane affaires, especially in warre,* *warre.* where it helpeth more then force.

2. To make profit of rumours and reports that run abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may do much, especially in the beginning, *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumve impelit animos, By fame or report wars continue, fame endeth warre, and moveth mens minds either to hope or fear.*

3. But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him : he may consider of them, but let them not hin' er him to do that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firm to that which reason hath counselled him.

4. Above all, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he grow into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and careless ; it is the most dangerous evil that can fall out in warre. He that contemneth his enemie, discovereth and betrayeth himself, *Frequentissimum initium calamitatis,*

tatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quam qui non timet. Nil tantum
in honeste despiciuntur: quems preveris; valentiores negligenter facies:
Security is the most common beginning of calamity. No man is sooner
overcome than he that feareth not: Nothing safely is to be despised in an
Enemy: that will make by thy negligence, him whom thou despisest, more
strong and valiant. There is nothing in War that must be despited: for
therein there is nothing little, and many times that which seemeth
to a man to be of small moment, yieldeth great effects. Sape parvis
momentis magni casus: ut nihil timendi, sic nihil contemendi: From
things of small moment oftentimes arise great events: As nothing is fea-
red so nothing is to be contemned.

5 To enquire very carefully, and to know the estate and affairs of
the Enemy, especially these points: 1. The nature, capacity, and de-
signments of the Chieftain. 2. The nature, manners and manner
of life of his Enemies. 3. The situation of the places, and the na-
ture of the Countrey where he is. Hannibal was excellent in this.

35
For the fight

6 Touching the fight or main battel, many things are advisedly
to be considered of; when, where, against whom, and how; to the
end it be not to small purpose. And a man must not come to this ex-
tremity but with great deliberation, but rather make choice of any
other mean, and seek to break the force of his Enemy by patience,
and to suffer him to beat himself with time, with the place, with the
want of many things before he come to this hazzard. For the issue
of Battels is very uncertain, and dangerous: *Incertus exitus pugnarum:*
Mars communis qui sapienter & iam exultantem evertit, &
perculit ab abjecto: The issue and event of war is uncertain: Mars is
common to all who often overthroweth him that spoileth, and now triom-
pheth, and confoundeth and striketh him by the abject, and by him that
was vanquished.

When.

7 A man then must not come to the Battel, but seldom, that is
to lay in great necessities, or for some great occasion: In necessity, as
if the difficulties grow on his part, his viands, his Treasure failereth; his
men begin to dittate the Wars, and will be gone, and he cannot long
conserve; *Capiens i robus in malis praecepit via est:* In extremities a
sudden course is to be taken upon great occasions, as if his part be clearly
the stronger that the Victory seemeth to offer it self, that the En-
emy is weak, and will shortly be stronger, and will offer the Battel, that
he is out of doubt and fear, and thinketh his enemy far off, that he is
weary and faint, revivisheth himself; his horses feed upon the
Litter.

8. He must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battels. In general, he must not attend (if he may prevent it) his enemy, till he enter within his own territories. He must go forth to meet him, or at least lay him in the entrance. And if he be already entred, not hazzard the battel, before he have another Army in readines, to make a supp'y; otherwise he puts his State in hazard. More particularly, he must consider the field where the Battel is to be fought, whether it be fit for himself, or his Enemy: for the field many times gives a great advantage. The plain Champion is good for the Cavalry, strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of Ditches, Trees, for the Infantry.

9. He must consider with whom he is to fight, ^{With and against whom.} not the strongest, I mean not the strongest men, but the strongest & stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giveth more heart and courage, than Necessity, an enemy invincible. And therefore I say, that a man must never fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazzard a battel within his own Countrey; for an enemy being entred, fighteth desperately, knowing if he be vanquished, he cannot escape death, having neither fortres, nor any place of retreat or succour; *Unde necessitas in loco, spes in virtute salm ex victoria: When necessity is in place, hope is in courage and resolution, and safety out of victory.*

10. The manner of fight that brings best advantage with it, whatsoever it be, is the best: whether it be surprise, subtlety, close and covert faining to bear, to the end, he may draw the Enemy, and catch him in his gin; *Spe victoria inducere, ut vincantur: To bring him into hope of Victory, that he may be vanquished;* to watch and mark his over-fights and faults, that he may the better prevail against him, and give the charge.

For ranged battels, these things are required. The first and principal, is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supply and ^{Rules for ranging} succour alwayes ready, but close and hidden, to the end, that coming suddenly and unawares, it may astonish and confound the Enemy. For all sudden things, though they be vain and ridiculous, bring fear and astonishment with them.

Primi in omnibus praliis oculi vincuntur & anres.

In skirmishes and bastes all,

The eyes and ears are first that fall.

3. To be first in the field, and ranged in battel array. This a Generall doth with so much the more ease, and it much increaseth the

36.

court-

The second part of this politick prudence.

courage of his Souldiers, and abateth his enemies ; for this is to make himself the assailant, who hath alwayes more heart then the defendant. 4. A beautiful, gallant, bold, resolved countenance, of the General and others Leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the Souldiers, and to lay open unto them the honour, commodity, and security that there is in valour ; That dishonour, danger, death, are the reward of cowards : *Minus timoris minus periculi, audaciam pro muro esse; effugere mortem, qui eam contemnit :* The lesse fear, the lesse danger, courage is a wall of defence, he avoideth death that contemns it.

37. *Having joyed* ^{37.} *Having joyed* ^{battl.} Being come to hand-strokes, if the Army waver, the General must hold him firm, do the duty of a resolute Leader, and brave man at arms, run before his astonished Souldiers, stay them recouling, thrust himself into the throng, make all to know, both his own, and his enemies, that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

And if it fall out, that he have the better, and the field be his, he must stay and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselves, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to be feared, which hath many times come to passe, that the vanquished gathering heart, make use of despair, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquisher, for this Necessity is a violent School-mistris. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia: & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido :* The courage of them that are inclosed, groweth out of despair: and when there is no hope, fear taketh arms. It is better to give passage unto them, and to remove all lets and hindrance that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a General suffer himself or his men, to attend the booty, or to be allureth thereby over hastily, if he be Conquerour. He must use his victory wisely, lest the abuse thereof turn to his own harm. And therefore he must not defile it with cruelty, depriving the enemy of all hope, for there is danger in it. *Ignaviam necessitas accusat; saepe desperatio spei causa est, gravissimi sunt morbi irritati necessitatis :* Necessity sharpneth cowardize; despair is oftentimes the cause of hope; most bitter are the bitings of urged necessity. But contrarily, he must leave some occasion of hope, and overture unto peace, not spoiling and ransacking the Countrey, which he hath conquer-ed; for fury and rage are dangerous beasts. Again, he must not stain his victory with insolency, but carry himself modestly, and alwayes remember the perpetual flux and reflux of this World, and that alternative revolution, whereby from adversity springeth prosperity, from prosperity adversity. There are some that cannot digest a good

for-

fortune: *Magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt: fortuna vitrea est, tunc cum splendet, frangitur: O infidam fiduciam! & saepe vixit virtus: They cannot digest great felicity: fortune is brittle, and slippery, when it shineth, it breaketh: O faithless confidence! that often the victor is vanquished.* If he be vanquished, wisdom is necessary well, to weigh and consider of his losse; it is sottishness to make himself believe that it is nothing, and to feed himself with vain hopes, to supprese the newes of the overthrow. He must consider thereof, as it is at the worst, otherwise how shall he remedy it: And afterwards with good courage, hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new levie, seek new succours, put good and strong Garrisons into his strong-hold places. And though the Heavens be contrary unto him, as sometimes they seem to oppose themselves to holy and just arms; it is nevertheless never forbidden to die in the bed of honour, which is far better then to live in dishonour.

And thus we have ended the second head of this subject, which is to make Warre, except one scruple that remaineth: That is to say, *A question of whether it be lawful to use subtily, policy, stratagems, in Warre, the Strategem.* There be some that hold it negatively, that it is unworthy men of honour and virtue, rejecting that excellent saying; *Dolus, an virtus quis in hoste requirat? Whether deceit or courage, is most requisite in an enemy?* Alexander would take no advantages of the obscurity of the night, saying, that he liked not of thieving victories; *Malo me fortuna pigrat, quam victorie pudeat: I had rather be sorry for my fortune, then victory should shame me.* So likewise the first Romans, sent their Schoolmaster to the Phaliscians; so Pyrrhus, his traiterous Physician, making profession of virtue, disavowing those of their Countrey, that did otherwise, reproving the subtily of the Greeks and Africans, and teaching, that true victory is by virtue; *Qua salva fide & integra dignitate paratur, Which is gotten with a safe faith and true honour;* That which is gotten by wit and subtily, is neither generous, nor honourable, nor secure. The vanquished, hold not themselves to be well vanquished, *non virtute, sed occasione & arie ducis se vicit rati.* Ergo non frande neque occulis sed palam & armatum hostes suos ulcisci. Think not themselves to be conquered by courage, but by occasion, and by the cunning and subtily of the Generall: Therefore they would not be revenged on their enemies by deceit, or secret fraud, but openly, and by force of Arms. Now all this is well, said

The second part of this politick prudence,

said and true, but to be understood in two cases, in private quarrels, and against private enemies, or where faith is not given, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say, in Warre, and without the prejudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any meanes whatsoever, to conquer the enemy that is already condemned. This, besides the judgement of the greatest Warriors, (who contrarily have preferred the victory gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is won by open force; whereupon, to that they have ordained an Ox for a sacrifice, to this only a Cock) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Cum justum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis, aut ex insidiis, nihil ad iustitiam intereat.* When a just Warre is undertaken, it is no prejudice to justice, whether any fight openly, or by lying in wait, and by wiles. Warre hath naturally reasonable priviledges, to the prejudice of reason. In time and place, it is permitted to make use and advantage of the tortishness of an enemy, as well as of his weaknes or idlenes.

39.

The third head and pleasing then the rest, which is to finish the War by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects: *pax optima rerum Quas homini novisse datum est. Pax una triumphis Innumeris potior:* Peace is the best thing that is given to man: one peace is better then innumerable triumphs.

Let us come to the third head of this military matter more short
subjectt, to finish war. And very commodious to both parts, the Conquerors and Conquered. But first, to the vanquished, who are the weaker; to whom I do first give this counsell, To continue armed, to make shew of security, assurance and resolution. For he that desirereth peace, must be alwayes ready for war. whereupon it hath been said, That treaties of peace, do well and happily succeed, when they are concluded under a Buckler. But this peace must be honest, and upon reasonable conditions; otherwise, though it be said, that a base peace is more profitable then a just warre, yet it is better to die freely, and with honour, then to serve dishonourably. And again, it must be pure and free, without fraud and hypocrisie, which finishereth the war, differreth it not: *Pace suspecta intus bellum: Warre is more safe, then a doubtful and suspicious peace.* Nevertheless, in times of necessity, a man must accommodate himself as he may. When a Pilot feareth a ship wrack, he casteth himself into the Sea to save himself, and many times it succeedeth well, when

In respect of the vanquisher. a man committeth himself to the discretion of a generous adversary: *Victores qui sunt also animo secundares in miserationem ex ira veruntur:*

For-

Polyb.

Plut. in Marc.

Ulp. lib.1. de

Prob.

August. quæst.

Ulp. Iuse.

Of peace in respect of the vanquished.

Fortunate and good success, turneth the minde of a noble and generous Conquerour, from wrath to mercy. To the vanquishers, I give this counsell, That they be not over-hardly periwaded to peace; for though perhaps it be lesse profitable unto them, then to be vanquished, yet some commodity it bringeth; for the continuance of war is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make War often against one and the same enemies, because they learn thereby to defend themselves, and in the end to assail too. The bittings of dying beasts are mortal; *Fraetis rebus violentior ultima virtus*: The last courage is more violent in a state overthrown. And again, the issue is alwayes uncertain; *Melior tuusque cetsa pax sperata victoria; illa in tua, hac in deorum manu est*: Better, and more safe is a certain peace, then a hoped for victory, the one is in thine own hand, the other in the hand of God. And many times the poyson lieth in the tail, and the more favourable fortune is, the more it is to be feared; *Nemus tuo dñm periculis offerre tam crebris potest*: No man can with safety present himself long to open dangers. But it is truly honourable, it is a glory, having a victory in his hands, to be facil and easily periwaded unto peace; it is to make known, that he undertaketh a Honourable, war justly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrarily, to refuse it, and afterwards, by some ill successe to repent the refusal, it is very dishonourable, and will be laid, that glory hath undone him. He refuseth peace, and would have honour, and so hath lost them both. But S. Bernard.

If thou shalt grant a good peace, it will be faithful and perpetual, if evil, it will not last long. Livius.

It is as great greatness to shew as much ientity towards the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemy. The Romans did very well put this in practice, and it did them no harm.

CHAP. IIII.

Of that prudence which is required in difficult affairs, and ill accidents, publick and private.

THE PREFACE.

HAVING spoken of that politick prudence required in a Sovereign, for the carriage of himself and his good government, we will here severally speak of that prudence that is necessary for the preservation of himself, and the remedying of those affairs, and difficult and dangerous accidents, which may happen, either to himself, or his particular subjects.

The Division of this matter, by distinction of the accidents. First, these affairs and accidents are very divers: they are either publick or particular, either to come, and such as threaten us, or present and pressing us: the one are only doubtful and ambiguous; the other dangerous and important, because of their violence: And they that are the greater and more difficult, are either secret and hid; and they are two, that is to say, conspiracy against the person of the Prince, or the State, and treason against the places and companies: Or manifest and open, and these are of divers sorts. For they be either without form of war, and certain order, as popular commotions for small and light occasions, factions and leagues between subjects of the one against the other, in small and great number, great or little: seditions of the people against the Prince or Magistrate, rebellion against the authority and head of the Prince or they are ripe and formed into a war, and are called civil wars: which are of so many kinds, as the above-named troubles and commotions, which are the causes, foundations and seeds of them: but have growen, and are come into consequence and continuance. Of them all we will speak distinctly, and we will give advice and counsel, as well to Sovereigns, as particular persons, great and small, how to carry themselves wisely therein.

I. *Of the evils and accidents that do threaten us.*

IN those croffe and contrary accidents, whereunto we are subject, there are two divers manners of carriage: and they may be both good, according to the divers natures, both of the accidents, and of

of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans self against the accident, to remove all things that may hinder the diverting thereof; or at least, to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and oblique minde, and hath need of hard and painful care. The other is incontinently, to take and receive these accidents at the worst, and to resolve himself to bear them sweetly, and patiently, and in the meantime, to attend peaceably whatsoeuer shall happen, without tormenting himself, or hindering it. The former studieth how to range the accidents, this himself. That seemeth to be more courageous, this more sure. That continueth in suspense, is tossed between fear and hope; this putteth himself in safety, and lyeth so low, that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the seat of constancy. That laboureth to escape, this to suffer: and many times this maketh the better bargain. Oftentimes it falleth out, that there is greater inconvenience and losse, in pleading and contending, then in losing; in flying for safety, then in suffering. A covetous man tormenteth himself more then a poor, a jealous then a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because he is in action; in this, patience. But what hindereth, but that a man may perform both in order: and that where prudence and vigilancy can do nothing, there patience may succeed? doubtless in publick evils, a man must assay the first; which such are bound to do, as have the charge and can do it; in particular, let every one choose the best.

*I.I. Of evils and accidents, present, pressing,
and extreme.*

THe proper means to lighten evils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppole himself, for opposition enflameth and increaseth them much more. A man by the jealousy of contention & contradiction sharpneth & stirreth the evil: but it is either in diverting them elsewhere, as Physicians use to do, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a Disease, seek to divert it into some other part less dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensibly. This is an excellent remedy against all evils, and which practised in all things, if a man mark it well, whereby we are made to swallow the lowest morsels; yea, death it self, and that insensibly; *Abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, loci denique munera.*

tatione, tanquam agroti non convalescentes, sape curandus est: The mind is to be led away to other studies, cares, business; lastly, with change of place, like sick persons not recovering, is often cured. As a man councelleth thole that are to passe over some tedious deep place, either to shut, or to divert their eyes. When a man hath occasion to launce a sore in a Child, he flatteth him, and withdraweth his minde to some other matter. A man must practise the experiment and subtlety of *Hippomenes*, who being to run with *Atalanta*, a Damoisel of excellent beauty, and to lose his life if he lost the Goal; to marry the Damoisel, if he won it; furnished himself with three fair Apples of Gold, which at divers times he let fall, to stay the course of the Damoisel, whilst she took them up, and so by diverting her, got the advantage of her, and gained her-self: so if the consideration of some present unhappy accident, or the memory of any that is past, do much afflict us; or some violent passion, which a man cannot tame, do move and torment us; we must change and turn our thoughts to something else, and substitute unto our selves, some other accident and passion lesse dangerous. If a man cannot vanquish it, he must escape it, go out of the way, deal cunningly, or weaken and dissolve it, with other thoughts and alienations of the minde, yea, break it into many pieces; and all this by diversions. The other advice, in the last and more dangerous extremities, that are in a manner past hope, is a little to cast down the head, to lean unto the blow, to yield unto necessity; for there is great danger, that by too much obstinacy in not relenting at all, a man giveth occasion to violence, to trample all under-foot. It is better to make the Lawes to will that they can, since they cannot do that they would. It was a reproach unto *Cato*, to have been over-rough in the civil Wars of his time, and that he rather suffered the Common-weal to run into all extremities, then succoured it, by tying himself over-tightly to the Lawes. Contrarily, *Epaminondas* in a necessity, continued his charge beyond his time, though the Law upon the pain of his life, did prohibit him: and *Philepæmnes* is commended, that being born to command, he did not only know how to govern according to the Lawes, but also commanded the Lawes themselves, when publick necessity did require it. A Leader at a necessity must stoop a little, apply himself to the occasion, turn the Table of the Law, if not take it away, go a little out of the way, that he lose not all; for this is prudence, which is no way contrary, either to reason or justice.

III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affairs.

IN things doubtfull, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inability to see and choose that which is most commodious, bringeth with it uncertainty and perplexity the best and safest way is to lean to that part where there is most honesty and justice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwayes remain an inward content, and an outward glory, to have chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrary part, what would have happened, and whether he had escaped his destiny. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the straiter.

IV. Difficult and dangerous Affairs.

IN difficult Affairs, as in Agreements, to be over-careful to make them over-sure, is to make them less firm; less assured; because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindered, more things, more clauses are mingled and interposed then are needful, from whence arise all differences. Add hereunto, that a man seemeth hereby to scorn fortune, and to exempt himself from her jurisdiction, which cannot be. *Vim suorum ingruentem refringi non vult:* *He will not weaken their approaching force.* It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, then to be so exact and cautious.

In dangerous affairs, a man must be wise and courageous, he must foresee and know all dangers, make them neither less nor greater then they are by want of judgment, think that they will not all happen, or shall not all have their effects; that a man may avoid many by industry or by diligence, or otherwise; what they are from whom he may receive aid and succour, and therupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest Enterprise. A wise man is courageous; for he thinketh, discoureth, and prepareth himself for all, and a courageous man must likewise be wise.

V. Conjurations.

WE are come now to the greatest, most important, and dangerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expressly ^{1.} *Description.* describing them one after the other, giving afterwards in every one

of them some advisments fit for a Sovereign, and in the end for every particular person.

Conjuration is a conspiracy and enterprise of one or many against the person of the Prince or the State : it is a dangerous thing, hardly avoided or remedied, because it is close and hidden. How should a man defend himselfe against a covert enemie, such an one as carrieth the countenance of a most officious freind; How can a man know the will and thoughts of another, And again, he that contemneth his owne life, is master of the life of another, *Contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem prius : He contemneth all men, that first contemneth death,* in such sort that the prince is exposed to the mercy of a privat man whosoever he be.

Machiavel setteth down at large, how a man should frame and order and conduct a conspiracy; we, how it may be broken, hindered, prevented.

2.
Remedies and
Advisements.

1. The counsels and remedies hereupon are, first a privie search and countermeine by faithfull and discreet persons fit for such a purpose, who are the eyes and ears of the Prince : These must discover whatsoever is said and done, especially by the principall officers. Conspirators do willingly here and there defame the Prince, or lend their ears to those that blame and accuse him. Their discourse and conference then touching the prince must be known, and a Prince must not stick to be bountiful in his rewards and immunitiess to such discoverers: But yet he must not over-lightly give credit to all reports : He must lend his eare to all, not his beliefe; and diligently examine to the end he oppresse not the innocent, & so purchase unto himselfe the hatred and hard speech of the people.

2. The second advice is, that he endeavour by clemency and innocency to win the love of all, even of his enemies, *fidiissima custodia Princiris innocentia: Innocency is the most faithfull safeguard of the Prince.* By offending no man, a man taketh a course to be offended by none: And it is to small purpose for a man to shew his power by wrongs and outrages *Male vim suam potestas, aliorum consumelii experitur : power doth ill make proof of its force by the contempt of others.*

3. The third is to make a good shew, to shew a good countenance according to the accustomed manner, not changing or depressing any thing; and to publisch in all places, that he is well periwaded of thos' meetings and assemblies that men appoint, and to make them believe that he hath them not in the wind, that he descrieth not their plots and purposes: This was an experiment which *Deyns* the Tyrant made

made good use of against an enemy of his, which cost him dear.

4. The fourth is to attend without astonishment & trouble whatsoever may happen unto him. *Cesar* did well put in practice these three latter means, but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, then to live (nay to die) alwayes in a trance and a continual fever of an accident, which is past remedy, and must be wholly referre unto God. They that have taken another course and have endeavoured to prevent it by punishments and revenge, have very seldom found it the best way, and have not for all that escaped the danger, as many Romane Emperours can well witnessse.

But the conspiracy being discovered, he truth found out, what is to be done? The conspirators must rigorously be punished: to spare such people, is cruelly to betray the weal-publick. They are enemies to the liberty, good, and peace of all: Justice requiriteth it. But yet wil-
Punishment of
conspirators.
and the advice
thereupon.
 dom and discretion is necessary herein; & he must not alwaies carry himself after one and the same manner. Sometimes he must execute suddenly, specially if the number of the conspiratos be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not seek by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise & secretly he may know them, and to make as though he knew them not, is good) or a man seeke him that which he would not find. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a mal number, good subjects are contained in their duty, and they diverted from their attempts that either are not, or think not themselves bewraied. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stir up mens hearts against him. Sometimes he must delay the punishment, but yet never be slow in procuring his safety. But yet the conspirators may be such, and the Treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantly is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to prevent the conspiracy, to frustrate it, faining nevertheless not to know the conspirators, but so to carry himself, as it he would provide for another thing as the *Carthaginians* did to *Hannan* their Captain. *Optimum & solum sapientiarum Justin. lib. 1. remedium, si non intelligentur: The best, and oftentimes the only re- Tacit.* medy of treachery, is, that a man seem not to know them. And which is more, a Prince must sometime pardon, especially if he be a great man, that hath deserved well of the Prince and State, and to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose children, parents friends are mighty. For what should he doe? how should he break this band? If with safety he may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemency in this case is sometimes not onely glorious to a Prince. *N. I. glori-*

Treason.

gloriosius Princeps impunis Ieso, but it helpeth much for safety to come, diveteth others from the like designments, and worketh either shame in them, or repentance; the example of *Augustus* towards *Cinna* is very excellent.

VI. Treason.

I. *Description.* **T**Reason is a secret Conspiracy or Enterprise against a place, or a Troop or Company; it is as a conjuration a secret evil, dangerous and hardly avoided: for many times a Traitor is in the middle and bosom of the Company, or place, which he selleth and betrayeth. To this unhappy mystery are willingly subject, such as are covetous, light spirits hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a fair shew of trust and fidelity, they commend and keep it carefully in small matters, and by that means endeavouring to cover, they discover themselves. It is the mark whereby to know them.

2. *Advise-
ments, and
Remedies.* **T**he advisements are always the same that belongs to conjurations: except in the punishments, which here must be speedy, grievous, and irremissible: for they are a kind of people ill-born and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world; whom to pity it is cruelty.

VII. Commotions of the People.

1. *Advise-
ments, and
Remedies.* **T**here are many sorts, according to the diversity of the causes; persons, manner and continuance, as we shall see hereafter: Federation Confederacy, Sedition, Tyranny, Civil Wars. But we will speak here simply, and in general of those that are raised in a heat, as sudden Tumults, that endure not long. The Advise-ments and Remedies, are to procure som one or other to speak & to shew himself unto them, that is of Authority, virtue, and singular reputation eloquent, having gravity mingled with grace, and industry with smooth speech to win the people: for at the presence of such a man, as at a sudden lightning, the people grow calm and quiet:

— *Veniti magno in populo cum saepe coorta
Seditio est, savitque animis ignobile vulgus,
Jamque faces, & saxa volant: furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis, si foris virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arrestisque auribus adstant:
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcer.*

When

*When as the Commons in tumultuous guise
with furious rage do in sedition rise,
Then stones and fire, and all things fly about,
as farie fills the hands of that base rout :
And if by chance a man both grave and sage,
of good desert, and reverenc'd for his age
They hap to see, then silent straight they stand ;
with listning eares his words to understand :
He with sweet words their anger doth asswage,
rules their stout mindes, and doth appease their rage.*

Sometimes the Captain himself must undertake this busines. But it must be done with an open front, a strong assurance, having his minde free, and pure from all imagination of death, and the worst that may happen unto him : for to go amongst them with a fearful and unconstant countenance, with flattery and humble carriage, is to wrong himself, and to do little good. This, *Cesar* did excellently put in practice, upon those mutinous Legions and Armies, that rose up against him.

— *sterit aggere fultus.*

*Cespitis, intrepidus vultu, meruit que timeri
Nil metuens.* —

*On high upon a heap of turfs he year'd,
Undaunted stood, as in his looks appear'd,
And fearless shew'd him worthy to be feard.*

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Aetlian* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two means to quiet and appease a moved and furious people : the one is by rough usage, and pure authority and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becommeth a Captain, if it stand him upon ; but yet he must take heed how he do it, as hath been said. The other more ordinary, is by flattery and fair speeches, for he must not make an open resistance. Savage beasts are never tamed with blows : and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and fair promises. In this case, the wise have permitted a man to lie, as men use to do with Children and sick folk. Herein *Percles* was excellent, who won the people, by the eyes, the eares, and the belly ; that is to say, by Shews, Comedies, Feasts, and hereby did what he list. This mean, more base and servile, but yet necessary, must be practised by him whom the Captain sendeth, as *Menenius Agrippa* did at *Rome*. For if he think to win them by main force, when they are without the bounds of reason, no

way yielding unto them, as *Appius*, *Coriolanus*, *Cato*, *Phocion*, endeavoured to do, he is mistaken, and deceiveth himself.

VIII. Faction and Confederacy.

1. *The description.* **F**action or confederacy is a complotment and association, of one against another, between the subjects; whether it be between the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are between private men, and certain Families; but for the most part, from ambition (the plague of States) every one covering the first rank. That which falleth out between great personages, is more pernicious. There are some that stick not to say, That it is in some sort, profitable for a Sovereign; and it doth the self-same service to a Common-weal, that brawls of servants do in Families, saith *Cato*. But that cannot be true, except it be in tyrants, who fear lest their subjects should agree too well; or in small and light quarrels between Cities, or between Ladies of the Court, to know newes. But not important factions, which must be extinguished in their first birth, with their marks, names, habitaments, which are many times the seeds of villainous effects, witness that great deflagration, and those bloody murders happened in *Constantinople*, for the colours of green and blue, under *Justinian*. The advisements hereupon are, That if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeavour by good words or threatenings to make peace and atonement betwixt them; as *Alexander the Great* did betwixt *Ephesians* and *Craerus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot do it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspicion and passion. The like he should do, if the faction be betwixt divers subjects, or cities, and communities. And if it fall out that it be necessary that he speak himselfe, he must do it with councel, being called, to avoid the malice and hatred of those that are condemn'd. If the faction be between great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by justice, the Prince is to employ his force for the utter extinguishment thereof. But he must take heed that he carry himselfe indiferent, not more affectioned to one than to another, for therein there is great danger, and many have undone themselves. And to say the truth, it is unworthy the greatness of a prince, and he that is master of all, to make himself a companion to the one, and an enemy to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light upon thse that are the principal heads, and let that suffice.

2.
The advisements and remedies.

IX. Sedition.

Sedition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a Prince, or a Magistrate. It ariseth or groweth, either from oppression, or fear : For they that have committed any great offence, fear punishment ; others think and fear they shall be oppressed ; and both of them by the apprehension of an evil, are stirred to sedition, to prevent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious liberty, from want and necessity, in such sort, that men fit for this business, are such as are indebted, male-content, and men ill accommodated in all things, light persons, and such as are blown up, and fear justice. These kinde of people cannot continue long in peace : peace is war unto them, they cannot sleep but in the midst of sedition, they are not in liberty, but by the meanes of confusion. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they conser together in secret, they make great complaints, use doubtful speeches, afterwards speak more openly, seem zealous of their liberty, and of the publick good, and ease of the people ; and by these fair pretences, they draw many unto them. The advitements and remedies are : First, the self-same that served for popular commotions, to cause such to shew themselves, and to speak unto them that are fit for such a purpose ; as hath been said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arm and fortifie himself, and for all that, not proceed against them, but rather give them leasure and time to put water in their wine, to the wicked to repent, to the good to reunite themselves. Time is a great Physician, especially in people more ready to mutiny and rebel, then to fight. *Ferocior plebs ad rebellandum, quam belandum; tentare magis quam tueri libertatem:* The common people are more stout for rebellion, then for battell ; apter to assay, then to defend their liberty. Thirdly, he must in the mean time, try all meane to shake and dissolve them, both by hope and fear ; for these are the two wayes ; *Spem offer, metum intende :* Offer mercy, and intend judgement. Fourthly, endeavour to disjoyn them, and to break the course of their intelligence. Fifthly, he must win and draw unto him under-hand, some few amongst them, by fair promises, and secret rewards, whereby some of them withdrawing themselves from their company, and comming unto him, others remaining with them to serve him, and to give intelligence of their carriages and purposes ; they may the better be brought asleep, and their heat be somewhat allayed. Sixthly, to draw and win the rest, by yielding unto them some part of that which

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they demand, and that with fair promises and doubtful termes. It shall afterwards be easie, justly to revoke that which they have unjustly by sedition extorted, *Irrita facies qua per seditionem exprimeris*, and to make all whole with lenity and clemency. Lastly, if they return unto reason and obedience, and become honest men, they must be handled gently, and a man must be contented with the chaffisement and correction of some few of the principal authours and fire-brands, without any further enquiry into the rest of the confederates, that all may think themselves in safety, and in grace and favour.

X. Tyranny and Rebellion.

The description **T**YRANNY, that is to say, a violent rule, or domination against the Laws and Customs, is many times the cause of great and publick commotions, from whence commeth rebellion, which is as an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyranny, to the end, they may drive him away, and pluck him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so far, being raised only from a discontent of the government, complaining and desiring an amendment thereof. Now this tyranny is practised by people ill-bred, cruel, who love wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers; hate and fear men of honesty, and honour; *Quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omisso gestiq; honores pro criminis, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minus ex magna fama quam mala: To whom other mens virtue is ever fearful, nobility, riches, honours, are accounted for crimes; for virtues, they render most assured destruction; and no lessse out of good as evil report.* But they carry their punishment with them; being hated of all, and enemies to all. They live in continual fear, and apprehension of terror; they suspect all things; they are pricked and galled inwardly in their Consciencies, and at last, die an evil death, and that very soon; For an old tyrant is seldom seen.

The advertisements and remedies in this case, shall be set down at large hereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two: at his entrance to stay and hinder him, lest he get the mastery; being enstalled & acknowledged, to suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, then to move sedition and civil war; *Petus deterius usque tyrannide, siue injusto imperio, bellum civile;* Civil war is worse then tyranny, or unjust government; for there is nothing gotten

gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked Princes, and makes them more cruel: *Nihil tam exasperat feruorem vulneris, quam ferendi impatientia: Nothing so much exasperat the heat of the wound, as impatience in suffering it.* Modesty and obedience allayeth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a Prince; for the clemency of a Prince, saith that great Prince *Alexander*, doth not only consist in their own natures, but also in the natures of their subjects, who many times by their ill carriage and bad speeche, do provoke a Prince, and make him far worse: *Obsequio mitigantur imperia; & contra, contumacia inferiorum lenitatem imperianu[m] diminuit;* *contumaciam cum pernicio[n]e quam obsequium cum securitate malunt:* Soveraign authorities are mitigated by dutifull service; and contrarimente, the mildness of the Soveraign is diminished by the contumacy of subiects: They rather love disobedience with destruction, then dutifullness with security.

Curt. Tacit.

XI. Civil Warres.

When one of these forenamed publick commotions, popular insurrections, faction, sedition, rebellion, comes to fortifie it ^{I.} *The Description?* and continue until it get an ordinary train and form, it is a civil War: which is no other thing, but a preesse and conduct of Armies by the subiects; either amongst themselves, and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacy; or against the Prince, the State, the Magistrate, and this is sedition or rebellion. Now there is not a milchief more miserable, nor more shameful; it is a Sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, *That it is not properly warre, but a malady of the State, a fiery sickness and phrensie.* And to say the truth, he that is the authour thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kinde of wickedness that it is freed from, impiety and cruelty between Parents themselves, murthers with all manner of impunity: *Occidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo licet, non atas, non dignitas quenquam protegit; nobilitas cum plebe perit, lateque vagatur ensis:* It is lawful to kill openly, but not to pardon but in deceiving: No age, no dignity protecteth any man; the Nobility perisheth with the common people, and the Sword wandereith far and wide, All kinde of disloyalty, discipline abolished; *In omne fas nefasq[ue] avidos aut venales; non sacro, non profano abstinentes:* Greedy and mercenary in all mischief, abstaining neither from sacred nor profane. The inferiour and basest sort, are companions with the

best. *Rheni mibi Cesar in undis Dux erat, hic socius. Facinus quos inquit, egnat: Cesar was both my Captain and Companion on the River of Rhine. Them whom mischief defileth, it maketh equal. He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approve it not: Obnoxii ducibus & prohibere non ausis: The Leaders being guilty of the same crimes, dare not forbid them. It is an horrible confusion; Metu ac necessitate huc illuc mutantur: With fear and necessity, they are changed hither and thither. To conclude, it is nothing but miferie: but there is nothing so miserable, as the victory. For though it fall into the hand of him that hath the right on his side; yet there followeth this inconveniency, that it maketh him insolent, cruel, inhumane; yea, though he were before, of a mild and generous nature. So much doth this intestine war flesh a man in bloud; yea, it is a poyon that consumeth all humanity. Neither is it in the power of the Captains to withhold the rest.*

2.

The Causes.

There are two causes to be considered of civil wars: The one in secret, which as it is neither known nor seen, so it cannot be hindred, or remedied: It is destiny, the will of God, who will chastise, or wholly dispeople a State. *In se magna ruunt, latis hunc numina rebus Crescendi posuere modum. They bring great ruines to themselves; God hath set his stop to their growing prosperity.* The other is well understood by the wise, and may be happily remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth, set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and general corruption of manners, whereby men of no worth, and that have nothing to do, endeavour to turn all topsy turvie, to put all into combustion, cover their wounds with the hurt of the state; for they love better to be overwhelmed with the publick ruine, than their own particular. *Miscere cuncta, & privata vulnera reipublica malis operire: nam ita se res habet, ut publica ruina quisque malit quam sua proteri, & idem passurus minus conspicere: They confound all things, and cover private wounds, by the evils of the Common-wealth: for the case so stands, that every one had rather be trodden down in the publick ruine, than in his own, and to be least seen when they suffer the same.*

3.

*The Counsels
and Remedies.*

Now the advisements and remedies for this mischief of civil war, are to end it assoon as may be, which is done by two meanes, agreement and victorie. The first is the better, although it be not such as a man desireth, time will help the rest. A man sometimes must suffer himself to be deceived, to the end, he may end a civil war, as it is said of *Antipater, Bellum finire cupienti, opus erat decipi: He that*

that desirereth to end the war, had need to be deceived. Victorie is dangerous, because it is to be feared, that the Conquerour will abuse it, whereby a tyrannie may ensue. To the end, a man may carrie himself well herein, he must quit himself of all the authours of troubles, and other commotions, and such like bloud-tuckers, as well on the one part, as the other, whether it be by sending them far off with some charge, or under some fair pretext, and so dividing them; or by employing them against the stranger, and handling the meane sort with lenity and gentleness.

XII. *Advisements for particular persons, touching the foresaid publick divisions.*

Hus we have seen many kinds of publick troubles and divisions, for which and everie one of them, we have given counsels and remedies, in respect of the Prince: It remaineth, that we now give them for particular persons. This cannot be determined in a word. There are two questions; the one, whether it be lawful for an honest man to joyn himself to one part, or to remain quiet and indifferent: the second, how a man must carrie himself in both cates, that is to say, being joyned to one part, or not joyned to either. Touching the first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are not yet engaged to any part; for if they be, this first question belongs not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, because a man may joyn himself to the one part, not of purpose, and by election; yea, to that part which he approveth not; but only because he findeth himself carried and bound with strong and puissant bands, which he may not easilie break, which carrie with them a sufficient excuse, being natural and equivalent. Now the first question, hath contrarie reasons and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest man cannot do better then to keep himself quiet; for he knoweth not how to betake himself to either part, without offence, because all these divisions are in their own natures unlawful, and cannot be carried, nor subsist without inhumanity and injustice. And many good people have abhorred it, as *Afinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc Antony*. On the other side, is it not a thing reasonable, for a man to joyn with the good, and such as have right on their side? Wise *Solon*, hath judged affirmatively, yea, roughly chastised him, that recireth himself, and taketh not part. The professor of virtue *Cato*, hath likewise put in practice, not being content to take

one part, but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it seemeth that men of worth and renown, who have both publick charge and credit, and sufficiency in the State, may and ought to range themselves in that part which they shall judge the better: for they must not abandon in a tempest, the stern of that ship, which in a calm Sea, they are content to govern; especially, being an honourable part, to provide for the safety of the State: And secondly, that private men, and such as are of a lower degree in the charge of the State, should stay and retire themselves into some peaceable and secure place, during the division: and both of them so to carry themselves, as shall be laid hereafter. Finally, touching the choice of the part, sometimes there is no difficulty, for the one is so unjust, and so unfortunate, that a man cannot with any reason, joyn himself thereunto: But at another time, the difficulty is very great, and there are many things to be thought of, besides the justice and equity of the parts.

The second.

Let us come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counsel and rule of moderation, following the example of Atticus, so renowned for his modesty and prudence in such tempests, alwayes held to favour the good part, yet never troubling, nor intangling himself with arms, and without the offence of the contrary part.

*Outragious.
Moderate,*

1. For they that are known to be of one part, must not be moved over-much, but carry themselves with moderation, not busying themselves with the affairs, if they be not wholly carried and pressed unto it, and in this case, carrie themselves in such order and temperature, that the tempest being passed over their heads, without offence, they have not any part in these great disorders and insolencies, that are committed, but contrarily sweetning and diverting them as they can. 2. They that are not ingaged to any part (whose condition is sweetest and best) though, it may be, inwardly, and in affection, they incline rather to one, then another, must not remain as neuters, that is, taking no care of the issue, and of the state of either the one or the other, living to themselves, and as spectators in a Theater, feeding upon the miseries of other men. These kind of men are odious to all, and at the last, they run a dangerous fortune, as we read of the Thebanes, in the war of Xerxes, and of Jabs Gilead; *Neutralitas nec amicos parit; nec inimicos tollit: Neutrality neither getteth friends, nor taketh away enemies.* Neutrality is neither fair, nor honest, if it be not with consent of parts, as Cesar, who held neutrals for his friends, contrary to Pompey, who held them for enemies; or

Neuters.

that he be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatness and dignity, ought not to mingle himself with such a rout, but rather reclaim them if he can, arbitrating and moderating all. Much lesse, must men in such a case be inconstant, wavering mungrels, *Proten's*, far *Inconstant*. more odious then neuters, and offensive to all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our own) be common in their actions, offensive to none, officions and gracious to all, complaining of the common infelicity. *common.* These kinde of people, neither get enemies, nor lose their friends, They are fit to be mediators, and loving arbitrators, who are better then the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are four, two are evil, neuters and inconstant persons; two good, com-mon, and mediators; but alwayes the one more then the other, as of partakers, there are two sorts, heady, outragious; and moderate. *Mediators.*

XIII. Of private troubles and divisions.

IN private divisions, a man may commodiously, and loyally carry himself between enemies, if not with equal affection, yet in such a temperate manner, as that he engage not himself so much to one, more then to another, as that either part may think they have more interest in him, and so contending himself with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are known, or that serve in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one, that he may not lay to the other in its due time, changing only the accent and the form thereof.

Of Justice the second Virtue.

CHAP. V.

Of Justice in general.

Justice is to give to every one, that which appertaineth unto him, to himself first, and afterwards to others: so that it comprehend-^{I:} *The descripti-*
eth all the duties and offices of every particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himself, the second to another, and they are contained in that general commandment, which is the summary of all justice; *Thou shalt love thy Neighbour, as thy self:* which doth not only set down the duty of a man towards another, in the second place,^{II.}

place, but it sheweth and ruleth it, according to the pattern of that duty and love he oweth towards himself: for as the *Hebreus* say, a man must begin charity with himself.

2.

The first and original justice.

The beginning then of all justice, the first and most ancient commandment, is that of reason over sensuality. Before a man can well command others, he must learn to command himself, yielding unto reason, the power of commanding, and subduing the appetite, and making it pliant to obedience. This is the first original, inward, proper, and most beautiful justice that may be. This command of the Spirit, over the brutal and sensual part, from whence the passions do arise, is compared to an Esquire, or Horseman, who by reason, that he keepeth his Horse, and mounteth him often, and is ever in the saddle, he turneth and manageth him at his pleasure.

3.

The distinction of justice.

To speak of that justice which is outwardly practised, and with another, we must first know, that there is a two-fold justice; the one natural, universal, noble, philosophical; the other after a sort, artificial, particular, politick, made and restrained to the necessity of policies and states. That hath better rules, is more firm, pure and beautiful, but it is out of use, unprofitable to the world, such as it is. *Veri juris germanaq; justitia solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbris & imaginibus utimur: We hold no sound and true image of right and perfect justice; we only use the shadow and imaginations thereof:* it is not in a manner capable thereof, as hath been said. That is the rule of *Polycletus* inflexible, invariable. This is more loose and flexible, accommodating it self to humane weakness, and vulgar necessity. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yieldeth and bendereth it self, as there is need, and as the times, persons, affairs, and accidents do require. This permitteth upon a necessitie, and approveth many things, which that wholly rejecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawful, and many good actions unlawful. That respecteth wholly and purely reason, honesty; This profit, joyning it as much as may be with honesty. Of that, which is but an *Idea*, and in contemplation, we shall not need to speak.

4.

Justice in practice distinguished.

The usual justice, and which is practised in the world, is first two-fold, that is to say, equal, bound, and restrained to the termes of the Law; according to which Judges and Magistrates are to proceed: the other just and consonable, which not enthralling it self to the words of the Law, marcheth more freely, according to the exigency of the case, yea, sometimes against the words of the Law. Now

to

to speak better, it handlēth and ruleth the Law, as need requireth. And therefore, saith a wise man, the Lawes themselves and justice, have need to be ordered and handled justlie, that is to say, with equitie; *Qua expositio & emendatio legis est, exponit sensum, emendat defectum: Which is an exposition and amending of the Law, expoundeth the meaning, and amendeth the defect.* This is the fine flour of justice, which is in the hand of those that judge in ioveraigntie. Again, to speak more particularly, there is a twotold justice; the one communitative, betwixt private men, which is handled and practised by Arithmetical proportion; the other distributive, publickly administered by Geometrical proportion: it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

Now this usual and practised justice, is not truly and perfectly justice: humane nature, is not capable thereof, no more then of all other things in their puritie. As humane justice is ming'ed with some grain of injustice, favour, rigour, too much, or too little, and there is no pure and true mediocritie; from whence have sprung these ancient proverbs, That he is enforced to do wrong by retail, that will do justice in grosse: and injustice in small things, that will do justice in great. Lawyers to give course and passage to communitative justice, do covertly and silently suffer themselves to deceive one another, and that in a certain measure, so that they passe not the moitie of the just price, and the reason is, because they know not how to do better. And in distributive justice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned; how many guilty quit and set at libertie; and that without the fault of the Judges, never dreaming either of that too much, or too little, which is alwayes perpetual in the purest justice? Justice is a let or hinderance to it self; and humane sufficiencie, cannot see and provide for all. And here we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive justice, in that it punisheth only, and rewardeth not; although there are the two parts, and the two hands of justice: but as it is commonlie practised, it is lame, and inclineth whollie unto punishment. The greatest favour that a man receiveth from it, is indemnitie, which is a pay too short, for such as deserve better then the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man be falslie accused, and upon that accusation committed, he is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last, his innocencie being known, he escapeth perhaps his uttermost punishment, but without amends of that wrongful affliction he hath endured, even such perhaps, as shall never leave him.

5.
*There is no true
justice in the
World.*

Of Justice in general.

him. And the accuser in the mean time, be the colour and ground of his accusation never so light (which is easie to do) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is justice in rewarding, as that it constituteth whollie in chastelement, whereof that common speech ariseth, that to do justice, and to be subje&t unto justice, is alwayes to be understood of punishment. And it is an easie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger of punishment, even to such an estate, as that he shall never know which way to get forth, but with losse.

6. Of justice and duty, there are three principal parts: for man is indebted to three, to God, to Himself, to his Neighbour: to One above himself, to himself, and to others beside himself. Of his duty towards God, which is piety and religion, hath sufficientlie been spoken before: It remaineth, that we now speak of his dutie towards himself, and his Neighbour.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Justice and duty of a man towards himself.

This is sufficiently contained in this whole work; in the first book, which teacheth a man to know himself, and all humane condition; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end, giveth advisements and rules; and in the rest of this book, especiallie in the virtues of fortitude and temperance. Nevertheless, I will here summarily set down some advisements, more express and formal.

The first and fundamental advice is, to resolve not to live carelesly, after an uncertain fashion, and by chance and adventure, as almost all are accustomed to do, who seem to mock and deceive themselves, and not to live in good earnest, nor leading the life seriously and attentively, but living from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possess not, they enjoy not their life: but they use it, to make use of other things. Their designments and occupations do many times trouble, and hurt their life, more then do it service. These kind of people, do all things in good earnest, except it be to live. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole body thereof passeth away, as if they thought not thereof: it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident, is principal unto them, and the principal as an accessary. They affect and incline themselves to all things,

things, some to get knowledge, honours, dignities, riches: others to take their pleasure, to hunt, to sport themselves, to pass away the time: others to speculations, imaginations, inventions: others to marriage and order affairs: others to other things; but to live, is the least they think of. They live as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted and fastening their thoughts upon other things. Life is unto them but as a dream, and a procrastination or delay to employ it about other things. Now all this is very unjust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans self: it is for a man to lose his life and to go against that which every man should do, that is, live seriously, attentively, and cheerfully, *bene vivere & latari: sibi semper valere, & vivere doctum: To live well and cheerfully: ever to do good to himself, and to live learned*, to the end, he may live well, and well die: it is the fault of every man. A man must lead and order his life, as if it were a busines of great weight and consequence, and as a bargain made whereof he must give an account exactly, by parts and parcels. It is our greatest busines, in respect whereof, all the rest are but royes, things accessary and superficial. There are some that deliberate and purpose to do it, but it is when they must live no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling, till the market be past, and when they see their folly, they complain, saying, Shall I never have leisure to make my retreat, to live unto my self? quam sernum est incipere vivere cum desinendum est? quam fluita mortalitatis oblivio? dum differtur, vita transcurrit. How late is it to begin to live, when a man must cease to live? how foolish is it to forget our mortality? whilst it is deferred, life passeth away. And this is the reason why the wise cry out unto us, well to use the time, *tempori parce*. That we have not need of any thing so much as time, saith Zenon. For life is short, and Art is long: not the Art to heal, but rather to live, which is wisdom. To this first and principal advice, these following do serve.

To learn to dwell, to content, to delight himself alone, yea, to quit himself of the World, if need be: the greatest thing is for a man to know how to be himself; virtue is content with it self: let us win so much of our selves, as to be able in good earnest and willingly, to live alone, and to live at our ease. Let us learn to quit our selves of all those bands that fasten and bind us to another, and that our contentment depend of our selves, neither seeking nor disdaining, or refusing company, but cheerfully to go on, with or without company, as either our own, or anothers need do require: but yet not

See Lib. I.
cap. 36.

Of the justice and duty of man towards himself.

so to shut up our selves, and to settle and establish our pleasure, as some that are half lost being alone. A man must have within himself wherewith to entertain and content himself, & in *suum suorum gaudere, And to rejoice within himself.* He that hath won this point, pleaseth himself in all places, and in all things. He must carry a countenance conformable to the company, and the affairs that are in hand and present themselves, and accommodate himself unto another, be sad if need be, but inwardly to keep himself one and the same : this is Meditation, and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *cuius vivere est cogitare : Whose life is cogitation.* Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any business which we do more often, continue longer; that is more easie, more natural, and more our own, then to meditate, and to entertain our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one manner, but very divers, according to the diversity of spirits. In some, it is weak, in others strong ; in some it is languishing idleness, a vacancy, and want of other business. But the greater spirits make it their principal vacation, and most serious study, whereby they are never more busied, or lesse alone, (as it is said of *Scipio*) then when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affairs, in imitation of God himself, who liveth and feedeth himself with his eternal thoughts and meditations. It is the business of the gods (saith *Aristotle*), from whence doth spring both their and our blessedness.

3.
To know and culture himself. Now this solitary employment, and this cheerful entertainment of a mans self, must not be, in vanity, much lesse, in any thing that is vicious; but in study and profound know'edge, and afterwards in the diligent culture of him'self. This is the price agreed, the principal, first and plainest travel of every man. He must alwayes watch, taste, sound himself; never abandon, but be alwayes near, and keep himself to himself: and finding that many things go not well, whether by reason of vice and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casual accidents that trouble him, he must quietly and sweetly correct them, and provide for them. He must reason with himself, correct and recall himself courageously, and not suffer himself to be carried away, either with disdain or carelessness.

4.
To keep himself marre both the soul and body, keep himself alwayes in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not over-bent, violent and painful; but above all, honest, virtuous and serious, And that he may the better

ter do it, he must quit himself of other business, and propose unto himself such deaignments as may delight him, conferring with honest men, and good books, dispensing his time well, and well ordering his houres, and not live tumultuously, and by chance and hazard.

Again, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented unto him, done, said, and make them an instruction unto him, apply them unto himself, without any shew or semblance thereof.

And to particularize a little more, we know that the duty of man towards himself, consisteth in three points, according to his three parts; to rule and govern his spirit, his body, his goods. Touching his spirit, (the first and principal, whereunto especially do belong these general advisements which we are to deliver) we know, that all the motions thereof, are reduced to two, to think, and to desire; ^{To make use of all things.} the understanding and the will; whereunto do answer science and virtue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the understanding, he must preserve it from two things, in some sort, contrary and extreme, that is, foolishnes and folly, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the one side; this is to bastardize and to loose it: it was not made to play the novice or haboun, *non ad jocum & lusum genitus, sed ad severitatem potius; Not born to sports and play, but rather for gravity:* and from phantastical, absurd, and extravagant opinions on the other side; this is to pollute and debate it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious, and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and natural opinions: and so much care must not be taken, to elevate and mount it, to exterr it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For order and continency, is the effect of wisdom, and which giveth price to the soul; and above all, to be free from presumption, and obstinacy in opinion, vices very familiar, with those that have any extraordinary force and vigor of spirit; and rather, to continue in doubt and suspence, especially in things that are doubtful, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing, and the securest way, well to know how to doubt, and to be ignorant, and the most noble Philosophers, have not been ashamed to make profession thereof; yea, it is the principal fruit and effect of science.

Touching the will, it must in all things be governed, and subiect ^{6.} it self to the rule of reason, which is the office of virtue, and not

Of the justice and duty of man towards himself.

not unto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lese unto passion. These are the three that move and govern our souls. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himself according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphal, and suspecteth whatsoever dependeth upon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liveth in peace, passeth away his life cheerfully and pleasantly, is not subject to repentance, recantations, changes; because whatsoever falleth out, he could neither do, nor chuse better, and therefore he is neither kindled nor stirred; for reason is always peaceable. The fool that suffereth himself to be led by the two, doth nothing but wander and war with himself, and never resteth. He is always re-advising, changing, mending, repenting, and is never contented; which to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and vertue to make himself such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composit.* No rest more pleasing, than that which reason hath settled. An honest man must govern and respect himself, and fear his reason and his Conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort, that he cannot without shame, stumble in their prelence: *rarus est, ut satis se quisque vereat*: It is a rare thing, that any man should sufficiently be afraid of himself.

8. As touching the body, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is folly to go about to separate and funder these two principal parts, the one from the other; but contrarily, it is fit and necessary they be united and joyned together. Nature hath given us a body, as a necessary instrument to life: and it is fit that the spirit as the principal, should take upon it the guardianship and protection of the body. So far should it be from serving the body, which is the most base, unjust, shameful, and burthen someritudo, that is, that it should alist, counseil it, and be as a husband unto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not service: It must handle it as a Lord, not as a Tyrant; nourish it, not pamper it; giving it to understand, that it liveth not for it, but that it cannot live here below, without it. This is an instruction to the work-man, to know how to use, and make use of his instruments. And it is likewise no small advantage to a man, to know how to use his body, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of virtue. Finally, the body is preserved in good estate, by moderate nourishment, and orderly exercise. How the spirit must have a part, and bear it company in those pleasures that belong unto it, hath been said before, and shall hereafter

after, be set down in the virtue of Temperance.

Touching goods and the duty of every man in this case, there are many and divers Offices; for to gather riches, to keep them, to husband them, to employ them, to yield unto them all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other understandeth nothing, neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches, hath more parts then the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preservation and custody, which is proper to the women, is the Arbour to cover them.

These are the two extremities alike vicious, to love and affect riches; to hate and reject them. By riches, I understand that which is more then enough, and more then is needful. A wise man will do neither of both, according to that wish and prayer of Solomon: *Give me neither riches nor poverty: but he will hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing of it self indifferent, matter of good and evil, and to many good things commodious.*

The evils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, have been spoken of before. Now in five words we set down a rule touching a mediocrity therein. 1. To desire them, but not to love them. *Sapiens non amat d. vias, sed mervult: A wise man doth not love riches, but would willingly have them.* As a little man, and weak of body, would willingly be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or pain unto himself, seeking that without passion, which nature desireth, and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lessse, to seek them at the cost and damage of another, or by art, and bad and base means, to the end, no man should complain, or envy his gains. 3. When they come upon him, entering at an honest gate, not to reject them, but cheerfully to accept them, and to receive them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his love, as being unworthy thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestly and discreetly, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leave, be lost or stollen from him, that he be not sorrowful, but that he suffer them to depart with themselves, without any thing of his. *Si divitiae effluxerint nisus non auferant semetipsas: If riches passe away, let them carry nothing with them but themselves.* To conclude, he deserveth not to be accepted of God, and is unworthy his love, and the profession of virtue, that makes account of the riches of this world.

Of love or friendship.

*Aude hospes contemnere opes, & te quoque dignum Finge Deo :
Be bold to set at naught base trash and pelf,
And worthy of a God frame thou thy self.*

*Of the justice and duty of man towards man**An Advertisement.*

This duty is great, and hath many parts; we will reduce them to two great ones. In the first we will place the general, simple, and common duties required in all and every one, towards all and every one, whether in heart, word, or deed; which are amity, faith, verity and free admonition, good deeds, humanity, liberality, acknowledgement or thankfulness. In the second, shall be the special duties required for some special and express reason and obligation between certain persons, as between a Man and his Wife, Parents and Children, Masters and Servants, Princes and Subjects, Magistrates, the great and powerful, and the lese.

The first part, which is of the general and common duties of all, towards all, and first,

C H A P. VII.*Of love or friendship.*

1.
The Description.

Amity is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts, first by nature, and hath expressed its first heat between the Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters; and afterwards growing cold, hath recovered heat by Art, and the invention of alliances, Companies, fraternities, Colleges, and Communities. But so far much as in all things, being divided into many parts, it was weakened, and mingled with other profitable and pleasant considerations, to the end, it might re-strengthen it self, & unite its own forces into a narrow room, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amity, which is so much more fervent and spiritual then other, by how much the heart is hotter then the liver, and the blood then the veins.

2. Amity is the soul and life of the world, more necessary (say the wife)

the wise) then fire and water : *Amicitia, necessitudo, amici necessarii: Friendship, familiarity, are necessary friends.* It is the sun, the staff, the salt of our life; for without it, all is darkness, and there is no joy, no stay, no taste of life : *Amicitia justitia consors, natura vinculum, ci-vitatis praesidium, senectutis solarium, vita humanae portus : ea omnia constant, discordia cadunt:* Friendship is the companion of Justice, the bond of nature, the defence of a City, the comfort of old age, and the quiet harbour of mans life : By it all things consist, and by discord decay.

And we must not think that friendship is profitable and delightful to private men only, for it is more commodious to the weal-publick : it is the true nursing Mother of humane society, the preserver of states and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor displeaseth any but Tyrants and Monsters, nor because they honour it not in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that number, for only friendship sufficeth to preserve the world. And if it were every where in force, there would be no need of a Law, which hath not been ordained, but as a helpe, and as a second remedy for want of friendship, to the end, it might enforce and constrain by the authority thereof, that which for love and friendship, should be free and voluntary ; but howsoever the Law taketh place far below friendship. For friendship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the effects; the Law can but provide for that which is without. This is the reason why Aristotle said, that good Law-makers, have ever had more care of friendship, than of justice : And because the Law and Justice do many times lose their credit, the third remedy, and least of all, hath been in Arms and force, altogether contrary to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see by degrees, the three means of publick Government. But love or friendship is worth more then the rest, for second & subsidiary helps are no way comparable to the first and principal.

The diversity and distinction of friendship is great : That of the ancients into four kinds, Natural, Sociable, Hospital, Venetous, is *The first di-*
causes which engender it, which are four; nature, virtue, profit pleasure, sometimes go together in Troops; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone : But virtue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spiritual, and in the heart, as friendship is: Nature in the bloud, profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body. So likewise virtue is more liberal, more free, and

3.
How necessary
to the weal.
publick.

pure, and without it the other causes are poor, and idle; and frail. He that loveth for virtue, is never weary with loving, and, if friendship be broken, complaineth not: He that loveth for profit, if it fail, complaineth, and it turneth to his reproach, that when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all: He that loveth for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his love ceaseth with it, and without complaint, estrangeth himself.

5.
2. Of persons.
1.
2.
- The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in three kinds: The one is in a straight line, between superiors and inferiors; and it is either natural, as between Parents and Children, Uncles and Nephews; or lawful, as between the Prince and the subjects, the Lord and his vassals, the Master and his servants, the Doctor and the Disciple, the Prelate or Governour, and the People. Now this kind to speak properly, is not friendship, both because of the great disparity that is betwixt them, which hindereth that inwardness and familiarity and entire communication, which is the principal fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse liberty, and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason, why men give it other names then of friendship: for in inferiors, there is required of them honour, respect, obedience; in superiors, care and vigilancy, over their inferiors. The second kinde of friendship, in regard of the persons, is in a collateral line between equals, or such as are near equals. And this is likewise twofold; for either it is natural, as between brothers, sisters, cousins, and this comes nearer to friendship, then the former, because there is lesse disparity. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side, it knitteth and fastneth, so on the other it loosneth: for by reason of goods, and divisions, and affairs, it is not possible, but brothers and kin-folks, must sometimes differ: besides, that many times the correspondence, and relation of humours and wills, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them; He is my brother, or my kinsman, but yet he is a wicked man, a fool: Or it is free and voluntary, as between companions and friends, who touch not in bloud, and hold of nothing but only friendship and love: and this is properly and truly friendship.

3.
3. The third kind of friendship, in regard of the persons, is mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it shoule be more strong, this is matrimonial of married couples, which

which holdeth of love or friendship in a straight line because of the superioritie of the husband, and the inferioritie of the wife; and of collaterall friendship being both of them companions joyned together by equal bands. And therefore the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foot, but the fide of man. Again, such as are married, in all things and by turns exercise and shew both these friendships; that which is in a straight line in publick, for a wife woman honoureth and respecteth her husband; that which is collaterall in private, by private familiaritie. The matrimoniall friendship is likewise after another fashion double and compounded; for it is spirituall and corporall, which is not in other friendship, save one-ly in that which is reproved by all good laws, and by nature it self. Matrimoniall friendship then, is great, strong, and puissant. There are nevertheless two or three things that stay and hinder it, that it cannot attain to the perfection of friendship: The one, that there is no part of marriage free but the entrance, for the progresse and the continuance thereof is altogether constrained, enforced, I mean in Christian marriages; for every where else it is lesse enforced, by reason of those divorcements which are permitted: The other is the weaknesse and insufficiencie of the wife, which can no way correspond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and judgements: her soul is not strong and constant enough to endure the straitnesse of a knot so fast, so strong, so durable: it is as if a man should sow a strong and coarse piece of cloath to a soft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vanisheth, and is easily torn from the other. Again, this inconvenience followeth the friendship of married couples, that it is mingled with so many other strange matters, children, parents of the one side and the other, and so many other distaff-busynesses that do many times trouble and interrupt a lively affection.

The third distinction of friendship respecteth the force and intention, or the weaknesse and diminution of friendship. According to this reason, there is a two-fold friendship, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiaritie, private acquaintance: and it hath infinite degrees, one more strict, intimate and strong then another: and the perfect, which is invisible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceived by imagination.

We shall know them both by confronting them together, and by knowing their differences. The common may be attained in a short time. Of the perfect it is said, that we must take long time

*The difference
of friendship
common and
to perfect.*

to deliberate, and they must eat much salt together before it be perfected.

* 2. The common is attained, built, and ordered by divers profitable and delightfull occasions and occurrents ; and therefore a wise man hath set down two means to attain unto it, to speak things pleasant, and to do things profitable ; the perfect is acquired by an onely true and lively virtue reciprocally known.

3. The common may be with and between divers : the perfect is with one onely, who is another self, and between two onely, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it self amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrary offices ; if the one should commit to my secrecie a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept herein? Doubtlesse, division is an enemy to perfection, and union her cousin-germane.

4. The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications ; it is kindled and cooled, subject to accession and recession, like a favour, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equal pace, firm, haughtie, and constant.

5. The common receiveth and hath need of many rules and cautions given by the wise; whereof one is, to love without respect of piety, verity, virtue, *Amicus usq; ad aras.* Another, so to love as that a man may hate ; so to hate, as that he may likewise love, that is, to hold alwaies the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himself so profusely, that he may have cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to untie.

Again, to aid and succour at a need without intreaty : for a friend is basifull, and it costs him dear to request that that he thinks to be his due. Again, not to be important to his friends, as they that are alwayes complaining after the manner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholsome in ordinary friendship, but have no place in this sovereign and perfect.

9.
The description of perfect friendship.

We shall know this better by the portrait and description of perfect friendship, which is a very free, plain, and universall confusione of two souls. See here three words. 1, A confusion, not onely a Conjunction, and joyning together, as of solid things, which howsover they be fastned, mingled, and knit together, may be separated

rated and known apart. For the souls of men in this perfect amity are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be divided, neither would they, than things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built upon the pure choice and liberty of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntary then affection. 3. Universall, without any exception of all things, goods, honours, judgements, thoughts, wills, lie. From this universall and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or give to the other, and there is no speech betwixt them of good turns, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulness, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of division & difference, as I know not how to thank my self for the service I do unto my self, neither doth that love which I bear unto my self increase by those succours and helps I give unto my self. And in marriage it self, to give some resemblance of this divine knot, though it come farre short thereof, donations are forbid between the husband and the wife: and if there were place for the one to give unto the other, he is the giver that gives cause to his friend to expresse and employ his love; and he receiveth the good turn, that by giving binds his companion: for the one and the other seeking above all things even with a greedy desire to do good to one another, he that giveth the occasion and yieldeth the matter, is he that is liberal, giving that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desirereth.

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquity yieldeth some examples. *Blosius* taken for a good friend of *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what he would do for his sake, and he answering that he would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would do if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? To whom he answered, that *Gracchus* would never intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him. A very bold and dangerous answer. He might boldly have said, that *Gracchus* would never have required such a mattter, and that should have been his answer; for according to this our description, a perfect friend doth not onely fully know the will of his friend, which might have sufficed for an answer, but he holdeth in his sleeve, and wholly possessest it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would have required it, he would have done it; it is as if he had said nothing, it neither alters nor hurteth his first answer concerning

10.

Examples.

Of love or friendship.

that assurance that he had of the will of *Grascbus*. This of Wills and Judgement. 3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make us think that this was no perfect amity) two rich, and one poor, charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marry: this man dying made his Will, wherein he bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him; to the other his daughter, to be married by him; enjoying him withall to bestow upon her the best dowry that his abilitie would afford: and if it should happen that the one of them should die, he should substitute the other. The people made themselves merry with his Will or Testament, the Legataries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them received unto them their legacie; but he that had taken the mother, departing this life within five dayes after, the other surviving and remaining the sole universall inheritour, did carefully entertain the mother, and within a few daies after, he married in one day his own and only daughter, and her that was bequeathed unto him, dividing betwixt them by equal portions all his goods. The wise, according to this description, have judged that the first dying, expressed greatest love, and was the more liberal, making his friends his heirs, and giving them that contentment, as to employ them for the supply of his wants. 4. Touching life; that history is sufficiently known of those two friends, whereof the one being condemned by the tyrant, to die at a certain day and hour, he requested, that giving bail, he might in the mean time go and dispose of his domesticall affairs, which the tyrant agreeing unto upon this condition, that if he did not return by that time, his bail should suffer the punishment: The prisoner delivered his friend, who entred into prison upon that condition: and the time being come, and the friend who was the bail resolving to die, his condemned friend failed not to offer himself, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more then astonished, and delivering them both from death, desired them to receive, and to adopt him into their friendship as their friend.

C H A P. VIII.

Of faith, trust, treachery, secrecie.

^{I.} *The dignity of fidelity.* **A**ll men, yea the most treacherous know and confess that faith is the band of humane societie, the foundation of all justice

stice, and that above all things it ought to be religiously observed ; *Nihil augustinus fide, qua justitia fundamentum est, nec illa res vobem
mentius rem publicam continet & vitam : Sanctissimum humani pe-
ctoris bonum : Nothing is more excellent than Faith, which is the foun-
dation of Justice; neither doth any thing more mightily bridle and rule
the Common-wealth, and the life of man. It is the most sacred good in
the breasts of men.*

*Anie jovem generata, decus divumque hominumque,
Qua sine non tellus pacem, non equora norunt,
Justitia consors, racisumque in pectore numen.
Born before Jupiter, of gods and men the grace,
Without which neither land nor seas for peace have place,
Consort to justice, in mans breast,
A God-head not to be exprest.*

Nevertheless the world is full of treacheries. There are but few
that do well and truly keep their faith. They break it divers wayes
and they perceive it not. So they find some pretext and colour
thereof, they think they are safe enough. Others seek corners eva-
sions, subtleties. *Qarunt latebras perjurio.* Now to remove all
the difficulties that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man
should carry himself, there are four considerations, whereunto all
the rest may be referred : The persons, as well he that giveth faith,
as he that receiveth it; the subject whereof the question is made, and
the manner according to which the faith is given.

As touching him that giveth faith, it is necessary that he have
power to do it : If he be subject to another, he cannot give it ; and *He that giveth*
having given it without the leave and approbation of his master, it
is of no effect, as it did well appear in the Tribune *Saturnine* and
his complices, who coming forth of the Capital (which they had
taken by rebellion) upon the faith given by the Consuls, subjects,
and officers of the Common-weal, were justly slain. But every
free man must keep his faith, how great and honourable soever he
be ; yea, the greater he is, the more he is bound to keep it, because
he is the more free to give it. And it was well said, *That the*
simple word of a Prince should be of as great force, as the oath of a
private man.

As touching him to whom faith is given, whosoever he be, it must
carefully be kept, and there are but two exceptions, which are clear
enough; the one if he received it not, and were not contented with
it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred
thing,

thing, must ſimply be received; otherwise it is no more faith, nor trust, when hoffages are demanded, ſureties are given; to take gages or cautions with faith, is a thing ridiculous. He that is held under the guard of men, or walls, if he escape and ſave himſelf, is not faultie. The reaſon of that Romane, is good; *Vult ſibi quisq; eredi, & habita fides ipsam ſibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relativa ſunt: Every one would have himſelf to be credited, and faith given, bindeth faith unto him: faith requireth trust, and they have relation the one to the other.* The other, if having accepted it, he first brake it; *Frangentis fidem, fides frangatur eidem: quando tu me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Consule: Wish him that breaketh faith, let faith alſo be broken: When thou holdest not me for a Senator, I will not hold thee for a Consul.* A treacherous man dererveth not by the law of nature that faith ſhould be kept unto him, except it be after an agreement, which covereth the treachery, and maketh revenge unlawfull. Now these two caſes excepted, a man muſt keep his faith to whomſoever, to his ſubjects as ſhall be ſaid.

2. To an enemy, witneſſe the act of *Attilius Regulus*; the proclamation of the Senate of *Rome* againſt all thoſe that had been licensed by *Pyrrhus* upon their faith given to depart; and *Camillus*, who would not ſo much as make uſe of the treachery of another, but reſent the children of the *Falifians* with their matter.
3. To a thief and publick offender, witneſſe the fact of *Pompey* to the pirates and robbers; and of *Augustus* to *Crocorus*.
4. To the enemies of religion, according to the example of *Jofua* againſt the *Gibeonites*. But faith ought not to be given to theſe two latter, theives and hereticks, or apostata's, nor taken of them: for we ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittingly of peace and alliance with ſuch kind of people, except it be in extreme neceſſity, or for the winning of them of the truth, or for the publick good, but being given, it ought to be kept.

5.
The ſubject of
faith.

As touching the thing ſubjeſt, if it be unjust or imposſible, a man is quit: and being unjust, it is well done to ſlie from it, and a double fault to keep it. All other excuses beſides theſe two, are of no account, as losſe, damage, diſpleaſure, diſcommodity, diſſiculty; as the *Romanes* have many times practiſed, who have rejeſted many great advantages, to avoid the breach of faith, *Quibus tantā uilitate fides antiquior fuit: With whom faith was better accounted then ſo much profit.*

Livie.

6.
The manner of
giving faith.

Touching the manner of giving faith, there is ſome doubt; for ma-

ny

By think, that if it have been extorted either by force and fear, or by fraud and sudden surprise, a man is not bound unto it; because in both cases, he that promiseth hath not a wil, whereby all things are to be judged. Others are of a contrary opinion; and to say the truth, *Joshua* kept his faith and promise to the *Gibeonites*, though it were extorted from him by a great surprise, & false intelligence, and it was afterwards declared, that he did therein what he ought to do. And therefore it seemeth that a man may say, That where there is onely a ſimple word and promise past, a man is not bound, but if faith or promise given be confirmed and authorised by an oath, as the fact of *Joshua*, he is bound to perform it in regard of the name of God: but yet that he is afterwards in judgment to ſeek means to right himself of that either deceit or violence. Faith given with an oath, and the interpoſition of the name of God, bindeth more then a ſimple pro-mife; and the breach thereof which includeth perjurie with treachery, is far worse. But to think to give assurance of faith by new and ſtrange oaths, as many do, is ſuperfluouſ amongst honeſt men, and unprofitable, if a man will be diſloyall. The beſt way is to ſwear by the eternall God, the revenger of thofe that vainly uſe his name, and break the faith.

Treachery and perjury is in a certain ſense, more base and execra-ble then Atheiſme. The Atheiſt that believeth there is no God, is not ſo injurious againſt him in thinking there is no God, as he that knoweth him, believeth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth perjuriously abuse his name. He that ſweareth to deceive, mocketh God, and teareth man. It is a leſſe ſin to contemn God, then to mock him. The horror of treachery and perjury cannot be better deci-phered, then it was by him that ſaid, It was to give a testimony of the contempt of God, and the ſear of men. And what thing is more monſtrous then to be a coward with men, and resolute and valourous with God? Treachery, is ſecondly, the traytor and capital enemy of humane ſociety. For it breaketh and deſtroyeth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth upon the word and pro-mifes of men, which if it fail we have nothing elſe to ſlick unto.

To the keeping of faith belongeth the faithfull guard of the ſecrets of another, which is a charge full of inconveniencie, especially of great personages, which though it may wiſely be performed, yet it is good to flie the knowledge of them, as ſometimes that Poet did the ſecrets of *Lyſimachus*. He that takes into his cuſtody the ſecrets of another, draws a greater trouble upon him, then he dreams of:

7.
Treachery inju-
rious to God.

To may.

8.
To keep ſecrets.

for

for besides the care that he takes unto himself, to keep them well, he binds himself to faint, and to denie his own thoughts, a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Neverthelesse he that takes that charge upon him, must keep it religiously: and to the end he may do it well, and play the good secretary, he must be such a one by nature not by art and obligation.

CHAP. IX.

Veritie and free Admonition.

1.
An excellent
thing.

Free and hearty admonition is a very wholesome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amitie. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to love soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Evangelical commandments: *Si peca-
caveris in te frater tuus, corrige illum, &c. If thy brother sin against
thee, reprove him, &c.*

2.
To whom pro-
fitable.

All have sometimes need of this remedie, but especially all those that are in prosperity, for it is a very hard thing to be happie and wise together. And Princes who lead a life so publick and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and have so many things hid from them, cannot see nor understand, but by the eyes and ears of another. And therefore they have great need of advertisements: otherwise they may chance to runne strange and hard fortunes, if they be not very wise.

3.
Rare, difficult,
dangerous.

This office is undertaken by very few: There are required thereunto (as the wise affirm) three things, judgement or discretion, courageous libertie, amitie, and fidelitie. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that do it, for fear of offending, or want of true amitie; and of those that do it, few there are that know how to do it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applyed, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with grief, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended and to be reprehended unfittingly and to small purpose, is the self-same wound, and a matter alike faultie in him that doth it. Veritie how noble soever it be, yet it hath not this privilege, to be employed at all hours and in all fashions. A wholesome holy reprehension may be virtuously applied.

4.
The rules of
true admoni-
tion.

The counsels and cautions for a man well to govern himself herein (it is to be understood where there is no great inwardnesse, familiaritie, confidence, or authoritie and power, for in these cases there

there is no place for the careful observation of these rules following) are these. 1. To observe place and time; that it be neither in times nor places of feasting, and great joy; for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast: nor of sorrow and adversity; for that were a point of hostility, and the way to make an end of all; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Crudelis in re adversa objurgatio, damnare est objurgare, cum auxilio est opus: Chiding is cruel in adversity, to chide is to condemn, when help is needful.* King *Perseus*, seeing himself thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all things indifferently: not small and light offences; this were to be envious, and an importunate, ambitious reprehender; not great and dangerous, which a man of himself doth sufficiently feel, and fear a worse punishment to come; this were to make a man think he lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretly, and not before witness; to the end, he make him not ashamed, as it hapned to a young man, who was so much abashed, that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himself. And *Plutarch* is of opinion, that it was for this cause, that *Alexander* killed his friend *Clitus*, because he reprehended him in company: but especially, that it be not before those, whose good opinion, he that is reprehended desirereth to retain, and with whom he desires to continue his credit, as before his Wife, his Children, his Disciples. 4. Out of a simple careless nature, and freedom of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the minde, be it never so little. 5. To comprehend himself in the same fault, and to use general termes, as, We forget our selves, What do we think of? 6. To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of service and help; this tempereth the tartness of correction, and gives a better entertainment. Such an. such a thing, becoms you well, but not so well such and such a thing. 7. To express the fault wirth better words then the nature of the offence doth require, as, You have not been altogether well advised; in stead of, You have done wickedly: Receive not this woman into your company, for she will undo you; in stead of, Allure her not, perswade her not to yield to your desires, for thereby you will undo your self: Enter not into dispute with such a man; in stead of, Quarrel not, envy not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended, be not presently gone; but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.

CHAP. X.

Of flattery, lying, and dissembling.

1.
Flattery a pernicious and villainous thing.

Flattery is a very dangerous poison, to every particular person, and almost the only cause of the ruine of a Prince and the State : it is worse then false witness, which corrupteth not the Judge, but deceiveth him only, causing him to give a wicked sentence against his will and judgement : but flattery corrupteth the judgement, enchanteth the spirit, and makes him unapt to be further instructed in the truth. And if a Prince be once corrupted by flattery, it necessarily followeth, that all that are about him, if they will live in grace and favour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious, as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villainous vice, of a base beggerly mind, as foul and ill beseeeming a man, as impudency a woman. *Ut matrona metretrici dispar erit atque Discolor, infido scurra distabit amicus :* Look how different and unlike a modest matron, is to an impudent harlot; so far distant is a friend from a faithless jeffer. Flatterers are likewite compared to harlots, forcerers, oyl-sellers, to wolves ; and another faith, That a man were better fall among crows then flatterers.

2.
Especially to two sorts of people.

There are two sorts of People subiect to be flattered, that is to say, Such as never want People to furnish them with ~~this~~ kinde of Merchandise, and easily suffer themselves to be taken by it ; that is to say, Princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby ; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinary, to corrupt the chastity of women, as to feed and entertain them with their own commendations.

3.
Hardly avoided.

Flattery is hardly avoided, and it is a matter of difficulty, to be preserved from it, not only to women, by reason of their weaknes, and their natures full of vanity, and desirous of praise ; and to Princes, because they are their kinsfolks, friends, and principal officers, whom they cannot avoid, that profels this mystery : (*Alexander, that great King and Philosopher, could not defend himself from it, and there is not any private man, that would not yield much more unto it, then Kings, if he were daily assaulted and corrupted, by such base rascal sort of people as they are.*) But generally unto all, yea, to the wifst, both by reason of the sweetnes thereof, in such sort, that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseith ; and though he oppose himself against it, yet he never shutteth it quite out of doors:

doors: *Unde sape exclusa novissime accipitur: Though often reject-ed, yet at last receiv'd: and because of the hypocrise thereof, where-by it is hardly discovered: for it is so well counterfeited and cov-ered with the visage of amity, that it is no easie matter to discern it.*

It usurpeth the Offices, it hath the voice, it carrieth the name and counterfeit thereof so artificially, that you will say, that it is the same. It studieth to content and please, it honoureth and commend-eth: It busieth it self much, and takes much pains to do service; it accommodateth it self to the wills and humours of men. What more? It takes upon it, even the highest and most proper point of amity, which is, to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brief, A Flatterer will seem to exceed in love, him that he flattereth; where-as contrariwise, there is nothing more opposite unto love, nor detrac-tion, nor injury, nor professed enmity. It is the plague and poy-son of true amity; they are altogether incompatible; *Non potes me simul amico & adulatore uti: Thou canst not use me together, both for a friend, and a flatterer.* Better are the sharp admonitions of a friend, then the kisses of a flatterer. *Meliora vulnera diligentis, quam oscula blandientis.*

Wherefore, not to mistake it, let us by the true Picture thereof, finde out the means to know it, and to discern it from true amity.

1. Flattery respecteth for the most part its own particular benefit, and thereby it is known; but true friendship seeketh not the good of it self.
2. The flatterer is changeable, and divers in his judge-ment, like wax, or a Looking-glasse, that receiveth all forms. He is a Chameleon, a *Polypus*; fain to-praise and dispraise, and he will do the like, accommodating himself to the mind of him he flattereth. A friend is firm and conistant.
3. He carrieth himself too violently and ambitiously in all that he doth, in the view and knowledge of him he flattereth, ever praising and offering his service. *Non imi-tatur amicitiam, sed praterit: He doth not imitate friendship, but passe by it.* He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrari-wise, inwardly he hath no affection; which are conditions quite contrary to a true friend.
4. He yieldeth, and alwayes giveth the victo-ry to him he flattereth, alwayes applauding him, having no other end then to please, in such sort, that he commendeth all, and more then all; yea, sometimes to his own cost, blaming & humbling him-self like a wrestler that stoopeth, the better to overthrow his com-pa-nion. A friend goes roundly to work, cares not whether he have

*It imitateth and
resembleth a-
mity, but it is
the plague
thereof.*

4
*The description
and antithesis of
flattery and a-
mity.*

Of flattery, lying, and dissimulation.

the first or the second place, and respecteth not so much how he may please, as how he may profit, whether it be by fair meanes, or by foul, as a good Physician useth to do to cure his patient. 5. A flatterer sometimes usurpeth the liberty of a friend to reprehend; but it is with the left hand and uncowardly. For he stayes himself at small and light matters, that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater, but yet he will be rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kinred and servants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should do unto him. Or he faineth to have understood some light accusations against him, and that he could not be quiet until he knew the truth thereof; and if it fall out, that he that is flattered deny them, or excuse himself, he taketh occasion to commend him the more: I was much astonished at it (saith he) and I could not believe it, for I see the contrary. For how should I think, that you will take from another man, when you give all that is your own, and take more care to give then to take? Or at least wise, he will make his reprehension to serve his turn, that he may flatter the better; telling him, that he takes not care enough of himself, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence, so necessary to the Common-weal, as once a Senator did to Tiberius in a full Senate, but with an ill sent, and as bad success. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwayes respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honest, and duty; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a malady in the minde of him that is flattered. And therefore he is a proper instrument, for all things that belong to pleasure and licentious liberty, and not for that which is honest or painful, and dangerous. He is like an Ape, who being unfit for any other service, as other beasts are, serves for a play-game, and to make sport.

5.
Of lying, the
foulaef and
burt thereof.

A neer Neighbour and alliance to flattery is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, *That it was the part of slaves to lie, of free-men to speak the truth.* For what greater wickedness is there, then for a man to belie his own knowledge? The first step to the corruption of good manners, is the banishment of truth; as contarily, saith Pindarus, *To be true, is the beginning of virtue.* It is likewise pernicious to humane society. We are not men, neither can we knit and joyn together in humane society, as hath bin said, if this be wanting. Doubtless, silence is more sociable, then untrue speech. If a lie had but one visage as truth hath, there were some reme-

remedy for it; for we would take the contrary to that which a liar speaketh to be the certain truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thousand figures, and an indefinite and unlimited field. That which is good, that is to say, virtue & verity, is too finite & certain, because there is but one way to the mark: That which is evil, that is to say, vice and error, and lying, is infinite and uncertain, because there are a thousand waies to miss the mark. Doubtless if men knew the horror of lying, they would pursue it with sword and fire. And therefore such as have the charge of youth are with all instance and diligence to hinder it, and to withstand the first birth and progress of this vice, as likewise of opinative obstinacie, and that in time, for they never leave growing.

There is likewise a covered and disguised lye, which is hypocritie and dissimulation (a notable quality of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongst them as virtue) the vice of licentious and base minds: for a man to disguise and hide himself under a mask, as not daring to shew himself to be that which he is, is a cowardly and servile humeur.

Now he that makes profession of this goodly mystery, lives in great pain, for it is a great unquietnes for a man to endeavour to seem other then that he is, and to have an eye unto himself, for fear lest he should be discovered. It is a torment for a man to hide his own nature: to be discovered, a confusion. There is no such pleasure as to live according to his nature, and it is better to be lesse esteemed and to live openly, then to take so much pains to counterfeit and live under a canopie; so excellent and so noble a thng is freedom.

But the mystery of these kinde of men is but poor; for dissimulation continues not long undiscovered, according to that saying: Things fained and violept dure not long: and the reward of such people is, that no man will trust them, nor give them credit when they speake the truth; for whatsoever comes from them is held for apocryphal and mockery.

Now here is need of indifferencie and wisdom. For if nature be deformed, vicious and offensive to another; it must be constrained, and to speak better, corrected. There is a difference between living freely and carelessly. Again, a man must not alwayes speak all he knows, that is a follie; but that which he speaketh, let it be that which he thinketh.

There are two sorts of people in whom dissimulation is excusable,

6.

of hypocrisy.

7.

The difficulty thereof.

8.

The dissimilati-

9.

The counsel hereupon.

10.

Dissimulation befitting wo-
men.

Of benefits, obligation and thankfulness.

ensable, yea sometimes requisite; but yet for divers reasons, that is to say, in the Prince for the publike benefit, and the good and peace of himself, or the state, as before hath been said; and in women for the conveniencie thereof, because an overfree and bold liberty becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudence. Those small disguisements, fained carriages, hypocrisies, which well befit their shamefastnes and modellie, deceive none but fools; besem them well and defend their honours. But yet it is a thing which they are not to take any great pains to learn, because hypocrisie is natural in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make use of it, and too much: their visage, their vestments, their words, countenance, laughter, weeping; and they practise it not onely towards their husbands living, but after their death too. They fain great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Jactantissim marent, qua minus dolent: They mourn in shew, that grieve but little.*

CHAP. XI.

Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness.

THe science and matter of benefits or good turns, and the thankful acknowledgment of the obligation, active and passive is great, of great use, and very subtile. It is that wherein we fail most. We neither know how to do good, nor to be thankful for it. It should seem that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgment is decayed, and revenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are we thereunto. *Gratia oneri est, ultio in quaestu habetur: altius injuria quam merita descendunt: Thankfulness is a burthen, revenge is accounted for gain: Injuries sink deeper than deserts.* First then we will speak of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanity, liberality, almes-deeds, and their contraries, inhumanity, cruelty; and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgment, and forgetfulness, or ingratitude and revenge,

Tacit.
Senec.

*An exhortati-
on to good
works by divers
reasons.* God, nature, and reason, do invite us to do good, and to deserve well of another; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good; neither do we know any better means how to imitate God; *Nulla re propius ad Dei naturam accidens, quam be-
neficentia. Dei est mortalem succurrere mortali.* In nothing we come nearer to the nature of God, then in doing good. It is of God that one mor-

tal

tal man succoureth another. Nature witnesseth this one thing, that every one delighteth to see him, to whom he hath done good: it best agreeth with nature; *nihil tam secundum naturam, quam ju-
vare consortem natura:* Nothing is more agreeable to nature, then to help him that partaketh of the same nature. It is the work of an honest and generous man to do good, and to deserve well of another, yea to seek occasions thereunto. *Liberalis etiam dandi causa* An brof.
quarit: It is a part of a liberal man even to seek occasions of giving. And it is said, that good blood cannot lie, nor fail at a need. It is greatness to give, baseness to take; *Beatus est dare quam accipere.* It is better to give then to receive. He that giveth, honoureth himself, makes himself master over the receiver; he that takes, sells himself. He (saith one) that first invented benefits or good turns, made stocks and manacles to tie and captivate another man. And therefore divers have refused to take, lest they should wound their liberty, especially from those whom they would not love, and be beholding unto, according to the counsel of the wise, which adviseth a man not to receive any thing from a wicked man, lest he be thereby bound unto him. Cesar was wont to say, that there came no sound more pleasing unto his ears then prayers and petitions. It is the most of greatness, Ask me; *Invoca me in die tribulationis, erham te & ho-
norificabis me:* Call upon me in the day of tribulation, and I will de-
liver thee, and thou shalt glorifie me. It is likewise the most noble, and honourable use of our means or substance, which so long as we hold and possess them privately, they carry with them base & abject names; horses, lands, money: but being brought into light, and em-
ployed to the good and comfort of another, they are ennobled with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificencies. It is the best, and most commodious imployment that may be; *Ars quæstus-
issima, optima negotiatio,* whereby the principal is assured, and the profit is very great. And to say the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his own, but that which he gives; for that which he retains, and keeps to himself, benefits neither himself, nor another: and if he employ them otherwise, they consume and diminish, pass thorow many dangerous accidents, and at last death it self. But that which is given, it can never perish, never wax old. And therefore Mark An-
tony being beaten down by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cried out that he had nothing, but that whi. li
he had given: *Hoc habeo quodcumque dedi.* And therefore this sweet, debonaire, and ready will to do good unto all, is a

Of benefits, obligation and thankfulness.

right excellent and honourab'e thing in all respects : as contrarily, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature, then crueltie, for which cause it is called inhumanitie ; which proceedeth from a contrary cause, to that of bounty and benefits, that is to say, daftardly cowardlines, as hath been said.

4.

*The distinction
of benefits.*

There is a two-fold manner of doing good unto another, by profiting and by pleasing him : for the first a man is admired and esteemed ; for the second, beloved. The first is far the better, it regardeth the necessity and want of a man, it is to play the part of a tather and a true friend. Again, there are two sorts of bounties or good turns ; the one are duties, that proceed out of a natural or lawful obligation : the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection. These seem the more noble : nevertheless if the other be done with attention and affection, though they be duties, yet they are excellent.

3.

*Inward and
outward bene-
fits.*

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is given, is seen, is touched ; this is but the grosse matter, the mark, the shew thereof, but it is the good-will. That which is outward is many times but small, that which is inward very great ; for this hath commonly with it a kinde of hunger and affection, and is alwaies seeking occasions to do good ; it giveth so much as it can, and what is needfull, forgetting its own benefit. *In beneficio hoc suspicendum quod alteri dedit, ablatum sibi, utilitatis sua oblitus :* In a benefit sibi is to be considered that which he giveth to another, he taketh away from himself, being forgetful of his own profit. Contrarily, where the gift is great, the grace may be small ; for it is commonly given with an ill will ; with an exspectation of much intreay, and leasure enoughe to consider whether he may give it or no. This is to make too great preparation thereunto, and too great use thereof, to give it rather to himself ; and his ambition, then to the good and necessity of the receiver. Again that which is outward may incontinently vanish, that which is inward remains firm : The libertie, health, honour, which is to be given, may all at an instant, by some accident or other, be taken away ; the benefit nevertheless remaining entire.

4.

*Rules of bene-
fits.*1. *To whom.*

The advisements whereby a man should direct himself, in his bounties and benefits he bestoweth, according to the rules and instruction of the wise, are these : First, to whom must he give ? to all ? It seemeth that to do good unto the wicked and unworthy, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an ill name upon the giver, entertaineth and kindleth malice, gives that which

which belongs to virtue and merit, to vice also. Doubtless free and favourable graces are not due, but to the good and worthy; but in a time of necessity, and in a generality all, is common. In these two cases the wicked and ungrateful have a part, if they be in necessitie; or if they be in such sort mingled with the good, that the one can hardly receive without the other. For it is better to do good to thoe that are unworthy for their sakes that are good, than to deprive the good for their sakes that are evil. So doth God, good unto all; he suffereth the sunne to shine, and the rain to fall indifferent-ly upon all: But yet his special gifts he giveth not but to thole whom he hath chosen for his; *Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum, & projicere canibus: multum refert utrum aliquem non excludas a eligas:* It is not good to take the Childrens bread, and cast it unto dogs. There is a great difference between not excluding and chusing. At a need therefore, in a time of affliction and necessitie we must do good unto all; *Hominibus prodeesse natura jubet, ubiquecumque homini beneficio locus: Nature commandeth to do good unto men, whensoever opportunity is offered to benefit them.* Nature and humanity teach us, to regard and to offer our selves unto them, that stretch out their arms unto us, and not unto those that turn their backs towards us; rather unto those to whom we may do good, then to those that are able to do good unto us. It is the part of a generous mind, to take part with the weaker side, to succour the afflicted, and to help to abate the pride and violence of the conqueror; as *Chelonis* once did, the Daughter and Wife of a King, whose father and husband being at variance and warr one against another, whensoever the husband had got the better against her father, like a good daughter she followed and served her father in all things in his afflictions; but the chance turning, and her father getting the mastery, like a good wife, she turned to her husband, and accompanied him in his hardest fortune.

Secondly, he must do good willingly and cheerfully; *Non ex tristitia aut necessitate; hilarem datorem diligit Deus: Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultra offeras: Not with discontent, or out of necessitie: God loveth a chearfull giver: that is twice acceptable, that is needfull, and offered of thine own accord: not suffering himself to be over-intreated, and importuned; otherwise it will never be pleasing: Nemo libenter debet quod non accipit, sed expressis: No man receiveth with that thankfulness, when it is not willingly given, but wrung out by imporenny.* That which is yielded by force, and en-treaty

treaty and prayers, as dearly sold ; *Non tulit gratis, qui accipit ragans: imo nihil carius emuntur quam quod precibus :* He hath it not freely, which receiveth by entreaty : yea nothing is dearer bought, than that which is had by earnest sues. He that prayeth and entreateth, humbleth himself, confesseth himself an inferiour, covereth his face with shame honoureth him whom he entreateth ; whereupon *Cesar* was wont to say after he had overcome *Pompey*, That he lent not his ears more willingly, nor took so much content in any thing, as to be intreated ; whereby he gave a kind of hope unto all, even his enemies, that they should obtain whatsoever they should request. Graces are silken vellments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

6.
3. Speedy.

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seems to depend upon the former, for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed. Now he that stayes long before he succour and give, seems to have been a long time unwilling to do it ; *qui tardè fecit, diu noluit.* As contrarily, a readinesse herein doubleth the benefit ; *Bis dat, qui celeriter :* He giveth twice that giveth quickly. That indifference and careless regard, whether it be done, or not done, that is used herein, is not approved by any, but impudent persons. Diligence must be used in all points. Herein then there is a five-fold manner of proceeding, whereof three are reproved ; to refuse to do a good turn, and that slowly too, is a double injury : to refuse speedily, and to give slowly, are almost one : and some there are that are lesse offended with a quick denial ; *Minus decipitur cui negatur celeriter :* he is lesse deceived that is soon denied. The best way then is, to give speedily : but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demand, to prevent the necessarie and the desire.

7.
4. Without hope of restitution.

Fourthly, without hope of restitution : this is that wherein the force and virtue of a benefit doth principally consist. If it be a virtue, it is not mercenary : *Tunc est virtus, dare beneficia non redditura :* Then it is virtue to bestow benefits, when they expect no requital. A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retrogradation and reflection ; but when there is no place for requital ; yea, not known from whence the good turn cometh, there it is in its true lustre and glory. If a man look after the like, he will give slowly and to few. Now it is far better to renounce all such hopes of two returns, then to cease to merit, and to do good ; for whilst a man seeketh after that strange & accidentall payment he depriveth himself of the true and naturall, which is that inward joy and comfort he receiveth in doing good. Again, he must not be twice entreated for

for one thing. To do wrong, is in it self a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to disswade a man from it : so to deserve well of another, is an excellent and honourable thing, and there needs no other thing to enflame a man to it. And in a word, It is not to do good, to look after the like return; it is to make merchandize and profit thereof; *Non est beneficium quod in quantum mititur: That is not a benefit that is given for gain.* And a man should not confound and mingle together actions so divers; *densus beneficia, non faeneramus: Let us give benefits, but not for usury.* It is pitie but such men should be deceived that hope after such requitals: *Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitaret, cum daret: He is worthy to be deceived, who looketh for a recompence of that he gave.* She is no honest woman who either for fear, or the better to enflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *Qua quia non licuit non dedit, ipsa dedit: She who hath not given her consent because she could not fitly do it, hath notwithstanding consented.* So he deserves nothing that doth good to receive good again. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of return, saith Hesiod.

Fifthly, to do good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiveth it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done unto him. Concerning which point you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits, the one are honourable to the person that receiveth, and therefore they should be done publickly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weakness, shame, or other necessitie of the receiver. These are to be done secretly, yea, if need be, that he onely may take notice that receiveth them; and if it be fit, the receiver should not know from whence they come (because it may be he is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs be great) it is good and expedient to conceal it from him, and to suffer the benefit to drop into his hand, as it were unawares. It is enough the benefactor know it, and his own conscience serve him for a witness, which is better then if he had a thousand lookers on.

Sixthly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the prejudice of justice: to do good not doing evil: To give to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the sonne in the presence of the father, saith a wise man.

Seventhly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demands and petitions, from refusing or yielding unto them

8.

According
to the desire of
the receiver.

9.

6. without the
offence of ano-
ther.

10.

7. Wisely,
them

Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness.

them. This difficultie proceedeth from the evil nature of man, especially of the petitioner, who vexeth himself too much in the enduring of a repulse, b: it never so just and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimony of weakness) yea, when they have neither power, nor will to perform and referring the avoiding of this difficultie to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so think to quit themselves of their obligation: or if it fall out there be question made thereof, they find excuses and avoidances; and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed; for a man ought not to agree to any thing, but to that which he can, will, and ought to perform. And finding himself between these two straits and dangers; either of a bad promise, because it is either unjust, or ill befitting; or an absolute denial, which may stir up some suspicion, or misconceit; the counsele is, that he leave this matter either by delaying the answer, or in such sort composing the promise, in such generall and doubtful terms, that they binde not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But here is craft and subtlety, far different from true freedom; but this iniquity of the petitioner is the cause thereof, and he deserveth it.

II.

8. From a heavy affliction.

Eightly, it must proceed from a manly heart, and hearty affection, *Homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto: I am a man, and I think nothing belonging unto man strange unto me;* especially towards those that are afflicted in want; and this is that which we call mercy. They that have not this affection, *ἀσπόνδιος & immunes*, are inhumane, and carry the marks of dishonest men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous; not a soft, effeminate, and troubled mind: for that is a vicious passion, and which may fall into a wicked minde, whereof in this place we have already spoken: for there is a good and evil mercy. And a man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himself, and applying the evil unto himself, detract nothing from equity, and honour: for God saith that we must not have pity of the poor in judgment: and so God and his Saints are said to be merciful and pitiful.

12.

9. without boasting.

Ninthly, it must be without boasting and shew, or publike proclamation thereof, for this is a kind of reproach: These kind of vaunts do not onely take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perducere.* And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds.

He must continue them, and by new benefits confirm, and renew the old, (this inviteth the whole world to love him, and to seek his love) and never repent himself of the old, howsoever it may seem, that he hath cast his seed upon a barren and unthankfull ground, *beneficii tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hac vox, Vellem non fecisse.* Let even the ill successe of thy good deeds please thee : never have this in thy mouth, I would I had not done it. An unthankfull man wrongs none but himself, and a good turn is not lost by his ingratitude; it is a holy coniecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to be good, or discontinue his office : and that which is more, the work of a noble and generous heart is to continue to do well, to break and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners : *Optimi viri & agentis animi est tam diu ferre ingratum donec feceris gratum : vincit malos pertinax bonitas.* The best men and generous mindes will bear so long with an ungrateful person, untill with their goodness they shall make him grattfull, persevering goodness overcometh the evil.

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiver in the fruition thereof, as they who having given an honour, or an office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselves ; or at leastwise, procure them one good, that they may reap another themselves. He that is the receiver, ought not to encure this, and therefore is not unthankfull ; and the benefactor defaceth the benefit, and cancelleth the obligation. One of the Popes denying a Cardinall an unjust boon which he demanded, alledging unto him that he was the cause why he was made Pope answered him, Why then give me leave to be Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast given me.

After these rules and advisements concerning good deeds ; we must know that there are some benefits more acceptable and welcome then others, and which are more or lesse binding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendly hand, from those whom a man is inclined to love without this occasion ; and contrarily it is a grief to be obliged unto him, whom a man likes not, and to whom he would not willingly be indebted. Such benefits also are welcome, that come from the hand of him that is any way bound to the receiver : for here is a kind of Justice, and they bind lesse. Those good deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carry with them

13.

10. Continue
them without
repentance.

14.

Not to remove
or trouble a
good man.

15.

Distinction of
benefits.

Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness.

them a greater force, they make a man forget all injuries, and offences past, if there were any, and binde more strongly; as contrarily the denial, in such a case is very injurious, and makes a man forget all benefits past. Such benefits likewise, as may be required with the like, are more gladly received, than their contraries, which ingender a kinde of hate; for he that findeth himself wholly bound, without any power or possibility of repayment, as often as he seeth his benefactor, he thinks he sees a testimony of his inability or ingratitude, and it is irksome to his heart. There are some benefits, the more honest and gracious they are, the more burthenosome are they to the receiver, if he be a man of credit, as they that tye the conscience and the will; for they lock faster, keep a man in his right memory, and some fear of forgetfulness, and failing his promise: A man is a safer prisoner under his word, then under lock and key. It is better to be tied by civil and publick bands, then by the law of honesty, and conscience: two notaries are better then one. I trust your word, and your faith, and conscience: here is more honour done to the receiver; but yet constraint fastneth, soliceth, and presseth much more, and here is more safety to the lender; and a man carrieth himself more carelesly, because he doubteth not but that the law, and those outward ties will awaken him when the time shall serve. Where there is constraint, the will is more loose: where there is lesse constraint, the will hath lesse liberty: *Quod me jus coget, vix à voluntate impetrerem: I can hardly request of my will, that which the law constraineth me unto.*

16.

Obligation the mother and daughter of a benefit or good turn.

From a benefit proceeds an obligation, and from it a benefit; and so it is both the childe and the father, the effect and the cause; and there is a two-fold obligation, active and passive, Parents, Princes and superiors, by the duty of their charge, are bound to do good unto those that are committed and commended unto them, either by law or by nature; and generally all men that have means are bound to relieve those that are in want, or any affliction whatsoever, by the command of nature. Behold here the first obligation; afterwards from benefits or good turns, whether they be due and springing from this first obligation, or free & pure merits, ariseth the second obligation and discharge, whereby the receivers are bound to an acknowledgment & thankfull requital. All this is signified by *Hesiodus*, who hath made the Graces three in number, holding each other by the hands.

17.

The first obligation and mother.

The first obligation is discharged by the good offices of every one that is in any charge, which shall presently be discoursed of in the second part, which concerneth particular duties: but yet this obligation

gation is strengthened, and weakened and lessened accidentally, by the conditions and actions of those that are the receivers. For their offences, ingratitudes, and unworthiness do in a manner discharge those, that are bound to have care of them; and a man may almost lay as much of their naturall defects too. A man may justly, with lesse affection love that childe, that kinsman, that subject, that is not onely wicked and unworthy, but foul, mis-shapen, crooked, unfortunate, ill born; God him selfe hath abated him much, from their natural price and estimation: but yet a man must in this abatement of affection, keep a justice, and a moderation; for this concerneth not the helps and succours of necessity, and those offices that are due by publick reason, but onely that intension, and affection, which is in the inward obligation.

The second obligation, which ariseth from benefits, is that which we are to handle, and concerning which, we must at this time set down some rules: First, the law of dutiful acknowledgment and thankfulness is natural, witness beasts themselves, not onely private and domestical, but cruel and savage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgment, as of the Lyon towards the Roman slave. *Officia etiam fera sentiunt: Even wilde beasts have a feeling of good offices done unto them.* Secondly, it is a certain act of virtue, and a testimony of a good minde, and therefore it is more to be esteemed then bounty or benefit, which many times proceed from abundance, from power, love of a mans proper interest, and very seldom from pure virtue, whereas thankfulness springeth alwaies from a good heart; and therefore howsoever the benefit may be more to be desired, yet kind acknowledgment is far more commendable. Thirdly, it is an easie thing, yea a pleasant, and that is in the power of every man. There is nothing more easie, then to do according to nature, nothing more pleasing then to be free from bands, and to be at liberty.

By that which hath been spoken, it is easie to see how base and ^{19.} *of ingratitude.* villainous a vice forgetfulness and ingratitude is, how unpleasing and odious unto all men; *Dixeris maledicta enixa cum ingratum hominem dixeris: Thou speakest all the evil that may be said, when thou namest an ungrateful man.* It is againt nature; and therefore Plato speaking of his disciple Aristotle, calleth him an ungrateful mule. It is likewile without all excuse, and cannot come but from a wicked nature; *Grave vitium, intolerabile, quod dissociat homines: A grievous vice and intolerable, which breaketh the society of men.* Sen.

Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness.

men. Revenge which followeth an injurie, as ingratitudo a good turn, is much more strong and pressing (for an injurie enforceth more, then a benefit) : *Altius injuria quam merita descendunt : Injuries sink deeper into the mind, than deserts.* It is a very violent passion, but yet nothing so base, so deformed a vice as ingratitude. It is like those evils that a man hath, that are not dangerous; but yet are more grievous and painfull, then they that are mortall. In revenge, there is some shew of justice, and a man hides not himself, to work his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but base dishonesty and shame.

20.

Rules of thankfulness.

Senec.

Idem.

Plin.

Thankfulness or acknowledgment, that it may be such as it should be, must have these conditions. First, he must graciously receive a benefit, with an amiable and cheerfull visage and speech : *Qui grata beneficium accepit, primam ejus pensionem solvit : He which receiveth a benefit thankfully, dischargeth the first payment thereof.* Secondly, he must never forget it. *Ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus, nusquam enim gratia fieri posset, cui totum beneficium elapsum est : He that forgetteth a benefit is of all other most ingratefull; for in no respect can he be made thankful, that hath utterly forgotten a good turn.* The third office, is to publish it ; *Ingenni pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus ; & hac quasi merces authoris : It is the part of an honest mind, to confess by whom we have received profit; and this is as it were a reward to the author.* As a man hath found the heart, and the hand of another, open to do good; so must he have his mouth open to preach and publish it: and to the end the memorie thereof may be more firm and solemn, he must name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make restitution, wherein he must observe these four conditions : That it be not too speedy, nor too curiously, for this carries an ill sent with it, and it bewrays too great an unwillingness to be in debt, and too much hate to be quit of that band. And it likewise giveth an occasion to the friend or benefactor, to think that his courtesie was not kindly accepted of; for to be too carefull and desirous to repay, is to incurre the suspicion of ingratitude. It must therefore follow somerime after; and it must not be too long neither, lest the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted young) and it must be upon some apt and good occasion, which either offereth it self, or is taken, and that without noise and rumour. That it be with some usury, and surpass the benefit, like fruitfull ground : *Ingratus est qui beneficium reddit sine usura.* He
is

is unhandfull, who restoreth a benefit without profit; or at least equall it with all the shew and acknowledgement that may be, of great reason, of a farther requitall, and that this is not to satisfie the obligation, but to give some testimonie that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it be willingly and with a good heart : *In gratiis est, qui metu gratus est : He is ungrateful, who is grateful for fear.* For if it were so given ; *Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur; errat si quis beneficium libenter accipit, quam reddit :* A benefit ought to be restored with the same mind wherewith it was given : he is to be blamed whosoever he be, that receiveth a benefit more willingly then he restoreth it. Lastly, if his inability be such, as that he cannot make present restitution, yet let his will be forward enough, which is the first and principall part, and as it were the soul, both of the benefit and acknowledgement ; though there be no other witnessesse hereof then it self; and he must acknowledge not onely the good he hath receaved, but that likewise that hath been offered, and might have been received, that is to say, the goodwill of the benefactor, which is, as hath been said, the principall.

3.

4.

The second Part.

Which concerneth the speciall duties of certain men, by certain and speciall obligations.

THE PREFACE.

B eing to speak of speciall and particular duties, differing according to the diversity of the persons and their states, whether they be unequall, as superiours and inferiours, or equal : we will begin with married folks, who are mixt, and hold with both equalities and inequality. And so much the ratter, because we are first to speak of private and domesticall justice and duties, before publick, because they are before them; as families and houses are before common-weals, and therefore that private justice which is observed in a family, is the image, and source, and model of a Common-weal. Now these private and domesticall duties are three ; that is to say, between the husband and the wife, parents and children, masters and servants, and these are the parts of a household or family, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the masters and authors thereof. And therefore first of married folk,

C H A P.

CHAP. XII.

The duty of married folk.

According to those two divers considerations that are in marriage, as hath been said, that is to say, equality and inequality; there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folk, the one common to both, equally reciprocall, of like obligation, though according to the custome of the world, the pain, the reprobation, the inconvenience, be not equal: that is to say, an entie loyalty, fidelity, community, and communication of all things, and a care and authority over their family, and all the goods of their house. Hereof we have spoken more at large in the first book.

The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them: for those of the husband are; 1. To instruct his wife with mildnes in all things that belong unto her duty, her honour, and good, whereto she is capable. 2. To clothe her, whether she brought dowry with her or no. 3. To nourish her. 4. To lie with her. 5. To love and defend her. The two extremitie are base and vicious, to hold her under like a servant, to make her mistresse by subjecting himself unto her: And these are the principall duties. These follow after, to comfort her being sick, to deliver her being captive, to bury her being dead, to nourish her living, and to provide for his children he hath had by her, by his Will and Testament.

3.
Of the wife.

The duties of the wife. 1. Are to give honour, reverence, and respect to her husband, as to her master and lord; for so have the wisest women that ever were, termed their husbands, and the Hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth her self of this duty, honoureth her self more then her husband; and doing otherwise, wrongs none but her self. 2. To give obedience in all things just and lawfull, app'ying and accommodating her self to the manners and humours of her husband, like a true looking glasse, which faithfully representeth the face; having no other particular designation, love, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents, which have no other proper action or motion, and never move but with the body, she applyes her self in all things to her husband. 3. Service, as to provide either by her self or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keep the house, and therefore she is compared to the Tortois, and is painted having her feet naked, and especially in the absence of her husband. For her husband being

being far from her, she must be as it were invisible, and contrary to the Moon (which appeareth in her greatness when she is farthest from the Sun) not appear, but when she comes neer her Sun. 5. To be silent, and not to speak but with her husband, or by her husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing, and hardly found she is said to be a precious gift of God. 6. To employ her time in the practice and study of houwifery, which is the most commodious and honourable science and occupation of a woman; this is her speciall misris-qualitie, and which a man of mean fortune, should especially seek in his marriage. It is the onely dowry, that serveth either to ruinate, or preserve families; but it is very rare. There are divers that are covetous, few that are good houwives. We are to speak of them both, of houshould husbandry presently by it self.

Ecclus. 26.

In the private acquaintance and use of marriage, there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and devout band, for that pleasure that is therein, must be mingled with some severity; it must be a wife and consonable delight. A man must touch his wife discreetly and for honesty, as it is said, and for fear, as Aristotle saith, lest provoking her desires too wantonly, the pleasures thereof make her to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindreth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not over-languishing, barren, and subject to other diseases, he must offer himself unto her, though seldom. Solon saith, thrice in a moneth; but there can no certain law or rule be given hereof.

*An advisement
upon the ac-
quaintance of
married folk.*Plutarch, in
Selon.

The doctrine of houshould husbandry doth willingly follow, and is annexed unto marriage.

CHAP. XIII. *Houshould husbandry.*

1. **H**oushould husbandry is an excellent, just, and profitable occupation. It is a happy thing, saith Plato, for a man to go through his private affairs without injustice. There is nothing more beauifull then a houshould well and peaceably governed.

2. It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is not capable of any thing else, is capable of this; but yet it is carefull and painfull, and troubleome, by reason of the multitude of affairs, which though they be small and of no great importance, yet forasmuch

Household husbandry.

much as they are common and frequent, and never at an end, they do much annoy and weary a man. Domesticall thorns prick, because they are ordinary; but if they come from the principall persons of the familie, they gaul and exulcerate, and grow remedieless.

3. It is a great happiness, and a fit mean to live at ease, to have one whom a man may trust, and upon whom he may repose himself; which that he may the better do, he must choose one that is true and loyall, and afterwards bind him to do well by that trust and confidence he putteth in him. *Habita fides ipsam obligat fidem;* multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli; & alius ius peccandi, suspicando deterunt: Faith being given binds faith again; many have taught to deceive, whilst they fear to be deceived, and have given occasion unto others of offending, by suspecting them.

4. The principall precepts and counsels that belong to frugality, or good husbandry, are these: 1. To buy and sell all things at the best times and seasons, that is, when they are best and best cheap. 2. To take good heed lest the goods in the house be spoyled or miscarry, be either lost or carried away. This doth especially belong to the woman, to whom Aristotle gives this authority and care. 3. To provide first and principally for these three; necessarie, cleanlinesse, order: and again, if there be means, some advise to provide for these three too; but the wiser sort will no great pains to be taken therein: *Non ampliter, sed munditer convivium; plus salis quam sumpitus:* A feast must not be costly, but cleanly, more mirth than soft. Abundance, pomp, and preparation, exquisite and rich fashion. The contrary is many times practised in good houses, where you shall have beds garnished with silk, embroydered with gold; and but one simple coverlid in winter, which were a commodity far more necessary. And so of the rest.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away superfluities, yet providing for necessities, and that which is fit and beleeming. A ducket in a mans purse will do a man more honour and honesty, then ten prodigally spent, saith one. Again (but this requires industry and good sufficiency) to make a great shew with a little charge; and above all, not to suffer the expence to grow above the receipt and the income.

5. To have a care and an eye over all: The vigilancy and presence of the Master, saith the Proverb, fretteth the horse and the land. And in any case the master and mistresse must take a care to con-

conceal their ignorance and insufficiency in the affairs of the house, and much more their carelessness, making a shew as if they attended and thought of nothing else. For if officers and servants have an opinion, that their masters look not unto them, they may chance to make his hair grow through his hood.

C H A P. XIV.

The duty of Parents and Children.

THe dutie of Parents and Children is reciprocall, and reciprocally naturall : if that of children be more strait, that of Parents is more ancient , parents being the first authors and cause , and more important to a Common-weal : for to people a State, and to furnish it with honest men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is necessary, which is the seed of a Common-wealth. And there comes not so much evils to a Weal-publick, by the ingratitude of Children towards their Parents , as by the carelessness of Parents in the instruction of their Children: and therefore with great reason in *Lacedemon*, and other good and politick States, there was a punishment and a penalty laid upon the Parents , when the Children were ill conditioned. An *I Plato* was wont to say, that he knew not in what a man should be more careful & diligent, then to make a good sonne. And *Crates* cryed out in tholer, To what end do men take so much care in heaping up goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leave them ? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shoo, and not of his foot. What should he do with riches that is not wise , and knows not how to use them ? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle upon a Jades back, Parents then are doubly obliged to this duty , both because they are their Children, and because they are the tender plants and hope of the Common-weal : This is to till his own land , together with that of the Weal-publick.

Now this office or duty hath four successive parts , according to those four goods or benefits that a child ought to receive successively from his parents , Life, Nourishment, Instruction, Communication. The first regardeth the time when the infant is in the womb, untill his coming into the world inclusively : the second, the time of his infancy in his Cradle, untill he know how to go and to speak : the third , all his youth ; this part must be handled more at large , and more seriously : the fourth concerneth their affection, com-

^{2.}
*The division of
the office of
parents.*

3.
The first part of
the office of
Parents.

munication and carriage towards their children now come to mans estate, touching their good thoughts, desigments.

The first, which regardeth the generation and fruit in the womb, is not accounted of and observed with such diligence as it ought, although it have as much part in the good or evil of a child (as well of their bodies as their souls) as their education and instruction after they are born, and come to some growth. That is that, that giveth the substance, the temper and temperature, the nature, the other is artificiall and acquired : and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repair it , no more then a fault in the first concoction of the stomach, can be mended in the second or third. We men go unadvisedly and headlong to this copulation, onely provoked thereunto by pleasure , and a desire to disburthen our selves of that which tickleth and presteth us thereunto: if a conception happen thereby, it is by chance, for no man goeth to it warily , and with such deliberation and disposition of body as he ought, and nature doth require. Since then men are made at adventure, and by chance, it is no marvell if they seldom fall out to be beautifull, good, sound, wise, and well composed. Behold then briefly, according to Philosophy the particular advisements touching this first point, that is to say , the begetting of male-children, sound, wise, and judicious : for that which serveth for the one of these qualities, serves for the other. 1. A man must not couple himself with a woman that is of a vile, base, and dissolute condition, or of a naughty and vicious composition of body. 2. He must abstain from this action and copulation seven or eight dayes. 3. During which time he is to nourish himself with wholesome victuals, more hot and dry then otherwise, and such as may concoct well in the stomach. 4. He must use a more then moderate exercise. All this tendeth to this end and purpose, that the seed may be well concocted and seasoned, hot and dry, fit and proper for a masculine, sound and wise temperature. Vagabonds, idle and lazie people, great drinkers, who have commonly an ill concoction, ever beget effeminate, idle, and dissolute children (as Hippocrates reounteth of the Scythians.) Again , a man must apply himself to this encounter after one manner, a long time after his repast, that is to say , his belly being empty , and he fasting (for a full pance performes nothing good either for the mind or for the body) and therefore Diogenes reproached a licentious young man, (or that his father had begotten him being drunk. And the law of the Carthaginians is com- mended

mended by *Plato*, which enjoyned a man to abstain from wine that day that he lay with his wife. 6. And not near the monethly terms of a woman; but fix or seven dayes before, or as much after them. 7. And upon the point of conception and retention of the seed, the woman turning and gathering her self together upon the right side, let her so rest for a time. 8. This direction touching the viands and exercize must be continued during the time of her burthen.

To come to the second point of this office after the birth of the infant, these four points are to be observed. 1. The infant must of the office of parents, be washed in warm water, somewhat brinish, to make the members supple and firm, to cleanse and dry the flesh & the brain, to strengthen the sinewes, a very good custome in the Eastern parts, and among the Jews. 2. The nurse, if she be to be chosen, let her be young, of a temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be, brought up in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardened against cold and heat. I say, if she be to be chosen, because according to reason, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother, and therefore they cry out against her, when she refuseth this charge, being invited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end hath given her milk anddugs, by the example of beasts; and that love and jealousie that she ought to have of her little ones, who receive a very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustomed in a stranger, and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrary to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers, but by halfs. *Quod est hoc contra naturam, imperfectum, ac dimidiatum* Aul. Gell. 1. 12. c. 3. *matris genu? peperisse, & statim ab se abiecisse; aliusse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo latte, quod videat iam, viventem, jam hinc nem, jam matris officia implorans: It is a thing against nature, imperfect and by halfs, for a mother to bring forth a child, and presently to cast it from her; to nourish in her womb with her own blood, I know not what, which she saw not; & not nurse with her milk that which she seeth already living, a man, & imploring the duties of a mother.* 3. The nourishment besides the dug should be goats milk, or rather cream, the most subtil and aerly part of the milk, sod with honey and a little salt. These are things very fit for the body and the mind, by the advice of all the wise and great Physicians, Greeks and Hebrew. *Butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum, & eligere bonum: Let him eat butter and honey, until he be able to refuse the evill, and choose the good.* The quality of milk or cream is very temperate, and full of good

Galen. multe locis.
Homeric. 10.
Iliad.
Esay 7.

nourishment ; the drinessse of the honey and salt consummeth the too great humidity of the brain, and disposeth it unto wisdome. 4. The infant must by little and little be accustomed and hardened to the air, to heat, and cold : and we are not to be fearfull thereof; for in the Northern parts of the world, they wash their children so soon as they come out of the wombe of their mothers ; in cold water, and are never the worse.

5. The two first parts of the office of parents we have soon dispatched ; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that have not that care, affection, and diligence in these matters that is fit; for they are the cause and occasions, either by carelessness, or otherwise, of the death and untimely birth of their Children ; and when they are born they care not for them, but expose them to their own fortunes ; for which cause they are deprived by law of that fatherly power over them that is due unto them ; and the Children to the shame of their parents , are made slaves by those that have nourished them , and brought them up , who are far from taking care to preserve them from fire and water, and all other crosses and afflictions that may light upon them.

6.
*The third part
of the office of
parents.*
*An instruction
very important.*

The third part which concerneth the instruction of Children, we are to handle more seriously. So soon as this Infant is able to go, and to speak, and shall begin to employ his mind and his body, and that the faculties thereof shall be awakened and shew themselves , the memory, imagination, reason, which begin at the fourth or fifth year, there must be a great care and diligence used , in the well forming thereof : for this first tincture and liquor wherewith the mind must be seasoned, hath very great power. It cannot be expressed how much this first impression and formation of youth prevaileth , even to the conquering of Nature it self. Nurture , saith one , excelleth Nature. *Lycurgus* made it plain to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diversely brought up , to whom presenting before them in an open place, a pot of porrage and a hare, that which was brought up tenderly in the houle fell to the porrage ; the other that had been ever trained up in hunting , forsook the porrage , and ran after the hare. The force of this instruction proceeds from this, that it entreth easily, and departeth with difficulty: for being the first that entreth, it taketh such place, and winneth such credit as a man will; there being no other precedent matter to contest with it , or to make head against it. This mind then wholly new and near, soft and tender, doth easily receive that impression that a man will give unto it; and afterwards doth not easily lose it.

Quint.
Sec.

Now

Now this is not a thing of small importance, but a man may rather say, it is the most difficult and important that may be. For, who feeth not that in a State, all depends upon this? Nevertheless (and it is the greatest, most dangerous and lamentable fault that is in our policies, noted by Aristotle and Plutarch) we see that the conduct and discipline of youth is wholly left unto the charge and mercy of their parents, what kind of men soever they be, many times careless, foolish, wicked, and the publick state regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almost the onely States that have given to the laws the discipline of children, were that of *Lacedemon* and *Crete*: But the most excellent discipline of the world for youth, was the *Spartan*; and therefore *Agisilanus* perswaded *Xenophon* to send his Children thither, for there (faireth he) they may learn the most excellent science of the world, and that is to command and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at arms, Magistrates, Citizens. Their youth and their instruction they esteemed above all things; and therefore *Antipater* demanding of them fifty Children for hostages, they answered him, that they had rather give him twice as many men at their ripest years.

Now before we enter into this matter, I will here give an advertisement of some weight. There are some that take great pains to discover the inclinations of Children, and for what employment they shall be most fit; but this is a thing so obscure, and so uncertain, that when a man hath bestowed what cost, and taken what pains he can, he is commonly deceived. And therefore not to tie our selves to these weak and light divinations & prognostications drawn from the motions of their infancy, let us endeavour to give them an instruction, universally good and profitab'e whereby they are made capable, ready, and disposed to whatsoever. This is to go upon a sure ground, and to do that which must alwayes be done. This shall be a good tincture, apt to receive all others.

To make an entrance into this matter, we may refer it unto three points, the forming of the spirit, the ordering of the body, the ruling of the manners. But before we give any particular counsell touching these three, there are generall advisements that belong to the manner of proceeding in this businesse, that shew us how to carry our selves worthily & happily therein, which must be first known as a preamble to the rest.

9.
The division of
this matter.

The first is carefully to guard his soul, and to keep it neat and free

*The first gene-
ral advice
touching in-
struction.
To guard the
ears.*

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from the contagion and corruption of the world, that it receive not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to do this, he must diligently keep the gates, which are the ears especially, and then the eyes; that is to say, give order, that not any, no not his own father, come near unto him, to buzz into his ears any thing that is evil. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be, to make an evil almost past reparation: Guard thine ears above all, and then thine eyes. And for this cause, *Plato* was of opinion that it was not fit that servants and base persons should entertain Children with discourse, because their talk can be no better then fables, vain speeches, and fooleries, if not worse. This were to train up and to feed those tender years with follies and fooleries.

11.

*The second ge-
neral advice
touching the
choice of in-
structors, con-
ference, books.*

The second advice concerneth not only the persons that must have charge of this Child, but the discourse and conference where-with he must be entertained, and the books he must read. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well-born, of a sweet and pleasing conversation, having their head well framed, fuller of wisdom then of science, and that they agree in opinion together; lest that by contrary counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigor the other by flattery, they hinder one another; and trouble their charge and deignments. Their books and communication must not be of small, base, softish, frivolous matters, but great and serious, noble and generous; such as may rule and enrich the understanding, opinions, manners, as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition, the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himself and others: such, I say, as may teach him what to fear, to love, to desire; what passion is, what virtue, how he may judge betwixt ambition and avarice, servitude and subjection, liberty and licentiousness. He is deceived that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the understanding of thole excellent examples of *Valerius Maximus*, and all the Greek and Romane Histories (which is the most beautiful science and knowledge of the world) then to understand *Amadis of Gaul*, and other like vain and frivolous discourses. That Child that can know how many hens his mother hath, and who are his uncles and his cosens, will as easily carry away how many Kings there have been, and how many Ccesars in *Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacity and sufficiency of his mind, but know how to conduct and manage it.

12.

The third is, to carry himself towards him, and to proceed not after

after an austere, rude, and severe manner, but sweetly, mildly, and cheerfully. And therefore we do here altogether condemn that custome which is common in all places, to beat, and to box, and with strange words and out-cries to hazen Children, and to keep them in fear and subjection, as the manner is in free-schools and colledges. For it is a custome too unjust, and as foul a fault, as when a Judge or Phyfitian shall be moved with choler against an offender and patient : prejudiciale and quite contrary to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir up a desire in them, and to bring them in love with virtue, wi'dome, science, honesty. Now this imperious and rude carriage, breeds in children a hatred, horror, and detestation of that they should love ; it provoketh them, makes them head-strong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their minds become servile, base, and flavid, like their usage ; *Parentes ne Colosse-3.* *provocetis ad iracundiam filios vestros, ne despondeant animum : Parents provoke not your Children to anger, lest they be discouraged.* For seeing themselves thus handled, they never perform any thing of worth, but curse their master and their apprenticeship. If they do that which is required at their hands, it is because the eye of the master is alwaies upon them, it is for fear, and not cheerfully and nobly, and therefore not honestly. If they fail and perform not their task, to save themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they have recourse to base unlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, tears of despight, flights, truantings, all worse then the fault they have committed.

Terent.

*Dum id rescitum iri credit, tantisper caver ;
Si sperat fore clam, rursum ad ingenium reddit.
Ille, quem beneficio adjungas, ex animo facit ;
Studet par referre, prasens absensque idem erit.*

*The shame keeps knowledge, knowledge keeps the sin
In awe, which did in secrecie begin :
Whom good turns with love have got
To be thy friend, repose thy lot,
Beest thou there or beest thou not.*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, using there-in reason, and sweet and mild persuasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame. The first will serve them as a spurre to what is good, the second as a bridle to check and withdraw them from evill. There is something, I know not what, that is servile and base in rigour and constraint, the enemy

to honour and true libertie. We must clean contrary sat their hearts with ingenuity, liberty, love, virtue and honour.

Terent.

*Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere
Satius esse credo, quam metu.
Hoc patrinius est potius consuefacere filium
Sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu.
Hoc Pater ac Dominus interest: hoc qui nequit,
Fas et iuris se nescire imperare liberis.*

*I hold it better, children up to rear
With modesty and bounty; then by fear,
To enure a child; 't is rather fathers law
To do well of himself, then others aw.
A Father and a Master differ so;
So who can not, to rule sons doth not know.*

Blows are for beasts that understand not reason: injuries and brawls are for slaves. He that is once accustomed thereunto is mā'd for ever. But reason, the beauty of action, the desire of honesty and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerfulness and comfort of heart, and the detestation of their contraries, as brutishness, baseness, dishonour, reproach, and the improbation of all men, these are the arms, the spurs, and the bridles of Children well-born, and such as a man would make honest men. This is that which a man should alwayes sound in their ears; and if these means cannot prevail, all other rigour and roughnesse shall never do good. That which cannot be done with reason, wisdome, endeavour, shall never be done by force; and if haply it be done, yet it is to small purpose. But these other means cannot be unprofitable, if they be employed in time, before the goodness of nature be spent and spilt. But yet for all this, let no man think that I approve that loose and flattering indulgence, and softish fear to give children cause of discontent and sorrow, which is another extremity as bad as the former. This were like the Ivie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth; or the Ape, that killeth her young with culling them; or like those that fear to hold him up by the hair of the head that is in danger of drowning, for fear of hurting him, and so suffer him to perish. Against this vice the wise Hebrew spake much. Youth must be held in obedience and discipline, not bodily like beasts and madmen, but spiritual, humane, liberal, according to reason.

Ecclius. 30.

We come now to the particular and more expresse advisements of this instruction. The first head of them is, as we have said, so-

exercise, sharpen and form the mind. Whereupon there are divers precepts, but the first principal and fundamental of all others, which respecteth the end of instruction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is least embraced and followed, and every man runneth after the contrary, which is a common and ordinary errore, is, to have much more, and the chief and principal care to exercise, to husband and manure, to use the proper good, and much lese to get and endeavour the attainment of that which is strange; to strive and studie more for Wisdom, then for Science and art; rather well to form the judgement, and by consequence the will, and the conscience, then to fill the memory, and to enflame the imagination. These are the three misstris parts of a reasonable soul: But the first is the judgement, as before hath been discoursed, to which place I referre the Reader. Now the custome of the world is quite contrary, Lib. I. cap. 7. which runneth wholly after Art, Science; and what is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their Children wile, are at great charge, and their children take great pains. *Ut omnium rerum sic literarum imtemperantia laboramus: We are troubled with an immoderate desire of learning, as of all things else.* And many times all is lost. But to make them wile, honest, apt and dexterous, which is a matter of small charge or labour, they take no care at all. What greater folly can there be in the world, more to admire science, that which is acquired, then memory, then wisdom, then nature? Now all commit not this fault with one and the same minde; some simp'ly carried by custome, think that wisdom and science are not things different, or at lefwise, that they match alwaies together, and that it is necessary a man have the one to attain the other: these kinde of men deserve to be taught: others go out of malice: and think they know well enough what they do, and at what price soever it be they will have Art and Science: For this is a mean in these daies in the occidental parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches, These kinde of people make of Science, an Art and merchandise, science mercenary, pedantical, base and mechanical. They buy Science to sell it again. Let us leave these merchants as uncurable. Contrariwise, I cannot here but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our Gentlemen of France, (for in other Nations this faule is not so apparent) who have knowledg or Art in such disdain and contempt, that they do less esteem of an honest man only for this, because he hath studie: they dischard it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their Nobilitie. Wherein they shew themselves

Tacit.

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selves what they are, ill-born, worse advised, and truly ignorant of virtue and honour, which they likewise bewray in their carriage, their idleness, their impertinencies, their insufficiencies, in their infinite evies, vanities, and barbarities.

14.
*A comparison
of science and
wisdom.*

To teach others, and to discover the fault of all this, we must make good two things; The one that Science and Wisdom are things very different; and that Wisdom is more worth then all the Science or Art of the world; as Heaven exceeds the price of the Earth, gold of iron: The other, that they are not onely different, but that they seldom or never go together, that they commonly hinder one another; he that hath much knowldg or Art is seldom wise, and he that is wise hath not much knowldg. Some exceptions there are herein, but they are very rare, and of great, rich, and happy spirits. Some there have been in times past, but in these dayes there are no more to be found.

15.
*The definition
of science and
wisdom.*

The better to perform this, we must first know what science and wisdom is. Science is a great heap, or accumulation, and provision of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath seen heard & read in books; that is to say, of the excellent sayings and doings of great personages that have been of all nations; now the garner or storenouse where this great provision remaineth and is kept, the treasury of science and all acquired good, is the Memory. He that hath a good memory, the fault is his own if he want knowldg, because he hath the mean. Wisdom is a sweet and regular managing of the soul. He is wise that governeth himself in his desires, thoughts, opinions, speeches, actions, with measure and proportion. To be brief, and in a word, wisdom is the rule of the soul: and that which manageth this rule is the judgement, which seeth, judgeth, esteemeth all things, rangeth them as they ought, giving to every thing that which belongs unto it. Let us now see their differences, and how much wisdom excels the other.

16.

Science is a small and barren good in respect of wisdom, for it is not onely not necessary (for of three parts of the world, two and more have made little use thereof) but it brings with it small profit, and serveth to little purpose. 1. It is no way serviceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poor, great and small, live pleasantly and happily, that have never heard any speech of science? There are many other things more commodious and serviceable to the life of man, as i the maintenance of humane society, as honour, glory, nobility, dignitie, which nevertheless are not necessary;

2. Neither

2. Neither is it serviceable to things natural, which an ignorant son may as well perform, as he that hath best knowldg: Nature is a sufficient misbris for that. 3. Nor to honesty, and to make us better: *pauca est opus literis ad bonam mentem.* Little learning is requisite for a good minde: nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will mark it well, shall find not only more honest people, but also more excellent in all kind of virtue among them that know little, than those that know most; witness *Rome*, which was more honest being young and ignorant, than when it was old, crafty and cunning. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solerrem sci-entiam versa est:* That simple and open virtue is turned into obscure and crafty knowldg. Science serveth not for any thing, but to invent crafts and subtleties, artificial cunning devices, and whatsoever is an enemy to innocencie, which willingly lodgeth with simplicity and ignorance. Atheisme, errours, fects, and all the troubles of the world have risen from the order of these men of Art and knowldg. The first temptation of the devil, saith the Scripture, and the beginning of all evil, and the ruine of mankinde, was the opinion and the desire of knowldg: *Eritis sicut di scientes bonum & malum: Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.* The Sirenes to deceive and intrap *Ulysses* within their inates, offered to him the gift of Science; and *S. Paul* adviseth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam: let no man seduce you through their Philosophy.* One of the sufficientest men of knowldg that ever was, spake of science, as of a thing not onely vain, but hurtful, painful, and tedious. To be brief, Science may make us more humane and courteous, but not more honest. 4. Again, it serveth nothing to the sweetning of our life, or the quittung us of those evils that oppress us in the world: but contrarily it increaseth and sharpeneth them, witness Children and fools, simple and ignorant persons, who measuring every thing by the present taste, run thorow them with the less grief, bear them with better content, than men of greatest learning and knowldg. Science anticipateth those evils that come upon us, in such sort that they are sooner in the soul of man by knowldg, than in nature: The wise man said, That he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow: Ignorance is a more fit remedie against all evils, *Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est: Ignorance is the idle remedy of evils.* From whence proceed thole counsels of our friends; Think not of it, put it out of your head and memory. Is not this to cast us into the arms of ignorance, as into the best and

Solomon in
his Ecclesiast

Eccles. 1. 18.

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and safest Sanquary that may be ? But this is but a mockery, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would do as Chirurgions use to do, who not knowing how to heal a wound, yet set a good shew upon it by allaying the pain and bringing it asleep. They that counsel men to kill themselves in their extreme and remediless evils, do they not send a man to ignorance, stupiditie, insensibility ? Wisdom is a necessary good, and universally commodious for all things : it governeth and ruleth all : there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it self of the jurisdiction or knowledge thereof : It beareth sway every where, in peace, in war, in publick, in private ; it ruleth and moderateth even the insolent behaviours of men, their sports, their dances, their banquets, and is as a bridle unto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discreetly and wisely ; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

17 Secondly, Science is servile, base and mechanical, in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with pain. A learned man is like a Crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stoln from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another ; and he had need to veil his bonnet often, as a testimony of that honour he gives to those from whom he hath borrowed his Art. A wise man is like him that lives upon his own reuenewes ; for wisdom is properly a man own's; it is a natural good well tilled and laboured.

18 Thirdly, the conditions are divers, the one more beautifull and more noble then the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opinative, indiscreet, querulous, *Scientia inflat: Knowledge puffeth up.* 2. Science is talkative, delirous to shew it self, which nevertheless knows not how to do any thing, is not active, but onely fit to speake and to discourse : wisdom acteth and governeth all.

Learning, then and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent, more to be esteemed then science. For it is necessary, profitable to all, universal, active, noble, honest, gracious, cheerful. Science is particular, unnecessary, seldom profitable, not active, servile, mechanical, melancholick, opinative, presumptuous.

19 We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwaies together, but contrarily almost alwaies separated. The natural reason (as hath been said) is, that their temperatures are contrary.

tray. For that of science and memory is moist; and that of wisdom and judgement, dry. This also is signified unto us, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soon as they cast their eyes upon knowledg, they presently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdom, wherewithal they were indued from the beginning; whereof we every day see the like in common experience. The most beautifull and flourishing States, Common-weals, Empires, antient and modern, have been, and are governed very wise-wisdom without Science. *Rome* the first five *out* *Science*. hundred years, wherein it flourished in virtue and valour, was without knowledg; and so soone as it began to be learned, it began to corrupt, trouble, and ruinate it self by civil wars. The most beautifull Politie that ever was, the Lacedemonian, built by *Lycurgus*, from whence have sprung the greatest personages of the world, made no profession of learning, and yet it was the school of virtue and wisdom, and was ever victorius over *Athens*, the most learned Cittie of the world, the shool of all science, the habitation of the Muses, the Hore-houle of Philosophers. All those great and flourishing Realms of the east and west Indies, have stood for many ages together without learning, without the knowledge of books or writings. In these dayes they learn many things, by the good leave and assistance of their new masters, at the expence of their own liberty, yea their vices and their subtleties too, whereof in former times they never heard speech. That great, and it may be the greatest and most flourishing State and Empire which is at this day in the world; is that of that great Lord, who like the Lyon of the whole earth, makes himself to be feared of all the Princes and Monarchs of the world; and even in this State, there is not any profession of Science, nor School, nor permission or allowance to read, or teach publickly, no not in matters of religion. What guideth and governeth and maketh the State to prosper thus? It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come we to those States wherein Learning and Sciences are in credit. Who do govern them? Doubtlesse, not the learned. Let us take for example this our Realm, wherein learning and knowledg have greater honour then in all the world besides, and which seemeth to have succeeded Greece it self: The principal officers of this Crown, the Countable, Marshal, Admiral, the Secretaries of the State who dispatch all affaires, are commonly men altogether illiterate. And doubtlesse many great Lawgivers, Founders, and Princes have banished Science: as the poyson and pestilence of a Common-

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*Science with-
out wisdom.*

Act. 26.

Common-wealth, *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lycurgus.* And this we see what wisdom is without science. Let us now see what science is without wisdom, which is not heard to do. Let us look a little into those that make profession of learning, that come from Schools and Universities, and have their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Bartolus.* Are there any people in the world more untoward, more sottish, more unfit for all things? From hence cometh that Proverb, that when a man would describe a fool, or an untowardly person, he calleth him Clerk, Pedant: And to expresse a thing ill done, it is the manner to say, It is Clerkely done. It should seem that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans brains, and makes him to turn tot and fool, as King *Agrippa* said to S. *Paul;* *Multa te litera ad insaniam adiungit: much learning maketh thee mad.* There are divers men, that had they been never trained up in schools and colleges, they had been far more wile: and their brethren that have never applied themselves to learning, have proved the wiser men; *Ut melius fuisset non didicisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt: So that it had been better they had never been learned: for after they became learned, they left off from being good.* Come to the practise: chuse me one of these learned scholers, bring him to the common council of a citie, or any publick assembly, wherein the affairs of State are consulted of, or matter of policy, or houſhold husbandry, you never saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at laſt knows not what to ſay. And if he chance to ſpeak, he entreth into a long diſcource of definitions, and diſti-
ons of *Aristotle: ergo pot-lead.* Mark in the ſelfeame counſel, a Merchant, a Burgeſſe, that never heard ſpeak of *Aristotle*, he will yield a better reaſon, give a ſounder judgement, and more to purpose then these ſcholaſtical Doctors.

20.

*The reaſon of
this ſeparation.*

Now it is not enough to have ſaid, that wisdom and learning ſeldom concur and meet together, unleſſe we ſeek the reaſon and cauſe thereſe; not doubting thereby but ſufficiently to content and to ſatisfie thoſe, that miſlike what I have ſaid, or think me perhaps an enemy to erudition and learning. The queſtion therefore is, From whence it cometh that learning and wisdom do ſeldom encounter and meet together in one and the ſame man: And there is great reaſon, why we ſhould move this queſtion: for it is a ſtrange thing, and againſt reaſon, that a man, the more learned he is, ſhould not be the more wile; learning and knowledg being a proper means, and

and instrument unto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none; he that hath studied, is, in some sort, bound to be far the wiser of the two, because he hath all that the other hath, that is, nature, reason, judgement, spirit; and besides these the counsels, discourses, judgements of all the greatest men of the world, by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterous, more honest than the other, since that with these proper and natural means, he attaineth so many extraordinary on every side? For as one saith well, the natural good cohering and concurring with the accidental, frameth an excellent composition: and yet nevertheless, we see the contrary, as hath been said.

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the evil and sinister manner of study and ill instruction. They learn out of books and schools excellent knowledge, but with ill means, and as bad successe. Whereby it comes to passe, that all their study profiteth them nothing at all, but they remain indigent and poor, in the midst of their plenty and riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their dainties: the reason is, because whilst they pore upon their books, they respect nothing so much as to stuffe and furnish their memories with that which they read and understand, and presently they think themselves wise: like him that put his bread in his pocket, and not into his belly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with a memory fully stuffed, they continue fools; *Student non sibi & vita, sed alius & schola: They study not for themselves, and for the benefit of their life, but for others, and for the schoolers.* They prepare themselves to be reporters; *Cicero* hath said it, *Aristotle, Plato* hath left in writing, &c. but they for their parts know nothing. These men commit a double fault; the one is that they apply not that which they learn, to themselves, that so they may form themselves unto virtue, wisdom, resolution, by which means their knowledge is unprofitable unto them; the other is, that during all that time, which with great pains and charge they employ, to the heaping together and pocketing up for another without any profit to themselves, whatsoever they can rob from other men, they suffer their own proper good to fill to the ground, and never put in practice. They on the other side that studie not, having no recourse unto another, take a care to husband their natural gifts, and so prove many times

21.

An answer to
ill discipline.

the

the better, the more wise, and resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious. One there is that hath said as much, though otherwile and more briefly; That learning marreth weak wits and Good discipline. perfitteth the strong and natural.

Now hearken to that counsel that I give hereupon; A man must not give himself to the gathering and keeping the opinions & knowledges of another, to the end he may afterwards make report of them, or use them for shew or ostentation, or some base and mercenary profit; but he must use them so, as that he may make them his own. He must not onely lodg them in his minde, but incorporate and transubstantiate them into himself. He must not onely water his minde with the dew of knowledg, but he must make it essentialy better, wise, strong, good, courageous; otherwile to what end serveth study? *Non paranda nobis solum, sed fruenda sapientia est: wisdom is not onely to be gotten by us, but to be enjoyed.* He must not do as it is the manner of those that make garlands, who pick here and there whole flowers, and to carry them away to make nose-gayes, and afterwards presents; heap together out of that book, and out of this book, many good things, to make a fair and a goodly shew to others; but he must do as Bees use to do, who carry not away the flowers, but settle them selves upon them (like a hen that covereth her chickens) and draweth from them their spirit, force, virtue, quintessence, and nourishing themselves, turn them into their own substance, and afterwards make good and sweet honey, which is all their own; and it is no more either Thyme or sweet Marjoram. So must a man gather from books the marrow and spirit (never enthralling himself so much as to retain the words by heart, as many use to do, much lesse the place, the book, the chapter; that is a sottish and vain superstition and vanity, and makes him lose the principal) and having sucked and drawn the good, feed his minde therewith, inform his judgment, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinion, rectifie his will; and in a word, frame unto himself a work wholly his own, that is to say, an honest man, wise, advised, resolute; *Non ad pompam, nec ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi oculum velis, sed quo firmior adversus fortuita rem publicam capessas.* Not for pomp or ostentation, nor to the end thou wouldest follow ease with a glorious name, but that thereby thou mayest more firmly take upon thee the government of the Common-wealth against all accidents.

Tacit.

23.

And hereunto the choice of sciences is necessary, Those that I commend

comend above all others, and that best serve to that end, which I purpose, and whereof I am to speak, are natural and moral, which reach us to live, and to live well, nature and virtue; that which we are and that which we should be: under the moral are comprehended, the Politicks, Oeconomicks, Histories. All the rest are vain and frothy, and we are not to dwell upon them, but to take them as passing by.

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and Wisedome, hath held me too long, by reason of the contestation. Let us now proceed to the other parts and advisements of this instruction. The means of instructions are divers, especially of two sorts: the one by word, that is to say, by precepts, instructions and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filling and refining our wits against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file; This meane and manner is very pleasing and agreeable to Nature.

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten, not onely from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also wicked, by disagreement in opinions; for some there are that learn better by the opposition and horrour of all evil they see in another. It is a speciall use of Justice, to condemn one that he may serve for an example unto others. And old Cato was wont to say, That wife then may learn more of fools, than fools of wise men. The Latedemonians made their servants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

Now this second means or manner by example, teacheth us with more ease and more delight. To learn by precepts is a long way, because it is a painfull thing to understand well, and understanding to retain well, and retaining to use and practise well. And hardly can we promise our selves to reap that fruit which they promise unto us. But example and imitation teacheth us above the work or action it self, invite us with much more ardour, and promise unto us that glory which we learn to imitate.

The seed that is cast into the earth, draweth unto it self in the end, the quality of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like unto that which doth there naturally grow: So the spirits and manners of men conform themselves to those with whom they commonly converse.

2. The second advice touching the choice of science.

24.
3. The means to learn.
By word of mouth.

25.
By example.

A comparison
of these two.

26.

From the living.

Now these two manners of profiting by Speech and by Example are like-wise twofold: for they are drawn from excellent Personages, either living by their sensible and our w^r frequentation and conference; or dead, by the reading of their books.

The first, that is the commerce with the living, is more lively and more naturall, it is a fruitlex exercise of life, which was much in use amongst the ancients, yea the Gre.ks them selves; but it is casual depending on another, and rare: It is a difficult matter to meet with such people, and more difficult to make use of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by travelling and visiting strange countries, nor to be fed with vanities, as the most do, but to carry with them the knowledge and consideration especially of the humors and customs of those nations.

This is a profitable exercise, the body is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keeps a man in breath, the minde is in continuall exercise, by marking things known and new.

There is not a better school to form the life of man, then to see the diversity of so many others lives, and to taste a perpetuall variety of the forms of our nature.

27.

From the dead, by books.

The other commerce with the dead by the benefit of their books, is more sure, and more near unto us, more constant, and lesse chargeable. He that knows how to make use of them, receiveth thereby great pleasure, great comfort. It dischargeth us of the burthen of a tedious idlenesse, it withdraweth us from fond imaginations, and other outward things, that vex and trouble us: It councelleth us, and comforteth us in our griefs and afflictions: but yet it is onely good for the minde, whereby the body remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

28.

a. To make the scholar to speak and to reason.

We must now speak of that order of proceeding and formality which a teacher of youth must keep, that he may happily arrive to his proposed end. It hath many parts; we will touch some of them. First he must often examine his scholar, aske his judgement and opinion of whatsoever shall present it self unto him. This is quite contrary to the ordinary stile, which is, that the master do alwaies speake and teach his child with authority, and work into his head as into a vessel, whatsoever he will, insomuch that child en are only Auditors and Receivers, which manner of teaching I cannot commend; *Ohest plerumq*z* iis qui discere volunt, autoritas eorum qui docent: The authority of them which teach, burieh for the most part*

part those which would learn. Their spirits must be awakened and inflamed by demands, make them first to ask others, to enquire, and to open the way at their own will. If without questioning with them a man speak wholly unto them, it is a labour in a manner lost, the childe is not profited thereby, because he thinks it belongs not unto him, so long as he yeilds not an account thereof; he lends onely his ears and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pase, as when he is a party in the businesse. Neither is it enough to make them give their judgment, but that they maintain it, and to be able to give a reason of their saying, to the end that they speak not by roat; but that they be attentive, and careful of that they speak: And to give them the better encouragement thereto, a man must not seem to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and endeavour. This form of teaching by questions and demands, is excellently observed both by *Socrates* (the principall in this businesse) as we see every where in *Plato*, where by a long annexion and enfolding of demands Wittily and dexterously made, he sweetly leadeth a man to the closer of verity; and also by the Doctor of verity, in his *Gospel*. Now *Math. 16. 12.*
Luk. 10. & 24.

these questions must not be onely of things touching science and memory, as hath been laid, but matter of judgement. For to this exercise all things may serve, even the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at Table: for the work of judgment is not to handle and to understand great and high matters, but justly to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoever they be.

Questions therefore must be moved touching the judgment of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their judgment and their conscience. The tutor or instructor of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this Question; A great youth having a little coat or cassock, gave it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and took from him his cassock, which was the greater: upon which fact he demanded his judgment. *Cyrus* answered, that it was well, because both of them were thereby the better fited. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because he considered onely the fitnessse and convenience thereof, and not the justice, which shoulde first and especially have been thought of, which was that no man may be enforced in that which was his own. And this no doubt is an excellent manner of instruction, And though a man may recite authorities out of

books, the saying of *Ciceron*, or *Aristotle*, yet it is not only to recise them, but to judge of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all uses, and to apply them to divers subjects. It is not enough to report as a history, that *Caesar* killed himself at *Uxbridge*, that he might not fall into the hands of *Ceser*; and that *Bruno* and *Cassius* were the authors of the death of *Ceser*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and judge, whether they did well herein, or no; whether they deserve well of the common-weal, whether they carried themselves therein according to wisdom, justice, valour; and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally and generally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the conveniency, order, verity, must be inquired into; a work of judgement and conscience. These things a man by any means must not dissemble, but ever preesse them, and hold him subject unto them.

29.

3. An advise- fity to know all things, whereby he must first have his eyes upon every thing, the better to consider all that may be said, done or attempted concerning himself, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his judgement; and then he must make an enquiry into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing, knows nothing, saith one: He that busieth not his minde, and sufferereth it to rust, becomes a fool; and therefore he must make profit of all, apply every thing to himself, take advice and counsel as well of what is past, the better to see the error he hath committed; as of that which is to come, the better to rule and direct himself. Children must not be suffered to be idle, to bring themselves asleep, to entertain themselves with their own prattle: for wanting sufficiency to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed upon vanities; they must therefore be alwayes busied in some employment, and kept in breath: and this curiositie must be engendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spur them toward, which being such as is said, shall be neither vain in it self, nor tedious to another.

30.

4. Advice.

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the general pattern and model of the world and of nature, make it universal; that is to say, represent unto him in all things, the universal sage of nature: that the whole world may be his book: that of what subject soever a man talk, he cast his eye and his thought upon the large summetry of the world; upon so many different fabri-

ons,

ons and opinions, which have been, and are in the world touching that subje^t. The most excellent and noble mindes, are the more univerſall and more free; and by this means the mind is contented, learned not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resolution and ſtedfaſt conſtanty. To be brief, ſuch a man doth no more admire any thing, which is the highest and laſt point of wiſdom. For whatſoever doth happen, or a man may report unto him, he eaſily finds that there is nothing in the world either new or ſtrange; that the condition of man is capable of all things; that they have come to others, and that elſewhere divers things paſſe more ſtrange, more great. And in this ſenſe it was that wile *Socrates* called himſelf, A ciſten of the world. And contrariy, therē is not any thing that doth more deprave and enthrall the minde of man, then to make him taſte and understand but one certain opinion, belief, and manner of life. What greater folly or weaſeſſe can there be, then to think that all the world walketh, believeth, ſpeaketh, doth, liveth, and dieth, according to the manner of his country? like thofe bard block-heads, who when they hear one recite the manners and opinions of forrein countries very diſſerent and contrary to theirs, they tremble for fear, and believe them not, or elſe do abſurdly condemn them as barbarous; ſo much are they enthralled and tyed to their cradle, a kinde of people brought up (as they ſay) in a botle, that never ſaw any thing but thorow a hole. Now thiſ universal ſpirit muſt be attained by the diligēce of the master or teacher, afterwards by travel, and communication with ſtrangers, and the reading of books and the hiſtories of all Nations.

Finally he muſt teach him to take nothing upon credit and by authority; thiſ is to make himſelf a beast, and to ſuffer himſelf to be led by the noſe like an oxe: but to examine all things with reaſon, to propoſe all things, and then to give him leave to chufe. And if he know not how to chufe, but doubt which perhaps is the better, ſounder, and ſurer course; to teach him likewiſe to reſolve of nothing of himſelf, but rather to diſtruit his own judge-
ment.

Aſter the minde comes the body, whereof there muſt likewiſe be a care taken, at one and the ſame iſtant with the ſpirit, not ma-
king two workeſ thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master muſt endeavour to keep his childe free from delicacy
and pride in apparell, in ſleeping, eating, drinking; he muſt bring
him up hardly to labour and pains, accuſtom him to heat and cold,

31.

An adverſe-
ment touching
the body.

The duty of parents and children.

wind and weather; yea and unto hazards too; harden his muscle, and his sinews, as well as his minde, to labour and then to pain and grief too; For the first disposeth to the second: *Labor callum obducit dolori: Labour hardnesh a man against grief.* To be brief, he must endeavour to make him lusty and vigorous, indifferent to all kinde of viands. All this serveth not only for his health, but for publick affaires and services.

We come now to the third head, which concerneth manners: wherein both body and soul have a part, This is two-fold; To hinder the evil, to ingraft and nourish the good. The first is the more necessary, and therefore the greater care and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedy, to hinder the birth and growth of all ill manners and conditions; especially these following, which are to be feared in youth.

1. *Evil manners.* To lie, a base vice of servants and slaves, of a licentious and fearful minde, the cause whereof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

2. A lothly shame and weaknesse, whereby they seek to hide themselves, hold down their heads, blush at every question that is proposed, cannot endure a correction, or a sharp word without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times bear a great sway herein, but it must be corrected by study.

3. All affection and singularity in habit, carriage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimony of vanity and vain-glory, and marreth all the rest, even that which is good; *Litter sapere sine pompa, sine inuidia: A man may be wise without pomp, without envy.*

4. But above all, choler, fullenesse, obstinacy; and therefore it is very necessary that a childe never have his will by such froward means, and that he learn and find that these qualities are altogether unprofitable and boodesse, yea base and villainous; and for this cause he must never be flattered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be fullen and froward, if he have not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent, that a man shall never work any good upon him; *Nihil magis reddit iracundos, quam educatione mollescere. nra: Nothing more maketh one prone to anger than soft and cowering education.*

34. *Good manners.* By the self-same means a man must ingraft into him good and honest manners: And first to instruct him to fear and reverence God,

God, to tremble under that infinite and invisible majesty, to speak seldom and soberly of God, of his power, eternity, wisdom, will, and of his works; not indifferently and upon all occasions, but fearfully, with shame and reverence. Not to be over scrupulous in the mysteries and points of Religion, but to conform himself to Government and Discipline of the Church.

Secondly, to replenish and cherish his heart with ingenuity, freedom, candor, integrity, and to teach him to be an honest man, out of an honourable and honest minde, not servilely and mechanically, for fear, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, then virtue it self. These two are especially for himself.

For another and the company with whom he converseth, he must work in him a sweet kinde of affability to accommmodate himself to all kinde of people, to all fashions; *Omnis Aristippum decuit color, & form, & res: Every countenance, condition and gesture became Aristippus.* Herein Alcibiades was excellent. That he learn how to be able, and to know how to do all things, yea excesse and licentious behaviours, if need be; but that he love to do only that which is good. That he refrain to do evil, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledg, but will. *Multum interest utrum peccare quis nolit, aut nescit: There is great difference, in not being willing to sin, and not being able.*

Modesty, whereby he contenteth not, nor tieth himself, either to all, as to the greatest and most reſpective persons, or such as are his See lib. 2. capi inferiors, either in condicōn or sufficiency; nor defendeth any thing ^{35.} obstinately, with affirmative, resolute, commanding words, but sweet, ſubmiff and moderate ſpeeches. Hereof hath been ſpoken elsewhere. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents are diſpatched.

The fourth, concerneth their affection and communication with them, when they are great and capable of that whereunto they were inſtructed. We know that affection is reciprocall and naturall betwixt parents and their children, but that of parents towards their children is far more strong and more naturall; because it is given by nature to love thole things that are coming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world; especially thole in whom a man doth live when he is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not ſo ſtrongly, not ſo naturally; and it ſeemeth rather to be the payment of a debt, and a

^{36.}
The fourth
part touching
the duty of pa-
rents.

The love of
parents greater
than the love
of children.

acknowledgment of a benefit received, then a pure, fee, simple, and naturall love. Moreover, he that giveth and doth good, loveth more then he that receiveth and is indebted: And therefore a father and every agent that doth good to another, loveth more then he is beloved. The reasons of this proposition are many. All love to Be (which Being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action). Now he that giveth and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiveth. He that giveth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honourable; he that receiveth doth none of this: honestie is for the first, profit for the second. Now honestie is far more worthy, firm, stable, amiable then profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Again, those things are most beloved that cost us most; that is dearest unto us, which we come more dearly by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring up is a matter of greater charge, then to receive all these.

37.
The love of parents, two-fold.

This love of Parents is two-fold, though always naturall, yet after a divers manners: the one is simply and universally naturall, and is a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which Parents love and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milk-sops, and use them like moppets, or little apes. This love is not truly humane. Man inued with reason, must not servilely subject himself unto nature as beasts do, but follow it more nobly with discourse of reason. The other, then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loveth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the seeds and sparks of virtue, goodnessse, and towardlinesse to arise and spring up in them. Some there are who being beftotted and carried with the former kind of affections, have but little of this, and never complaining of the charge so long as their children are but small, complain thereof when they come to their growth, and begin to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses, that they may become honest men: these parents are brutish and inhumane.

38.
*Of the true
fatherly love
in commun-
icating with his
children being
come to years
of discretion.*

Now according to this second, true, and fatherly love, in the well governing thereof, parents should receive their children, if they be capable, into their society and partnership to their goods, admit them to their counsell, intelligence, the knowleage and course of their domesticall affairs, as also to the communication of their designments, opinions, and thoughts, yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require, always

always reserved their rank and authority. For we condemn the austere, lord-like, and imperious countenance and carriage of those that never look upon their children, nor speak unto them but with authority, will not be called fathers but lords; though God himself refuse not this name of Father, never caring for the hearty love of their children, so they may be feared, reverenced, and adored. And for this cause, they give unto them sparingly, keep them in want that they may the better keep them in awe, and obedience, ever threatening them some small pittance by their last Will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a foppish, vain, and ridiculous folly; It is to distrust their own proper, true, and natural authority, to get an artificial; and it is the way to deceive themselves, and to grow in contempt, which is clean contrary to that they pretend. It causeth their children to carry themselves cunningly with them, and to conspire and find means how to deceive them. For parents should in good time frame their minds to duty, by reason, and not have recourse to these means more tyrannous than fatherly.

*Errat longè meā quidem sententiā,
Qui imperium credit esse gravissim aut stabilissim
Vi quod sit quād illud quod amicitiā adjungitur.*

*In my opinion he is much amiss,
Who thinks more firm or grave that rule of his,
That's wrought by force than what of friendship is.*

In the last disposition of our goods, the best and surest way is to follow the laws and customs of the Country. The laws have better provided for it than we, and it is a safer course to suffer them to fail in something, than to adventure upon our own defects, in our own proper choice. It is to abuse that liberty we have therein, to serve our foolish phantasies and private passions, like those that suffer themselves to be carried by the unwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make use of their last Wills and Testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conform himself to reason and common custom herein, which is wiser than we are, an the surer way.

We come now to the duty of children towards their Parents, so natural and so religious, and which ought to be done unto them, not as unto pure and simple men, but demi-gods, earthly, mortall, visible gods. And this is the reason why *Philo the Jew* said, 40.
Of the duty of
children to-
wards their
parents.
that

39.
*The usage of
them in their
last wills ac-
cording to the
laws.*

that the Commandment touching the duty of children was written the one half in the first Table, which contained the Commandments that concern our duty towards God; and the other half in the second Table, wherein are the Commandments that concern our neighbour, as being half divine, and half humane. This duty likewise is so certain, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other duty or love whatsoever, be it never so great.

For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, he must forsake his sonne, and go to his father though his love towards his sonne be greater, as before hath been said. And the reason is, because the duty of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priviledge, and cannot be abrogated by any later duty.

41.
This duty consisteth in five points.

Now this duty consisteth in five points, comprehended in this word; *Honour thy father and thy mother.* The first is reverence, not only in outward gesture and countenance, but also inward; which is that high and holy opinion and esteem, that a child ought to have of his parents, as the anchors and originall causes of his being, and of his good: a quality that makes them resemble God himself.

2.
Jer. 35.

The second is obedience, even to the roughest and hardest commands of a father, according to the example of the *Rehabites*, who to obey the command of their father, never drank wine in all their lives.

Nay more then that, *Isaac* refused not, to yeild his neck to the sword of his father.

3.

The third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotency, and wants; to give them their assistance in all their affairs.

In Example.

We have an example and pattern hereof even in beasts.

In th: Stork, whose little ones (as Saint Basil affirmeth) feed and nourish their oddamms, cover them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themselves together to carry them upon their backs. Love furnisheth them with this art.

This

This example is so lively and so significant, that the duty of children towards their parents hath been signified by the quality of this creature, *অস্ত্ৰাশয়ীর, recicomate.* And the Hebrews call this bird, for this cause, *chafida*, that is to say, the debonair, the charitable bird. Levit.

We have likewise notable examples hereof amongst men.

Cymon the sonne of the great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in prison, as some say for debt, and not having where-withall to bury his body, much lesse to redeem it being arrested for the debt whilst it was carried to the buriall, according to the lawes of the Country; *Cymon* sold himself and his libertie for money to provide for his funerall. He with his plentie and goods relieved not his father, but with his libertie; which is dearer then all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father living and in necessary, but dead, and being no more a father, nor a man. What had he done to succour his father living, wanting and requiring his help? This is an excellent precedent.

We have two the like examples, even in the weak and feeble sex of women, of two daughters which have nourished and given suck the one to the father, the other to her mother, being prisoners and condemned to die by famine, the ordinary punishment of the Ancients. It seemeth in some sort a thing against nature, that the mother should be nourished with the daughters milk, but this is truly according to nature, yea, those first lawes, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

The fourth is, not to do, to attempt, or enterprise any thing of weight or impertance, without the advice, consent, and approbation of Parents, and especially in marriage.

The fifth is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testie and impatient humors of Parents, their levity and rigour. *Mantius* had made good proof hereof: for the Tribune *Pomponius* having accused the father of this *Mantius* in the presence of the people of many crimes; and amongst others, that he over-cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bed, putting the point of his dagger to his throat, enforced him to swear, that he should desist from his pursuit he made against his father, de-

4.

4.

siring

bring rather to endure his fathers rigour, then to see him troubled for it.

A childe shall finde no difficulty in these five duties, if he consider how chargeable he hath been to his parents, and with what care and affection he hath been brought up. But he shall never know it well, untill he have children of his own, as he that was found to ride upon a hobby-horse playing with his children, entreated him that so took him to hold his peace untill he were himself a father, reputing him till then no indifferent Judge in this action.

CHAP. XV.

The duty of Masters and Servants.

Here cometh the third and last part of private and domesticall justice, which is the duties of Masters and Servants. Touching which, it is necessary to know the distinction of servants: for they principally are of three sorts: That is to say, of slaves, whereof all the world hath been full in former time, and is at present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free then here about France; they have no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are wholly their masters, who may give, lend, sell, resel, exchange, and use them as beasts of service. Of these hath been spoken of at large. There are inferiour servants, and servants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargain, or otherwise do any thing to the prejudice of their own liberty; but they owe honour, obedience, and service until such times, and upon such conditions, as they have promised, and their masters have power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subject, they owe no service nor obedience, but onely work and labour for money; and they have no authority in commanding or correcting them.

3. The duties of masters towards their servants, as well of slaves as inferiour servants, are, not to handle them cruelly, remembraing they are men, and of the same nature with us, but onely fortune hath put a difference, which is very variable and sporteth it self in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemn them. *Sunt homines, contuberniales, humiles amici, conservi, a quo fortuna subjici: They are*

are men, dwellers with thee, bumble friends, fellow servants; equally the subjects of favours. To handle servants gently, seeking rather to be beloved than feared, is the testimony of a good nature: to use them roughly and too severely, proceedeth from a crabbed and cruel mind, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsel, and those things that are requisite for their health and safety.

The duties of servants are, to honour, and fear their masters whatsoever they be, and to yield them obedience and fidelity, serving them not for gain, or openly outwardly and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without disimulation. We read of most worthy, noble, and generous services performed in former times by some towards their masters, even to engaging and hazard of their lives, for their masters safeguard and honour.

C H A P. XVI.

The duty of Sovereigns, and Subjects.

OF Princes and Sovereigns, their descriptions, notes, humours, marks, and discommodities hath been discoursed in the first book, chapter 49. Their duty to govern the Common-wealth hath been spoken of at large in this present book, chapter 2. and 3. which is of politick prudence: yet we will touch a little here the heads and generall points of their duty.

The Sovereign as the mean betwixt God and the people, and debtor to these two, ought alwayes to remember that he is the lively image, the Officer and Lieutenant generall of the great God his Sovereign, and to the people a perfect mirror, a bright beam, a cleat looking glasse, and elevated theater for every one to behold, a fountain where all refresh them selves, a spurre to virtue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the Register of perpetnall memory. He ought then first of all to fear and honour God, to be devout, religious, to observe piety not only for himself ^{I.} *The duty of Sovereigns.* and for conscience sake, as every other man, but for his State, and as he is a Sovereign. The piety which we here require in a Prince, is the care he ought to have, and to shew for the conservation of Religion and the ancient laws and ceremonies of the Country, providing by laws, penalties, and punishments that the Religion be neither

To be religious.

Mercur.
Trism.

neither changed, troubled, nor innovated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and security (for all do reverence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprise any thing against him whom they see fear God, and believe to be in his protection and safeguard: *Una custodia pietas: pius virum nec malus genius nec fatum devincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo.* The onely safeguard is piety: neither the evil genius nor fate can overcome a godly man: for God delivereth him out of all evil.) And also to the good of the State, for as all the wisest have said, Religion is the band and cement of humane society.

2.
To observe the
laws of super-
iors.

3.
To keep his
promise.

4.
To observe the
laws.

The Prince ought also to be subject, and inviolably to observe and cause to be observed the laws of God, and Nature, which are not to be dispensed with: and he that infringeth them, is not only counted a tyrant, but a monster.

Concerning the people, he ought first to keep his covenants and promises, be it with subjects or others with whom he is interessed or hath to do. This equity is both naturall and universall. God himself keepeth his promise. Moreover, the Prince is the pledge and form or warrant of the law, and those naturall bargains of his subjects. He ought then above all to keep his faith, there being nothing more odious in a Prince then breach of promise and perjury; and therefore it was well said, that a man ought to put it among those casuall cases, if the Prince do abjure or revoke his promise, and that the contrary is not to be presumed. Yes, he ought to observe those promises and bargains of his predecessors, especially, if he be their heir, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the Commonwealth. Also he may relieve himself of his unreasonable contracts and promises unadvisedly made, even as for the self same causes private men are relieved by the benefit of the Prince.

He ought also to remember, that although he be above the law (I mean the civil and humane) as the Creatour is above the creature (for the law is the work of the Prince, and that which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure it is the proper right of the Sovereignty) nevertheless if it be in force and authority, he ought to keep it, to live, to converse and judge according unto it: and it would be a dishonour and a very evil example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* having done something against the law by his own proper act, would needs die for grief: *Lycurgus, Agesilanus, Zeleucus*; have left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

Thirdly

Thirdly, the Prince oweth justice to all his subjects; and he ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of justice. This is the proper virtue of a Prince truly royall and Prince-like; wherefore it was rightly said by an old man to King Philip that delayed him justice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist and leave off to be King. But Demetrius sped not so well, who was dispossess'd of his Realm by his subjects, for casting from a bridge into the River many of their Petitions, without answer, or doing them justice.

5.

To do justice.

Finally, the Prince ought to love, cherish, to be vigilant and carefull of his State, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the Shepherd of his flock, having alwaies before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subjects. The prosperity and welfare of the State is the end and contentment of a good Prince, *ne Respub. opibus firma, copiis locuples gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit: That the Common-wealth be strong in power, rich in plenty, abound in glory, honest in virtue.* The Prince that tieth himself to himself, abuileth himself: for he is not his own man, neither is the State his, but he is the State's. He is a Lord not to domineer, but to defend. *Cui non civium servitus tradita, sed intacta: To whom is committed not the servitude of citizens, but their safeguard, to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilancy may secure his sleeping subjects, his travell may give them rest, his providence may maintain their prosp'erty, his industry may continue their delights, his businesse their leisure, their vacation, and that all his subjects may understand and know that he is as much for them, as he is above them.*

6.

To take care
and offend the
common good.

Seneca.

To be such, and to discharge his duty well, he ought to demean and carry himself as hath been said at large in the second and third Chapters of this book, that is to say, to furnish himself of good counsel, of treasure, and sufficient strength with his state to fortifie himself with alliance and foreign friends, to be ready and to command both in peace and war; by this means he may be both loved and feared.

8.

And to contain all in a few words, he must love God above all things, be advised in his enterprises, valiant in attemptes, faithfull and firm in his word, wise in counsel, caretull of his subjects, helpfull to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pitifull to the afflicted, gentle and courteous to the good people, severe to the wicked, and just and upright towards all.

9.

The duty of
Subjects.

The duty of subjects consisteth in three points, to yeild due honour

The duty of Sovereigns, and Subjects.

now, to their princes, as to those that carry the Image of God, ordained and established by him; therefore they are most wicked, who detract or slander; such were the seed of Châim an i Chahaan.

3. To be obedient, under which is contained many duties, as to go to the wars, to pay tributes and imposts imposed upon them by their authority. 3. To wish them all prosperity and happiness, and to pray for them.

Exod. 12.

10.
whether it be
lawfull to lay
violent waies
upon the per-
son of a ty-
rant.

A doublety-
rant.

1.
The entrance.

2.
In the executi-
on three waies.

Hereof see a-
bove Chap. 4.
in chap. of ty-
ranny and re-
bellion.

But the question is, whether a man ought to yeild these three duties generally to all Princes, if they be wicked, or tyrants. This controversie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore we must distinguish. The prince is a tyrant and wicked, either in the entrance, or execution of his government. If in the entrance, that is to say, that he treacherously invadeth, and by his own force and powerful authority gains the sovereignty without any right, be he otherwise good or evil (for this cause he ought to be accounted a Tyrant) Without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of justice, if there be opportunity and place, or by surprise: and the Grecians, saith Cicero, ordained in former times rewards and honours for those that delivered the common-wealth from servitude and oppression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the Prince, either by justice or surprise, since he is neither received nor acknowledged to be a Prince.

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightful and just, but that he carrieth himself imperiously, cruelly, and wickedly, and according to the common saying, tyrannically; it is then also to be distinguished: for it may be so three waies, and every one requireth particular consideration. The one is in violating the laws of God, and nature, that is to say, against the Religion of the country, the commandment of God, enforcing and constraining their consciences. In this case he ought not to yeild any duty or obedience, following those divine axioms, That we ought rather to obey God then men, and fear him more than commandeth the entire man, then those that have a power but over the least part. Yet he ought not to oppose himself against him by violence of sinister meanes, which is another extremity, but to observe the middle way which is either to flee or suffer *fugere aut pati*; these two remedies are named by the doctrine of verity in the like extremities. 2. The other lesse evil, which concerneth not the consciences, but onely the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subjects, denying them justice, imprisoning their persons, and depriving them of their goods,

good. In the which case he ought, with patience and acknowledgement of the wrath of God, yeild these 3 duties following, honour, obedience, vows and prayers : and to be mindfull of 3 things, that all power and authority is from God, and who so ever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: *Principi sumsum rerum iudicium dicit dederunt: Subditis obsequii gloria relata est: bonos principes voto expetere, qualesunque tolerare.* God hath given the sovereign judgment of affairs to the Prince : The glory of dutiful service is left to the subjects: to desire by prayer good Princes, and to tolerate them whatsoever they be. And he ought not to obey a superior, because he is worthy and worthily commandeth, but because he is a superior; not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawful. There is great difference between true and good, every one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and just, but simply, because it is the law. That God causeth an hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people, though he reserve him for a day of his fury ; that the wicked Prince is the instrument of his justice , the which we ought to endure as other evils, which the heavens do send us; *quomodo sterilitatem ant nimios imbres & cætera natura mala, sic luxum & avaritiam dominantium tolerare:* As when we suffer sterility or unseasonable weather, and other evils of nature, so must we endure the riot and covetousness of our rulers. 3. The examples of Saul, Nabuchadonosor, of many Emperours before Constantine, and others since him as cruel tyrants as might be: towards whom nevertheless these three duties have been observed by good men, and enjoyed them by the Prophets and learned men of those daies, according to the oracle of the great Doctor of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seat of Government, notwithstanding they oppresse us with insupportable burthens, and their Government be evil.

The third concerneth the whole State, when he would change or ruinate, seeking to make it elective, of hereditary; or of an Aristocracy, or Democracy, a Monarchy; or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of justice, or otherwise: for he is not master of the state, but onely a guardian and a surety. But these affairs belong not at all, but to the tutors and maintainer of the State; or thole that are interessed therein; as electors of elective States; or Princes apparent in hereditary States; or States general, that have fundamental laws. And this is the onely case wherein it is lawfull to resist a tyrant. And all this

*l. Cogitationis
ff. de pan. L.
Si quis non di-
cam e. de fa-
cros. Eccles.*

The duty of Sovereigns, and Subjects.

is said of subjects, who are never permitted to attempt any thing against a sovereign Prince for what cause soever; and the laws say that he deserveth death, who attempteth, or giveth counsel, and which intendeth, or onely thinketh it. But it is honourable for a stranger, yea it is most noble and heroicall in a Prince by warlike means to defend a people unjustly oppressed, and to free them from tyranny; as *Hercules* did, and after *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlain*, Prince of the Tatars, who overcame *Bajazeth* the Turkish Emperor, and besieged *Constantinople*.

12.
*Examinations
of Sovereigns
after their
death.*

These are the duties of subjects towards their living Sovereigns: But it is a point of justice to examine their life after they are dead. This is a custom just and very profitable, which benefiteth much thole nations where it is observed, and that which all good Princes do desire, who have cause to complain, that a man banteth the memory of the wicked as well as theirs. Sovereigns are companions if not masters of the laws; for seeing justice cannot touch their lives, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, to the good of their successors. We owe reverence and duty equally to all kings, in respect of their dignity and office, but inward estimation and affection to their virtue. We patiently endure them, though unworthy as they are: We conceal their vices; for their authority and publick order where we live, hath need of our common help: but after they are gone, there is no reason to reject justice, and the liberty of expressing our true thoughts, yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that we manifest to the posterity faithfully to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well known. They who for some private duty commit a wicked Prince to memory, do private justice to the publick hurt. An excellent lesson for a successor, if it were observed.

CHAP. XVII.

The duty of Magistrates.

3.
*For what
cause Magis-
trates are at-
tained of.*

Good people in a common-wealth would love better to enjoy ease of contentment, which good and excellent spirits know how to give themselves in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, then to undertake publick charges, were it not that they fear to be ill governed, and by the wicked; and therefore they consent to be magistrates: but to hunt and follow publick charges, especially the judgment-seat, is base and vile, and condemned

condemned by all good laws, yea even of the Heathen; witnesseth the law *Julia de ambitu*, unworthy a person of honour: and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiency, then by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by bribery or money to purchase them; and there is no merchandize more hatefull and contemptible then it: for it necessarily followeth, that he which buyeth in grosse, selleth by retail: Whereupon the Emperour *Serwerus* speaking against the like inconvenience, saith, That a man cannot justly condemn him which selleth that he bought.

Every a man apparelleth himself, and putteth on his best habit before he departeth his house to appear in publick: so before a man undertake publick charges, he ought privately to examine himself, to learn to rule his passions, and wel to settle and establish his mind. A man bringeth not to the Turney a raw unmanaged horse; neither doth a man enter into affars of importance, if he hath not been instructed and prepared for it before: so, before a man undertakes these affars, and enters upon the stage and theater of this world, he ought to correct that imperfect and savage part in him, to bridle and restrain the liberty of affections, to learn the laws, the parts, and meaneings thereof, wherewithal it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrariwise it is a very lamentable and absurd thing, as *Socrates* saith, that although no man undertaketh the profession of any mystery or mechanicall Art, which formerly he hath not learned; yet in publick charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to govern the world, the deepest and difficultest mysterie of all, they are accepted, and undertake it, that know nothing at all.

Magistrates are intermixed persons, placed between the Sovereign and private men, and therefore it behoveth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their sovereign, yeld to the power of superiour Magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiours, defend the weak, make head against the great, and be just to all: and therefore it was well said, That magistracy descrieth a man, being to play in publick so many parts.

In regard of his Sovereign, the Magistrate according to the diversity of the commands, ought diversly to govern, or readily, or not at all to obey, or surcease his obedience. First, in those commands which yeld unto him acknowledgment and allowance, as are all the warrants of justice, and of all other, where this clause, or any equivalent unto it (if it appear unto you) or which are with-

Lamprid.

2.
How a Magistrate ought to prepare himself before he take the charge.

3.
A general description of Magistrates.

4.
The duty of Magistrates touching the Sovereign.

The duty of Magistrates.

one attribution of allowance, just and indifferent of themselves he ought to obey, and he may easily discharge himself without any scruple and danger.

2. In those commands which attribute unto him no acknowledgment, but only the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be against right and civil justice, and that have in them clauses derogatory, he ought simply to obey: for the Sovereign may derogate from the ordinary law, and this is properly that wherein Sovereignty consisteth.

3. To those which are contrary to right, and contain no derogatory clause, but are wholly prejudicial to the good and utility of the Common-wealth, what clause soever it hath, and though the Magistrate knoweth it to be false, and enforceth against right and by violence, he ought not to yeild readily in these three cases, but to hold them in suspense, and to make resistance once or twice, and at the second or third command to yeild.

4. Touching those which are repugnant to the law of God and nature; he ought to dismiss and acquit himself of his office, yea to endure any thing, rather then obey or consent: and he need not say that the former commands may have some doubt in them: because natural Justice is more clear then the light of the Sun.

5. All this is good to be done in respect of the things themselves: But after they are once done by the Sovereign, how evil soever they be, it is better to dissemble them, and bury the memory of them, then to stir and loose all (as Papinian did) *Frustraniti, & nihil aliud nisiodium querere, extrema dementia est: It is extreme folly to labour to no purpose and to get nothing else but hatred.*

In respect of private Subjects, Magistrates ought to remember that the authority which they have over them, they have but at a second hand, and hold it of the Sovereign, who alwayes remaineth absolute Lord, and their authority is limited to a prefixed time.

The Magistrate ought to be of easie access, ready to hear and understand all complaints and suites having his gate open to all, and himself alway at hand; considering he is not for himself, but for all, and servant of the Common-wealth. *Magna servitus magna fortuna: Great fortune is a great servitude.* And for this cause the law of Moses provided, that Judges and the Judgement seats were held at the gates of the Cities, to the end every man might have easie access thereto.

He ought also indifferently to receive and hear all, great & little, rich and poor, being open to all: Therefore a wise man compareth him to an altar, whereto a man repaireth, being oppressed and afflicted, to receive succour and comfort.

But he ought not to converse and be familiar with many; but with very few, and those very wise and advised, and that secretly: for it debaseth authority, it diminisheth and dissolveth the grace and reputation thereof. *Cleon* called to the Government of the Common-wealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all intimacy, or inward amity with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge; for *Cicero* saith, he depriveth himself of the person of a Friend, that undertaketh that of a Judg.

His office is especially in two things, to uphold and defend the honour, the dignity, and the right of his Sovereign, and of the weal-publick which he representeth: *genere personam civitatis, ipsius dignitatem & decus sustinere*; to represent the person of the City, to uphold the dignity and glory thereof, with authority and mild severity.

Cic. lib. 1.
Officior.
Then as a good and loyal Interpreter, and Officer of the Prince, he ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say, the law, of which he is the Minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all, therefore he is called the living law, the speaking law.

Although the Magistrate ought wisely to temper mildness with rigour, yet it is better for a Magistrate to be severe and cruel, than gentle, facil, and pittifull: And God forbiddeth to be pittifull in judgement. A severe Judg holdeth subjects in obedience of the laws: a milde and pittifull makes them to contemn the laws, the Magistrates, and the Prince, who made both. To be brief, to discharge well his office, there is required two things, honesty and courage. The first hath need of the second. The first preserveth the Magistrate free from avarice, respect of persons, of bribes, which is the plague, and smoother of truth, (*Acceptatio munierum pravaricatio est veritatis: Alii accepting of gifts, is a prevarication of the truth*). From the corruption of justice, which *Plato* calleth an hal-lowed virgin: Also from passions, of hatred, of love, and others, all enemies to right and equity. But to carry himself well against the threatenings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his friends, the lamentations and teats of the poor distressed, which are all violent and forcible things, and yet have some colour of rea-

soe and justice, and which maketh sometimes the most resolute to stlent; he had need of courage: firm and inflexible constancy is a principal quality and vertue in a Magistrate, to the end he may not feare the great and mighty, and be not moved and mollified with the misery of another, though it carry with it some shew of goodness. But yet it is forbid to have pity of the poor in judgement.

CHAP. XVIII.

The duty of great and small.

Exod. 2.

THE duty of the great consisteth in two things, in endeavouring by all means, to spend their blood and ability, for the defence, and conservation of piety, justice, of the Prince, of the State, and generally for the welfare and good of the Common-wealth; of which they ought to be pillars and supporters; and after in defending and protecting the poor afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked: and like good blood, to run to the wounded part, according to the Proverb; *That good blood, that is to say, noble and generous, cannot lie, that is to say, deceive where is need.* By this means, *Moses* became the head of the Jewish Nation, undertaking the defence of men injured, and unjustly trod under-foot. *Hercules* was deified for delivering the oppressed from the hands of Tyrants. Those that have done the like, have been called Heroes, and demi-gods; and to the like, all honours have been anciently ordained, that is, to such as deserved well of the Common-wealth, and were the deliverers of the oppressed. It is no greatness for a man to make himself to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some have done, which also have procured them hate. *Oderint quem motuunt. They hate whom they fear.* It is better to be beloved, than adored. This containeth of a natural pride, and inhumanity, to contemn and disdain other men, as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruel, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weak, a thing wholly contrary to true greatness and honour, who ought to undertake the defence thereof.

The duty of inferiors towards their superiors, consisteth in two points, in honouring and reverencing them, not only ceremoniously and in outward shew, which he must do as well to the good as the evil,

evil, but with love and affection, if they deserve it, and are lovers of the Common-wealth. These are two things, to honour and to esteem, which are due to the good and truly great; to others to bend the knee, to bow the body, not the heart, which is to esteem and love. Moreover, to please them by humble and serviceable duties, and to insinuate into their favour.

Principibus placuisse virū non ultimā lans est:

The praise is not the least,

To please men of the best.

And to make himself capable of their protection; which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least, not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion. For over-greedily to avoid their indignation, or to seek their grace and favour, besides, that it is a testimony of weakness, it is silently to condemn them of injustice and cruelty; *Non ex professo cavere aut fugere: nam quem quis fugit, damna;* Not of set purpose to beware and avoid: for he whom any man shanmeth, he condemneth: or to stir up in them a desire to execute their fury, seeing so base and fearful a submission,

Of Fortitude the third Virtue.

P R E F A C E.

THe two former precedent virtues, rule and govern men in company, or with another: these two following rule him in himself: for himself respecting the two visages of fortune, the two heads and kindes of all accidents, Prosperity, and Adversity: for fortitude armeth a man against adversity, Temperance guideth him in prosperity: moderating the two brutish parts of our soul; fortitude ruleth the irascible, temperance the concupiscent; These two virtues may wholly be comprised and understood by this word Constancy, which is a right and equal stayedness of the minde, in all accidents and outward things, whereby he is not puffed up in prosperity, nor dejected in adversity. *Nec adversis frangitur, nec prosperis astutus.*

C H A P. XIX.

Of Fortitude or Valour in general.

1.
The description
of valour.

VAlour (for this virtue is more properly so called, than fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equal and uniform stayedness of the mind against all dangerous, difficult, and dolorous accidents: in such sort, that difficulty and danger is the object and matter wherein it is exercised: to be brief, it is all that which humane weakness feared. *Timendorum contemptrix, qua terribilia, & sub jugum libertatem nostram missentia, despicit, provocat, frangit: It contemneth things to be feared, despiseth, challengeth and destroyeth dreadful things, and bringeth our liberty into bondage.*

2.
The praise
thereof.

Senec.

Of all the virtues in greatest estimation and honour, this is most renowned, which for the prerogative thereof, is simply called virtue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous, and most excellent effects, it containeth magnanimity, patience, constancy, an invincible resolution, heroical virtues, whereupon many have fought the inconveniences that belong thereunto, with greedines to attain so honourable imployment. This virtue is an impregnable Bulwark, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents. *Munimentum imbecillitatis humana in expugnabile: quod qui circumdedidit sibi, securus in hac vita ob sidione perdurat: An invincible forress of humane weakness, that whosoever armeth himself withall, continueth secure in this siege of life.*

3.
Of imperfect
or false valours.

Military valour.

But because many do mistake, and in place of the only true virtue, conceive the falle and basardly valours, I will in declaring more at large, the nature & definition thereof, expel those popular errors that are here intruded. We will note then in this virtue, four conditions: the first is generally and indifferently against all sorts of difficulties and dangers; wherefore they are deceived, that think there is no other valour then the military, which only they esteem; because, it may be, it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honour, which is the tongue and trumpet of immortality; for to say truth, there is more fame and glory therein then pain and danger. Now this is but a small part, and a little ray or light of the true, entire, perfect, and universal, whereby a man is one and the same, in company, in bed with his griefs, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house, as in the Army. This mi-

military valour is pure and natural in beasts : with whom it is as well in females as in males : in men it is often artificial , gotten by fear, and the apprehension of captivity, of dearth, of grief, of poverty; of which things, Beasts have no fear. Humane valour is a wile cowardliness, a fear accompanied with fore-fight, to avoid one evil by another ; choler is the temper and file thereof : Beasts have it simply. In men also it is attained by use, institution, example, custom, and it is found in base and slavish mindes : of a servant, or slave, or a factor, or fellow trained up in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instruction of virtue and true philosophical valour.

The second condition, it presupposeth knowledg, as well of the difficulty, pain, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented ; as of the beauty, honesty, justice, and duty required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceived, that make valour an inconsiderate temerity, or a senseless brutish stupidity ; *Non est in consulta temeritas, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligenterissima in tutela sui fortitudo est : & eadem Senec.* patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est : It is not an inconsiderate rashness, nor a love of danger, nor a desire of dreadful things; but fortitude is most diligent in the safeguard of a mans self, and most patient in those things wherein there is a false shew of evils. Virtue cannot be without knowledg and apprehension, a man cannot truly condemn the danger which he knoweth not ; if a man will also acknowledg this virtue in Beasts. And indeed, they that ordinarily attempt without any fore-fight or knowledg, when they come to the point of execution ; the tense is their best intelligence.

The third condition ; this is a resolution and stayednes of the mind, grounded upon the duty, and the honesty, and justice, of the enterprise ; which resolution never slacketh, whatsoever hapneth, *Bodily strength.* until he have valiantly ended the enterprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first, and more grossly, they that seek this virtue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limbs. Now valour is not a quality of the body, but of the minde; a settled strength, not of the arms and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and valour of a man, consisteth in his heart and will : here lieth his true honour, and the only advantage and true; the victory over his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arm himself against his constancy and virtue ; all other helps are strange and borrowed: *Strength.*

strength of arms and legs is the quality of a porter: to make an enemy to stoop, to dazzel his eyes at the light of the sun, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any fear of death, quelleth not in his constancy and resolution: and though he fall, he is not vanquished of his adversary (who perhaps may in effect, be but a base fellow) but of fortune; and therefore he is to accuse his own unhappiness, and not his negligence. The most valiant, are often-times the most unfortunate. Moreover, they are deceived, which disquiet them selves, and make accouit of those vain Thrasional brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their losty looks, and brave words, would win credit of thole that are valiant and hardy, if a man woud do them so much favour, as to believe them.

6. Moreover, they that attribute valour to subtilty and craft, or to *Art and Industry*, do much more profane it, and make it play a base and abject part. This is to disguise things, and to place a falle stone for a true. The *Lacedemonians* permitted no Fencers nor master-wrestlers in their Cities, to the end, their youth might attain thereto by nature, and not by Art. We account it a bold and hardy thing to fight with a Lyon, a Bear, a wild Bore, which encounter a man only according to nature; but not with Wasps, for they use subtilty. *Alexander* woud not contend in the Olympick games, saying, there was no equality; because a private man might overcome, and a King be vanquished. Moreover, it is not fitting for a man of honour, to try and adventure his valour in a thing, wherein a base fellow, instructed by rule, may gain the prize. For such victory cometh not of virtue, nor of courage, but of certain artificial tricks and inventions: wherein the baseit will do that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither should he regard to do it. Fencing is a trick of Art, which may be attained by base persons, and men of no accouit. And although infamous and ruffin-like fellows are apt to fight, or do any thing in Cities or Towns, with the dexterity of the sword; if they see an enemy, woud they not run away? Even so is it in that, which is attained by long habit and custom, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who undertake dangerous things, and more difficult then the most valiant, being trained and instructed therein from their youth.

7. Finally, they which consider not sufficiently, the motive & circumstance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour and virtue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to passion or particular intent. For

For as it is not properly virtue, nor justice to be loyal and officious towards some, which a man particularly loveth; nor temperance, to abstain from the carnal pleasure of his sister, or of his daughter; nor liberality towards his wife and Children: so it is not true valour to adventure himself to any danger, for his own benefit and particular satisfaction. Wherefore if it be for gain; as spies, pioners, traitors, merchants on the Sea, mercenary soldiery; if for ambition or reputation to be esteemed and accounted valiant, as the most part of our men of war, who say, being naturally carried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not go; if weary of his life through pain and grief, as the soldier of *Amigonus*, who living in extreme torment, by the means of a fistula he had, was hardly to attempt all dangers, being healed avoided them; if to prevent shame, captivity, or any other evil; if through fury, and the heat of choler; to be brief, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Ajax*, *Cataline*, it is neither valour nor virtue; *Sicut non martyrem pana, sic nec fortis pugna, sed causa facit*: As the torment maketh not a martyr, so doth not the conflict make a valiant man, but the cause.

The fourth condition. It ought to be, in the execution thereof, wise and discreet, whereby many false opinions are rejected in this matter, which are, not to hide themselves from those evils, and inconveniences that threaten them; neither to fear lest they surprise us, nor to fly, yea not to feel the first blows, as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to understand amiss: for so that the minde remain firm and entire in its own place and discourse, without alteration, he may outwardly disquiet and make a stir. He may lawfully, yea, it is honourable to overthrow, to undo, and to revenge himself of evils, by all means, and honest endeavours: and where there is no remedy, to carry himself with a settled resolution. *Mens immota manet; lachrymae voluntur innatae; Viam ruitus flos sspac, but the minde remaneth immovable.* Socrates mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardlineis to beat and vanquish them by giving them place? Homer commendeth in his *Ulysses* the skill to fly: the Lacedemonians professors of valour, in the journey of the *Platzans*, retired, the better to break and dissolve the Persian Troops which otherwise they could not do, and overcame them. This hath been practised by the most warlike people. In other places, the Stoicks themselves allowed to wax pale, to tremble at the first sudden

8.
Indiscretion.

fudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into minde and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are justly to be feared and fled, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedy, neither place of virtue, prudence, valour.

Of Fortitude and Valour in particular.

*The proposition
and division of
this matter.*

I O divide the matter and discourse of that which is here to be said ; this virtue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth evil. Now this evil is twofold, external and internal, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by divers names, adversity, affliction, injury, unhappiness, evil and sinister accidents : The other is inward in the mind, but caused by that which is outward : These are hateful and hurtful passions, of fear, sadness, choler, and divers others. We must speak of them both; prescribe means and remedies to overcome, suppress and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our virtue, fortitude and valour. It consisteth then here of two parts, the one of evils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The general advice against all good and evil fortune, hath been declared before: we will speak here more specially and particularly thereof.

C H A P. XX.

The first part of outward evils.

*1.
The distinction
and compari-
son of evils by
their causes.*

WE will consider these outward evils three wayes, in their causes, which shall be declared in this Chapter; afterward in their effects ; lastly, in themselves distinctly, and particularly every kind of them : and we will give advice and means in them all, by virtue to be armed against them.

The cause of evil and hateful accidents which happen to us all, are either common and general, which at the same instant they concern many, as pestilence, famine, war, tyranny : And these evils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heaven, or at least, the proper and nearest cause thereof we cannot properly know : Or particulars, and those that are known, that is to say, by the means of another. And so there are two sorts of evil; publicke and private. Now the common evils, that is to say, proceeding of a publike cause, though they concern every one in particular,

are

are in divers kindes, more or lesse grievous, weighty and dangerous, then the private, whose causes are known. More grievous, for they come by flecks and troops, they assaile more violently, with greater stir of vehemency and fury: they have a greater concourse and train: they are more tempestuous, they bring forth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grievous: because generality and community seemeth to mitigate and lessen every mans evil. It is a kinde of comfort, not to be alone in misery: it is thought to be rather a common unhappinesse, where the course of the world, and the cause is naturall, then personall affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth us, torment us more, wound us to the quick, and much more alter us. Both these two have their remedies and comforts.

Against publike evils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent; and to marke their cause. It is God, his providence, from whence cometh and dependeth an absolute necessity, which governeth and ruleth all, whereunto all things are subject. His providence, and destiny, or necessity, are not, to lay the truth, two distinct laws in essence, *τρόποια καὶ δύναμις*, neither are they one.

^{2.}
The advice against publick evils.
Providence.
Destiny.

The diversity is onely in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur and to be grieved at the contrary, is, first of all, such impiety, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things do quietly obey, man onely torments himself. And again it is a folly, because it is vain and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this sovereign and absolute mitriis willingly, it shall carry all by force; *Ad hoc Sacramentum adacti sumus ferre mortalia, nec perirebami iis, quae vitare nostra potestatis non est: in regno nasi sumus, Deo pare et libertas est;* We are brought to this necessity, to suffer mortal things, and not to be troubled at those things which are not in our power to avoid: we are born in a kingdom, it is freedom to obey God.

Define fata deum fleti sperare querendo:

Surcease to think that destiny.

Can by complaining be put by.

There is no better remedy, then to apply our wills to the will thereof; and according to the advice of wisdom to make a virtue of necessity, *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quam velle quod ipsa cogitat:* There is no other avoiding of necessity, then to will that which it constraineth. In seeking to contend or dispute againt it, we do but sharpen and stir the evil; *Lets animo ferre quicquid acciderit,*

The first part of outward evils:

cideret, quasi tibi volueris accidere; debuisse enim velle, si scires ex decreto Dei fieri: To suffer with a cheerfull minde, whatsoever shall happen, as if thou wouldest have it happen unto thee; for thou oughtest to be willing, if thou knowest it to be done by the decree of God. Besides we shall better profit our selves, we shall do that which we ought to do, which is to follow our general and sovereign who hath so ordained it: Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis; & Deum, quo auctore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuratione comitari. Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur: It is an excellent thing patiently to suffer what thou canst not remedy; And to yeild unto God without murmuring, from whom, as anhour, all things proceed. He is an evil soldier that felloweth his Commander with grudging. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoever he will. It is magnanimity of courage to yeild unto him. Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit: It is magnanimity to yeild himself unto God. It is effeminacie and dastardliness to murmur or complain; pulsillus & degener qui oblectetur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare manu: Deum quam se: He is base and ignoble, that strugleth against him; he judgeth ill of the order of the world, and had rather amend God then himself.

3.
The distinction
of private
evils.

Against those private evils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce us more, we ought first well to distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceive ill of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended us either in deed nor will, as when he hath either demanded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtful unto us: for such causes it is too great simplicity to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one crosseth our affaers against equity; this is to wrong us: the others are applyed to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise then it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grievous and harder to be endured, then any other kinde of affliction.

4.
The advice a-
gainst them in
general.

The first and general advice against all these sorts of evils, is to be firmand resolute, not to suffer himself to be led by common opinion but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to verity and reason. The world suffereth it self to be persuaded and led by impression. How many are there, that make less account to receive a great wound, then a little blow? more account of a word, then of death? To be brief, all is measured

sured by opinion : and opinion offendeth more then the evil; and our impatience hurts us more, then those of whom we complain.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawn first from our selves, (and this is that we must first look into.) These pretended offences may arise of our own defects and weakness. This might be a folly grounded upon some defect, in our own person, which any one in derision would countereit. It is folly to grieve and vex himself for that which proceedeth not from his own fault. The way to prevent others in their scoffs, is first to speak and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you; if it be that the injury hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we have given the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receive, and make use of as a punishment ; 2. But for the most part it proceedeth of our own proper weakness, which makes us melancholy. Now he ought to quit himself of all those tender delicacies, which make him live unquietly; but with a manly courage, strong and stoutly to contemn, and tread underfoot, the indiscretions and follies of another. It is no sign that a man is sound, if he complain when one toucheth him. Never shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy self to all that is presented.

They are also drawn from the person that offendeth. We represent in generall the manners and humors of those persons with whom we are to live in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to do evil, and measure their power by the disdain and the injury of another. So few there are which take pleasure to do well. We ought then to make account that whithersoever we turn us, we shall finde those that will harm, and offend us. Wheresoever we shall find men, we shall find injuries. This is so certain and necessary, that the Lawyers themselves, who rule the traffick and affaires of this world, have winked at, and permitted in distributive and communicative justice many escaptes in Law. They have permitted deceit and hindrances even to the one half of the just price. This necessity to hurt and offend cometh, first of the contrariety and incompatibility of humors and wills, whereof it cometh that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affairs, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, damage, and ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common and generall picture of the world; if he who offendeth

5.
Particular ad-
visements
drawn from
our selves.

9.
Of those who
offend.

fendeth thee is insolent, a fool, and rash as he is, (for an honest man never wrongeth any) wherefore complainest thou, since he is no more his own man, than as a mad man? You can well endure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pity him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, you will laugh at them: a fool, a drunken man, a cholerick, an indiscreet man in like sort. Wherefore when these people assail us with words, we ought not to answer them: we must hold our peace, and quit ourselves of them. It is an excellent and worthy revenge, an grievous to a fool, not to make any account of him; for it is to take away that pleasure which he thinketh to have in vexing us, since our silence condemns his simplicity, and his own temerity is smothered in his own mouth: if a man answer him, he makes him his equal, and, by esteeming him too much, he wrongs himself. *Male loquuntur quia bene loqui nesciunt, faciunt quod solent & scient, male quia mali, & secundum se: They speak evil, because they know not how to speak well, they do what they are used to, and what they know; evilly because they are evil, and according to themselves.*

7.
*The conclusion
of these coun-
sels with the
rule of wise-
dom.*

Behold then for conclusion the advice and counsel of wisdom: we must have respect unto our selves, and unto him that offendeth us. As touching our selves, we must take heed we do nothing unworthy and unbecoming our selves, that may give another advantage against us. An unwise man that distrusteth himself, growes into passion without cause, and thereby gives encouragement to another to contradict him. This is a weaknesse of the minde, not to know to contemn offence: an honest man is not subject to injury: he is inviolable: an inviolable thing is not onely this, that a man cannot be beat, but being beaten, neither receiveth wound nor hurt: This resolution is a most strong bulwark against all accidents; that we can receive no evil, but of our selves. If our judgement be as it ought, we are invulnerable. And therefore we alwaies say with wise *Socrates*, *Anitus*, and *Melitus* may well put me to death, but they shall never inforce me to do that I ought not. Moreover, an honest man, as he never giveth occasion of injury to any man, so he cannot endure to receive an injury; *Ledere enim la-
dig, coniunctum est. For to hurt and to be hurt, are near neighbours.* This is a wall of brasle, which a man is not able to pierce; scoffes and injuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offended us, if you hold him vain and unwise, handle him accordingly, and so leave him: if he be otherwise, excuse him. Imagine that he hath had

had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence; he is vexation enough to himself, and he wisheth he had never done it. Moreover, I lay, that like good Husbands, we must make profit and commodity of the injuries that are offered us. Which we may do at the leat two wayes, which respect the offender, and the offended. The one, that they give us occasion to know those that wrong us, to the end, we may the better fly them at another times. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently, that he is malicious, and trut him no more. The other, that they discover unto us our infirmity, and the means whereby we are easly beaten; to the end, we should amend and repair our defects, lest another take occasion to say as much or more. What better revenge can a man take of his enemies, then to make profit of their injuries, & thereby better and more securely to manage our affairs?

C H A P. XXI.

Of outward evils considered in their effects and fruits.

After the causes of evil, we come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preservatives and remedies. The effects are many, are great, are general and particular. The general respect the good, maintenance and culure of the univerſal.

First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and be lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renewed by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, war, mortality; which season, perfect and purifie it, to the end, to sweeten the rest, and give more liberty and ease to the whole. Without these, a man could neither turn himself nor be settled. Moreover, besides the variety and interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beauty and ornament of the universe, also all parts of the world are benefitted thereby. The rude and barbarous are hereby polished and refined, Arts and Sciences are dispersed and imparted unto all. This is as a great Nurſery, wherein certain Trees are transplanted from other Stocks, others pruned and pulled up by the root, alſo for the good and beauty of the Orchard. These good and general considerations, ought to remain and reſolve every honest and reasonable mind, and to hinder the curious inquiry of men, into those great and turbulent accidents, ſo ſtrange and wonderful, ſince they are the works of God and Nature, and that they do ſo notable a ſervice in the general course of the world. For we muſt think, that that

General effects
very profitable,

which is a losse in one respect, is a gain in another; and to speak more plainly, nothing is lost; but such is the course of the world, so it changeth, and so it is accommodated. *Vir sapiens nihil indignetur sibi accipere, sciatque illa ipsa quibus ladi videatur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, & ex his esse, que cursum mundi officiumque consumant: Let a wise man disdain nothing that shall happen unto him, and let him know, that those things that seem hurtful unto him, pertain to the preservation of the whole universe, and to be of the nature of those things that finish up the course and office of the world.*

2.

Particular effects divers.

*1. Lib. of the
three veritatis,
cap. 11.*

The particular effects are divers, according to the divers spirits and states of those that receive them. For they exercise the good, relieve and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of every one a word; for hereof we have spoken else-where. These outward evils are, in those that are good, a very profitable exercite, and an excellent school, wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Marriners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers in their Academies, and in all other sorts of people, in the serions exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed unto virtue, constancy, valour, the victory of the world and of fortune. They learn to know themselves, to make triall of themselves; and they see the measure of their valour, the uttermost of their strength; how far they may promise, or hope of themselves, and then they encourage and strengthen themselves to what is best, accustom and harden themselves to all, become resolute and invincible; whereas contrariwise, the long calm of prosperity mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, That there were no people more miserable, than they that had never felt any crosses or afflictions, that had never been miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

3.

*Medicine and
chastisement.*

These outward evils, to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction, and fatherly rod after the fall, to put them in remembrance of themselves; so the end, they make not a second revolt: They are a kind of letting blood, and medicine, or preservative to divert faults and offences, or a purgation to void and purifie them.

4.

Punishment.

To the wicked and forlorn they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserab'e languishment. And these are the wholsome and necessary effects, for which these outward evils are not only to be esteemed of, and quietly taken with patience, and in good part, as the exploits of divine justice, but are to be embrased as tokens and instruments of

of the care, of the love and providence of God, and men are to make a profitable use of them, following the purpose and intention of him, who feudeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

Of outward evils in themselves and particularly.

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL these evils, which are many and divers, are privations of their contrary good, as likewise the name and nature of evil do signify. And therefore as many heads as there are of good, so many are there of evils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seven; sickness, grief, (I conclude these two in one) captivity, banishment, want, infamy, losse of friends, death; which are the privations of health, liberty, home-dwelling, means or maintenance, honours, friends, life, whereof hath been spoken before at large. We will here inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines, against these seven heads of evils, and that briefly without discourse.

*In the first
Book.*

C H A P. XXII.

Of sickness and grief.

WE have said before, that grief is the greatest, and to say the truth, the only essential evil, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Nevertheless, behold some few that regard the reason, justice, utility, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessity, To endure; there is no reason, that for our sakes, a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended, if that happen unto him, that may happen unto every man.

It is also a natural thing, we are born thereunto; & to desire to be exempted from it is injustice, we must quietly endure the laws of our own condition. We are made to be old, to be weak, to grieve, to be sick, and therefore we must learn to suffer that which we cannot avoid.

If it be long, it is leight and moderate, and therefore a shame to complain of it: if it be violent, it is short and speedy, ends either self or the patient, which comes all to one end, *Confide, summis*

non habet tempus dolor: Si gravis, brevis; Si longus, levius. Be bold of this: Extreme pain hath no perpetuity: if it be grievous, it is soon gone; if long, then light.

4. And again, it is the body that endureth: it is not our selves that are offended, for the offence diminishest the excellency and perfection of the thing; and sicknes or grief is so far from diminishing, that contrarily it serveth for a subject and an occasion of a commendable patience, much more then health doth: And where there is more occasion of commendation, there is not lesse occasion of good. If the body be the instrument of the spirit, who will complain, when the instrument is employed to the service of that wherunto it is destinatid? The body is made to serve the soul: if the soul should afflict it self for any thing that hapneth to the body, the soul should serve the body. Were not that man over-delicate and curios, that would cry out and afflict himself, because some one or other had spoiled his apparel, some thorn had taken hold of it, or some man passing by had torn it? Some base Broker perhaps would be agrieved therewith, that would willingly make a commodity thereof: but a man of ability and reperation, would rather laugh at it, and account it as nothing, in respect of that state and abundance, that God hath bestowed on h m. Now this body, is but a borrowed garment, to make our spirits for a time, to appear upon this low and troublefome stage; of which only we should make accounr, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence commeth it, that a man suffereth grief with such impatiency? It is because he accusommeth not himself to seek his content in his soul; *non asservant animo esse contenti; nimis illis cum corpore fuit: they have not accustomed themselves to be content in mind; their contentment was too much with the body.* Men have too great a commerce with their bodies, and it leemeth, that grief groweth proud, seeing us to tremble under the power thereof.

5. It teacheth us to distaste that which we must needs leave, and to unwinde our selves from the vanity and deceit of this world, an excellent piece of service.

6. The joy and pleasure we receive by the recovery of our health, after that our grief or sicknes hath taken his course, is a strange enlightening urroure; in which sort that it should seem that nature hath given sickness for the greater honour and service of our pleasure and delight.

Now when if the grief be indifferent, the patience shall be easier: if

if it be great; the glory shall be as great: if it seem over-hard, let us accuse our delicacy and niceness; and if there be but few that can endure it, let us be of the number of those few. Let us not accuse nature for having made us so weak, for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we flie it, it will follow us; if we cowardly yield unto it, and suffer our selves to be vanquished, it will handle us the more roughly, and the reproach will light upon our selves. It would make us afraid, and therefore it standeth us upon, to take heart, and that when it commeth, it finde us more resolute then was imagined. Our yielding makes that more eager, and more fierce,
Stare fidenter: non quia difficultia non audemus, sed quia non audemus, difficultia sunt. To stand confidently: we do not shrink at them, because they be difficult; but they are difficult to endure, because we shrink at them.

But lest these remedies should seem but fair words, and meere imaginations, and the practice of them altogether impossible, we Examples. have examples, both frequent and rich, not only of men, but of women and Children, who have not only a long time endured long & grievous sicknesses with such constancy, that their grief hath rather given them life then courage; but have attended and born even with joy, yea, have fought after the greatest and most exquisite torments. In Lacedemon, little Children whipped one another, yea, sometimes to the death, without any shew in their countenance, of any grief or smart that they felt, only to accustom themselves to suffer for their Country. Alexanders Page suffered himself to be burnt with a cole, without cry or countenance of discontent, because he would not interrupt the sacrifice: and a Lad of Lacedemon, suffered a Fox to gnaw his guts out of his belly, before he would discover his theft. Pompey being surprised by King *Gentius*, who would have constrained him to reveal the publick affairs of *Rome*, to make known, that no torment should make him to do it, did voluntarily put his finger into the fire, and suffered it to burn, until *Gentius* himself took it out. The like before that, had *Mucius* done, before another King, *Porsenna*: and that good old *Regulus* of Carthage, endured more then all these: and yet more then *Regulus*, *Anaxarchus*, who being half pounded in a morter, by the tyrant *Nicocreon*, would never confess, that his minde was touched with any torment; Beat and pourd the sack of *Anaxarchus*, till you be glutted, as for himself you shall never touch him.

CHAP. XXIII.
Of Captivity and Imprisonment.

THIS affliction is no more then nothing, and in respect of sicknesse and grief, it is an easie matter to vanquish it. For sick folk are not without captivity in their beds, in their houses, for the time they lie in; yea, they ingrosse as it were affliction above captivity; nevertheless, a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the body, the cover, the prison of thy soul that is captive; the soul it self remaineth alwayes free and at liberty, in despight of all; and therefore how shoulde that man know or perceive that he is in prison, who as freely, yea, and more freely too, may walk and wander whither he will, then he that is abroad? The walls and Dungeons of the Prison, are not strong enough to shut him up; the body that tou. heth him, and is joyned unto him, cannot hold nor stay him. He that knoweth how to maintain himself in his liberty, and to use and hold his own right, which is not to be shew up, no not in this World, will but laugh at these sleight and childish embarrasments, *Christianus enim extra carcere seculo renuntiavit: in carcere, etiam carceris: nihil interest ubi sitis in seculo qui extra seculum estis; feramus carcere nomen, secessum vocemus; et si corpus includitur, caro detinetur, omnia spiritus patent, totum hominem animus circumfert, & quo vult transfert.* A Christian man, even out of prison, hath renounced the World: in prison also, he bath renounced the prison: it mattereth nothing where thou art in the world, who art of the world: Let us take away the name of prison, and call it a quiet retiring place, and if the body be included, the flesh is prisoner, but the spirit is free to all things, the minde carrieth about the whole man, and whither he list it transporteth him.

The Prison hath gently received into the lap thereof, many great and holy Personages; it hath beene the sanctuary, the haven of health, and a fortres to divers that had been utterly undone, if they had had their liberty; yea, that have had recourse therunto, to be in liberty; have made choice thereof, and espoused themselves unto it, to the end, they might live at rest, & free themselves from the cares of the world, *& carcere in custodiā translati;* Translated from the prison of affaires, to the quiet of 4. walls. That which is shut-up under lock and key, is in safell custody: and it is better to be under the safegard of a key, then to be bound and enthralled with those fetters.

ters and flocks, whereof the world is full; that publick places and courts of great Princes, and the tumultuous affairs of this world, bring with them, jealousies, envies, violent humours, & the like. *Si recogitemus ipsum mundum carcerem esse, exisse nos e carcere quam in carcерem introisse intelligemus, maiores tenebras habet mundus, qua hominum praecordia excancant, graviores catenæ induit, qua ipsas animas constringunt, pejores immunditiae exspirat, libidines hominum, plures postremo reos continent, universum genus hominum: If we consider, that the world it self is a prison, we shall understand, that we are rather gone out of the world, then entred into prison; the world hath greater darkness, wherewith the inward cogitations of the hearts of men are blinded; it fettereth with more grievous Irons, wherewith mens very souls are shackled; it breatheth forth worser uncleannesses in the lusts and sensualities of men; it containeth more guilty persons, even whole Mankind.* Many have escaped the hands of their enemies, and other great dangers and miseries, by the benefit of imprisonment. Some have therri written Books, & have therre bettered their knowledge. *Plus in carcere spiritus acquirit quam caro amittit: The spirit geteth more in prison, then the flesh loseth.* Divers there are, whom the prison having kept and preserved for a time, hath re-sent unto their former sovereign dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world; others it hath yielded up unto Heaven, and hath not at any time received any that it restoreth not.

Tertul.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of Banishment and Exile.

Exile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion, it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginary: for according to reason, there is not any ill in it: In all places, all is after one fashion, which is comprehended in two words, Nature and Virtue. *Duo quæ pulcherrima sunt, quoctaque nos moverimus sequentur, natura communis & propria virtus: There are two excellent things, which will follow us, whither soever we go, common Nature, and mans own Virtue,*

In all places, we finde the self-same common nature, the same heavens, the same elements. In all places, the heavens and the stars appear unto us in the same greatness, extent; and that is it which principally we are to consider, and not that which is under us, and which we trample under feet. Again, at a kenning we cannot see of

2.
Nature.

the Earth above ten or twelve leagues: *Angustus animus quem terrena detinet: The minde is narrow and strait, whom earthly things delight.* But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautiful and shining Diamonds, doth alwayes shew it self unto us; and to the end, we may wholly behold it, it continually whirleth about us. It sheweth it self all unto all, and in all respects, in a day and a night. The Earth, which with the Sea, and all that it containeth, is not the hundredth and sixty part of the greatness of the Sun, sheweth not it self unto us, but in that small proportion that is about the place where we dwell: yea, and that change of that earthly floor that is under us, is nothing. What matter is it to be born in one place, and to live in another? Our Mother might have layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance, that we are born here or there. Again, all Countries bring forth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoever is necessary. All Countries have kindred: nature hath knit us altogether in blood and in charity. All have friends; there is no more to do, but to make friends, and to win them by vertue and wisdom. Every Land is a wise mans Countrey, or rather no Land is his particular Countrey. For it were to wrong himself, and it were weakness and baseness of heart, to think to carry himself as a wrangler in any place. He must alwayes use his own right and liberty, and live in all places as with himself, and upon his own; *Omnis terra tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium: to see all Lands as their own, and their own as the Lands of all.*

Moreover, what change or discommodity doth the diversity of the place bring with it? Do we not alwayes carry about us one and the same spirit and virtue? Who can forbid, saith *Brunius*, a banished man to carry with him his virtues? The spirit and vertue of a man, is not shut up in any place; but it is every where equally and indifferently. An honest man is a Citizen of the World, free, chearsful, and content in all places, alwayes within himself, in his own quarter, and ever one and the same, though his case or scabbard be removed, and carried hither and thither: *Animus sacer & aeternus ubique est diis cognatus, omni mundo & aeo par: The sacred and eternal soul is every where, of near affinitie with God, alike to all the world, and to all ages.* A man in every place, is in his own Countrey, where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not upon the place, but himself.

4.
Examples:

How many are there, that for divers considerations, have willingly

Iy banished themselves? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, have refuled to return; and have found their exile not only tolerable, but pleasant and delightful; yea, never thought they lived until the time of their banishment, as those noble Romans, *Rutilius, Marcellus*? How many others have been led by the hand of good fortune our of their Countrey, that they may grow great and puissant in a strange Land.

CHAP. XXV.

Of poverty, want, losse of goods.

THIS complaint, is of the vulgar and miserable sort of people, who place their sovereign good, in the goods of fortune, and think that poverty is a very great evil. But to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold poverty: the one extreme, which is the want of things necessary, and requisite unto nature; this doth seldom or never happen to any man, nature being i. want of so just, and having formed us in such a fashion, that few things are necessary, and those few are not wanting, but are found every where; *Parabile est quod natura desiderat, & expeditum: That which nature desireth is ready and easie to be had;* yea, in such a sufficiency, as being moderately used, may suffice the condition of every one. *Ad manum est, quod sat est: That which sufficeth, is ready and at hand.* If we will live according to nature and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall always finde that which is sufficient. If we will live according to opinion, whilst we live, we shall never finde it. *Si ad naturam vives, nunquam eris pauper; si ad opinionem, nunquam dives: exiguum natura desiderat, opinio immensum: If thou wilt live according to nature, thou shalt never be poor; if according to opinion, never rich: nature desireth little, opinion much, and beyond measure.* And therefore, a man that hath an Art or science to stick unto, yea, that hath but his arms at will, is it possible he should either fear, or complain of poverty?

The other is the want of things that are more then sufficient, required for pomp, pleasure and delicacy. This is a kinde of mediocrity and frugality: and to say the truth, it is that which we fear, *things superfluous,* to lose our riches, our moveables, not to have our bed soft enough, our diet well drest, to be deprived of these commodities; and in a word, it is delicateness that holdeth us, this is our true malady.

Now

Prov. 30.

The praise of
sufficiency.

2 Tim. 6.

Now this complaint is unjust; for such poverty is rather to be desired than feared: and therefore the wise man asked of God; *Nec menicitatem nec divitias, sed necessaria: Neither poverty nor riches, but things necessary.* It is far more just, more rich, more peaceable and certain, then abundance, which a man so much desireth. More just; for man came naked, *Nemo nascitur dives; No man is born rich;* and he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man term that truly his, that he neither bringeth nor carrieth with him? The goods of this world, they are as the moveables of an Inn. We are not to be discontented so long as we are here, that we have need of them. More rich; It is a large signory, a Kingdom: *Magna divitiae lege naturae composita paupertas: magnusque pietas cum sufficientia: Moderate and quiet poverty by the law of nature, is great riches; Godliness is great gain with sufficiency.* More peaceable and assured; it feareth nothing, and can defend it self against the enemies thereof: *Etsiam in obessa via paupertas pax est: Poverty bath peace, even in a besieged way.* A small body that may cover and gather it self under a Buckler, is in better safety then a great, which lieth open unto every blow. It is never subject to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwayes more cheerful and comfortable; for they never have so much care, nor fear such tempests. Such kinde of poverty is free, cheerful, assured, it maketh us truly masters of our own lives; whereof the affairs, complaints, contentions, that do necessarily accompany riches, carry away the better part. Alas! what goods are those, from whence proceed all our evils? They are the cause of all those injuries that we endure, that make us slaves; trouble the quiet of our souls, bring with them so many jealousies, suspicions, fears, frights, desires? He that vexeth himself for the losse of these goods, is a miserable man; for together with his goods, he loseth his spirit too. The life of poor men, is like unto thole that sail near the shore; that of the rich, like to thole that cast themselves into the main Ocean. These cannot attain to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the tide; the other come abroad, passe and repasse, as often as they will.

3.

Finally, we must endeavour to imitate those great and generous personages, that have made themselves merry with such kinde of losses, yea, have made advantage of them, and thanked God for them; as *Zenon, after his ship-wreck, Fabricius, Serenus, Crivius.* It should seem that poverty is some excellent and divine thing, since

since it agreeeth with the gods, who are imagined to be naked; since the wisest have embraced it, or at least have endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word; with such as are not over passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of Infamy.

This affliction is of divers kindes. If it be losse of honours and dignities, it is rather a gain then a losse: Dignities are but honourable servitudes, whereby a man by giving himself to the weal-publick, is deprived of himself. Honours are but the torches of envy, jealousy, and in the end, exile and poverty. If a man shall call to minde the history of all antiquity, he shall finde, that all they that have lived, and have carried themselves worthily and virtuously, have ended their course, either by exile, or prison, or some other violent death: witness amongst the Greeks, *Aristides, Themistocles, Phocion, Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camillus, Scipio, Cicero, Papinius*; among the Hebrews, the Prophets: In such sort, that it should seem to be the livery of the more honest men; for it is the ordinary recompence of a publique state, to such kinde of people. And therefore a man of gallant and generous spirit, should contemn it, and make small account thereof, for he dishonoureth himself, and shewes how little he hath profited in the study of wisdom, that regardeth in any respect, the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good, or evil.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of the losse of friends.

Here comprehend Parents, Children, and whatsoever is neer and dear unto a man. First, we must know upon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether upon the interest, or good of our friends, or our own. Upon that of our friends; I doubt we shall say Yea to that, but yet we must not be too credulous to believe it. It is an ambitious faining of piety, whereby we make a shew of sorrow and grief for the hurt of another, or the hinderance of the weal-publick: but if we shall withdraw the veil of dissimulation, and found it to the quick, we shall finde that it is

Of the loss of Friends.

our own particular good that is hid therein, that toucheth us nearest. We complain that our own Candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger: This is rather a kind of envy, then true pity; for that which we so much complain of, touching the losse of our friends, their absence, distance from us, is their true and great good: *Mærere hoc eveniūm, invidi magis quam amici est; to mourn for this event, is rather the part of an envious person then of a friend.* The true use of death is, to make an end of our miseries. God had made our life more miserable, if he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is upon our own good, that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth us not; it is a kind of injury to be grieved with the rest and quiet of those that love us, because we our selves are hurt thereby. *Suis incommo-
dis angi, non amicum, sed seipsum amantis est: to be grieved for his own
discommodities, sheweth a man not to love his friend, but himself.*

Again, there is a good remedy for this which fortune cannot take from us; and that is, that surviving our friends, we have meanes to make new friends. Friendship, as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends. He that wanteth not virtue, shall never want friends. It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith, when he hath lost his old, he makes new. If fortune hath taken away our friends, let us endeavour to make new; by this means, we shall not lose them, but multiply them.

Of Death.

WE have spoken hereof so much at large, and in all respects in the eleventh and last Chapter of the second book, that there remaineth not any thing else to be spoken: and therefore to that place, I refer the Reader.

The second part of inward evils, tedious and troublesome passions.

THE PREFACE.

FROM all these above-named evils, there spring and arise in us, divers passions and cruel affections: for these being taken and considered

considered simply as they are, they breed fear, which apprehendeth evils as yet to come, sorrow for present evils, and, if they be in another, pity and compassion. Being considered as coming, and procured by the act of another, they stir up in us the passion of choler, hatred, envy, jealousy, despight, reenge, on all thole that procure displeasure; or make us to look upon another with an envious eye. Now this virtue of fortitude and valour, consisteth in the government and receipt of these evils, according to reason, in the resolute and courageous carriage of a man, and the keeping of himself free and clear from all passions that spring thereof. But because they sub-sist not, but by these evils, if by the means and help of so many advisements and remedies before delivered, a man can vanquish and conquer them all, there can be no more place left unto these passions. And this is the true mean to free himself, and to come to the end; as the best way to put out a fire, is to withdraw the fuel that gives it nourishment. Nevertheless, we will yet add some particular counsels against these passions, though they have been in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficulty, to bring them into hatred and detestation.

CHAP. XXVIII. *Against Fear.*

Let no man attend evils before they come, because it may be, they will never come: our fears are as likely to deceive us, as our hopes; and it may be, that those times that we think will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many unexpected adventures may happen, that may defend a man from that blow we fear? Lightning is put by with the wind of a mans hat, and the fortunes of the greatest states, with accidents of small moment. The turn of a wheel mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour; and many times it faileth our, that we are preserved by that, which we thought would have bin our overthrow. There is nothing so easily deceived, as humaine foresight. That which it hopeth it wantereth; that which it feareth, vanishest; that which it expecteth, hapneth not. God hath his counsel by himself: That which man determineth after one manner, he resolveth after another. Let us not therefore make our selves unfortunate before our time, nay when perhaps we are never likely to be so. Time to come which deci-

veth

veth so many, will likewise deceive us as soon in our fears, as in our hopes. It is a maxim commonly received in Physick, that in sharp maladies the predictions are never certaine; and even so is it, in the most furious threatenings of fortune; so long as there is life, there is hope; for hope continues as long in the body as the soul: *quam diu spiro, spero.*

But forasmuch as this fear proceedeth not always from the disposition of nature, but many times from an over-delicate education (for by the want of exercise and continual travel and labour, even from your youth, we many times apprehend things without reason) we must by a long practice, accustom our selves unto that, which may most terrifie us, present unto our selves the most fearful dangers that may light upon us, and with chearfulness of heart attempt sometimes casual adventures, the better to try our courage, to prevent evil occurrents, and to seize upon the arms of fortune. It is a matter of lesse difficulty, to resist fortune by assailing it, then by defending our selves against it. For then we have leasure to arm our selves, we take our advantages, we provide for a retreat; whereas when it assaulteth, it surpriseth us unawares, and handleth us at her own pleasure. We must then whilest we assail fortune, learn to defend our selves, give unto our selves false alarums, by proposing unto us, the dangers that other great personages have passed, call to minde, that some have avoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at them; others have been overthrowne by the least, for want of resolution.

CHAP. XXIX. *Against Sorrow.*

The remedies against sorrow (set down before as the most tedious, hurtful, and unjust passion) are two-fold: some are direct or straight, others oblique. I call those direct, which Philosophy teacheth, which concern the confronting and disdaining of evils, accounting them not evils, or at leastwile, very small and light (though they be great and grievous) and that they are not worthy the least motion or alteration of our mindes; and that to be sorry for them, or to complain of them, is a thing very unjust and ill befitting a man, as teach the Stoicks, Peripateticks, and Platonists. This manner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholick passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of the first rank. There is likewise

wile another kind of Philosophical remedy, although it be not of so good a stamp, which is easie, and much more in use, & it is oblique; this is by diverting a mans mind and thought to things pleasant and delightful, or at least indifferent from that that procureth our sorrow: which is to deal cunningly, to decline and avoid an evil, to change the object. It is a remedy very common, and which is used almost in all evils, if a man mark it, as well of the body as of the mind. Phyisitians, when they cannot purge a Rheum, they turn it into some other part less dangerous. Such as passe by steep and precipitate deeps and downyalls, that have need of lancings, tearing Irons, or fire, shut their eyes, and turn their faces another way. Valiant men in warr, do never talke nor consider of death, their mindes being carried away by the desire of victory; so much, that divers have suffered death gladly, yea, have procured it, and been their own executioners, either for the future glory of their name, as many Greeks and Romans; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the Disciples of *Hegesimus*, and others, after the reading of *Plato* his book to *Antiochus, Democritus contemnenda*; or to avoid the miseries of this life, and for other reasons. All these, are they not diversions? Few there are that consider evils in themselves, that relish them as *Socrates* did his death; and *Flavius* condemned by *Nero*, to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therfore in sinister accidents and misadventures, and in all outward evils, we must divert our thoughts, and turn them another way. The vulgar sort can give this advice, Think not of it. Such as have the charge of thole that are any way affested; should for their comfort, furnish affrighted spirits, with other objects. *Abducendus est animus ad alia studia, solitudines, curas, negotia; loci designe mutatione sepe curandas est.* The minde is to be led away to other studies, cares, affairs; lastly, by change of place it is often cured.

CHAP. XXX.

There is a two-fold mercy, the one good and virtuous, which is in God, and in his Saints, which is in will, and in effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting them selves, or diminishing any thing that concerneth honour or equity; the other is a kind of feminine passionate pity, which proceedeth from too great a tenderness and weak-

weakness of the mind, whereof hath been spoken before in the above-named passion. Again, this wisdom teacheth us to succour the afflicted, but not to yield and to suffer with him. So is God said to be merciful, as the Physician to his patient, the advocate to his Client, affordeth all diligence and industry, but yet taketh not their evils and affaires to the heart; so doth a wise man, not entertaining any grief, or darkning his spirit with the smoke thereof. God commandeth us to aid, and to have a care of the poor, to defend their cause; and in another place he forbids us to pity the poor in judgement.

CHAP. XXXI.

Against Choler.

THe remedies are many and divers, wherewith the minde must before-hand be armed and defended, like thote that fear to be besieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; The first is to cut off the way, and to stop all the passages unto choler. It is an easier matter to withstand it, and to stay the passage thereof in the beginning, then when it hath seized upon a man to carry himself well and orderly. He must therefore quit himself from all the causes and occasions of Choler, which heretofore have been produced in the description thereof, that is to say, 1. weakness and tendernes, 2. malady of the minde in hardning it self against whatsoeuer may happen. 3. too great delicatenes, the love of certain things do accustom a man to facility, and simplicity, the mother of peace and quietness, *Ad omnia composti simus: que bona & paratiora, sint nobis meliora & gratiora;* Let us be settled to all things: let those things which are good and ready at hand, be better and more acceptable to us. It is the general doctrine of the wise King Cottys, who having received for a present many beautiful and rich vessels, yet frail and easie to be broken, brake them all, to the end, he mig't not be stirred to choler and fury, when they should happen to be broken. This was a distrust in himself, and a base kind of fear that provoked him therentto. 4. Curiosity; according to the example of Cesar, who being a Conqueror, and having recovered the letters, writings, and memorials of his enemies, burnt them all before he saw them. 5. Lightnes of belief. 6. And above all, an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he must chace from him as unworthy a man of spirit: for

for though it seem to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high esteem of himself (which nevertheless is a great vice) yet it cometh of baseness and imbecillity. For he that thinketh himself to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferior, judgeth himself, or fears that in truth he is so, or is so reputed, and distrusteth himself. *Nemo non eo, à quo se contemptus judicat, minor est; No man but is lesser than he of whom he thinketh himself to be contemned.* A man must therefore think that it proceedeth rather from any thing then contempt; that is, fortishnesse, indiscretion, want of good manners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiarity: If from his subjects or servants, knowing that their master hath power to chaste them, it is not to be believed that they had any such thought: If from base and inferior people, our honour, or dignity, or in lignity, is not in the power of such people: *Indignus Cesaris ira: unworthy the wrath of Cesar.* *Agaiboles and Antigonus* laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not, having them in their power. *Cesar* excelled all in this point; and *Moses, David*, and all the greatest personages of the world have done the like. *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; A great mind becometh a great fortune.* The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himself, not to be moved by another. To be stirred to choler, is to confess the accusation. *Convicta si irascare agnita videmur, spreta exolescant: Re-prachfull speeches if thou be angry at them, seem acknowledged; if thou despise them, they vanish to nothing.* He can never be great, that yieldeth himself to the offence of another: If we vanquish not our choler, that will vanquish us. *Injuries & offendiones superno despiciere: Highly to despise injuries and offences.*

The second head is of those remedies that a man must employ 2. *Heal,* when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there is a likelihood that we may be moved thereunto; which are first, to keep and contain our bodies in peace and quietnesse, without motion or agitation; which inflameth the blood and humours, and to keep himself silent and solitary. Secondly, delay in believing and resolving, and giving leisure to the judgement to consider. If we can once discover it, we shall easily stay the course of this Fever. A wise man counselled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moved before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoever we say or do in the heat of our blood, ought to be suspected. *Nil tibi licet, domo irasciri, Quare? Quia vis omnia licere.* Nothing is lawfull

lawfull for thee whilest thou art angry. Why? because thou wilt then have all things lawfull for thee. We must fear and be doubtfull of our selves, for so long as we are moved, we can do nothing to purpose. Reason, when it is hindred by passions, serveth us no more than the wings of a bird being fastened to his feet. We must therefore have recourse unto our friends, and suffer our choler to die in the middest of our discourse. And lastly, diversion to all pleasant occasions, as musick, &c.

3. Head.

The third head consisteth in those beautifull considerations, wherewith the mind must long before be seasoned. First, in the consideration of the actions and motions of those that are in choler, which should breed in us a hatred thereof, so ill do they become a man. This was the manner of the wife, the better to dissuade a man from this vice, to counsell him to behold himself in a glasse. Secondly, and contrarily, of the beauty which is of moderation; Let us consider how much grace there is in a sweet kind of mildnesse and clemency, how pleasing and acceptable they are unto others, and commodious to our selves: It is the Adamant that draweth unto us the hearts and wils of men. This is principally required in those whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honour, who ought to have their motions more remisse and temperate; for as their actions are of greatest importance, so their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally, in the consideration of that esteem and love which we should bear to that wisdome which we here study, which especially sheweth it self in retaining and commanding it self, in remaining constant and invincible; a man must mount his mind from the earth, and frame it to a disposition, like to the highest region of the air, which is never over-shaddowed with clouds, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetuall serenity; so our mind must not be darkned with sorrow, nor moved with choler, but fly all precipitation, imitate the highest Planets, that of all others are carried more slowly. Now all this is to be understood of inward choler, and covered; which endureth being joyned with an ill affection, hatred, desire of revenge: *qua in sinu flutorum requiescit, ut qui reponunt odia; quidq[ue] sava cogitationis indicium est, secreto suo satianur:* Which rest in the boosome of a fool, as he that layeth up hatred; and which is a token of a cruell mind, being inwardly glutted therewith: For the outward and open choler is short, a fire made of straw, without ill affection, which is only to make another to see his fault, whether inferiours by reprehensions or

or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit, it is a thing profitable, necessary, and very commendable. It is good and profitable, both for himself, and for another, sometimes to be moved to anger; but it must be with moderation and rule.

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it break not forth, and that they may seem wise and moderate; but they set themselves inwardly, and offer themselves a greater violence then the mater is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not over ardent and painfull within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should prick a little without, then that it should be turned against it self. *Omnia vicia in apero leviora sunt, & tunc pernici-
osissima, cum simulata sanitate subdunt: All diseases that appear
openly are the lighter, and then are most dangerous when they rest hid-
den with a counterfeit health.*

To be angry,
when it is good
and commen-
dous.

For himself,

Morevoer, against those that understand not, or seldom suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kind of servants that do nothing but for fear, it is necessary that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or government in a family. But yet it must be with these conditions: First, that it be not often, upon all, or leight occasions. For being too common, it grows into contempt, and works no good effect. Secondly, not in the air, murmuring and railing behind their backs, or upon uncertainties, but be sure that he feel the smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be used as a medicine.

For another;
with condi-
tions.

All these remedies may serve against the
following passions.

CHAP. XXXII.

Against Hatred.

That a man may the better defend himself against hatred, he must hold a rule that is true, that all things have two handles whereby we may take them: by the one they seem to be grievous and burthenome unto us; by the other, easie and light. Let us then receive things by the good handle, and we shall find that there is

Against Envie.

something good and to be beloved, in whatsoever we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth us, we have more cause to complain thereof, then to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiveth the greatest damage, because it loseth therein the use of reason, the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let us turn our hate into pity, and let us endeavour to make those worthy to be beloved, which we would hate; as *Lycurgus* did unto him, that had put out his eye, whom he made, as a chaitisement of that wrong, an honest, virtuous, and modest Citizen by his good instruction.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Against Envie.

Against this passion, we must consider that which we esteem and envie in another. We willingly envie in others riches, honours, favours; and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they have cost them. He that shall say, thou shalst have as much at the same price, we would rather refuse his offer, then thank him for it. For before a man can attain unto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, injuries; to be brief, lose his liberty, satisfie and accommodate himselfe to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To think to attain to goods, honours, states, offices, otherwises, and to pervert the law, or rather custome of the world, is to have the money and wares too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour, and of virtue, why dost thou afflic thy self if thou have not these goods, which are not gotten but by a shameful patientie? Do thou therefore rather pity others, then envie them. If it be a true good that is happened to another, we shalld rejoice therat; for we should desire the good of another: To be pleased with another mans prosperity, is to encrease our own.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Against Revenge.

Against this cruell passion, we must first remember that there is nothing so honourable, as to know how to pardon. Every man may procure the law to right that wrong that he hath received; but to give grace, to come and forgive, belonged to a Sovereign.

Sovereign Prince. If then thou wilt be a King, of kings themselves, and do an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardiness and a courageous insensibility in the suffering of injuries, whereby they return and rebound wholly upon the wrongers, as heavy blows upon a hard and steeled anvil, which do no other but wound and benum the hand and arm of the striker : To meditate revenge is to confess himself wounded ; to complain is to acknowledge himself guilty and inferior. *Ultio, doloris confessio est : non est magnus animus quem incurvat injuria : ingens animus & virtus estimatur sed non vindicat injuriam quia non sentit : Revenge is a confession of grief : a high and generous mind is not subject to injurie ; magnanimity and true valour revengeth not an injury, because it feeleth it not.*

But some will object, that it is irksome and dishonourable to endure an offence. I agree thereunto, and I am of opinion not to suffer, but vanquish and master it ; but yet after a fair and honourable fashion, by scorning it and him that offered it ; nay, more than that, by doing good unto him. In both these, Cesar was excellent. It is a glorious victory to conquer, and make the enemy to stoop, by benefits, and of an enemy, to make him a friend, be the injury never so great. Yea to think that by how much the greater the wrong is, by so much the more worthy it is to be pardoned ; and by how much more just the revenge is, by so much the more commendable is clemency.

Again, it is no reason that a man should be judge and a party too, as he that revengeth is. He must commit the matter to a third person, or at least take counsell of his friends, and of the wiser sort, not giving credit unto himself. Jupiter might alone dart out his favourable lightnings ; but when there grew a question of sending forth his revenging thunderbolts, he could not do it without the counsell and assistance of the twelve gods. This was a strange case that the greatest of the gods, who of himself had power to do good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular person, but after a solemn deliberation. The wisdome of Jupiter himself feared to erre, when there is a question of revenge, and therefore he hath need of a counsell to detain him.

We must therefore form unto our selves a moderation of the mind ; this is the virtue of clemency, which is a sweet mildnesse and graciousnesse, which tempereth, retaineth, and represseth all

2.

3.

4.

clemency.

our

our motions. It armeth us with patience, it persuadeth us that we cannot be offended but with our selves; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in us, but that which we will retain. It winneth unto us the love of the whole world, and furnisheth us with a modest carriage agreeable unto all.

CHAP. XXXV.

Against Jealousie.

1. **T**He onely mean to avoid it; is for a man to make himself worthy of that he desireth, for jealousy is nothing else but a distrust of our selves, and a testimony of our little deuerr. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Fantina* his wife demanded, What he would do if his enemy *Cassius* should obtain the victory against him in battell, answered, I serve not the gods so slenderly, as that they will send me so hard a fortune. So they that have any part in the affection of another; if there happen any cause of fear to lose it, should say; I honour not so little his love, that he will deprive me of it. The confidence we have in our own merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

2. He that prosecuteth any thing wch virtue, is eased by having a companion in the pursuit; for he serveth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Imbecillity onely feareth the encounter, because it thinketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presently appear. Take away emulation, you take away the glory and spur of virtue.

3. My counsell to men against this malady, when it proceedeth from their wives, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world have fallen into this misfortune, and have been content to bear it without stirring and molestation: *Lucullus*, *Cesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato*, *Augustus*, *Antonius*, and divers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth and speaks of it: And of whom speak they not in this sense, from the greatest to the least? how many honest men do every day fall into the same reproach? and if a man stir therein, the women themselves make a jest of it: the frequency of this accident, should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally, be thou such that men may complain of thy wrong, that thy virtue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account never, the lesse of thee, but rather curse the occasion.

As touching women ; there is no counsell against this evil, for their nature is wholly composed of suspicion, vanity, curiosity. It is true , that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands , turning their evil upon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsell , a man would advise them not to care for it, nor to seem to perceive it : which is a sweet mediocrity between this foolish jealousie , and that other opposite custome practised in the Indies and other nations , where women labour to get friends , and women for their husbands seek above all things their honour and pleasure (for it is a testimony of the virtue , valour , and reputation of a man in those countries to have many wives.) So did *Livia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonic* to King *Deiotar* ; and for multiplication of stock, *Sarah*, *Leah*, *Rachel*, to *Abraham* and *Jacob*.

Of Temperance, the fourth virtue.

CHAP. XXXVL

Of Temperance in generall.

TEmperance is taken two ways, generally for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a speciall virtue, but generall and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest ; and it is perpetually required, especially in those affaires where there is controversie and contestation, troubles and divisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, then to be free from particular phantasies and opinions , and simply to hold himself to his own devoir. All lawfull intentions and opinions are temperate ; choler, hatred, are inferior to duty, and to justice, and serve onely those that tie not themselves to their duty by simple reason.

1.
Temperancie
two-fold.
Generall.

Specially , for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightfull, which tickle our senses, and naturall appetites. *Habent voluptatis speciales inter libidinem & stuporem natura posita, cuius due partes; veretudia in fugaturpium, honestas in observatione decori:* The bridle of pleasure, is placed between desire and dulnesse of nature , of which there is two parts : shamefassenesse in the avoiding of filthy dishonest things : and honesty, in the observation of comeliness and decency. We will here take it more at large, for a rule and duty in all prosperity, as fortitude is the rule in all adversity ; and it shall be the bridle,

as fortitude the spurr. With these two we shall tame this brutish, savage, untoward part of our passions which is in us, and we shall carry our selves well and wisely in all fortunes and accidents, which is a high point of widdome.

Temperancy then hath for the subiect and general object there-

The description of all prosperty, pleasure, and plausible things; but especially and proper y pleasure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off strange and vicious superfluities; the rule of that which is naturall and necessary: *Voluptatibus imperat, alias odit & abigit, alias dispensat & ad s. xum modum redigit: nec unquam ad illas propter illas venit: scit optimum esse modum cupiditorum, non quantum velis, sed quantum debeas.* It commandeth our pleasures; some it bates and chaseth away, others it setteth in order and bringeth to a sound mediocritie: neither doth it ever come unto them for them; it knoweth that the best mean of things to be desired, is not, so much as thou wouldest, but so much as thou oughtest. This is the authority and power of reason, over concupiscence and violent affections, which carry our wills to delights and pleasures. It is the bridle of our soul, and the proper instrument to clear those boyling tempests which arise in us by the heat and intemperancy of our blood, that the soule may be alwaies kept one, and appliant unto reason, that it apply not it selfe to sensible objects, but that it rather accommode them unto it selfe, and make them serve it. By this we wean our soul from the sweet milk of the pleasures of this world, and we make it capable of a more solid and loveraign nouishment. It is a rule that weetly accommodateth all things unto nature, to necessity, simplicy, facility, health, constancy. These are things that go willingly together, and they are the measures and bonds of widdome; as contrarily Arts, lust, and superfluity, variety, and multiplicity, difficulty, malady, and delicatenesse, keep company together following intemperancie and folly. *Simplici cura constant necessaria, in deliciis laboratur. Ad parantati sumus; nos omnia nobis difficultia facilium fastidio fecimus:* There needs no great care for things necessary, the labour is in delicacies. We are born to things already prepared: but we have made all things that were easie, difficult unto us through leahsomeness.

CHAP. XXXVII.
Of prosperity, and counsell therupon.

THAT prosperity which sweetly falleth upon us, by the common courte and ordinary custome of the world, or by our own wildom and discreet carriage, is far more firm and assured, and lesse envied, then that which commeth from heaven, with fame and renown, beyond an *l* against the opinion of all, and the hope even of him that receiveth these boonties.

Prosperity is very dangerous : whatsoever there is that is vain and light in the soul of man, is railed and carried with the first favourable wind. There is nothing that makes a man so much to lose and forget himself, as great prosperity, as corn lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs over-charged with fruit break asunder, and therefore it is necessary that a man look to himself, and take heed, as if he went in a slippery place, and especially of intollency, pride, and presumption. There be some that swim in a shallow water, and with the least favour of fortune are puffed up, forget themselves, become insupportable, which is the true picture of folly.

From thence it cometh that there is not any thing more frail, and that is of less continuance then an ill advised prosperity, which commonly changeth great and joyfull occurrents into heavy and lamentable; and fortune of a loving mother, is turned into a cruell step-dam.

Now the best counsell that I can give to a man, to carry himself herein, is, not to esteem too much of all sorts of prosperity and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them: If they shall happen to come, out of their good grace and favour, to receive them willingly and cheerfully: but as things strange and no way necessary, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason he should make account of them, or think himself the worse or better man for them; *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum.* *Qui tutam vitam agere voleat, ista viscata beneficia deviter; nil dignum putare quod speres.* *Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas?* It is not thine, which fortune hath made thine. He that will lead a safe life, let him eschew those alluring benefits, and think nothing worthy that thou shouldest hope for. What worthy thing hath Fortune, that thou shouldest covet or desire?

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Pleasure, and advice thereupon.

I.
The description
and distinction
of pleasure.

Pleasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling; as contrarily, grief or sorrow, is unwelcome and displeasing to the senses; nevertheless, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the sovereign good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a privation of evill and dil' pleasure, in a word, Indolence. According to their opinion the not having of any evil, is the happiest estate that a man can hope for in this life. *Nimiam boni est cui nihil est mali: It is too much good which hath no evil.* This is as a mid-way or neutrality betwixt Pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and Grief. It is, as sometime the bosome of Abraham was said to be, betwixt paradise, and the hell of the damned. This is a sweet and peaceable state and setting, a true, constant and staid pleasure, which reembleth, in some sort, the tranquillity of the soul accounted by Philosophers the chief and sovereign good: the other first kind of pleasure is active and in motion. And so, there should be three estates: The two extreme oppoites, Grief and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, and both of them sickly: and that in the middle, stable, firme, sound, whereupon the Epicures gave the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of grieve and sorrow) making it the chief and sovereign good. This is that which hath to much defamed their school, as Seneca hath ingenuously acknowledged and said, that their evil was in the title and words, not in the substance, having never had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemy to wickednesse and vice then theirs. And it is not altogether without reason, that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure: for that tickling delight which seemeth to mount us above indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of grief, as its proper But; as for Example, that appetite that ravisheth us, with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to fly that pain, that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our lust bringeth with it, to quit our selves of this sever, and to purchase our self.

2.
Against it.

Pleasure diversly hath been spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly than was fit: some have denied it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word; taking it alwayes in the

the worser part. They that do wholly contemn it, say; first, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be lively and active. Secondly, frail and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marrs a whole Sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked piece of artillery. Thirdly, base, shamefull, exercising it self by vile instruments, in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent and pompos pleasures. Fourthly, quickly subject to satiety. A man knows not how to continue long in his pleasures; he is impatient as well in his delights, as his griefs, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yields pernicious effects, the overthrow of men, families, commonweals. Fifthly, and above all, they alledg against it, that when it is in his greatest strength, it mastereth in such a manner, that reason can have no entertainment.

On the other side, it is said to be naturall, created and established in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retail of the individual parts, as in grosse of the speciall kinds. Nature the mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessity, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to live well, is to consent unto nature. God, saith Moses, hath created pleasure, *Plantaverat Dominus paradisum voluptein:* *The Lord planteth the paradise of pleasure,* hath placed and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life: and in the end, what is the last and highest felicity, but certain and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabantur ab uberrate domus tua & torrente voluptatis tua potabili eos.* *Suis concava finibus, res est divina voluptas:* They shall be made drunken with the plenty of thy house, and thou shall make them drink in the streams of thy pleasure. Divine pleasure is a thing that is consonant with her bounds. And to say the truth, the most regular Philosophers, and the greatest professeours of virtue, Zeno, Cato, Scipio, Epaminondas, Plato, Socrates himself, have been in effect amorous, and drinckers, dancers, sporters, and have handled, spoken, written of love and other pleasures.

And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish; for pleasures are divers. There are naturall, and non naturall: This distinction, as more important, we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant and difficult; others that are obscure, mild, easie and ready. Though to say the truth; Pleasure is a quality not greatly ambitious; it is accounted rich enough of it self, without the adition of any thing

3.
For it, See l. 2.
cap. 6.

4.
The distinction
of pleasures.

Of Pleasure, and advice thereupon.

to the reputation thereof, and it is love best in obscurity. They likewise that are so easie and ready, are cold and frozen, if there be no difficulty in them: which is as an inducement, a bait, a spur unto them. The ceremony, shame and difficulty that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of love, are the spurs and matches that give fire unto it, and increase the price thereof. There are spirituall pleasures and corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they all belong to the entire man, and the whole composed subject: and the one part of our selves hath not any so proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the mariage and amorous band of the soul and body continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soul hath a better part then the body, and therefore they better agree with men, then beasts, and are more durable, as those that enter into us by the sense of seeing and hearing, which are the two gates of the soul, for having only their passage by them, the soul receiveth them, concocteth and digesteth them, feedeth and delighteth it self a long time; the body feeleth little. Others there are wherein the body hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste and touch, more grosse and materiall, wherein the beasts bear us company; such pleasures are handled, tried, used and ended in the body it self, the soul hath only the assistance and company, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soon in, soon out.

5.
Advisemens
hereupon.

which are nat-
urall.

The chief thing to be considered herein, is to know how we should carry and govern our selves in our pleasures, which wisdom will teach us, and it is the office of the vertue of temperance. We must first make a great and notable difference between the naturall, and not naturall. By the not-naturall, we do not onely understand those that are against nature, and the true use approved by the laws; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an exesse and superfluity, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it self with the supply of necessity; whereunto a man may likewise add decencie and common honesty. It is naturall pleasure to be covered with a house and garments against the rigour of the Elements, and the injuries of wicked men; but that they should be of gold and silver, of Jasper or Porphyry, it is not naturall: Or if they come unto a man by other means then naturall, as if they be sought and procured by Art, by medicines, or other unnaturall means: Or if they be first forged in the mind, stirre by passion, and afterwards from thence come unto the body,

dy, which is a preposterous order: for the order of nature is, that pleasures enter into the body, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend unto the mind. And even as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme-holes, is neither naturall nor pleasing, but rather a kind of convulsion; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soul, is not natural.

Now the first rule of wisdom concerning pleasure is this, to chace away, and altogether to condemn the unnaturall, as vicious, basardly (for as they that come to a banquet unbidden, are to be refused; so those pleasures that without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be rejected) to admit and receive the naturall; but yet with rule and moderation: and this is the office of temperance in general to drive away the unnaturall, to rule the natural.

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points: First, that it be without the offence, (candal, damage and prejudice of another.

*The first and
general rule.*

*Rules for the
natural.*

Secondly, that it be without the prejudice of himself, his honour, his health, his leasure, his duty, his functions.

Thirdly, that it be with moderation that he take them no more to the heart, then against the heart, neither covet them, nor fly from them, but take and receive them, as men do honey with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand, not to engage himself in them too far, nor to make them his principal busynesse, and only work; much lesse to ensharr him self unto them, and of recreations make them necessities, for that is the greatest milery of all others. Pleasure should be but as an accessary, recreation for the time, that he may the better return to his labour; as sleep which strengtheneth the body, and giveth us breath to return the more cheerfully to our work. To be short, a man must use them, not enjoy them. But above all, he must take heed of their treason: for some there are that whilst we give our selves unto them, and love them over dearly, return evill for good, and more displeasure then delight: but this is treacherously, for they go before to besot and deceive us, and hiding from us their tail, they tickle us and embrace us to strangle us. The pleasure of drinking goes before the pain of the head: such are the delights and pleasures of indiscreet and fiery youth: whereith they are made drunken. We plunge our selves into them, but in our old age they forsake us as it were drowned and overwhelmed, as the sea in his reflux over-runne the sandy-banks:

That

Of eating and drinking, Abstinence and Sobriety.

That sweetnes which we have swallowed so greedily, endeth with bitternes and repentance, and filleth our souls with a venomous humour that infecteth and corrupteth it.

8.

*Want of go-
vernment in
pleasure, preju-
dices.*

Now, as moderation and rule in pleasures is an excellent and profitable thing according unto God, nature, reason: so excesse and immoderate unrulinesse is of all others the most pernicious, both to the publick and private good. Pleasure ill valued, softneth and weakneth the vigour both of soul and body; *Debilitatem induxit delitia, blandissime domina: Delicacies have brought in debility, as a most alluring mistress:* it beforreth and effeminate the best courages that are, witness *Hannibal*: and therefore the Lacedemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasures, were called men; and the Athenians, soft and delicate women. *Xerxes* to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, and to assure himself of them in time to come, took from them their arms, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitted all pleasures and delicacies whatsoever. Secondly, it banisheth and driveth away the principal virtues, which cannot continue under so idle and effeminate an Empire: *Maximas virtutes jacere oportet, voluptate dominante: The chiefest virtue must be laid aside, when pleasure beareth all the sway.* Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly into the contrary thereof, which is grief, sorrow, repentance: for as the rivers of sweet water run their course to die in the salt sea, so the honey of pleasures endeth in the gall of grief. *In precipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium abit, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudii luctus occupat.* It is subject to sudden downfull, it inclineth towards grief, is converted into the contrary, unless there be kept a mean. *Sorrow occupieth extremities of joy.* Finally, it is the seminarie of all evils, of all ruine. *Malorum esca voluptas: Pleasure is the bait of evill.* From it come those close and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end eversions and ruines of Common-weales. Now we will speak of pleasures in particular.

C H A P. XXXIX.

Of eating and drinking, Abstinence and Sobriety.

I.
*The use of
virtualls.*

Virtualls are for nourishment, to sustain and repair the infirmity of the body; the moderate, naturall, and pleasant use thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soul; as contrarily

contrarily an unnaturall exesse weakneth, bringerh great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancy. *Simplex ex simplici causa valerado; multos morbos supplicia luxuria, multa fercula fecerunt:* A simple health proceeds from a single cause; many dishes have caused many diseases, the punishments of excesse. A man complaineth of his brain for sending down so many rheums, the foundation of all dangerous maladies; but the brain may well answer him, *Define fundere, & ego definam fluere.* Cease to pour in, and I will cease to pour out. Be thou sober in pouing down, and I will be sparing in dropping down. But what? the exesse and provision, the multitude, diversity, and exquisite preparation of viands is come in request; and it is our custome even in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to crave pardon for not providing enough.

How prejudiceth both to the mind and to the body a full diet, with diversity, curiositie, exquisite and artificial preparation is, every man may find in himself. Gluttony and drunkennesse are idle and undecent vices; they bewray themselves sufficiently by the gestures and countenances of those that are therewith tainted; whereof the best and more honest is to be dull and drowsie, unprofitable and unfit for any good: for there was never man that loved his belly too well, that did ever perform any great work. Moreover, it is the vice of bruishe men, and of no worth; especially drunkennes, which leadeth a man to all unworthy actions; witnesse *Alexander*, otherwile a great Prince, being overcome with this vice killed his dearest friend *Clitus*, and being come to himself, would have kild himself for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and perverteth his understanding. *Vinum clavo caret, dementat sapientes, facit repuerascere senes:* Wine wanteth government, it maketh wise men fools, and old men become children again.

Sobriety though it be none of the greatest and more difficult virtues; and which is not painfull to any but fools, and mad-men; yet it is a way and a kind of progresse to other virtues: It extinguisheth vice in the cradle, and stifleth it in the seed: It is the mother of health, and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that lengtheneth a mans life. *Socrates*, by sobriety had alwayes a strong body and lived ever in health; *Masinissa* the soberest King of all the rest, got children at 86. years of age, and at 92. vanquished the Caithaginians; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkennesse died.

3.
Sobriety com-
mended.

died in the flower of his age, though he was better born and of a founder constitution then them all. Many, subject to gouts and other diseases, by physick incurable, have recovered their health by diet. Neither is it serviceable to the body only, but to the mind too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdome and good counsell. *Salubrium consiliorum parens sobrietas: Sobriety is the mother of wholesome counsels.* All the greatest personages of the world have been sober, not onely the professors of singular virtue and austerity of life, but all those that have excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Caesar, Julian the Emperour, Mahomet: Epicurus, the great Doctor of pleasure, herein excelled all men.* The frugality of the Roman *Curiæ* and *Fabritii* is more extolled then their great victories: The Lacedemonians as valiant as they were, made expresse profession of frugality and sobriety.

4. But a man must in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancy, and not stay till the infirmities of old age come upon him, lest that he be utterly cast down with variety of diseases; as the Athenians, who were reproached for that they never demanded peace, but in their mourning garments after they had lost their kindred and friends in warr, and were able to defend themselves no longer. This is to ask counsell, when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parsimonia; It is too late to spare when all is spent.* It is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walls, to make his market when the fair is ended.

It is a good thing for man not to accustom himself to a delicate diet, lest when he shall happen to be deprived thereof, his body grow out of order, and his spirit languish and faint; and contrarily to use himself to a grosser kind of sustenance, both because they make a man more strong and healthfull, and because they are more easily gotten.

CHAP. XI.

Of riot and excesse in apparel, and ornaments,
and of frugality.

I. T hath been said before that garments are not naturall, nor necessary to man; but artificiall, invented and ued only by him in the world. Now inasmuch as they are artificiall, (for it is the manner of things artificiall to vary and multiply, without end and measure, simplicity being a friend unto nature) they are extended and multiplied

multiplied into so many inventions { for to what other end are there so many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the covering and decking of our bodies ? } dissolutions and corruptions, in somuch that it is no more an excuse and covering of our defects and necessities, but a nest of all manner of devices, *vexillum superbiae, nidus luxuria; The banner of pride, the nest of Luxurie,* the subiect of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the propriety of things, mine and thine; and in the greatest communities of fellowships that are, apparell is always proper, which is signified by this word, dirobe.

It is a vice very familiar an' proper unto women (I mean excess in apparell) a true testimony of their weakness, being glad to win credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselves to be too weak and unable to purchase credit and reputation by better means: for such as are vertuous, care least for such vanities. By the laws of the Lacedemonians, it was not permitted for any to wear garments of rich and costly colours, but to common women: That was their part, as virtue and honour belonged unto others.

Now the true and lawfull use of apparell, is to cover our selves against wind and weather, and the rigour of the air, and should never be used to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessive nor sumptuous; so should they not be too bese and beggerly. *Nec affectata sordes, nec exquista munditie: Neither affected uncleanness, nor exquisite pickaness.* Caligula was as a laughing-flock to all that beheld him, by reason o' the dissolute fashion of his apparell. Augustus was commended for his modesty.

CHAP. XLI.

Continency is a thing very difficult, and must have a carefull and painful guard: It is no easie matter wholly to resist nature, See the cap. 24. which in this is most strong and most ardent.

And this is the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficulty in it; as for the rest, it is without action and wit' out fruit, it's a privation, a not-doing, pain without profit, and therefore sterility is signified by virginity. I speak here of simple continency, and only in it self, which is a thing altogether barren and unprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more then not to play the

August.

glutton not to be drunke & not of Christian continency, which to make it a virtue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpote always to keep it, and that is for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus predicanus, quod sint virgines. sed quod Deo dicatae;* We praise not this in Virgins, for that they be Virgins, but because they be dedicated unto God: witnessse the Veitalls, and the five foolish Virgins, shut out of doores; and therefore it is a common error, and a vanity, to call continent women, honest women and honourable, as if it were a virtue, and there were an honour due to him that doth no evill, doth nothing against his duty; why shoulde not continent men in like sort have the title of honesty and honour? There is no reason for it, because there is more difficulty, they are more hot, more hardy, they have more occasions, better means. So unlikely is it
Iib. I. Cap. 60. that honour should be due unto him that doth no evill, that it is not due unto him that doth good, but onely, as hath been said, to him that is profitable to the weale publike, and where there is labour, difficulty, danger. And how many continent persons are there stut with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vain-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are ready to judge and condemn others? And by experiance we see in many women how dearly they sell it unto their husbands, for dislodging the devill from that place where they row, and establishing the point of honour as in its proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appear in the head to make him believe that it is not any lower elsewhere. If nevertheless this fluttering word, Honour, serve to make them more carefull of their duty, I care not much if I allow of it. Vanity it selfe vies for some use, and simple incontinency and sole in it selfe is none of the greatest faults, no more then others that are purely corporall, and which nature committeth in her actions either by excess or defect without malice. That which discredited it, and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost never alone, but is commonly accompanie and followed with other greater faults, infecte with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places; practise by wicked means, lies impostures, subornation, treasons, besides the losse of time, distractions of thole fructus from whence it proceedeth, by great and grievous scandals.

3. And because this is violent passion and likewise deceitfull, we
An aduertisement. must arm our selves against it, and be wary in descryng the baits thereof

thereof, and the more it flattereth us, more distrust it: for it would willingly embrace us to strangle us; it pampereth us with honey, to glut us with gall; and therefore let us consider as much, that the beauty of another, is a thing that is without us, and that as soon it turneth to our evill as our good, that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing and almost nothing but the colour of a body; and acknowledging in beauty the delicate hand of nature, we must prize it as the sun and moon, for the excellency that is in it: and coming to the fruition thereof by all honest means, always remember that the immoderate use of this pleasure consumeth the body, effeminateth the soul, weakeneth the spirit, and that many by giving themselves overmuch thereunto, have lost some their life, some their fortune, some their spirit, and contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glory in vanquishing pleasure, then in possessing it: that the continency of *Alexander* and of *Scipio* hath been more highly commended, then the beautifull countenances of those young damosels that they took captives.

There are many kinds of degrees of continency and incontinency. The conjugall is that which importeth more then all the rest, which is most requisite and necessary, both for the publick and particular good, and therefore should be by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained within the chaste breast of that party, whom the destinies have given for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not onely violate his own body, making it a vessel of ordure by all laws; the law of God, which commandeth chastity; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common, which is proper to one, and impothech upon a man faith and constancy; of Countries, which have brought in marriages; of families, transferring unjustly the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly, Justice it self, bringing in uncertainties, jealousies, and brawls amongst kindred, depriving children of the love of their parents, and parents of the piety and duty of their children.

CHAP. XLII. *Of Glory and Ambition.*

Ambition, the desire of glory and honour (whereof we have already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weal-publicke, as the world goeth, for it is from thence the greatest of our honourable actions doth rise, that hasteneth men to dangerous attempts; as

we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who have not all been led by a philo ophicall spirit, as *Socrates*, *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato* and *Scipio*, by the onely true and lively image of virtue; for many, yea the greatest number have been tirred thereunto by the spirit of *Themistocles*, *Alexander*, *Caesar*: and although these honourable achievements and glorious exploits have not been with their authors and actors, true works of virtue, but ambition; nevertheless their effects have been very beneficiall to the pub'ick state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wifest, it is excutable and allowable in two ca'es: the one, in good and profitable things, but which are inferiour unto virtue, and common both to the good and to the evil, as Arts and Sciences: *Honos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloria: Honour nourishest the Arts: all are inflamed through glory to study: inventions, industry, military valour.* The other, in continuing the good will and opinion of another. The wise do teach, Not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it be for the avoiding of such inconveniences, as may happen by their contempte of the approbation and judgment of another.

2. But that a man shou'd be virtuous, and do good for glory, as if that were the salary and recompence thereof is a false and vain opinion. Much were the state of virtue to be pitied, if she should fetch her commendations and pris from the opinion of another; this coine were but counterfeit, and his pay too base for virtue; She is too noble to beg such recompence. A man must settle his soul, and in such sort compole his actions, that the brightnesse of honour daile not his reason; and strengthen his mind with brave resolutions, which serve him as barriers against the assaults of ambition.

3. He must therfore perswade himself, that virtue seeketh not a more ample and more rich Theater to shew it self then her own conscience: The higher the Sun is, the lessel shadow doth it make: The greater the virtue is, the lesse glory doth it seek. Glory is truly compared to a shadow which followeth tho'e that fly it, and flyeth tho'e that follow it. Again, he must never forget that man commeth into this worl as to a Comedy, where he chuseth not the part that he is to play, but onelybethinks himself how to play that part well that is given unto him: or as a banquet, wherein a man feeds upon that that is before him, not reaching to the far side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a

man commit a charge unto us, which we are capable of, let us accept of it modestly, and exercise it sincerely; making account that God hath p'aced us there to stand sentinell, to the end that others may rest in safety under our care. Let us seek no other recompence of our travell, then our own conscience to witnesse our well doing, and desire that the witness be rather of credit in the Court of our fellow citizens, then in the front of our publicke actions. To be short; let us hold it for a maxime that the fruit of our honourable actions, is to have acted them. Virtue cannot find without it self, a recompence worthy it self. To refuse and contemn greatnessse, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficulty. He that loves himself, and judgeth soundly, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very active and passive are painfull, and are not desired but by feeble and sick spirits. *Oranes* one of the seven that had title to the soveraignty of *Persia*, gave over unto his companions his right, upon condition that he and his, might live in that Empire free from all subjection and Magistracy, except that which the ancient laws did impose, being impatient to command and to be commanded. *D.oclesian* renounced the Empire, *Celestius* the Popedom.

CHAP. XLIII.

Of Temperance in speech, and of Eloquence.

This is a great point of wisdom: he that ruleth his tongue well, in a word, is wise. *Qui in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est:* The reason hereof is, because the tongue is all the world; in it is both good and evil, life and death, as hath been said before. Let us now see what advice is to be given to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldom: To know how to be silent, is a great advantage to speak well; and he that knows not well how to do the one, knows not the other.

To speak well and much is not the work of one man; and the best men are they that speak least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barren in good speech and good actions; like those trees that are full of leaves and yeild little fruit, much chaffe and little corn.

The Lacedemonians, great professors of virtue and valour, did likewise profess silence, and were enemies to much speech: And therefore hath it ever been commendable to be sparing in speech, to

I.
Rules of speech,

Of Temperancy in speech, and of Eloquence.

keep a bridle at the mouth: *Pone Domine custodiam oris meo: O Lord, set a watch on my mouth.* And in the law of Moses that vessel that had not his covering fastened to it, was unclean. By speech a man is known and discerned: The wise man hath his tongue in his heart, the fool his heart in his tongue.

2. The second, that it be true: The use of speech is to assist the truth, and to carry the torch before it, to make it appear; and contrarily, to discover and reject lying. Insomuch, that speech is the instrument whereby we communicate our wills and our thoughts; It had need be true and faithfull, since that our understanding is directed by the onely means of speech. He that falsifieth it, betrayeth publick society; and if this mean fail us and deceive us, there is an end of all, there is no living in the world. But of living, we have already spoken.

Chap. 10.

3. The third, that it be naturall, modest and chaste: not accompanied with vehemency and contention, whereby it may seem to proceed from passion; nor artificiall nor affected; nor wicked, immodest, licentious.

4. The fourth, that it be serious and profitable, not vain and unprofitable. A man must not be too attentive in relating what hath hapned in the market place or theater, or repeating of ionners and merriments it bewrayes too great and unprofitable leisure, *otio abundantis, & abundantis:* Of one abounding with ease, and abusing it. Neither is it good to enter into any large discourse of his owne actions and fortunes, for others take not so much pleasure to hear them as they to relate them.

5. But above all, it must never be offensive, for speech is the instrument and forerunner of Charity; and therefore to use it against it, is to abuse it, contrary to the purpose of nature. All kind of foul speech, detraction, mockery, is unworthy a man of wisdom and honour.

6. The fixt, to be gentle and pleasing, not crabbed, harsh and envious; and therefore in common speech acute and subtle questions must be avoided, which resemble crafishes, where there is more picking work then meat to eat, and their end is nothing else but brawls and contentions.

7. Lastly, that it be constant, strong, and generous, not loose, effeminate, languishing, whereby we avoid the manner of speech of Pedantries, pleaders, women.

8. Chap. 8. To this point of Temperancie belongeth secrecy (whereof we have spoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelity) not only that which is

is committed unto us, and given us to keep, but that which wif-
done and discretion telleth us ought to be suppressed.

Now as speech makes a man more excellent then a beast, so Elo-
quence makes the professors thereof more excellent then other
men. For this is the profession or art of speech, it is a more exqui-
site communication of discourse and reason, the stern or roofer
of our souls, which disposeth the heart and affections, like certain
notes to make a melodious harmony.

Eloquence is not only a purity and elegancy of speech, a discreet
choice of words properly app'ied, ended in a true and a just fall,
but it must likewise be full of ornaments, graces, motions; the words
must be lively, first, by a clear and a distinct voice, raising it self, and
falling by little and little; Afterwards, by a grave and naturall acti-
on, wherein a man may see the visege, hinds, and members of the
Oratour to speak with his mouth, follow with their motion that
of the mind, and represent the affections: for an Oratour must first
put on those passions which he would stir up in others. As *Braſidas*
drew from his own wound the dart wherewith he slew his enemy:—
So passion being conceived in our heart, is incontinently formed
into our speech, and by it proceeding from us, entereth into ano-
ther, and there giveth the like impression which we our selves have,
by a subtil and lively contagion. Hereby we see that a iweet and a
mild nature is not so fit for eloquence, because it cannot conceive
strong and courageous passions, such as it ought, to give life unto
the Oration; in such sort, that when he should display the matter
full of eloquence in a great and vehement action, he come h fitt
short thereof; as *Cicerio* knew well how to reproach *Callidus*,
who accused *Gallus* with a cold and over-mild voice and action,
*Tunisifingeres, sic ageres? Thou thy selfe wondrest thou ds so, if thou
diddest not counterfeit?* But being likewise vigorous, and furnished
as hath been laid, it hath nor leſſe force and violence then the com-
mands of tyrants, environed with their guards and halberds; It
doth not onely lead the hearer, but intangle him, it reigneth over
the people, and establisheth a violent Empire over our soules.

A man may say against Eloquence, that truth is sufficiently
maintained and defended by it self, and that there is nothing more eloquent
then it self: which I confess is true, where the mind of
men is pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the
world, either by nature, or art, and ill instruction, is preoccupied,
and ill disposed unto virtue and verity, whereby it is necessary that

9.
*Of Eloquence
and the com-
mendation
thereof.*

10.
The description

11.
*Objections an-
swered.*

Of Temperance in speech, and of Eloquence.

men be handled like iron, which a man may soften with fire, before he temper it with water: So by the fiery motions of Eloquence, they must be made supple and maniable, apt to take the temper of Verity. This is that whereunto Eloquence especially tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arme virtue against vice, truth against lying and calumnies. The Orator, saith *Theophrastus*, is the true Physician of the soul, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of Serpents by the Musick of the Pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmony of reason. Now since no man can hinder, but that some there are that feaze upon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious designments, how can a man do less than defend himself with the same armes; for if we present our selves naked to the combat, do we not betray virtue and verity? But many have abused eloquence to wicked purposes, and the ruine of their country: It is true, but that is no reason why Eloquence should be despised, for that is common to it, with all the excellent things of the world, to be used or abused, well or ill applyed, according to the good and bad disposition of those that possesse them: Most men abuse understanding, but yet we must not therefore conclude that understanding is not necessary.

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A.N



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